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Abstract 
 
The long history of Anglo-French relations has often been acrimonious. After 
the German defeat of France in June 1940 the right to represent the French 
nation was contested by Philippe Pétain’s Vichy government and Charles de 
Gualle’s London-based Free French resistance movement. This thesis will 
examine the highly complex relationship between Britain and these two 
competing sources of Frenchness between 1940 and 1945. It will do so through 
a series of empire-themed “crisis points,” which contributed to a heightened 
state of Anglo-French tension affecting all three actors. 
 
This study uses rhetoric as a means to link decision makers or statesman to the 
public sphere. It argues that policy makers, whether in the British War Cabinet, 
de Gaulle’s headquarters at Carlton Gardens, or Pétain’s ministries at Vichy 
anticipated how their policies were likely to be received by a group or groups of 
individuals. These were individuals who contributed towards what decision 
makers believed to be public opinion. Perceptions of public opinion, in other 
words, played a vital role in policy creation. In turn, the desire to get one or 
more sectors of the public “on board” with a particular policy or wartime 
operation gave rhetoric a place of primary importance. 
 
Specifically, we will see how policy makers carefully constructed and revised 
public statements and speeches. When these external communications and 
explanations are placed side by side with internal official discussions, it will 
become evident that rhetoric is itself a vital strategic tool. The grammatical 
constructions and vocabulary that made up official statements and mass media 
responses shed light on broader wartime themes including victory and defeat, 
allies and enemies, power, sovereignty, neutrality and morality. Ultimately, 
acknowledging that rhetoric is an inherent part of policy making allows us to 
better understand the links between the governing bodies of a nation and those 
who have a stake in its policies. At the same time, it allows us to see how less 
tangible normative factors continue to impact this process.  
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What is it that prevents me from being useful as a doctor or 
a writer? I think it is not so much our privations or our 
wanderings or our constantly changing and unsettled lives, 
as the power in our day of rhetoric, of the cliché - all this 
"dawn of the future", "building a new world", "torch-bearers 
of mankind". The first time you hear it you think: "What 
wealth of imagination!'" But in fact the reason it is so 
pompous is that there is no imagination at the back of it, 
because the thought is second-rate.1 
 
 
[They] will judge you by public opinion in your town, and 
this is shaped by the fools who by sheer chance were both 
noble rich and moderate. Woe betide you if you stand out 
from the herd!2 
 
He talks a tremendous amount, with a strange, nervous 
volubility, in which you hear a dozen thoughts, ideas and 
memories muttering at once. Each thought remains 
uncompleted. He trails them behind him like so much torn 
paper, snagged on random words or images.3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Boris Pasternak, Doctor Zhivago (London: Random House, 2002), 258. 
2 Stendhal, The Red and the Black: A Chronicle of the Nineteenth Century 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 156. 
3 Mihail Sebastian, For Two Thousand Years, trans. Philip Ó Ceallaigh (London: 
Penguin Books, 2016), 136. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
History and Rhetoric 
 
Introduction 
The Second World War is often remembered as a period of rhetorical prowess. 
Churchill’s speeches and legacy as a great orator (a legacy which conveniently 
leaves out his numerous failures) continues to be recalled by modern-day 
politicians who seek, through reputational entrepreneurship, to persuade both 
themselves and others of their own greatness.1 Similarly, Churchillian rhetoric 
that denigrated the practice of appeasement has been and continues to be 
employed to suggest that a particular foreign policy is weak and abhorrent.2 
Indeed, it is the rhetoric that stemmed from events: the preambles to “great” 
speeches, the stark radio addresses, and the voices that delivered them, that is 
most often remembered and enshrined (even if retrospectively) as a part of our 
national story. Employing rhetorical analysis from a historical perspective can 
offer new insights on the complex and often subtle ways in which language is 
employed to persuade, place blame or confirm, even, on occasion, to create a 
lasting national myth. It can shed light on cultural norms by examining how and 
why a particular event was described in the way it was. Most importantly, it can 
become the connective tissue between official policy making and the translation 
and discussion of those decisions within the public sphere.  
Negative connotations of rhetoric, as compared to the search for an 
objective (and scientifically rigorous) truth, have encouraged modern definitions 
that describe it as “ostentatious or empty expression.”3 However, classical 
definitions, including that of Cicero, who described rhetoric as “speech designed 
to persuade” in his dialogue De Oratore, associate rhetoric with the art form of 
language that has a persuasive element.4 Kenneth Burke’s numerous books 
based on literary criticism through rhetoric insist that rhetoric is “rooted in the 
essential function of language itself,”5 and he uses this argument to construct a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Richard Toye, “The Churchill Syndrome: Reputational Entrepreneurship and 
the Rhetoric of Foreign Policy since 1945,” British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations 10 no. 3 (2008), 375. 
2 R. Gerald Hughes, The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement, British Foreign 
Policy Since 1945 (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 179. 
3 Jennifer Richards, Rhetoric, (London: Routledge, 2008), 3. 
4 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1969), 49. 
5 Ibid., 43. 
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rhetorical analysis of Hitler’s Mein Kampf that demonstrates how Hitler 
composed a singular worldview for his readers.6  
This feature of rhetoric, as serving to influence, has been elaborated 
upon by contemporary scholars such as Alan G. Gross, who argues that 
contrary to criticism associating rhetoric with lies and manipulation, “…rhetoric 
is more than window-dressing; it concerns the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for the creation of persuasive discourse in any field.”7 Acknowledging 
that language - far from a neutral concept - is employed both consciously and 
subconsciously as a form of persuasion makes it invaluable as a window into 
the motivations and underlying perceptions of its users. Studies that fail to 
distinguish between rhetoric and propaganda fail to consider the difference 
between discussion and demands. Rhetoric is unique in that it seeks, within the 
public sphere and through the appearance of rational choice, to lead readers 
and listeners to arrive at particular conclusions for themselves. This is a central 
tenant of democratic rhetoric – creating an environment in which the public can 
or appears to have access to different interpretations of a single policy. Policy 
makers, who sought to justify potentially controversial events did so by 
explaining the reasons for such a policy through a calculated use of rational 
arguments, not by demanding that their readership adhere to their decisions. 
This approach rightly acknowledges the complex relationship between policy 
making and the reaction, or perceived reaction that policy arguments elicit 
within the public sphere(s). As will be seen throughout this thesis, the Vichy 
government employed a much more authoritarian approach to rhetoric, in which 
official publications and the mass media response became largely synonymous. 
In the following chapters, I use rhetoric to examine this relationship 
between policy making and the public sphere within the context of Anglo-French 
imperial relations from late May 1940 through to the bitter colonial clashes 
between France and Britain over the future of the Levant mandates of Syria and 
Lebanon in 1945. Comparative in focus, this study analyses a series of “crisis 
points”: the fall of France between the Dunkirk evacuations and the signing of 
the armistice in late June, the British bombardment of the French Fleet at Mers 
el-Kébir a fortnight later, Free French attempts to take Dakar in late September 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Kenneth Burke, On Symbols and Society, (ed.) Joseph R. Gusfield (Chicago: 
The University of Chicago Press, 1989). 
7 Alan G. Gross, The Rhetoric of Science (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1996), viii. 
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1940, Allied landings in North Africa during operation Torch in 1942, and the 
Anglo-Free French operations in Syria in 1941 and subsequently in 1943 and 
1945.8 These points have been chosen with the goal of looking at the 
progression and complexity of the development of the British, Free French, and 
Vichy relationships through an analysis of the rhetoric of all parties involved. 
The very public and contentious nature of imperial clashes at Mers el-Kébir, 
Dakar, North Africa and the Levant make them ideal case studies as each 
provoked strong reactions and clear efforts to either justify or condemn the 
policies pursued. In sum, the scope of the study, spanning 1940-1945, makes it 
possible to understand how the shifting context of empires at war and the 
changing fortunes of each side affected their policy and rhetoric.  
Policy making is understood here as those discussions that took place as 
part of an internal government process of debating strategic alternatives. 
Central to this undertaking is the choice of options laid before ministers who 
had the goal of organising or explaining one of the above operations. In the 
United Kingdom, for example, policy discussions took place within the War 
Cabinet but policy makers extended beyond ministers to include those 
members of the Whitehall bureaucracy and the armed forces who contributed to 
the discussions and or brought professional opinions to the process with the 
goal of influencing the outcome. Importantly, policy makers not only consulted 
experts on the ground, they also weighed likely public responses to the policy 
choices under review and anticipated how each operation was likely to affect 
the standing of the government (and, often, of the minister concerned) in the 
eyes of key domestic and foreign interest groups. Pure material capabilities 
clearly played a significant role in determining whether the operation was 
actually feasible. However, the point is that even if manpower and weaponry 
were readily available, other intangible factors, such as a likely public backlash 
in response to unnecessary civilian deaths, still had real impacts on the final 
decision.  
The focus of this study is not to attempt to redefine events, but rather to 
understand how this series of clashes was understood, discussed, and indeed, 
portrayed rhetorically from the inception of the policy making process, to its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 The strong role that was played by the U.S., both before and after her entry 
into the war, in offering confirmation or criticism of Anglo-French actions will 
also contribute to this analysis. 
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publication in national papers and discussion (or lack of) on the streets. 
Between 1940-1945, the current state of the Anglo-French relationship was 
depicted using deliberate word choice, representations and structures. 
Understanding the complexity of the relationship through cultural, linguistic, and 
rhetorical lenses will bring a more nuanced viewpoint to this period and focus 
upon a vital consideration in wartime relations: the perception of events and 
their consequences, rather than simply the hard “facts” of the events 
themselves. The following pages will discuss how this argument will be 
grounded using various methodologies before examining how this study fits 
within and contributes to the already extensive range of Second World War 
research.  
 
Definition of Terms: 
Rhetoric 
What all of the aforementioned scholars do, and what this study will do as well, 
is to define rhetoric as a means of representation or portrayal of a particular 
event, focussing upon the persuasive nature of language usage. This approach 
is consistent with broader intellectual acknowledgement that language itself is 
inherently persuasive and subjective.9 Rhetoric, resulting from the relationships 
between political actors, media, and other sources of opinion is deliberately 
employed to influence events (or their perception) in order to achieve a specific 
outcome. Thus, studying the underlying rhetorical framework of an event 
creates greater insight into how and why it was conceived, planned, carried out, 
and subsequently justified and remembered in a particular way. This rhetorical 
approach to history emphasises the crucial role that persuasion played in how 
historical events were processed and understood. Recent years have seen a 
substantial growth in studies that employ rhetorical approaches or attempt to 
ascertain why historical events are remembered in a particular way.10 As a field 
of analysis, this approach offers many valuable opportunities for the inclusion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley, CA: University of California 
Press, 1969). Paul de Man, Blindness and Insight: Essays in the Rhetoric of 
Contemporary Criticism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971). Jennifer 
Richards, Rhetoric (London: Routledge, 2008). 
10 Geoffrey Cubitt, History and Memory (Manchester: Manchester University 
Press, 2007). Jonathan Charteris-Black, Politicians and Rhetoric: The 
Persuasive Power of Metaphor (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011). 
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interdisciplinary studies from areas of international relations such as foreign 
policy.  
 Richard Toye asserts “The purpose of rhetorical analysis is not to 
‘unlock’ a set of words to reveal a meaning that is innate or set in stone but 
rather – in part – to identify the social meaning of particular statements or 
symbols in given contexts.”11 Rhetorical analysis, in other words, is not simply 
about understanding what was said and how events were described, but how 
these descriptions were given meaning within their contemporary context. 
Efforts across other disciplines duplicate this call for a new understanding of 
rhetoric and the role it can play in our understanding of society, both past and 
present. Gross’s assertion that “…our social reality is uncontroversially the 
product of persuasion”12 critiques studies that are grounded in truth-based 
analysis, just as de Man’s statement that “…the bases for historical knowledge 
are not empirical facts but written texts…” highlights the very subjective nature 
that our source material often takes.13 These arguments play a valuable role in 
facilitating both understanding and debate. In literary analysis words can take 
on meaning as a result of their social significance, their context, and who is 
employing them. This observation is also important for historians attempting to 
capture the significance of political speeches, the mass media, and indeed 
public reactions to both of these sources.14 Given this approach to rhetoric, it is 
also crucial to define a second and linked set of concepts: that of “the public” 
and “public opinion.”  
 
The Public and Public Opinion 
When looking at the relationship between the public and policy making it is 
important to define how this great mass, “the public,” and its “opinions” were 
actually understood. Murray Edelman has pointed out “There can be no one 
‘public opinion’ but, rather, many publics. Some opinions change easily, while 
others persist indefinitely.”15 In this context, one must consider a number of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Richard Toye, Rhetoric: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2013), 59. 
12 Gross, The Rhetoric of Science, 3. 
13 De Man, Blindness and Insight, 165. 
14 Kenneth Burke, Attitudes Toward History (Los Altos, CA: Hermes 
Publications, 1959), 340. 
15 Murray Edelman, Political Language: Words that Succeed and Policies that 
Fail (New York: Academic Press, 1994), 50. 
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factors: the relative newness of polling organisations such as Gallup, the 
particular nature of foreign policy in a wartime context, and the beliefs of the 
policy making elite as to what constituted public opinion. In this sense, the 
historical context is paramount. Issues such as self-reporting, response bias, 
and perception must all be considered in this definition. Specifically, individuals 
may be motivated to modify their own reports due to the perceived necessity of 
conforming to social norms, such as not reporting fear of defeat in case of being 
stigmatised as disloyal. Similarly, individuals may perceive the same event 
differently, evaluating it through different life experiences.   
Following the post-modernist “crisis” in the 1980s, historical studies have 
debunked myths that readily equated British public opinion with the “Dunkirk 
Spirit” mentality. Consensus-based myths like this are misleading, not least 
because they lump all of the war years together instead of recognising shifts in 
both behaviour and popular opinion throughout 1939-1945.16 Similarly, regional 
studies point to a less homogenous reaction to the war across Britain. David 
Thoms, for example, argues that there was a general failure by the Home Office 
to establish criteria to define and measure morale. Far from, the “spirit of the 
blitz,” raids on Plymouth between November 1940 and April 1941 “appear to 
have brought the city close to the breaking point.”17 Work on the French side, 
particularly that portraying the Vichy/occupation years has largely been linked 
with ideas of collaboration when discussing opinions and attitudes to the 
regime. Indeed, Robert Paxton’s Vichy France Old Guard New Order, although 
rightfully still a seminal force in the field, has been followed by studies that seek 
to uncover the nuances of lives and ideology in both Vichy and occupied 
France.18 In particular, French scholar Pierre Laborie has argued that a lack of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 David Reynolds, Warren F. Kimball and A.O. Chubarian, eds., Allies at War: 
The Soviet, American, and British Experience, 1949-1945 (London: Macmillan, 
1994), 250. See also, for issues of misreporting due to feelings of guilt: M.A. 
Doherty, Nazi Wireless Propaganda: Lord Haw-Haw and British Public Opinion 
in the Second World War (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press Ltd., 2000), 
119-120.  
17 David Thoms, “The Blitz, Civilian Morale and Regionalism, 1940-1942,” in 
War Culture: Social Change and Changing Experience in World War Two, eds. 
Pat Kirkham and David Thoms (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1995), 4, 6. 
18 Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1972). Tony Judt, Postwar: A History of 
Europe Since 1945 (London: Penguin, 2005). Francine Muel-Dreyfus, Vichy 
and the Eternal Feminine: A Contribution to a Political Sociology of Gender, 
trans. Kathleen A Johnson (London: Duke University Press, 2001). 
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stability in the interwar years resulted in a confused and highly polarised 
ideological climate that was firmly entrenched by the late 1930s.19 The overall 
result has been to broaden the historiography of French wartime experience by 
placing the French story within a wider European context and taking a second 
look at the responses within French society under occupation.20 
 Beyond the historical field, the research of political scientists such as 
Ralph Negrine strengthens our understanding of public opinion as a 
measurable concept. Studies of the public and public opinion can be improved 
by taking a dynamic approach, utilising theoretical concepts based on the idea 
of social constructs and the tendency of individuals to interpret issues in a way 
that “draws on past, personal, and other experiences.”21 These approaches 
transcend simplifications of public opinion as a product of either mass media 
and official communiqués or ingrained sentiments. They argue that the public 
and its opinions might be influenced by rhetoric, but that the creation of rhetoric 
is also influenced by what its writers think will appeal to their target audience. 
Laborie succinctly argues: “Collective feeling is always expressed according to 
a scale of interests and a certain order of priorities…these being unstable 
hierarchies that are created from what individuals perceive or think they 
perceive, of reality at a given moment.”22 In short, not every item of news is 
considered to be as important as the next.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 Pierre Laborie, L’Opinion Française Sous Vichy (Paris: Éditions de Seuil, 
1990), 328. See also Philip Nord, France’s New Deal : From the Thirties to the 
Postwar Era (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 2010) for administrative 
continuity between the interwar and postwar years. 
20 Yves Durand, “Collaboration French-Style: A European Perspective,” in 
France at War: Vichy and the Historians, eds. Sarah Fishman, Ioannis 
Sinanoglou, and Laura L. Downs (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 63. John Hellman, 
“Communitarians, Non-Conformists, and the Search for a ‘New Man’ in Vichy 
France,” in France at War: Vichy and the Historians, eds. Sarah Fishman, 
Ioannis Sinanoglou, and Laura L. Downs (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 94. For a social 
history of Paris under occupation see: Ronald Rosbottom, When Paris Went 
Dark: The City of Light Under German Occupation, 1940-44 (London: John 
Murray, 2014). 
21 Ralph Negrine, The Communication of Politics (London: Sage Publications, 
1996), 128. See also: G. Lang and K. Lang, The Battle for Public Opinion: The 
President, the Press, and the Polls during Watergate (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1983). R. Neuman, M. Just and A Crigler, Common 
Knowledge (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
22 Pierre Laborie, “1940 -1944: Double Think in France,” in France at War: 
Vichy and the Historians, eds. Sarah Fishman, Ioannis Sinanoglou, and Laura 
L. Downs (Oxford: Berg, 2000), 183. 
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Rhetorical descriptions of events that impacted the Anglo-French 
wartime relationship illustrate this process, whereby policies are meticulously 
framed in light of policy makers’ beliefs about the current state of public opinion. 
British policy makers in particular continued to place a huge emphasis on the 
ability of the press to reflect public opinion despite the availability of new polling 
techniques that might have suggested otherwise.23 Perhaps, though, they were 
right. Attempts by organisations such as Mass Observation (MO), whose work 
was carried out under the auspices of the Ministry of Information (MOI), 
represented only a part of society, with MO diarists being largely “middle class, 
well read and articulate” as well as left-of-centre politically. 24 War Cabinet 
minutes included speculations about the likelihood of support for a policy, 
diplomatic correspondence in its aftermath, and analyses of metropolitan and 
foreign newspapers by the French25 and the British Ministry of Information.26 
Prior to the defeat, Daladier’s Commissariat Général à L’Information (led by 
Jean Giraudoux) and Reynaud’s Ministère de l’Information played a primary 
role in formulating propaganda and issuing press publications on the Anglo-
French position in the war. Throughout the conflict, both the United Kingdom 
and metropolitan France also engaged in frequent press analyses of both their 
own and the other’s press. Within Britain, analyses of the local press were 
included in MOI Home Intelligence Reports and foreign press commentary was 
routed through local officials to the Foreign Office. The French Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs received reports on British media content from their overseas 
legations including Portugal and Ireland.  
Leslie Hore-Belisha, National Liberal MP and Secretary of State for War 
under Neville Chamberlain until 1940, was to ask the British Parliament for 
assurance “that Parliament and the free press would be fully maintained, so that 
the Government should not be cut off from their stimulating power… It is a 
question of the freedom of public opinion to express itself, to watch and to 
influence the Administration, and to play its indispensible part in winning the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 Daniel Hucker, Public Opinion and the End of Appeasement in Britain and 
France (Surrey: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 2011), 20. 
24 Sandra Koa Wing, ed., Mass Observation: Britain in the Second World War, 
(London: The Folio Society, 2007), xiv. 
25 The bulk of French analyses of the foreign press can be found at the MAE in 
10GMII, Sub-Series Z and 9GMII, Sub-Series Y.  
26 Assuming that press reports were an accurate mirror of popular opinion. 
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war.”27 Hore-Belisha articulated his understanding of the relationship between 
the press, policy makers and the public. Oversimplified and grandiose, his 
depiction is valuable nevertheless. Within this context of multiple publics with 
multiple opinions, it is crucial to look at the perception that policy makers had of 
public opinion and how these perceptions (with all of their possible biases and 
oversimplifications) influenced policy.28 The argument proposed in this thesis 
points to the need to disaggregate what politicians understood likely public 
reactions to be from any supposedly objective or monolithic idea of a singular 
“public opinion.” Indeed, as the following section will demonstrate, studies in 
both the historical as well as other theory-based disciplines can offer valuable 
perspectives on the relationship between policy making and government 
perceptions of public opinion, largely read through mass media. I argue that 
rhetorical analysis provides a crucial link between these two constituencies: 
government members and the publics they represented. 
 
Synthesising Public Opinion, The Media and Foreign Policy 
Significant historical work has been undertaken in an effort to understand the 
relationship between public opinion, the media and foreign policy making.29 
However, what is notable within the current historiography is the persistent 
failure to engage with literary criticism and the social sciences, a fact noted by 
Melvin Small in his criticism of historians who have ignored the work on public 
opinion taking place in other disciplines. This failure, he asserts, has resulted in 
work that is “intellectually barren.”30 Bernard Cohen, a scholar of international 
relations, levels a similar charge at historians, arguing that they have failed to 
prove any kind of causal relationship between public opinion, the press and 
policy making, relying instead on tired assumptions and the perceived influence 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 “The Voice of Public Opinion,” The Manchester Guardian, June 26, 1940, 4. 
28 Hucker, Public Opinion, 1. 
29 Melvin Small, “Historians Look at Public Opinion,” in Public Opinion and 
Historians: Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Melvin Small (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1970). Bernard C. Cohen, “The Relationship between 
Public Opinion and Foreign Policy Maker,” in Public Opinion and Historians: 
Interdisciplinary Perspectives, ed. Melvin Small (Detroit: Wayne State University 
Press, 1970). Stuart N. Soroka, “Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy,” 
The Harvard International Journal of Press and Politics, 8, (2003): 27-48. 
30 Small, “Historians Look at Public Opinion,” 13. 
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of the above groups on decision makers.31 Cohen’s previous studies have 
sought to identify levels of interest and readership in foreign policy press reports 
in order to understand the role of news, not just as a fuel for intellectual debate 
or intelligence provision, but also as a social and psychological function. He 
argues that the press “…may not be successful much of the time in telling 
people what to think but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to 
think about.”32 Still, the field remains split between the theoretically rigorous 
work in International Relations (IR) and the largely empirical work in the 
historical field. Historians have generally been encouraged to avoid sweeping 
generalisations such as Cohen’s. Equally, however, it seems reasonable to 
conclude that theoretical methodologies, when combined with historical 
archival-based analyses, open wider perspectives than solely empirical 
approaches.  
 Efforts to prove the link between policy making and public opinion 
through a causal framework have increasingly emphasised (in both history and 
IR) the unique and varying nature of this relationship. Stuart Soroka argues that 
media coverage plays a key role in determining levels of salience, or interest, in 
foreign affairs, and that previous studies have failed to distinguish between the 
perceived importance of different issues.33 He has built on earlier work by Bryan 
Jones, which argues “that democratic governments are more responsive to 
changes in attentiveness (my italics) to problems than they are to the particular 
distribution of opinion on a problem.”34 In-depth analysis of policy making 
documents such as memoranda and War Cabinet minutes as well as edited 
texts of broadcasts and press reports offer useful clues as to what factors 
played key or facilitating roles in the decisions to go ahead with a particular 
policy. Reading the archive in this way also illuminates how these factors 
shifted from case to case within unique contexts. In addition, intelligence 
summaries and political correspondence from the Foreign Office files offer 
useful observations on perceptions of metropolitan and foreign reactions to 	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67. 
32 Bernard Cohen, The Press and Foreign Policy, (Princetown: Princetown 
University Press, 1965), 29. 
33 Soroka, “Media, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy,” 29. 
34 Bryan D. Jones, Reconceiving Decision-Making in Democratic Politics: 
Attention, Choice, and Public Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
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particular high-profile events. Indeed, one of the values of historical studies lies 
in their contextual specificity.35  
 Clearly, consensus about the relationship between policy making and the 
public is far from being realised. This study aims to show a potential way ahead. 
Specifically, although largely empirical in approach, it also brings in additional 
theoretical concepts. In this study, the language used to portray the Anglo-
French imperial relationship, as it shifted from alliance to animosity, offers 
insight into the causes and consequences of Franco-British colonial 
confrontation. Broad rhetorical themes, such as the emphasis upon the 
inevitability of a British victory and the rehabilitation of partnership between 
Britain and a restored French democracy illustrate commonalities in wartime 
justifications for violent actions. The unique language and the particular 
emphasis placed within political speeches and press reports can illustrate 
deeper tendencies, such as how the Anglo-French relationship was portrayed, 
where blame was laid for the success or failure of a policy, and the part played 
by rhetorical constructions in influencing their overall persuasiveness. The 
bottom line being that such observations contribute new perspectives on the 
ways in which policy is created: not simply from the top down, but from the 
bottom up as well.  
Foreign policy experts argue that theoretical approaches that “black box” 
the state by assuming that whatever group of individuals is making policy can 
be considered as a unitary rational actor are simply not realistic.36 In this vein, 
cognitive and constructivist theories, which consider both the individual and 
unique influences within thought processes as well as the subjective lenses 
through which decision makers view situations and relationships provide a basis 
for comparative historical studies. These theories rightly emphasise the need to 
consider how policy options are perceived according to a number of highly 
variable, and often culturally-influenced, constructs. This approach can deepen 
our understanding of the contributory factors to the making of policy by 
shedding light not just on how, but on why a policy was construed through 
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36 Valerie M. Hudson, Foreign Policy Analysis, Classic and Contemporary 
Theory (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc., 2007), 4. 
	   18	  
particular rhetorical choices.37 Methodologies such as these acknowledge the 
inherent complexity of the perceived social framework within which individuals 
respond to, understand or construct various events. So, just as British media 
sources utilised imagery of Napoleon to appeal to a common sense of pride and 
inevitable victory, so the French successfully employed Joan of Arc as a 
recognised symbol of a great nation, persevering through a testing period of 
foreign occupation. Wartime rhetoric in particular is an especially rich field of 
analysis, as times of upheaval often result in the rise of heroic myths or overt 
constructions of national greatness with the specific aim of motivating a 
population.38 Understanding the attitudes and perceptions of policy makers 
during this period, and the multitude of both personal and public factors that 
contributed to this viewpoint is crucial. These underlying factors increase 
understanding of the relationship between policy makers and their perceived 
public and how rhetoric was used in the interpretation and negotiation of this 
relationship.  
 
Methodology 
The methodology employed in this study emphasises the role that rhetorical 
analysis can play in deciphering how and why various policies affecting the 
Anglo-French imperial relationship were portrayed in the way they were. As 
mentioned above, this study will combine the empirical analysis of archival, 
media and mass observation material with recognition of the obvious value that 
interdisciplinary and especially theoretical material from fields such as IR and 
sociolinguistics can provide. Theoretical approaches add another analytical 
dimension that helps clarify the singular importance of rhetoric. For all that, the 
grounding of this research in extensive archival material makes it a valuable 
contribution to the field of history. As discussed, this study will look at a series of 
“crisis points” between 1940 and 1945 that in some way profoundly affected or 
reconfigured the Anglo-French imperial relationship. This scope of events 	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represents well the shifting nature of Franco-British imperial relations during the 
war years while maintaining a relatively consistent geopolitical perspective: the 
focus is on high-profile colonial clashes throughout. As a result, the chapters to 
come range from early British concerns surrounding French imperial 
possessions as exemplified by the violence of Mers el-Kébir, through to the 
immediate post war, in which colonial issues again played a crucial role in 
Anglo-French relations, this time in the context of imminent decolonisation from 
the Middle East. Another advantage of ranging across the years 1940 to 1945 is 
to highlight the steady growth of American influence on European colonial 
affairs and the consequent French and British reactions to Rooseveltian anti-
imperialist rhetoric. The following subsections elaborate further on the source 
material that is being used and the empirical and theoretical approaches being 
applied.  
 
Sources 
Sources for this study have been principally drawn from British and French 
governmental archives. On the British side, policy making documents including 
War Cabinet minutes and memoranda, Foreign Office and Service Ministry 
correspondence between departments and ministers and Political Warfare 
Executive reports tracing the outcomes of events and operations have all been 
consulted. These sources are used to gauge the factors (including public 
opinion), which influenced the construction of policy. Personal papers of political 
actors as well as memoirs and diaries provide similar insight into individual 
decision-making processes and beliefs as well as the relationships and views 
held by various decision-makers. Draft press releases, created as a part of the 
policy making process, as well as radio addresses and parliamentary speeches 
serve as a link between policy making processes internal to government and 
the mass media output and public sphere interpretation of the resultant policy 
actions.  
 French archival sources have been consulted in a similar pattern where 
possible. The personal correspondence of leading political figures will help to 
construct a fuller picture of individual beliefs as well as the decisive interactions 
between figures within the policy making process. Likewise, French archives 
contain extensive records analysing various foreign media sources. A 
significant portion of French sources have been drawn from the documents at 
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the Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, which contains reports, press releases 
and records of governmental and public reactions to critical events such as the 
clashes at Mers el-Kébir and Dakar. Also crucial are the press analyses of 
British newspapers following the collapse of France and the diplomatic crises 
between the two countries. This mirroring of sources between Britain and 
France is a crucial part of the methodology, in that it tests rhetorical 
constructions as part of typical and well-developed infrastructure within the 
administrative and government frameworks of the two imperial powers. A word 
of caution here: Free France may have been closer in practice to an exile 
movement, based first in London and then in the French empire. However, it 
regularly attempted to assert representative legitimacy by claiming that Vichy 
was both illegal and inadmissible as a government. Vichy, of course, attempted 
to do much the same in its efforts to delegitimize the ‘Gaullist’ movement as 
traitorous and unrepresentative. 
Sources that attempted to measure or gauge public opinion in response 
to a specific event or in regards to general wartime sentiment can lead to a 
more nuanced view of the variability of public opinion within both Britain and 
France. Thus, it is possible to dispel oversimplifications about wartime 
sentiment as Doherty did by pointing out that in wartime Britain, “at times, 
spirits…were very low, class antagonism was very sharp, the government was 
deeply unpopular and Jews were widely disliked.”39 In Britain, Home 
Intelligence reports are particularly valuable, as they commented directly on 
public attitudes to the press and other information sources. They also noted 
regional variations in sentiment due to sustained bombing raids or other 
contextual features. MO materials, particularly observational diaries that 
attempted to provide broad estimations of public opinion, remain a helpful, if 
sometimes class-specific source from which to find out how reactions to events 
varied. While less material exists in regard to attempts to measure public 
opinion in Vichy and occupied France, there is some political correspondence in 
which government discussions analysed perceived opinion in France. Prefects’ 
reports commented upon département-level opinion in occupied France and 
were systematically collated by the Interior Ministry. In this particular study, 
post-defeat analyses will be focused on sources internal to Vichy’s 
governmental bureaucracy or those that shed light on opinion within Vichy.  	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 On the British side, the primary media sources for this project are press 
reports from The Manchester Guardian (hereafter The Guardian), the Sunday 
paper, The Observer and The Times. These papers were national publications 
with a wide readership and longstanding reputations for full and fair news 
coverage. The Guardian epitomised C.P. Scott’s liberal beliefs that a paper 
should encourage public discussion and dialogue.40 Churchill himself made it a 
point to read The Guardian, a fact of which its editor William Crozier was well 
aware. The Times, on the other hand, most closely maintained the government 
line and additionally was referenced in intelligence summaries as a source of 
press opinion. That being said, it was neither controlled by government nor 
beholden to it and, like The Guardian and The Observer, it offers valuable 
perspective on the ways in which high-profile events were represented. Both 
the wide circulation and availability of these papers and their reputation as 
“serious” news sources within the broadsheet market make them ideal to 
observe the development of foreign policy rhetoric. Most importantly, for many 
within the policy making establishment, they were looked to as a reliable source 
of public sentiment in Britain. Radio addresses, including news reports and 
political speeches, which were broadcast through the BBC, will also be 
considered. Archival research based upon Home Intelligence reports indicated 
at times both a distrust of, and a frustration with radio broadcasts for their 
relative lack of substantial information in comparison to broadsheet press 
reports.41 However, this observation can be tied to two useful conclusions. First, 
analyses of official speeches made via radio can show how leaders attempted 
to foster credibility with their listeners through more succinct, simple messages. 
Second, the reliance of the public on press sources for deeper analysis 
demonstrates the two-way process between rhetoric and opinion formation. The 
most politically literate sections of the public actively chose to read, consider 
and sometimes critique different sources of news, a fact that decision makers 
were well aware of and responsive to.  
The French press represents more challenges, particularly in light of the 
disruption to newspaper publication both during and after the occupation. Vichy 
took over the Havas press agency in November 1940, subsequently renaming it 	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the French Information Office, and used it to issue instructions or guidance on 
publications.42 Left wing papers Ce Soir and Regards were not available after 
the prohibition of the Communist press in 1939, although Ce Soir was re-
established in 1944. Leading sources of international and diplomatic news 
including Le Temps and Le Figaro both stopped publishing following the 
German occupation of the southern zone in 1942. Papers that continued to 
publish through 1944, L’Action Française, Le Matin, Paris Soir, and Le Petit 
Parisien, were shut down after being branded as collaborationist. Additionally, 
following the French defeat in June 1940, the variety of print sources available 
was split between the occupied zone (northern and Atlantic coastal France) and 
unoccupied Vichy France. This study will focus upon papers that continued to 
publish as part of the new État Français. Of these, Le Temps will be the main 
source of analysis. Created in 1861, this newspaper gained a reputation as a 
well-informed and sometimes privileged source of global and international 
news.”43 Given the colonial nature of many of the crisis points as well as the 
strong symbolic role played by the colonies following the defeat, it will also be 
useful to look at some of the colonial press responses. The colonial publication, 
L’Echo d’Alger (1830-1962) will provide this alternative, “from the empire” 
perspective. Its availability as the principal French-language daily paper in 
Algeria until 1944 also makes it one of the only non-collaborationist press 
sources that continued to publish after the 1942 occupation. Although a settler 
mouthpiece and staunchly Vichy in tone, this paper did not have the overtly 
collaborationist or racialist views that were common in far-right publications. 
 
Analysis: Empirical and Theoretical 
Empirical analysis can highlight recurring themes within newspaper articles and 
press releases, such as the British insistence that Pétain’s government 
represented neither a legitimate entity nor the will of the citizenry. The “true” 
France, rather, was said to be made up of the bulk of the “ordinary” French 
population and rallied to de Gaulle’s Free French. This stance, so it was hoped, 
would allow the Anglo-French alliance to continue metaphorically in the hearts 
and minds of the respective populations. Equally, policy making documents 	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provide important clues about the perceptions and motivations that underlay 
this process of rhetorical reinforcement. Placed within a particular context, 
rhetoric offers insights into how and why events were framed, or indeed not 
framed, in a particular way. Motivating factors might include social and cultural 
norms, individual cognitive constructs, and the political frameworks of 
bureaucracy, party politics and the like in which policy choices were made.44 In 
addition to empirical analyses, the addition of theoretical perspectives can 
provide broadly applicable frameworks of understanding and can lead to 
stronger comparative studies and insights into patterns of decision making.  
 We have already seen how perspectives from IR might enrich empirical 
approaches. Sociolinguistic studies likewise offer additional insights. Cognitive 
linguists focus upon identifying links between metaphors as they exist in spoken 
language and our individual thought processes.45 In other words, the way we 
think about and discuss events involves the use of widely accepted conceptual 
metaphors about what something is like and what it feels like to experience. 
Consider the metaphor “war is a journey.” This assumption impacts how war is 
discussed, including, for example, assumptions that it is likely to be long, that 
there may be bumps in the road, and that it will require sacrifice. Jonathan 
Charteris-Black’s detailed analysis of the metaphorical and other grammatical 
content of Churchill’s wartime speeches argues convincingly that Churchill’s 
“primary rhetorical objective” was to create a “heroic myth” that broadly 
represented the allies as moral and good and Hitler as evil and depraved.46 By 
defining an event as a “crisis,” politicians are able to make credible implications 
about how the public should behave.47 A crisis implies the need for people to 
put aside differences and face the event as a united and equal front. The myth 
of social equality during wartime belies these assumptions, lending credence to 
Edelman’s argument that “the language in which each crisis is discussed is 
selective in what it highlights and what it masks.”48 As these examples indicate, 
incorporating theory into historical analysis can shed more light not just on what 	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was said, but why these constructs were deemed effective, and how they were 
subsequently framed within the press and discussed within the broader public. 
In this sense, this study will pinpoint how decision makers employed broad 
themes often based upon moral arguments to give their justifications increased 
legitimacy. 
 Grammatical constructs similarly contribute to the basic structure of an 
argument. Ideological structures made up of “social conventions, norms [and] 
histories” shape the ways in which an individual talks about a particular topic or 
event.49 This approach is consistent with efforts to understand the social 
function of rhetoric and its role here in understanding how both the self and a 
foreign other are portrayed within a wartime context. The core features of 
cognitive linguistics, which argue that language has a social and learned 
element rather than either residing autonomously in your head or being reduced 
to an objective, “truth conditional” way of describing events or surroundings, 
mesh well with the previously-discussed dimensions of rhetoric as a persuasive 
and subjective force. Specifically, policy discussions which included 
observations of public opinion, draft press reports that tone down or rephrase 
statements in order to present a more rosy view of Anglo-French relations, and 
general arguments or emphases within press stories provide a strong basis for 
understanding which specific perceptions played a role in policy formation (or, 
conversely, were left out) and how they were addressed rhetorically. The 
creation and dissemination of foreign policy, as seen through policy papers, 
speeches, and the mass media, utilise constructions based upon this social and 
symbolic nature of language. Individuals and policy makers create and 
negotiate meaning and articulate their understanding of policies through the 
mobilisation of cognitive processes, for example, by recalling a past experience 
in order to understand a present one. The discourses that grow up around 
policies are negotiated through understandings of social and cultural norms that 
have been constructed, confirmed, or renegotiated through the use of language, 
which includes grammatical structure, vocabulary, and broad ideas or 
arguments such as moral concepts. Ultimately, how, if at all, was the language 
of policy makers adapted to emphasise and garner a broader level of non-
partisan support? How did grammatical choice in addition to broader imagery 	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serve to place or remove blame, to imply a sense of inevitable victory or 
renewed growth in the pattern of a great historical tradition? These are some of 
the questions that the following chapters will seek to clarify.  
 
Historiography and Conclusion 
Undoubtedly, one of the most important questions that any new piece of 
research must answer is where it fits within and what it contributes to its 
particular field of study. First, it is useful to consider the main themes that this 
work addresses. On the broadest level, it examines the period of the Second 
World War. However, within this category it also addresses a number of key 
issues and questions: Anglo-French relations, Anglo-French imperial 
confrontations, decolonisation, and myth and memory. Analysis will be carried 
out using a variety of perspectives and viewpoints: public opinion, foreign 
policy, the role of the media and the nature of wartime diplomatic relations. 
Most importantly, analysis will be conducted through rhetoric. There are 
countless ways in which the Second World War has been studied, many of 
them offering valuable insights and perspectives into this complex battleground. 
It is certainly fair to say that each of these subject areas and each of these 
approaches occupy a part of the present historiography. However, what is 
lacking, and what makes this work original, is a synthesis of these areas. 
Rhetoric, as a primary tool of analysis, demonstrates the interconnectedness 
and indeed the interdependencies between policy making, public opinion and 
the mass media. It drives home the conclusion that rhetoric matters. What 
follows here is an overarching view of the academic approaches towards this 
topic. Due to the volume and detail of work that has been produced, a more 
nuanced historiographical analysis of each imperial crisis point to be studied will 
be incorporated within the appropriate chapter. 
 Starting from the bottom up, memoirs, diaries and volumes of speeches 
must be considered a valuable source of information. Where available, official 
histories like Llewellyn Woodward’s British Foreign Policy in the Second World 
provide a comprehensive description of events and the policies behind them. 
However, their tendency to mask controversy and act as a justification of policy 
means they must be treated with care.50 Issues of subjectivity aside, memoirs 	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can provide clues into the minds of decision makers – what clashes rankled the 
most, for example, just as omissions and discrepancies give an idea of what 
these individuals wanted to hide. Winston Churchill, Paul Reynaud, Charles de 
Gaulle, Duff Cooper, Paul Baudouin, Alexander Cadogan and Edward Spears 
all left behind extensive writings, which this study exploits.51 Edward Spears’ 
journey from champion to denigrator of the Free French is particularly well 
documented through a combination of his own writing (Assignment to 
Catastrophe and Fulfilment of a Mission) and that of his biographer, Max 
Egremont.52 Marshal Pétain’s biography by Richard Griffiths provides useful 
background and insights into the life of a man who took 12 years to advance to 
the rank of captain.53 The depictions of Pétain’s background and prejudices can 
aid researchers who want to better understand how these issues may have 
influenced his decision-making process. Paul Addison has written a voluminous 
study that traces the varying sources of Churchill’s policies and convictions, 
including his belief that the British electorate was largely conservative.54 On the 
other hand, comparative studies such as François Kersaudy’s excellent 
analysis of Churchill and de Gaulle demonstrate particularly well how both 
individuals used moral and emotive arguments to attempt to influence the 
actions of the other.55 
 The scope of this study and the complexity of the relationships that it 
addresses remain focused on two core issues: Anglo-French relations and 	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empire. The former will also include individual studies of the French or British 
wartime experience, as they can provide useful bases for comparative 
perspectives. These themes, however, are not mutually exclusive and have 
been approached in a wide variety of ways. For clarity’s sake, it is worth 
examining some of the core literature in each area in order to see how this new 
study and analytical approach can strengthen and even link these perspectives.  
 
Anglo-French Relations 
Current works have discussed, debated and scrutinised British, Gaullist and 
Vichy actions. The work of well-known scholars like PMH Bell and Robert 
Tombs has spanned the long history of connection between Britain and France 
and provides useful overviews of the often-acrimonious relationship.56 Today, 
the sheer volume of the current body of work is a testament to the continuing 
fascination with this topic. My study’s contribution lies in the fact that, by 
employing a rhetorical approach, it becomes possible to see interconnections 
that were previously unclear. Anglo-French relations were never confined to 
either a diplomatic, political or popular level – all were connected. By studying 
how policy makers attempted to influence and subsequently monitor 
perceptions of Anglo-French relations these linkages become evident, if more 
complex. Too often scholars tend to take for granted or oversimplify the 
sentiments and thus the decision-making process of one party or the other. 
Desmond Dinan’s book, The Politics of Persuasion, certainly makes it clear that 
British foreign policy was highly complex. It included countless plans for 
operations that were never carried out. However, this work unpacks the idea of 
persuasion from the specific perspective of foreign policy. Dinan is primarily 
concerned with understanding how the British policy-making establishment was 
able to or failed to persuade actors such as the United States or General 
Weygand to join the fight against the Axis powers.57 In contrast, my own study 
is an in-depth and detailed analysis, not of politics between states, or the 	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political institutions of states, but rather the linkages that exist between political 
institutions and the press and public who respond to and indeed have a role in 
shaping official policy.  
 Particularly in the last two decades, responses to postmodern challenges 
of “conventional,” or positivistic approaches towards the study of history have 
resulted in an influx of literature that employs new approaches toward new 
subjects. In particular, the replacement of traditional, narrative-driven methods 
has resulted in analytically rich perspectives focused upon gendered or minority 
experiences during wartime. Hannah Diamond’s work on women’s experiences 
in France, for example, adds further depth to traditional approaches that tend to 
focus upon men in positions of power.58 Additionally, the steady rise in 
publications dealing with historical myths and memory formation offer scholars 
many opportunities to challenge accepted assumptions about wartime 
behaviours and contexts. Two relatively early works that attempted to challenge 
British wartime “myths” were Agnus Calder’s The Myth of the Blitz and Tony 
Kushner’s The Persistence of Prejudice. Although Calder’s revisionist account 
has received some criticism for going too far in attempting to subvert the idea of 
British wartime unity, it is a useful platform because it leads the reader to 
question how wartime memories are often oversimplified and perpetuated.59 
Likewise, Kushner rightly points out that memories of wartime unity should not 
overshadow the fact that anti-Semitism and anti-Semitic stereotypes remained 
topical throughout the conflict.60 More recently, Sonya Rose has examined how 
characterisations of Britain as a single community were mobilised in spite of, 
and indeed, in recognition, of class differences.61 National identity is not a static 
concept. Examining the power of ideas of “oneness” and community during a 
war adds depth to studies on national identity and nationhood.62 
 Of particular value to this study has been the publication of research by 
Martin Alexander, Tony Judt and Samuel Hynes (to name only a few) that 	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examines links between historic portrayals of conflict with contemporary 
memories and perceptions of the incidents themselves.63 Richard Toye and 
David Reynolds64 have also approached questions of collective memory in their 
work on Churchill’s rhetoric and writing. Toye’s in-depth analysis of Churchill’s 
wartime speeches argues convincingly that his addresses were far more than 
heroic orations; rather, they were “calculated political interventions which had 
diplomatic repercussions far beyond the effect on the morale of listeners in 
Britain.”65 Studies such as these result in a greater understanding of historic 
contexts because they challenge preconceived notions about how individuals or 
groups responded to complex events. In a similar way, since the publication of 
Robert Paxton’s ground breaking work on Vichy France, first published between 
the late 1960s and early 1970s,66 the study of the Vichy state has become 
much more nuanced. Sarah Fishman’s article on the 1970s revisionist period 
spurns interpretations of Vichy as a small, unpopular regime that had been 
forced upon the French. In doing so it highlights this historiographical transition 
particularly well.67 Paxton’s work was decisive in shifting away from 
interpretations of Vichy as a “pause” in French history. However, more recent 
scholars like Philip Nord, Kevin Passmore, and Julian Jackson have been 
critical in revealing the continuities from the interwar decades of the late Third 
Republic, through the Vichy years and into the post-war era. By identifying how 	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Vichy policies were foreshadowed in the Third Republic, Nord rightly 
emphasises the need to consider them as part of a wider, more continuous 
phenomenon: Vichy avant Vichy and Vichy après Vichy.68 Similarly, Passmore 
has focused upon the French Right in order to show the extent to which Vichy’s 
own ideologies had long historical roots but were at the same time far from 
coherent, and indeed shifted throughout the war.69 Julian Jackson’s excellent 
and massive study on France from 1940-1944 not only emphasises the need to 
consider Vichy from within a broader historical scope, but also provides a highly 
detailed analysis of the period from intellectual, popular and political 
perspectives.70 Discussions of Vichy are a natural point from which to broach 
another, related section of World War Two historiography that is of particular 
importance: the role of empires. 
 
Empires in Conflict 
Imperial clashes are a focal point in this study and are the framework through 
which Anglo-French relations will be analysed. There is a very broad 
historiography covering this area, which often focuses upon particular regions of 
one or the other empire. On the other hand, Ashley Jackson’s The British 
Empire and the Second World War stands out as the most comprehensive 
publication dealing with the British perspective on the entirety of its global 
possessions during this period.71 John Darwin’s The Empire Project provides a 
broader overview of Britain’s empire, which spans the mid nineteenth century to 
the early twentieth. Darwin’s synthesis of the pre-war and post-war empire 
effectively challenges the use of “imperial overstretch” to explain British imperial 
evacuation beginning in the late 1940s.72 Talbot Imlay’s comparative study of 
French and British strategy during the war argues that, in contrast to the 
imperial-mindedness of the British, with the exception of North Africa and 
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Algeria, empire played a minimal role in French planning.73 Without disagreeing 
with this assessment, my study will take a different tactic. Particularly on the 
French side, empire was not just a source for manpower and material 
resources, but a means to symbolically demonstrate continued power and 
future greatness. Studies that examine the importance of empire both during 
and after Vichy occupy an important place in the current historiography. Martin 
Thomas’s extensive work dealing with both wartime and post-war perceptions of 
empire as a vital part of French identity emphasises the fact that British actions 
in the Middle East routinely placed strategic advantage over Free French 
claims.74 Ruth Ginio has studied Vichy’s attempts to mobilise empire as a sign 
of legitimacy in West Africa.75 Likewise, Bruce Marshall, Martin Shipway and 
Andrew Shennan have all contributed important perspectives on the extent to 
which maintenance of the empire in the early post war years was a necessary 
component of France’s planned national renewal.76 The assumptions in these 
studies, namely of the perceived importance of empire from perspectives of 
culture and prestige provide crucial grounding for this analysis. Specifically, as 
will become particularly clear in the final chapters, which examine Anglo-French 
clashes in the Levant, maintaining control over the demise of the mandate was 
crucial for preserving French legitimacy and therefore actual power over her 
remaining African territories and French Indo China.  
As Susan Pedersen has pointed out in her in-depth study of the League 
of Nations Permanent Mandate Commission (LON PMC), mandate holders 
employed rhetoric as a means to demonstrate that their actions were in 
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accordance with the values of the PMC.77 In a similar fashion, as decolonisation 
loomed larger in the war years, disparities between French rhetoric and material 
capabilities became more evident. Frederick Cooper’s work on decolonisation in 
French and British Africa warns of the danger of reading decolonisation 
backwards. The tendency to explain decolonisation from either a top down 
(national triumph) or bottom up (coloniser initiative) approach fails to see the 
process as it was: complex, contradictory and hugely uncertain.78 This study, 
while agreeing with Cooper’s assertion, will examine Anglo-French imperial 
relations through the lens of rhetoric, illustrating how both sides employed and 
were constrained by targeted justifications towards a unique set of audiences. 
For example, British rhetoric sought to garner Syrian, and thereby broader Arab 
goodwill with the goal of maintaining strategic and economic resources within 
the region. The ultimate fate of both French and British influence in the Middle 
East can only be understood by examining the geopolitical motives, actual 
power capabilities and often-contradictory use of rhetoric that made up the 
policies on both sides. In this sense, rhetoric can become a limiting factor on 
policy manoeuvres. The need to be seen as acting in accordance with principle 
or the demands of Arab clients can limit the range of options available. A host of 
regional studies addressing British actions in the Middle East, and most notably, 
the importance of Palestine as, at once, a regional flashpoint and an acid test of 
British imperial capabilities, have again deepened our understanding of 
economic and political factors in particular. As mentioned earlier, a more 
detailed examination of this literature will be included in the three relevant 
chapters on the Levant; however, it is worth highlighting a few studies here.  
Prolific authors like William Roger Louis have analysed the complex 
environment that was unfolding as the Second World War came to a close, 
rightly identifying the inconsistencies that existed between the possibility of 
Franco-Syrian reconciliation and the preservation of British influence.79 This 
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issue of British and French strategic interests and the ensuing struggle with 
nationalist demands has been well documented by scholars including Philip 
Khoury, A.B. Gaunson, James Gelvin, Jennifer Dueck, Aviel Roshwald and 
Yehoshua Porath. Porath’s study illustrates particularly well the part played by 
the pan-Arab movement and the consequent motivations behind British Foreign 
Office decisions, which always weighed likely Arab reactions to Palestinian 
partition.80 However, as will become increasingly clear, what such works do not 
do is provide a link between British depictions of themselves as a benign 
regional arbiter and their underlying economic and political motives in the wider 
Middle East region. This study will attempt to fill that gap by reassessing Anglo-
French imperial strategies in the region, and more especially, the ways in which 
British policies in particular were portrayed and communicated in such a way as 
to gain the trust of local nationalist groups, American and global audiences 
respectively.  
 
Conclusion 
Negotiating a field as well researched as the Second World War is never an 
easy task. However, the addition of new ways of looking at this period can add 
another dimension of analysis. Not only does this research employ a trans-
national and comparative perspective, it offers a way to better understand policy 
making by linking it to its intended audience(s) through rhetoric. No other work 
currently provides this link between the formation of official policy and the 
limitations imposed upon it by outside factors that include perceptions of public 
opinion, global (in this instance often anti-imperial) reactions, and the 
requirement to preserve key alliances. This perspective has great potential, 
both as an approach to historical studies and as a way in which to better 
understand why contemporary policy makers continue to mobilise historic 
“lessons” as a way to justify controversial policies.  
 The chapters that follow argue that rhetoric is an inherent part of the 
policy making process, particularly when policies are likely to cause controversy 
in one or more areas of the public sphere. Concerns over likely public reactions 
not only impact the decision-making process, they affect the manner in which 	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decisions and their outcomes are portrayed and justified. While many studies 
make casual reference to the fact that policy makers were aware of and tried at 
times to limit press publicity surrounding a particular policy or operation, these 
are only surface level observations. This study digs deeper, illustrating how 
leaders deliberately constructed justifications for policies as part of the decision 
making process. When rhetoric contradicted, as it often did, underlying strategic 
and economic policies, these strains had a real impact upon both British and 
French room to manoeuvre. Between the highly fraught days of 1940 and the 
more victory-assured period of 1945, sustaining gaps between a rhetoric full of 
good intentions and a policy committed to maintaining economic and strategic 
interests in a region that demanded unfettered independence would become 
increasingly difficult. On all sides, British, Free French and Vichy leaders 
mobilised rhetoric variously as a means to justify controversial policies, to 
contest the legitimacy of their rivals’ claims to imperial or sovereign rights, and 
to lay claim to foreign territory. On all sides rhetoric mattered. Acknowledging its 
importance helps unlock complex relationships on a metropolitan, diplomatic, 
and imperial level.  
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Chapter 2: Justifying Defeat 
Responding to the Dunkirk Evacuations and the Fall of France 
 
Introduction 
 
The Second World War is of huge significance in British cultural and historic 
memory. References to Anglo-French wartime relations are often met with 
knowing glances and unsubtle comparisons between British bravery and 
French defeat. However, true understanding of this complex relationship can 
only be reached by looking beyond the flat assumptions of what it means to win 
or lose. This chapter will expand upon the complexities of the Anglo-French 
relationship - analysing how it was shaped and perceived by policy makers and 
the broader wartime public - between late May and June 1940. Contextually, it 
is essential to recall that the relationship between the two wartime allies was 
constantly being debated and subtly reconstructed. Rhetoric was intrinsic to this 
process of alliance refinement, and, once France confronted defeat, helped 
facilitate a shift in British popular perceptions of the war in the West as a 
uniquely British struggle. Equally, rhetorical arguments provided the framework 
within which the very identity and future of France was reconceptualised: in 
France, in its empire and in Britain too.  
The collapse of France in June 1940 would hasten what had previously 
been a tentative loosening of alliance bonds, both at an official and popular 
level as each side struggled to redefine its position within the altered strategic 
context of France’s surrender. In the years leading up to the outbreak of war, 
the Anglo-French relationship had fluctuated, the Entente Cordiale enduring 
throughout largely to the exclusion of a formal - and reciprocal - military alliance. 
Although the French had initiated intensive negotiations with Britain in 1919 and 
again in 1921, with the goal of creating a formal alliance, both public and 
parliamentary opinion in Britain shied away from any such binding continental 
commitments.1 The outbreak of war 20 years later, however, catalysed 
unprecedented levels of cooperation including the formation of the Supreme 
War Council as well as financial and economic coordination designed to make 
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the Anglo-French alliance concluded six months earlier a meaningful reality.2 
Following the German invasion of the Low Countries on 10 May 1940, events 
moved quickly, leading to the ultimate French decision to request armistice 
terms through the intermediary of Francisco Franco’s Spain on 16/17 June. In 
the days following this request, uncertainty persisted on both sides. Doubts 
were sustained by coalescing around the belief – perhaps more hope than 
expectation - that French officials might yet proceed to North Africa to continue 
the struggle from the heart of their African Empire. Fears that Germany would 
otherwise move swiftly to secure the French Empire and France’s Oceanic fleet 
only increased official anxiety in Britain about the choices the French 
government, which by then had evacuated from Paris to Bordeaux, might make. 
Immediately following the signature of the armistice, and arguably long 
after, there has been a sustained attempt on the part of both academics and 
others to explain, and in some cases justify, the defeat. Issues of French 
societal division, allegations of defeatism and strategic wrong-headedness have 
figured largest. Marc Bloch’s well-known work, Strange Defeat: A Statement of 
Evidence Written in 1940, illustrates the extent to which even contemporaneous 
imagery depicted France as rotting from within, with governmental structures 
beginning to “give off the smell of a dry-rot which it had acquired in small cafés 
and obscure back rooms.”3 Since the publication of Bloch’s searing account in 
the immediate aftermath of the fall of France, the cause of defeat has remained 
a subject of controversy. The British official history attributes the French 
withdrawal to a lack of leadership.4 Scholars have amassed a huge amount of 
documentary material, the bulk of which focuses upon arguments surrounding 
the quality of military forces, materials and leadership, (mis)perceptions of 
German intentions and of course, national decadence.5 Interpretations such as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Philip Bell, “Entente Broken and Renewed: Britain and France, 1940-1945,” in 
Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation, eds. 
Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (London: Routledge, 2000), 223. 
3 Marc Bloch, Strange Defeat: A Statement of Evidence Written in 1940 
(London: Oxford University Press, 1949), 157. 
4 Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War 
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, 1962), 55. 
5 Ernst R. May, Strange Victory: Hitler’s Conquest of France (New York: Hill and 
Wang, 2000); Raymond Aron, the Century of Total War trans. E.W. Dickes and 
O.S. Griffiths (London: Derek Vershoyle, 1954). Robert Alan Doughty, The 
Breaking Point: Sedan and the Fall of France, 1940 (Hamden, CT: Archon 
Books, 1990). 
	   37	  
Bloch’s, which attempted to pin the cause of the defeat on societal malaise 
were subject to revision – but, crucially, not to outright rejection - in the 1970s. 
Scholars such as PMH Bell used the infamous report, “British Strategy in a 
Certain Eventuality,” to analyse how the British government attempted to bolster 
French morale at the close of May even while resolving to fight on alone if 
necessary.6 That Philip Nord’s recent book France 1940 continues to challenge 
long-standing perceptions of national decadence is proof of the extent to which 
the original explanation has clung on.7 These later works have placed a 
stronger emphasis upon political, economic and military factors, an 
understandable response given the availability of newly opened archival 
sources. Max Egremont’s biography of Edward Spears describes, but does not 
elaborate upon, the decision-making environment in the early days of the 
conflict. In particular, the extent to which policy makers planned for the present 
battle from within the shadow of 1914 was notable.8 There exists a broad 
swathe of specialist studies that place the Anglo-French relationship into a 
wider context, one in which the very idea of two united nation states marshalled 
for war remained profoundly complicated by long-standing questions of 
contested identity and evidence of serious domestic and colonial division.9 The 
traditional historiography of the French defeat was immediately split between 
arguments that privileged either perceived societal polarization or fatal military 
inadequacies. Both lines of argument have been criticised by Talbot Imlay for 
“drawing grand judgements from narrow accounts.”10 Joel Blatt’s edited 
collection on the French defeat addresses these historiographical shortfalls 
particularly well. It contributes a more nuanced understanding of the defeat as a 	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product of strategic and social factors.11 Indeed, works that encompass a 
broader scope such as Julian Jackson’s France the Dark Years rightfully point 
out the need to understand the recasting of French identities that followed the 
defeat as the product of social divisions and cultural strains that were present 
since the founding of the Third Republic.12  
Continuing along these more recent analyses, the experience of the 
French defeat on both sides cannot be understood or explained simply by 
determining or debating the underlying causal factors. However, the final days 
of May up through the signing of the Franco-German armistice will serve here 
as a useful jumping off point from which to understand how the conflict would 
be described, justified and interpreted on all sides. The days which progressed 
from the Dunkirk evacuations until the armistice came into effect in late June 
would be fraught with uncertainty, and notably, a gradual shift in rhetorical 
portrayals of the conflict and its key participants. June 1940 would, in 
retrospect, become the point at which Anglo-French wartime experience parted 
ways. However, in the midst of the crisis, the immediate situation was much 
more complex. As will be demonstrated, the collapse of France was less a 
surprise than a new, and initially uncertain, phase of the conflict, in which 
alliances had to be realigned and redefined. Rather than focussing upon why 
the French defeat took place, this chapter will examine the development of 
rhetoric in the events leading up to and following the request for and 
acceptance of a Franco-German armistice. Specifically, it will seek to 
understand how different groups attempted to frame the defeat, establishing 
blame upon a specific group of men, a national illness or the traitorous actions 
of the Belgian King, Leopold. The imagery and arguments that were established 
during this period of extreme uncertainty would form the framework around 
which individuals and groups would take sides and attempt to influence others 
to confirm their chosen course of action. Most notably, this period would see the 
beginning of Anglo-French attempts to each establish the credibility of their 
actions in the eyes of the United States and their own publics.  
The proliferation of blame literature in the wake of the defeat, despite its 
obvious obsession with the idea of establishing and placing a kind of moral 	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sanction upon the failed Third Republic, nevertheless offers valuable insights 
into the immediate desire to understand and prevent another such 
catastrophe.13 Indeed, attempts by both the French and British to explain this 
new wartime context were based on a desire to confirm and legitimise present 
actions within the framework of the broader struggle. While Pétain would 
establish promises of French renewal, British rhetoric would focus upon the 
necessity of sacrifice in order to guarantee future victory. The mobilisation of 
blame would be an important part of the rhetoric of both sides, and would 
establish a framework of interpretation, which would be employed throughout 
the conflict. British attempts to maintain sympathy for the broader French public 
would be carried out directly against the newly formed Pétain government. 
Rhetoric that challenged the constitutionality of this government and therefore 
the decision to seek an armistice would be directly linked to material concerns 
such as the fate of the French fleet and the loyalty of the French Empire.  
The scope of this chapter will encompass events from late May, 
focussing upon the lead up to the Dunkirk evacuations and including the 
backlash of negative sentiment towards the Belgian capitulation on 28 May. It 
will follow the progression of rhetorical responses in the press and political 
spheres up until the publication of the armistice terms in late June. This 
approach will illustrate how both sides gradually and tentatively redefined the 
conflict in line with their new status either as a belligerent or a (proposed) 
neutral. Importantly, these shifts included a renegotiation of the alliance around 
the presumed outcome of the war and the legality of the new French 
government. Questions of honour and loyalty, which had been crucial in 
Leopold’s demise, would be less pronounced, indeed largely lacking, in the 
initial British response to the French armistice, growing stronger only when it 
became clear that the armistice, far from an attempt to rally the population to 
continue the fight from abroad, was likely to be accepted. This sense of 
uncertainty, between 17-22 June, has largely been missing from analyses of 
this period, and illustrates lingering hopes that remained a part of press and 
public sentiment.  
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The following sections will proceed chronologically, beginning in late May 
and ending in late June. This will best demonstrate the emergence of themes 
as each side responded to the rapidly changing environment. The first section 
will focus upon British and French policy in later May. Specifically, it will 
examine how, on the British side, material considerations coupled with the 
desire to sustain French morale impacted the decision-making process. The 
rhetorical limitations and exaggerations that resulted from such a policy would 
have implications later. This idea will be explored in detail in the second section, 
which will examine press and public reactions in the wake of the Dunkirk 
evacuations and the realisation that claims of RAF superiority were largely 
fabricated. The final two sections will examine the initial reaction to the French 
request for an armistice, followed by the subsequent acceptance of terms. In 
particular, the final section will demonstrate a hardening of British sentiment 
towards what was then referred to as the Bordeaux government. Portrayals of 
the government as unrepresentative of the broader population would form the 
basis for British representations throughout the conflict.  
Ultimately, why does this type of interpretation or analysis matter? In 
short, both British and French political forces prioritised the need to justify 
important decisions through official announcements and carefully crafted 
speeches. Rhetoric mattered, because policy makers believed, and for that 
matter still believe, in the role it had in shaping public sentiment both locally and 
globally. Rhetoric provided the means to shape and defend actions as well as 
describe how those choices would define the future of each nation. The broader 
themes of morality, decay, rebirth and justice that manifested themselves 
repeatedly must be considered as part of the decision-making process. Today, 
Churchill’s words are remembered as almost prophetic. But, between 1940-
1945 the rhetorical battles that accompanied each facet of foreign policy were 
far from decisive. By focussing upon the process of decision making, rhetorical 
studies are able to illustrate its uncertainties and hesitations and avoid 
focussing upon the known outcomes – defeat or victory. More importantly, they 
demonstrate how policy makers attempted to minimise the possibility of dissent 
by pre-crafting arguments that drove home the validity of actions taken. Thus, 
this approach can grant insight into this complex period and draw connections 
between official policy and its portrayal through alternately moral, rational, and 
patriotic constructs.  
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Expectations of Victory 
Well before the conflict had developed into the global struggle it became, British 
policy makers were laying the groundwork for a campaign that they hoped 
would sustain morale and active participation in the war effort. Such efforts 
would obviously be varied and far-reaching. Drawing on previously discussed 
distinctions between rhetoric and propaganda, the analyses that follow will 
focus upon the former concept. In either case, however, the general belief in the 
importance of stimulating, influencing and tracking public sentiment is important 
because it showcases the perceived potential of persuasive text and imagery. 
As early as April 1939 a report identified the need to personalise propaganda 
messages in recognition of regional and viewpoint variations. In regards to the 
actual persuasive power of such a campaign, the report speculated: “The 
English people, being, in the broadest sense, idealistic and illogical in 
temperament, are probably at least averagely susceptible to propaganda (more 
so than the French).”14 In France the creation of the Service Géneral 
d’Information served similarly to conduct wartime operations “in the moral and 
psychological domain…”15 More than a year later, in late May 1940, British 
officials would continue to cite the importance of maintaining public confidence. 
A crucial part of their attempts would be based on the argument of final assured 
victory. Enter inevitability, a theme that remained at the heart of British rhetoric 
throughout the conflict. However, as events progressed throughout May and 
June, imagery of victory would increasingly be associated with past British 
rather than Anglo-French successes.  
 British policy in late May was balanced between two contradictory 
approaches. First, there was a real recognition of the possibility of French 
defeat, which led to an effort to preserve material for home defence. Anglo-
French policy prior to the evacuations remained uncertain; the possibility of an 
approach to Italy, although divisive, had not yet been shelved.16 However, these 
precautions were carried out alongside efforts to sustain both French and British 	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morale. They suppressed speculations about strains in the relationship and 
maintained claims that the RAF was successfully engaging with the enemy and 
assisting as the evacuation at Dunkirk proceeded. Following Churchill’s 16 May 
visit to Paris, Foreign Office intelligence concluded that the German 
breakthrough had resulted in “a severe shock…to the whole of French public 
opinion.”17 Reynaud’s panicked air, and proclamations that the war was lost, 
contributed to the British decision to prepare for the possibility of a French 
withdrawal. The French, similarly, were considering the possibility of defeat by 
25 May. Possible options were discussed within the Comite de Geurre.18 The 
previously mentioned report, “British Strategy in a Certain Eventuality,” argued 
that the British people could stand up to the strain of aerial bombardment and 
pinpointed economic warfare as a vital component in a British victory.19 The 
events that unfolded in the days that followed have been well studied and will 
not be examined in detail here. Rather, analysis will be focussed upon the 
subtle rhetorical shifts that began to take place as each player started to 
renegotiate his place in or outside of the conflict. Contradictions in words and 
actions illustrate the complexity of this period. While Britain prepared to withhold 
resources for the defence of the island, they mobilised a contrary rhetoric of 
grand gestures and proclamations in an effort to stave off French withdrawal as 
long as possible.  
 By 21 May, the Anglo-French alliance appeared to be holding together, 
at least according to the brave assertions of the political and military leadership. 
Reynaud made a series of addresses to the Senate, which, although grave, 
professed a renewed sense of purpose. Despite General Maurice Gamelin’s 
sterling reputation as the man who had turned back the Germans at the 1914 
Battle of the Marne and salvaged French affairs during the 1925 Druze revolt in 
Syria, Reynaud replaced him with General Maxime Weygand on 19 May. 
Weygand proclaimed that he was “full of confidence provided everyone does 
his duty with a fierce energy.”20 However, as the German armies approached 
the channel ports the situation appeared bleak and on 26 May Churchill gave 
the order to begin evacuation at Dunkirk as part of Operation Dynamo. This 	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order, which acknowledged the seriousness of events on the ground, was in 
sharp contrast to the positive press response toward Allied efforts. The French 
press was not only positive; it gave high praise to the British contribution. 
Justice wrote, “The French are courageous. The British manly and tenacious. 
With such qualities associated for the triumph of the same ideal, we are 
invincible.”21 Minister of Information Duff Cooper had made similar assurances 
in a Home Service broadcast on 21 May. Regardless of setbacks, he argued, 
“The end of this battle, whatever it may be, cannot (my italics) entail the defeat 
of Great Britain or France in the war.”22 This observation, of the inevitability of 
victory based upon moral ideals rather than military or material superiority would 
be a key component of first Anglo-French and then British rhetoric. French, or 
Vichy rhetoric, to the contrary, would employ a series of justifications for defeat 
based around statistical material inferiority and social decadence. Prior to this 
departure, however, both French and British policy makers supported and made 
claims that eventual victory was still assured.  
 The capitulation of King Leopold of Belgium on 28 May, although a 
disaster militarily, was an opportunity for French and British sources to provide 
renewed assurances of victory. These assurances were fuelled by disgust over 
his immoral and traitorous actions. Reynaud’s broadcast in response to the 
capitulation - “Our faith in victory remains complete” - was consistent with the 
optimism present throughout the mass media and reported public opinion. 23 
The Dunkirk evacuations progressed from 26 May, and during this time press 
sources regularly cited approval of Weygand and the belief that strong Allied 
resistance was wearing down their German rivals.24 In fact, Cooper believed 
that public sentiment was too optimistic and urged the War Cabinet to make a 
frank public statement via the BBC. He feared that over optimism, followed by 
disaster at Dunkirk, would result in promises of eventual victory being 
discredited.25 Weygand recalled in his own memoirs that Reynaud had argued 
for equal evacuation of French and British troops in order to avoid 	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compromising public perceptions of the future of the alliance.26 Indeed, there 
was little belief within parliament itself that the evacuations had any hope of 
success. Churchill estimated that no more than 50,000 individuals would be 
taken off.27 While the British press began to take on a more serious tone 
following Leopold’s withdrawal, reports from France betrayed a similarly 
optimistic assumption that lines on the Somme and Aisne would be firmly 
held.28 
 This tendency to waver between concern and optimism was symptomatic 
of the public reacting first to news of the Belgian capitulation then to the 
implications that this had for the evacuating French and British forces. Both 
sides attempted to withhold information from the public in order to avoid 
massive swings either toward over optimism or deep pessimism. Nevertheless, 
although outright speculations concerning the likely success or failure of the 
evacuations were largely absent, political rhetoric continued to assert that no 
matter the outcome, victory was still assured. Proclamations and broadcasts 
were duplicated in the press on both sides, demonstrating continued resolve in 
the conflict and the alliance.29 These intense efforts were aimed at creating a 
framework in which the public could not perceive the possibility of defeat. 
Cooper broadcast on 28 May, noting the seriousness of the situation, but 
offering the belief that “there should be no loss of complete confidence in our 
ability to achieve ultimate victory.”30 Reynaud’s 28 May broadcast was also 
given much publicity, and itself served to shift blame for the current situation by 
pointing out that the Belgian withdrawal had opened the Dunkirk route to 
German divisions.31 Drawing out the imagery employed by both sides during the 
final days of May highlights the symbolic role that rhetoric often plays in 
constructing arguments that will influence the opinions of key groups and 
individuals. Most notably, on the basis of appearing strong, Britain argued that 	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French desires to make a direct petition to the U.S. for assistance should be 
avoided. War Cabinet discussion concluded that such an appeal would only 
“confirm American fears as to our weakness, and would not produce the desired 
effect.”32 The at times conflicting desire to maintain the Anglo-French struggle, 
while also preparing for the dissolution of the partnership was evidence of the 
broader contextual uncertainty. A message from Churchill, circulated within the 
government, made it clear that speculations over the French making a separate 
peace should not be entertained; however, regardless of what happened in the 
coming weeks, Britain would continue the fight.33  
British policy in the midst and immediate aftermath of Dynamo was 
centred upon the desire to keep French forces in the war as long as possible. 
However, these efforts were often focussed upon the rhetorical level and were, 
at the same time, closely linked to preparations for home defence. A few voices 
in the government, most notably Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs 
Alexander Cadogan, had expressed the belief that the British would be better 
off without the French. His rational calculation that the provision of British air 
protection would leave Britain defenceless was coupled with the more emotive 
claim that the French were “quite helpless and [had] no stomach for the fight.”34 
On 28 May Reynaud suggested making an appeal for aid to the United States, 
a move the Foreign Office criticised as engendering weakness and panic. It 
would be more expedient, they argued, to make a public statement regarding 
British commitment to the fight ahead.35 The ultimate success of the evacuation, 
which carried off 316,663 men between 26 May and 4 June, was greeted with a 
great deal of relief, although policy makers found themselves struggling to 
moderate the public response.36 Although successful as a withdrawal operation, 
decision makers hoped to frame the event as a precursor for the difficult fight 
ahead. The coming days saw renewed confidence among the British public and 
a decrease in criticisms of the French. However, as the crisis drew to a close, 
opinion reports recorded that morale was almost “too good” and that elation 
directed at the return of the BEF resulted in a failure to understand the 	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significance of the event.37 The following section will expand upon the reactions 
to the Dunkirk evacuations in early June, up until the French armistice request 
on 17 June, examining how the conflict was portrayed and understood within 
the press and by the public.  
 
Interpretations of the Dunkirk Evacuations  
Before the evacuation had been carried off successfully, the British public 
displayed an early tendency to criticise their French counterparts based, most 
notably, around rumours of their likely capitulation.38 However, a perceived 
change in military fortunes resulted in a sharp decline in criticism. Analysts 
considered this decline was in part due to positive press treatment of the 
fighting abilities of the French army.39 Indeed, press emphases on the heroic 
action of the men taking part in the evacuations left no doubt as to the solidity of 
the Anglo-French relationship. One article cited the “Anglo-French brotherhood” 
as “a demonstration of the supreme vitality of the youth of the two countries.”40 
The French press similarly focussed upon the heroic efforts of French and 
British forces, and also reported stunning RAF victories. One article reported 
the downing of 56 planes in a single day as the evacuation was carried out. On 
the other hand, J.B. Priestley’s 5 June broadcast claimed that the ability to carry 
out the operations when failure loomed was a sign of that special English ability 
to right a “miserable blunder.”41 In the days to follow, claims of the superior 
efforts of the RAF would come into question, thus undermining some of the 
credibility of government and press rhetoric. Similarly, increasing uncertainty 
centred upon the French war effort would become more evident in the wake of 
the jubilation of the evacuations. Churchill’s depiction of sentiment in late May 
appears to be greatly exaggerated, as it presents a retrospective view of total 
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self-assurance: “There was a white glow, overpowering, sublime, which ran 
through our island from end to end.”42 
 Leo Amery, newly appointed to the India Office, had high praise for 
Churchill as a war leader and expressed his own jubilation over the success of 
the Dunkirk evacuations. Nevertheless, by early June, he wrote of his own and 
Churchill’s fear that the French line would break under attack, leading directly to 
their exit from the war.43 Churchill’s private secretary John Colville recorded in 
his diary that telephone calls from Reynaud requesting more planes and troops 
were a source of annoyance to Churchill, who was focussed upon the 
consolidation of the home front and preservation of valuable resources but 
aware of the need to sustain French morale, giving it “no excuse for a 
collapse.”44 At the same time, tension was building in response to discussion 
surrounding the lack of air support available during the operations. Grandiose 
claims about the feats of the RAF were in sharp contrast with the stories of 
returning soldiers.45 The Ministry of Information (MOI) reported that first hand 
stories from returnees of the BEF saying that the RAF was not in evidence 
during the evacuation were leading to increasing doubts over the truthfulness of 
the broadcasts and press reports of RAF feats.46 Public frustrations over the 
lack of accurate news and the marked depth of official censorship can provide 
insights into how rhetoric was assessed against perceived events. Throughout 
the conflict, public opinion analyses pointed to the value that the public placed 
upon pragmatic accounts of events. In turn, the care that leading officials began 
to take in drafting justifications for potentially controversial policies emphasised 
the perceived importance of public opinion and by association, the rhetoric that 
helped structure these opinions. 
The success of the evacuations, however, rallied spirits in the short term. 
As Martin Alexander has pointed out, Dunkirk, while rapidly becoming proof of 
the British ability to muddle through, was also recognised by British civilians as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
42 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. 2, Their Finest Hour 
(London: Cassell & Co. Ltd, 1949), 88. 
43 Leo Amery, Transcribed Diary, 4 June 1940, AMEL 7/34, CA. 
44 Sir John Colville, private diaries, 1 June 1940, CLVL 1/2, CA. 
45 “Towards the End in Flanders: Bulk of BEF Withdrawn, German Air Raids in 
the South of France, Another 113 Planes Fall to RAF,” The Guardian, 3 June 
1940, 5. “4 to 1 Gains by RAF: Dunkirk Air Battles 169 Nazi Planes in 3 Days,” 
The Guardian, 3 June 1940, 5.  
46“Public Opinion on the Present Crisis,” 3 June 1940, INF 1/264, TNA. 
	   48	  
an episode in which the French had taken the brunt of the attack.47 Likewise, 
French portrayals in early June remained positive, referencing the glorious feats 
and resistance of the French and British fighting forces.48 Anglo-French rhetoric 
in the aftermath of Dunkirk remained positive even if doubts existed on both 
sides regarding the sustainability of the French effort. The success of the Anglo-
French alliance was largely portrayed through imagery that lauded the final 
outcome (victory) as inevitable. This sense of inevitability, crucially, was not 
based upon material superiority or preparedness, but rather, upon an 
interpretation of the conflict as one of good vs. evil or man vs. machine, and 
grounded in a historical understanding, which looked back at past British 
victories as assurance of this outcome. This idea was particularly strong in First 
Lord of the Admiralty, A.V. Alexander’s empire broadcast, which portrayed the 
Germans as sadistic murderers. It is worth quoting at length: 
We have proved to the world what we ourselves have always known 
– that the free men of the democracies are man for man superior, 
not merely to the masses of German infantry herded into the fight, 
but also to the specially trained fanatics of the German shock troops 
whose minds have been systematically perverted in order to make 
them ruthless killers of innocent men, women and children.49 
 Press stories focussed upon scenes of heroism and unity, mobilising 
Dunkirk as a symbolic success, which again served as confirmation of the final 
outcome. One French article described with emotion the scene as heroes 
disembarked in England.50 There was a strong sense that despite the superior 
mechanised equipment and numbers of men on the German side, being on the 
‘right’ or moral side of the war effort would assure an eventual Allied victory. 
Broadcasts aimed at the empire, as well as the U.S., argued that the spirit of the 
BEF was responsible for the success of the evacuations and their “refusal to 
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accept defeat” was “the guarantee of final victory.”51 The mobilisation of 
American sentiment served as a way to highlight the success of the operation, 
while placing the Allied effort alongside the opinion of a powerful “neutral” state 
lent legitimacy to the war effort.52 The high praise evident in the mass media 
and recorded in estimates of public opinion once again left some unease in 
political circles. Within the French government internal critique of British actions 
was rampant. The fact that there was not significant Anglophobia was due to 
the fact that these disputes were not made public.53 Mass Observation diarists 
from London remained generally optimistic and reported that others around 
them also appeared steady, classifying Dunkirk as a great achievement. A 
London shopkeeper observed that citizens appeared calmer than in previous 
months.54 Such observations led to fears that the evacuations engendered a 
worrying level of over optimism. Calls for revenge following German air raids on 
Paris on 4 June led the MOI to conclude that the public had no real 
understanding of the potential consequences of retaliatory raids on Germany.55 
Reports recommended rectifying the present interpretations of Dunkirk, which 
tended to see the retreat as not only a victory but as a “lasting achievement” 
and a sign that “we cannot ultimately be beaten.”56 Churchill’s Commons 
speech, published widely on 5 June, attempted to drive home the struggle as 
one that called for perseverance and resistance. Although the tone of the 
address was broadly praised in the press, the MOI reported a slight increase in 
Anti-French sentiment, attributed to Churchill’s references to fighting alone.57 
What remains clear is that publically neither side engaged in anything 
resembling outright criticism or speculation on the future of the conflict aside 
from stressing that eventual victory was assured. French and British rhetoric 
alike praised the evacuation as a success. Churchill’s address was published 
widely in the French press, as was praise for the orderly manner in which the 	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evacuations had been carried out.58 The “Spirit of Dunkirk,” it is fair to say, was 
not always an exclusively British memory.  
 Although public praise for the Anglo-French efforts continued following 
the evacuations, a growing sense of unease was present by 10 June. The 
negotiations that took place in the days leading up to Reynaud’s resignation 
and the French armistice request have been well documented and will only be 
briefly reviewed here. Reynaud’s 5 June Cabinet shuffle bringing in Paul 
Baudouin and Charles de Gaulle to assist in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and 
Ministry of Defence respectively had done little to quash creeping defeatist 
sentiment, although it finally removed Pétain’s nemesis in the Foreign Ministry, 
Edouard Daladier. On 15 June, British Ambassador Sir Ronald Campbell 
reported to the Foreign Office that Reynaud’s 13 June telegram to Roosevelt 
had made French continuation of the struggle virtually reliant on an American 
promise to enter the war at an early date. The telegram depicted a rapidly 
deteriorating situation. In the event of an armistice, Campbell and Churchill’s 
personal representative to Reynaud, Edward Spears, communicated their plan 
to obtain the scuttling of the fleet, but remarked that “we have little confidence 
now in anything.”59 In the days immediately preceding the French armistice 
request, British policy operated on a number of fronts, consolidating steps to 
take in case of a French exit, but still acting to maintain a joint war effort for as 
long as possible. This latter tactic relied heavily on publically espousing both the 
strength of the alliance and the victory that would result. When Reynaud 
received a reply from Washington, the Foreign Office noted that the promises 
for material aid fell short of Reynaud’s expectations.60  
Nevertheless, Churchill attempted to bolster Reynaud by arguing that the 
content of Roosevelt’s message was sufficient assurance to continue the 
struggle. A telegram from Churchill for Reynaud drew directly from the latter’s 
10 June speech, quoting a line that would bear striking resemblance to 
Churchill’s own famous address. “[The] cabinet is united in considering this 
magnificent document as decisive in favour of continued resistance of France in 
accordance with your own declaration of June 10 about fighting before Paris, 	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behind Paris, in a province or if necessary in Africa or across the Atlantic.”61 
This response, however, clearly was not consistent with British sentiment. A 
separate note would be sent privately to Roosevelt stressing the “moral and 
psychological effect” of American entrance into the war.62 Intelligence reports 
concluded that the British public, far from being bolstered by the message, was 
inclined to attribute Reynaud’s appeal to the imminence of a French collapse. 
Indeed, there was reported criticism of vague Churchillian phrases like “we will 
never surrender” and “we will fight in the streets, on the hills…” Such critiques 
rested on the belief that material deficiencies in men and equipment had led to 
the defeat, and that real steps to rectify shortages needed to be taken.63 While 
the Dunkirk evacuations had been highly praised, there was still pressure to 
continually move towards victory. Heroic rhetoric devoid of any strategy or not 
backed up by visible movement towards this goal was considered cheap and 
not at all reassuring. This point will be crucial in understanding how British 
wartime operations were justified in the years to come. 
On 15 June Reynaud requested under what conditions the British would 
be willing to release France from the 28 March agreement not to seek out a 
separate peace.64 Within his request he assured Churchill and the War Cabinet 
that he was certain that the terms would be unacceptable, thus leading to the 
resumption of the struggle. In this way, the request was contextualised not as a 
definitive exit from the conflict, but rather, as a way to boost morale in the 
metropole for a long battle ahead. Reynaud himself was largely in favour of 
continuing the conflict, if not from within France, then from one of its colonies. 
Nevertheless, even Reynaud’s successors maintained this line of reasoning 
largely for public effect. In the flurry of telegrams that followed the French 
request, the British initially agreed on the condition that the French fleet would 
proceed immediately to Britain, an addendum that apparently annoyed 
Reynaud.65 Shortly after, Campbell was instructed to withdraw the above 
agreement in exchange for an offer of Franco-British union. However, despite 	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de Gaulle’s enthusiasm and Reynaud’s initial positivity upon hearing the news, 
the French cabinet declined to accept the offer and Reynaud resigned on 16 
June. His replacement, Philippe Pétain, the hero of Verdun, requested armistice 
terms through Spain in the early morning hours of 17 June.  
 
“Weather Fine, Paris Surrendered”66 
The indecision and uncertainty under which events unfolded following the 
French request to ascertain armistice terms has been documented in detail in 
Edward Spears’ colourful account, Assignment to Catastrophe. In addition to 
describing the growing belief that France was unlikely to continue the struggle, 
Spears, who Churchill appointed as Chief Liaison Officer to de Gaulle, 
documented his own personal disgust for the enemies of the war effort. After 
catching sight of Pierre Laval at dinner one evening he was so troubled he was 
unable to finish eating, writing that he was “a revolting sight and he made me 
feel sick.”67 Although Spears supported the offer of Franco British Union, it was 
met with a great deal of scepticism on both sides. Indeed, it is unfair to attribute 
too much meaning to an offer that was itself hugely symbolic at a point when 
many rightly believed that French collapse was imminent. Discussions 
surrounding the offer of union had centred upon making a statement of unity “in 
a dramatic form” that would impress France enough that they would abandon 
armistice discussions.68 Indeed, objections raised at the 16 June War Cabinet 
meeting were met by Churchill’s admission that, although he was initially 
opposed to the suggestion of union, be believed that “some dramatic 
announcement was necessary to keep the French going.”69 Pétain’s depiction 
of the agreement as marriage to a corpse was more in keeping with the broad 
scepticism on both sides.70 Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Paul Baudouin 
rightly argued that such an agreement would provide no immediate practical 
relief to France.71 Cadogan wrote following a 10 a.m. War Cabinet meeting on 
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15 June, “No one seems to be very keen on the idea of Anglo-French union.”72 
The symbolic nature of this gesture is important in that it illustrates the 
willingness of British policy makers to foster understanding of the conflict as a 
collaborative effort. The division of France made this effort more difficult, but not 
impossible.  
The failure of this grand gesture shifted the conflict into a new phase in 
which both sides began to issue a series of statements justifying their individual 
actions and consolidating public support. French press response was 
understandably sparse in the metropole. Following the armistice request Le 
Temps published only two editions, one covering 19-21 June and the second 25 
June. Imperial publications, however, maintained a regular publication 
schedule. More importantly, Pétain’s broadcasts became a vital source of news 
within the metropole.73 Both Pétain and Churchill made radio broadcasts on 17 
June following the official request for terms, which had been made early that 
morning. Pétain, in a well-known radio address at noon that day, told the nation 
“with a broken heart…fighting must cease.”74 The text of this address and 
another declaration made by the now Minister for Foreign Affairs Paul 
Baudouin, were both printed in the Algiers press the following day. The content 
of Pétain and Baudouin’s addresses lead to a number of observations. First, 
both praised the heroic and noble efforts of the French forces against an enemy 
that was technologically and numerically superior.75 Second, Baudouin’s 
address attempted to justify an armistice based on a narrow and very limited 
definition of nationhood and indeed sovereignty. He concluded that the 
existence of the French nation meant maintaining “the purity of the French soul” 
and the “spiritual heritage” of the homeland.76  
These depictions were illustrative of the disparity that existed between 
French and British war aims and thus French and British understandings of 
sovereignty. Or, perhaps it is more appropriate to say, Anglo-French 	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perceptions and portrayals of sovereignty. It would become increasingly clear 
that the British effort and stated refusal to compromise their own freedom was 
based on the belief that sovereignty and freedom were tantamount to control 
over national borders and the land within those borders. Likewise, British 
criticisms of the Pétain government were based on the claim that it had no real 
power over internal affairs. Spiritual and cultural remnants meant very little from 
within the bounds of an aggressive and territorial conflict. The Algiers press 
dutifully included copies of Churchill’s broadcast and publicised the fact that 
British officials were apparently united in the decision to fight until victory was 
achieved. Although this decision was taken with careful consideration of 
material resources and the eventuality of an American declaration of war, 
Churchill blithely claimed that fighting on was assumed, not discussed: “…we 
were much too busy to waste time upon such unreal, academic issues.”77 
Churchill’s rhetoric, both in the midst of and in the aftermath of the conflict, was 
strikingly similar. His stated certainty that “in the end all will be well,” was to 
form the basis of British rhetoric, which would centre upon the certainty of 
victory in an honourable struggle.78 Although some MO diarists were sceptical 
of Churchill’s assuring speech, many writers observed that the public described 
his oratory as “like a tonic” or greatly soothing.79 A female writer from North 
London concluded pithily “the better educated stand these things less well than 
the simple.”80 Crucially, press reports stated clearly that this tragic news, far 
from coming as a shock, had been expected and was met with full 
preparedness.81 De Gaulle made his initial broadcast via the BBC the following 
day, calling upon France to continue the struggle. Official declarations from the 
French metropole described the address as void and his position in London as 
having no valid links with the French government.82 In the days to follow, British 
sources very publically asserted that the armistice request could be a ruse in 
which the dishonourable nature of the terms would be used to bolster French 
opinion into continuing the struggle. This possibility led directly to the 	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suppression of Gaullist broadcasts until 22 June. At the first meeting of the 
Vansittart Committee on 21 June, which was formed with the goal of 
coordinating continued French resistance, the committee members83 agreed 
that de Gaulle should not be permitted to make any further broadcasts.84 
Indeed, initially, a decision had been made and subsequently reversed to reject 
de Gaulle’s request to broadcast 18 June. This initial rejection was based upon 
the hope of preserving relations with the current French government.85 In any 
case, Churchill’s own ‘Finest Hour’ address made the same day would largely 
overshadow de Gaulle’s speech, which struggled to gain listeners. The 
confusion of this period belies oversimplified conclusions that British opinion 
was either shocked by or fully expected the French defeat.  
Likewise, it is easy to detect continued confusion on the French side. The 
sparse press availability gave new value to radio statements. However Pétain 
and Baudouin made contradictory justifications for requesting terms. Pétain’s 
initial broadcast had been made without the consent of his ministers and 
confusion as to the likely outcome of the request for terms had prompted an 
alteration in the text of the speech. Pétain had initially said, “The fighting must 
cease.” When printed, the text was changed to “We must try to cease the 
fighting.”86 The original text was altered largely to avoid the confusion the 
statement had caused amongst the armed forces. Pétain made a second 
address on 20 June in which he announced that plenipotentiaries had been 
selected to hear the German terms. Likewise, this communication made no 
mention of the possibility of resuming the struggle. It stated that the dire military 
situation, again due to the inferiority of French material and quantities of men, 
made the request inevitable. Going further, it called for a renewed spirit of 
sacrifice in order to rebuild France.87 Rebuilding could not take place without 
first accepting defeat and signing an armistice.  
These utterances were at odds with information that was being given to 
the British and even in some cases to the French public. After meeting with 
Pétain and Baudouin, First Lord Alexander reported to Churchill that he had 	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received verbal assurances that the French would not accept dishonourable 
terms as well as the impression that the struggle was likely to be resumed. 
Baudouin’s 17 June broadcast argued in a similar vein, asserting that the 
current situation faced by the armed forces made it necessary to inquire as to 
the intentions of Germany before considering final defensive measures.88 His 
use of national rhetoric consolidated imagery that depicted the long and proud 
history of the French nation state, thus linking the idea of national existence 
with the decision to request terms.89 However, despite the influx of telegrams 
arriving in Bordeaux from French North Africa and the Levant promising 
continued assistance and urging officials to renew the struggle, Pétain and his 
new cabinet refused to commit to an evacuation plan. Alexander expressed 
disdain for Pétain and distrust over his intentions, finding him to be “obviously 
very old and finding it difficult to connect.”90 Pétain’s addresses, which would 
focus on explaining the defeat and criticising the moral decay that had been 
rampant in the interwar years cast a long shadow on the idea of further 
resistance, even if the French Cabinet remained divided. Nevertheless, British 
policy was carried out under the assumption that continued resistance was still 
possible.  
 This uncertainty had clear effects on official rhetoric, most notably in the 
British suppression of further broadcasts by de Gaulle. Additionally, the press 
increased speculations over the possibility that the armistice terms would be 
rejected. These speculations were the beginning of the separation of the mass 
of the French public from the Pétain government. Initial reactions in the press 
focussed upon British resolve to continue the struggle and avoided criticising 
the French. It is important to distinguish between two different expectations in 
response to the French request. First, as mentioned above, there was little 
surprise expressed either in official rhetoric or public sentiment over this 
outcome. Second, the armistice request was not interpreted as a definitive exit 
from the struggle. Intelligence reports depicted public sentiment as one of 
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“confusion and shock, but hardly surprise.”91 First Sea Lord Dudley Pound 
assumed that the armistice terms would be invalidated by a request to 
surrender the French fleet, leading to the termination of the conference and 
resumption in fighting.92 By 20 June the British press was asserting that 
opposition to surrender was growing among the French population, a claim that 
was increasingly at odds with Pétain’s own explanations of the reasons for 
defeat. An article in The Guardian accused the Pétain government of 
suppressing the publication of favourable news such as increases in war 
material being supplied by the U.S.93 As late as 21 June Foreign Minister Lord 
Halifax reported a meeting with French Ambassador Charles Corbin at which 
the latter had suggested that public opinion in France was gaining strength to 
continue the fight.94  
However, Pétain’s own 20 June broadcast explained the reason for the 
defeat as “too few children, too few arms, too few allies.”95 His addresses 
provided little scope for continuing the struggle. His claims, that material 
shortage was the cause of the French withdrawal, attempted to justify a 
strategic military decision encompassed within broader arguments of interwar 
decadence. Victory in 1918, Pétain argued, led to a nation in which “the spirit of 
pleasure has prevailed over the spirit of sacrifice.”96 Already, criticisms were 
beginning to surface surrounding Pétain’s perceived defeatism. The Times 
published a critique of the address, arguing that Pétain, in a speech “calculated 
to take the heart out of the French people,” attempted to justify the request for 
an armistice.97 Attempts to explain the armistice request in terms of both 
material and moral shortages would become increasingly difficult to maintain, 
particularly in light of repeated promises not to agree to a dishonourable peace. 
On the British side, it was becoming apparent that separating the French as a 
nation from their leadership would allow for the perpetuation of the alliance, 
albeit in an altered form. The British became France’s saviour and rehabilitator.  	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 Nevertheless, even as British publications persisted in claiming that 
France might still reject the armistice terms, it was possible to detect a growing 
tendency to understand the struggle as an exclusively British one. Depictions 
were focussed upon the defence of fortress Britain rather than the possibility of 
continued French aid. Corbin reported 21 June that the British press contained 
little news about France and focussed instead on the British effort and the 
evolution of American opinion.98 Although there was little outright criticism of the 
French between 17-21 June, and indeed a great deal of pity for their current 
plight, there was a noticeable shift in how the war was understood.99 
Specifically, it was increasingly interpreted as a British war. A South London 
shopkeeper wrote that the public displayed a “quiet steady confidence: we fight 
alone.”100 Resolve attached to these sentiments indicated a growing disinterest 
for the plight of France. Intelligence reports went as far as warning, “the latency 
of anti-French feeling must never be forgotten. A few days ago sympathy 
swamped it but it found indirect expression in a common phrase ‘At last we 
have no Allies, now we fight alone’.”101 
 Following a humiliating armistice ceremony, conducted at Rehondes, 
General Huntziger signed a Franco-German armistice in the same rail carriage 
that Foch had presented his own terms to the Germans in 1918. Thus ended 
speculations of possible continued French resistance from abroad. The days 
and weeks ahead would see fewer hopes of continued imperial resistance 
despite earlier assurances. Although the Franco-German armistice was signed 
on 22 June, it would not go into effect until 25 June at 12:35 a.m., following the 
negotiation of a separate Franco-Italian agreement. The period following the 
signature of the armistice, and leading up to the British bombardments of the 
French fleet in early July, saw continued separation in British rhetoric, which 
firmly distinguished between the Pétain government and the rest of the French 
population. This distinction, alongside British representations of themselves as 
the last bulwark against a breakdown of civilisation, would be key themes in 
British rhetoric throughout the struggle. These portrayals of France and future 
justifications of British operations rested on the assumption that France was no 	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longer an independent and sovereign nation. On the other hand, Pétain’s 
government would fight directly against such claims, basing its legitimacy and 
right to rule on the maintenance of its colonial territories and fleet.  
 
No Longer a French Government 
British political intelligence summaries expressed nothing but frustration over 
the events of late June. Pétain was depicted as “a hopelessly broken weed” and 
his new government was accused of perverting the offer of Franco-British union 
into “a purely selfish intention to absorb France and her empire into that of 
Britain.”102 This period remains important because it illustrates decisive moves 
on both sides to construct lasting and persuasive arguments about what had 
happened over the last two months and how the outcomes should be 
understood. Rhetoric, in other words, was a vital tool used to garner immediate 
support for two different future plans. Moves to consolidate support included 
attempts to influence American opinion, either in demonstrations of resolve on 
the British side or justifications of departure from the conflict on the French side. 
Although American radio on 23 June reported that France had signed an 
armistice with Germany the previous day, the event was not broadly confirmed 
or analysed in the British mass media until 24 June.  
Nevertheless, Churchill’s own address, made the night of 22/23 June, 
expressing “grief and amazement” at the decision to accept the armistice terms, 
formed the basis of French objections. Baudouin expressed his particular 
displeasure over Churchill’s promise to remain true to the cause of the French 
people in the conflict, despite the actions of their government.103 Indeed, 
Churchill’s address lay the groundwork for arguments that the Bordeaux 
government, by agreeing to armistice terms, had not only betrayed the will of its 
own people, but had forfeited the moral platform that a path of resistance would 
have provided. Immediately following the armistice request, Franco-British 
rhetoric shifted dramatically. The themes that emerged during this shift would 
form the basis of much of the rhetoric espoused throughout the conflict. It was 
from this point that Pétain began to directly address British statements, which 
distinguished French opinion from his government. Similarly, 22-23 June was, 
in British official quarters, believed to be the period during which the British 	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public came to the conclusion that the armistice terms would be accepted.104 
British rhetoric from 24 June moved immediately to consolidate support based 
around two key arguments. First, official statements and responses from the 
media drove home the idea of British resolve based around depictions of 
themselves as the lone and morally-superior combatant in the struggle. Second, 
the Franco-German armistice was dishonourable and indeed unrepresentative. 
This latter claim led to arguments that the fleet was now virtually in German 
hands and the Bordeaux government was not representative of the majority of 
opinion within France and the broader empire.  
Although the armistice terms met none of Pétain’s criteria for refusal and 
had been carefully crafted by the Germans to avoid French re-entry into the 
conflict, British portrayals of the agreement as dishonourable were necessary, 
particularly from a symbolic point of view. The emergence of de Gaulle as a 
rival figure of French governance and the voice of the “true” France was at the 
core of the issue. His 18 June address had already made rival claims on the 
issue of French sovereignty. Speaking from London he said “I…am conscious 
of speaking in the home of France.”105 His radio addresses on 22 and 24 June 
calling on Frenchmen to join him in disowning the Franco-German armistice 
precipitated a concerned telegram from French Charge d’Affaires Roger 
Cambon. Writing to the Bordeaux government, he expressed his concern that a 
hostile propaganda war would pit France against Britain.106 Indeed, French 
rhetoric worked directly to combat British criticisms and assert the continued 
sovereignty of the French nation state against British and Gaullist arguments to 
the contrary. 
 French analyses of the British political and press response to the signing 
of the armistice were quick to note that British rhetoric was moving in a new 
direction. Churchill’s aforementioned statement, which directly challenged the 
legitimacy of the agreement and the current government, argued that 
acceptance of the terms could not have been made by a government that 
“possessed freedom, independence and constitutional authority.”107 In a 
broadcast from Bordeaux on 23 June, Pétain protested in the name of the 	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French government against accusations that there was a difference of opinion 
between the views of the nation and the government that was leading it.108 He 
alluded to the renewal of French greatness, which would be achieved through 
the courage and perseverance of her people. By again referencing the material 
inferiority of the French war machine, Pétain constructed a broader rationale for 
the armistice. France had simply been out numbered on every front, and the 
only logical choice was to relent and begin to rebuild the nation from those new 
foundations. It was possible, Pétain argued, to create a new and better France 
even from within vastly altered circumstances. These depictions were 
fundamentally different to how Britain envisaged the unfolding conflict. De 
Gaulle’s broadcast the same day (and authorised by the War Cabinet) stating 
his intention to set up a provisional French National Committee in cooperation 
with the British government, which would express the true will of France, was a 
direct challenge to the validity of the Bordeaux government.109 However, the 
War Cabinet was noticeably reticent toward issuing a statement of 
unconditional support for de Gaulle, cancelling the initial 23 June plan to do so. 
The War Cabinet waited for a further five days before issuing a statement that 
recognised de Gaulle’s leadership, and only after being pressured by the 
Vansittart Committee.110 Political issues were rapidly shifting to the forefront of 
British rhetoric, at the centre of which were questions of legitimacy and what 
constituted and who could speak for the French state. Mass media including the 
press and BBC referred to the metropolitan government as “the Pétain 
government,” indicating that it did not represent the authentic France.111  
This depiction was also consistent with analyses of British opinion, which 
concluded “at all levels of society the opinion is bitterly and vigorously 
expressed that the French people have been betrayed by ‘the politicians’.”112 
French official and media responses to British rhetoric claimed that Churchill 
had acted in bad faith when he criticised the authority of the current government 	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in taking a decision that he himself had agreed was necessary before 17 June. 
L’Echo d’Alger published an article entitled “L’Attitude Anglaise” laying out the 
dates that Britain had been told that it was likely that France would have to put 
down her arms. The first warning was listed as 20 May.113 Underneath the back 
and forth of French and British rhetoric lay the deeper issue of legality, made 
more relevant with the emergence of de Gaulle as a rival voice. Statements 
broadcast in French and English via the BBC on 23 June argued that not only 
had Pétain’s government broken the 28 March agreement not to conclude a 
separate armistice, the decision to sign the agreement would remove all agency 
from the government, thus depriving it of the “right to represent free French 
citizens.”114 Although subsequent attempts to establish what would become the 
Vichy government as illegal have been tenuous at best, in 1940 such claims 
were at the heart of attempts to gain broader public support.115 
 The immediate mobilisation within the War Cabinet to condemn the 
terms as dishonourable was linked to the claim that the agreement was made 
under duress and therefore confirmed that France was no longer a free and 
sovereign nation.116 At this juncture, although de Gaulle would begin to play a 
greater role, his calls to Frenchmen urging them to join him in continuing the 
struggle could hardly be called wildly successful. A week after his 18 June 
address, only a few hundred individuals had volunteered.117 Indeed, despite the 
War Cabinet’s decision to allow de Gaulle to broadcast on 23 June, and his 
representations of France as having been reduced to a state of slavery, few 
rallied to his call.118 The armistice terms themselves were described across the 
British press as wholly dishonourable. The Times depicted them as exacting 
“the complete capitulation of France.”119 Ongoing concern regarding the fleet 
resurfaced with the publication of terms on 24 June. Under the agreement, 
“France will be entirely powerless.”120 Cambon wrote to his government 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
113 “L’Attitude Anglaise,” L’Echo d’Alger, 26 June 1940, 1. 
114 France Libre, Dossier 2, 23 June 1940, AG/3(1)/257, AN. 
115 Jackson, The Dark Years, 133-136. 
116 War Cabinet 176 (40) Conclusions, 22 June 1940, CAB 65/7/71, TNA. 
117 Charles de Gaulle, The Complete War Memoirs of Charles de Gaulle, vol. 1, 
The Call to Honour, trans. Jonathan Griffin (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1955), 88. 
118 “Submission to Slavery: Plea to Frenchmen, General de Gaulle’s Broadcast,” 
The Guardian, 24 June 1940, 6. 
119 “Hitler’s Terms for an Armistice Accepted,” The Times, 24 June 1940, 6. 
120 “The Terms,” The Guardian, 24 June 1940, 4. 
	   63	  
describing continued publications throughout the British press of material 
highlighting protests against the armistice within the French Empire.121 The 
mobilisation of imagery, particularly French dissent, was used as a way to drive 
home the legitimacy of British claims. 
Diplomatic disputes over the extent to which Britain attempted to 
convince French colonies to fight alongside Britain and the newly-recognised de 
Gaulle were an ongoing source of tension. Corbin’s complaint to Halifax that de 
Gaulle should not have been allowed to broadcast on 23 June and his 
subsequent request that the British declaration in French backing de Gaulle’s 
statement be kept out of the press were symptoms of a deeper crisis based 
upon two competing sources of Frenchness.122 Indeed, the Bordeaux 
government issued a “painful” note of complaint, which, following Corbin’s 
refusal to deliver it, arrived via Cambon. The newly-formed government 
protested against “the terms used by the Prime minister” as he sought to 
separate the true public opinion from the actions of Pétain’s government.123 
Nowhere was criticism greater than in the British press. The Times, in a claim 
that today seems ironic given American recognition of the Vichy government, 
claimed that French “independence” was a mockery “realized nowhere more 
acutely than in the United States.”124 It was generally agreed during this period, 
however, that relations with the Bordeaux government should not be completely 
severed even if they remained outwardly strained. Rhetorical condemnations, in 
other words, did not rule out back door diplomacy. Desmond Dinan has argued 
that after the Franco-German armistice was signed, “the British government lost 
all sensitivity to metropolitan French opinion.”125 However, this is inaccurate. 
While the British government would consistently criticise the Vichy government 
throughout the war, they were very careful to avoid implicating the broader 
French population and Pétain, who they knew still commanded a great deal of 
respect amongst a majority of citizens.  
 The fact that the terms of the armistice were not published within France 
until 25 June gave the British a new source of criticism. Following the news that 	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an armistice had been signed with Italy, The Guardian stressed the dishonour 
of the agreement, commenting “the Bordeaux Government, for understandable 
reasons, has not made known the nature of the German terms to the French 
people.”126 The assumption inherent in this statement makes it clear to the 
reader that only a small group of duplicitous and defeatist men stood in the way 
of a general population anxious to continue the struggle. More blatant 
statements regarding the armistice as “a betrayal of the French people” and 
“the handful of men” who surrendered French honour would emerge at the 
centre of Anglo-French tensions.127 The wealth of studies regarding the general 
chaos following the refugee crisis and immediate relief that met the 
announcement of a cessation in hostilities belies such sentiments.128 However, 
what is clear is that British rhetoric in the aftermath of the armistice request 
became increasingly judgmental of French decisions, creating a framework that 
allowed for the separation of the general population from what would become 
“the men of Vichy.” French observations of the British population concluded that 
they continued to hold the people of France in high regard and recognised the 
extent of their suffering.129 British rhetoric, then, was not just a way to ensure 
their own population of an eventual victory. It also was a means to preserve 
links between the larger population of metropolitan France and the ongoing war 
effort.  
 In order to discredit the Franco-German and to a lesser extent the 
Franco-Italian armistice, British arguments focussed upon the inherently 
untrustworthy nature of both parties. Notably, the Italians were treated more as 
a circling buzzard or a slightly annoying second cousin, rather than an organic 
threat. De Gaulle, in his 26 June BBC French address, asked how France was 
expected “to rise again from beneath the German jack-boot and the Italian 
dancing-slipper.”130 The Foreign Office suggested portraying the Italians as 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
126 “The Armistice,” The Guardian, 25 June 1940, 4; also Diplomatic 
Correspondent, “French People in the Dark,” The Times, 25 June 1940, 6. 
127 “Former Paris Correspondent, “The Riddle of the French Capitulation: Pétain 
and the Men Behind Him,” The Guardian, 25 June 1940, 4. “Britain and 
France,” The Guardian, 26 June 1940, 4. 
128 Hannah Diamond, Fleeing Hitler, France 1940 (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008). Jackson, The Dark Years. Jackson, The Fall of France. Robert O 
Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard New Order 1940-1944 (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1972). 
129 Cambon to Bordeaux, 25 June 1940, 10GMII/292, MAE. 
130 “De Gaulle to Pétain: Who is Responsible?” The Guardian, 27 June 1940, 7. 
	   65	  
duplicitous and sneaky in press and public statements. Although the terms 
appeared to be lenient, Italian intentions were to first demilitarise any zones of 
interest and then take them completely during peace negotiations.131 The 
perceived importance of American opinion and its anticipated participation in 
the struggle was also a concern on both sides of the channel. A Foreign Office 
note suggested countering negative French propaganda in the U.S. by arguing 
that British victory was a certainty. The same note, while emphasising the need 
not to engage in petty criticisms of French fighting efforts, made the slightly less 
actionable suggestion of landing “a few tough British marines in France” with 
the object of killing a few Germans. Such a sensational story, it was believed, 
could be worth “hours of drawing-room gossip and backstairs chat.”132 This 
response was a direct action taken following French publications in the U.S. 
accusing Britain of failing to mobilise men and resources during the conflict: “It 
was obvious that Britain had believed more in the blockade than in the provision 
of material assistance to her Ally.”133 Importantly, these plans illustrate a 
conscious effort to shape opinion through rhetoric and heroic, but strategically 
ineffective, action. What was important was to create the perception that Britain 
was taking action to defeat the enemy.  
 Harsh criticism like that which had met the abdication of King Leopold a 
month earlier was largely absent from depictions of the French armistice. The 
clear efforts to separate the bulk of the population from their leaders were 
evidence of the broader desire to maintain positive views of the French 
population within Britain. The expectation of victory and of a post-war France, 
which would be rehabilitated as a victor nation, played a key role, particularly in 
the emotive language of Churchill’s speeches. His address on 25 June in the 
Commons called for Britain to focus upon the task ahead, leading to the rescue 
of France “from the ruin and bondage into which she has been cast by the 
might and fury of the enemy.”134 The construction of the Anglo-French 	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relationship as one that remained valid, so long as the current government was 
excluded, was an important assumption of British rhetoric in the following years, 
and indeed, in the post-war years as well. It was premised on the notion that no 
matter who claimed to lead the French nation, the legitimate France remained 
true to the aims and goals of Britain. Pétain’s address, also made on 25 June, 
provides the opportunity to emphasise how each side dealt with and understood 
the concept of defeat. While Churchill’s speech focussed upon the inevitability 
of victory, Pétain’s outlined rational statistics, which made defeat inevitable. In 
sharp contrast to Churchill’s moral tones, Pétain argued “that victory is 
dependent upon men, material and how they are used.”135 
The French defeat led to a crisis of legitimation. It is crucial to consider 
how such sentiments were created not from the ground up, but through a 
framework of past successes and current understandings of Britain. Later 
interpretations of wartime sentiment too often make conclusions based upon 
the knowledge that Allied victory was forthcoming. Peter Mangold writes, 
“Britain’s final advantage over its ally was moral. Unlike France, the crisis of 
June, 1940, pulled the British together, producing a climate of defiance.”136 
However, such observations fail to understand that the moral rhetoric of the 
British struggle is not equivalent to an objective analysis of “why Britain won.” 
Rather, myths and memories that grew stronger in the aftermath of the war 
“were as much a consequence as a cause of victory.”137 The shift in 
representations of the war from an Anglo-French to a British struggle would play 
a crucial role in June 1940. Roger Cambon reported on the generally firm 
confidence in Britain, attributing it to ignorance regarding the battle to come and 
sentiments linked to “la citadelle britannique.”138 Churchill made references to 
Britain as an impenetrable island fortress in the immediate aftermath of the 
armistice request. His address on 17 June referred to the upcoming battle as a 
“world cause,” whose next battle would be the defence of “our island home.”139 
Likewise, Duff Cooper’s 19 June BBC broadcast drove home the advantages of 	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this new phase of the conflict. “We are nearly all inside the fortress now – the 
fortress is well defended and well supplied and will hold out until the efforts of 
the enemy are exhausted.”140 Heroic statements and assumptions of a 
victorious outcome, apparently through defensive efforts alone, were at the core 
of British rhetoric in the aftermath of the French defeat and throughout the war 
years. Ernest Bevin’s overseas broadcast on 23 June bestowed the upcoming 
battle with all of the trappings of historical greatness and triumph. At this “critical 
moment in world history” the Commonwealth would stand between “tyranny and 
liberty” and will ultimately triumph.141 The necessity of resistance was 
constructed upon the premise that being on the “right” side was a precursor for 
and an assurance of victory. 
Two related points of clarification should be made at this point. First, as 
John Darwin has pointed out, “The Fall of France opened the decisive phase of 
Britain’s imperial crisis.”142 Defending metropolitan Britain from what was 
thought to be imminent invasion was undoubtedly a top priority. However, the 
war that Britain now faced was an imperial war. Egypt and the Suez Canal were 
now under direct Italian threat and British eastern territories including Malaya 
and Singapore stared down the barrel of Japanese encroachment. Second, 
there was a strong tradition of securing Commonwealth support from wealthy, 
westernised and anglophilic countries including Canada, Australia, New 
Zealand and South Africa, giving Britain access to essential resources. The 
support provided by these nations as well as India (between May-November 
1940 the Indian army doubled in size)143 in material and manpower were vital 
considerations that allowed Britain to continue pursuing the struggle against the 
Axis powers.  
In the weeks following the French withdrawal, the massively under 
sourced and under informed British security service, or MI5, struggled both to 
learn more about the enemy it was facing and deal with the thousands of 
reports of suspected enemy infiltration.144 At the same time, military concerns, 
most notably the subject of the fleet, remained topics of great importance in 	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parliamentary circles. The significance of the fleet and the belief that Germany 
would simply seize it for use against Britain had already been a topic of 
conversation within the press. Once the terms of the armistice had been 
published, the offending article - which called for all French ships to return to 
their peacetime ports for demobilisation - was cited as another sign of German 
deceit and held up against all of the broken promises made in the past. As early 
as 24 June, ships in Oran were being kept under close watch “in case it might 
be necessary to take drastic action against them.”145 Churchill’s 25 June 
Commons address, while refusing to speculate on the fate of the fleet, 
nevertheless portrayed his concern regarding the current state of affairs.146 A 
closer study of the rising issue of the French fleet will be made in the following 
two chapters. However, at this point it must be stressed that questions of the 
fleet and empire were rapidly becoming central to both British policy and 
rhetoric. Likewise, they were beginning to form the basis of French claims of 
sovereignty. 
 
Conclusion 
The progression of the Anglo-French relationship between the Dunkirk 
evacuations in late May and the armistice coming into effect on 25 June 
illustrates how an alliance was reframed to reflect two vastly different policies. It 
was also the beginning of a triangular rivalry between British, Vichy and Gaullist 
forces. By examining the progression of sentiment during this period, it 
becomes evident that the initial alliance was both complex and at times highly 
uncertain. At the outbreak of war, it appeared as though both sides were 
mobilising resources for close cooperation. However, Germany’s swift progress 
unleashed chaos in the Low Countries and throughout France. Between 15-20 
June an estimated 6-8 million refugees flooded French roads and panicked 
officials deserted their posts.147 The possibility of a French collapse was 
considered not only within the political sphere but also among the broader 
public. Likewise, frays in the relationship were evident behind closed doors in 	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late May and early June. Even so, the frustrations expressed by French officials 
were deliberately kept out of the press in order to avoid damaging the public’s 
perception of the partnership and the broader conflict. Although British official 
rhetoric made no blatant speculations on the possibility of defeat, increasing 
references to the intention to continue the struggle no matter what happened 
resonated with the British public in a similar manner. “No matter what” became 
an early metaphor for French defeat. Public responses to the armistice were 
undoubtedly emotionally loaded; however, it is hard to argue that total shock 
was a statistically significant response. 
 This chapter establishes a framework for understanding how common 
themes and approaches became mainstays of the Anglo-French relationship 
over the next five years. The French decision to request an armistice on 17 
June set in motion first a tentative and then an increasingly rapid shift in the 
rhetoric of both sides. Uncertainty in the initial days after the request led to 
some hope, however small, that the French would continue the struggle from 
abroad after rejecting the armistice terms as dishonourable. Indeed, British 
rhetoric during this period made it clear that Germany was incapable of 
honourable acts, making any agreement unacceptable. The benefits of de 
Gaulle’s presence in Britain at this point were unconfirmed, as British officials 
sought to balance their relations with the current Bordeaux government and 
consolidate support within the broader French Empire. When the Franco-
German armistice was signed on 22 June, both sides moved rapidly to 
consolidate their positions with their own publics as well as important neutral 
territories, most notably the United States. Attempts to frame or justify decisions 
as an inevitable outcome of Germany’s mechanised assault coupled with the 
rotten decadence of interwar France were at the core of Pétain’s addresses. 
While British sources tended to agree that mechanical superiority had been the 
downfall of the Allied effort, criticism was levelled at the new government. British 
rhetoric laid the foundations for depictions of the leadership of metropolitan 
France throughout the war. Competing claims of legitimacy and national 
sovereignty were at the heart of the issue. Most notably, these constructs were 
based upon the argument that the Bordeaux government did not represent the 
majority of opinion within the French public, who were allegedly eager to 
continue the struggle. This approach made it possible for Britain to exonerate 
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the larger bulk of the population and simultaneously support de Gaulle as the 
purportedly true voice of France.  
 In the weeks following the armistice agreement, Pétain and Churchill 
would engage in a rhetorical battle as each attempted to establish foundations 
upon which to end or continue a war. As Churchill challenged the sovereignty of 
France, Pétain consolidated his own legitimacy and embarked upon a road 
which he hoped would lead to the renewal of France. Political communiqués 
issued by Baudouin emphasised that France was now a neutral territory and 
would act without prejudice to maintain this status.148 It was at this juncture that 
heroic British rhetoric describing victory as both inevitable and just begun to 
take shape. The Allied conflict became an exclusively British conflict (leading to 
French rescue), as did positive memories of the Dunkirk evacuations. 
Churchill’s frequent references to “German thoroughness” as no match for 
“British pluck” are another example of how retrospective and historically-
grounded assumptions can carry on masquerading as logical argument.149 By 
the end of 1940, the spectre of the long war ahead and the prospect of the 
gloomy winter months had dampened the mood of the British public. However, 
concerted efforts on the part of the MOI to find the ideal “psychological moment” 
to make public announcements were indicative of the continued belief in the 
power of communication.150 This conviction regarding the impact that rhetoric 
could make was an echo of earlier, pre-war preparations. The months following 
the armistice would see continued uncertainty, particularly surrounding the 
Anglo-Vichy relationship. This was accompanied by the knowledge that, 
ultimately, the conflict had shifted dramatically. The following chapters will track 
these shifts, as they increasingly resulted in violent Anglo-French clashes, both 
military and rhetorical. Beneath attempts to explain, condemn, or justify foreign 
policy, each side would rely upon the framework that they built up in the days 
after the armistice, mobilising competing ideas of sovereignty, legitimacy, and 
the moral stance of their respective paths.  
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Chapter 3: “The Real Question at Issue”  
British Policy Formulation and the French Fleet 	  
Introduction 
“In the fullest harmony with the Dominions we are moving through a period of 
extreme danger and of splendid hope when every virtue of our race will be 
tested and all that we have and are will be freely staked.”1 Churchill’s words, 
published in The Times on 5 July 1940, resounded in the aftermath of the 
British bombardment of the French fleet at the Algerian port of Mers el-Kébir, 
codenamed operation Catapult. They justified what was portrayed as a 
“necessary tragedy” carried out against an erstwhile ally. The starkly violent 
nature of the event was utterly suppressed within British official explanations 
and within the domestic press more broadly. Instead, Churchill linked the 
emotive yet vague concepts of ‘danger’ and ‘hope’ with the idea that the natural 
superiority of the British, both as a fighting force and a moral element, would 
eventually triumph. Thus, he effectively camouflaged the brutality of the 
bombardment, substituting instead celebratory imagery promising the 
continuing and ultimately successful prosecution of the war.  
The clashes that took place on 3 July 1940 between the British and 
French at Mers el-Kébir have been subject to a series of interpretations on both 
sides of the channel. Early analyses of these events on the British side tended 
to vindicate the action based upon the argument of “unfortunate necessity” - the 
British simply could not risk the possibility of the French fleet falling into German 
or Italian hands. From the French perspective, the operations have more often 
been interpreted as a betrayal of the Anglo-French alliance and evidence of 
underlying British self interest and historic perfidy. This latter perspective 
formed the crux of Jacques Costagliola’s argument in which the French were 
ultimately dual victims of both German and British determination to win the war 
with little cognizance or moral concern for the collateral damage sustained by 
France.  
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The Germans were willing to leave to us our ships, however, they 
demanded that they return from Britain. On 3 July, they posed an 
ultimatum: return them to their ports or the armistice will be void. On 
the same day, Catapult put everything into question, in Britain, at 
Oran, at Alexandria. The Franco-British war began loudly.2  
As more archival materials were being released in the 1970s, Anglophone 
scholarship began to take a more balanced perspective, although still justifying 
the basis upon which policy towards the fleet had been carried out. Writing on 
Darlan’s early policies, Robert Melka argued that the strategic importance of the 
fleet was not at issue. However, he affirms that Darlan never considered 
handing the fleet over to Germany, nor did Hitler consider, prior to the Torch 
operations in 1942, taking it by force.3 In any case, the ultimate scuttling of the 
French Fleet at Toulon in 1942 was proof of the validity of the French promise. 
Arthur Marder’s 1974 work, From the Dardanelles to Oran, argued, similarly, 
that although Britain had miscalculated about both German and Italian 
intentions and capabilities, this mattered little in the ultimate decision, because 
Britain simply could not trust either party to keep its word.4 His analysis took a 
more pragmatic view of events, rather than intending to place blame upon one 
of the actors. It also framed the context of the decision-making process in a 
more realistic manner, taking into account relevant limiting factors such as trust 
and uncertainty, which would have affected the perception of available options.  
Still, the topic of the French fleet and British policy towards it continues to 
generate interest. Philip Lasterle has pinpointed Churchill as essentially the 
driving force behind the policy making process, all other actors being only 
reluctant and guilt-ridden bystanders. His focus upon Churchill and French 
Admiral at Mers el-Kébir Marcel-Bruno Gensoul obscures the wider context and 
complexities of the decision-making process, as he sets out to determine to 
what extent Mers el-Kébir was “avoidable.”5 This interpretation is far too narrow 	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in its focus. Moreover, comparing the destruction at Mers el-Kébir to the more 
favourable outcome at Alexandria fails to account for the complexities inherent 
in the policy towards the Vichy French navy and its early distinction between the 
circumstances at each port. These differences led policy makers to the early 
conclusion that hostile action was acceptable at Mers el-Kébir, but not at 
Alexandria or Algiers, where civilian causalities as well as the destruction of 
British installations would have been too damaging. This was a point that John 
Colville, Private Secretary to Churchill emphasised in his introduction to Warren 
Tute’s book, The Deadly Stroke: “The War Cabinet reached the only possible 
conclusion. The ships at Plymouth, Portsmouth and Alexandria presented no 
insuperable difficulty… but a wide range of options must be offered to Admiral 
Gensoul at Oran.”6 Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and Claude Huan make a valid and 
valuable point in their assertion that militaristically, the British course of action 
was sound.7 Indeed, from a material point of view, it was one of the few feasible 
options given Britain’s limited resources. The following two chapters suggest 
that equally importantly, the public display of decisive action against the fleet 
carried a great deal of symbolic power. This was an act calculated to 
demonstrate British resolve in the on-going conflict. 
The analysis that follows is distinct from previous studies because it 
focuses on the extent to which military capability, perceptions of strategic 
imperatives, and anticipated public reactions to such an operation were thought 
likely to impact upon the prestige and credibility of the British war effort. Imagery 
and memories from this event rapidly became a barometer for measuring the 
state of Anglo-Vichy relations throughout the conflict and they resurfaced during 
future clashes at Dakar and in the Levant. The allocation of two chapters to 
Catapult is essential in order to fully understand the nuances of the decision 
making process, making plain how policy makers anticipated particular public 
responses both from metropolitan publics and from populations abroad 
immediately following the collapse of the French war effort. Furthermore, the 
policy process emphasised from the beginning the importance of achieving 
public support for these actions, and included active plans to foster this backing. 
In other words, the policy making process, the actual bombardments, and the 	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rhetorical discussion and interpretation of the outcome were factors that were 
both intimately linked and co-determined. British thinking about the French fleet 
encompassed consideration of its military capability, but also careful analysis of 
how a possible neutralisation of it might be justified. Herein lies the link between 
the policy making that took place behind closed doors and the subsequent 
dissemination of that much-refined policy into the public sphere(s), where it 
would be discussed and justified by analysis of the official rhetoric produced. 
Policy making during this period betrayed an early preoccupation with the 
eventuality of translating policy into convincing press releases and public 
statements, which mobilised heroic rhetoric confirming British superiority and 
the certainty of eventual victory. 
The scope of this first section will encompass the initial discussion 
surrounding the importance of the French fleet to British interests, the decision 
to take action against the fleet, and the refinement of that policy. There was a 
consensus both within the War Cabinet and the Service Ministries that 
something should be done to safeguard France’s fleet for the Allied cause. 
However, this sentiment was modified to take account of the underlying but 
crucial need to justify any British action taken in a manner that would preserve 
British moral superiority, while also remaining in sympathy with the abiding pro-
French sentiment among the British public as a whole. Such beliefs would 
shape the ways in which Catapult was coordinated, imposing tangible 
constraints on the operation more broadly, especially in relation to the use of 
force. British strategic planners thus acknowledged that garnering public 
support both at a local and global level were vital, if intangible aspects of the 
broader conflict.  
 
Early Planning and the Significance of the French Fleet 
The French fleet and naval affairs more generally played a crucial role in both 
French and British perceptions of themselves and of one another throughout 
the Second World War. This was particularly true immediately after the French 
collapse. An internal French message cited the fleet as “one of the essential 
elements of our international situation.”8 For metropolitan France, the fleet was 
a symbol of prestige, power and legitimacy, the protector of the empire, and a 
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hypothetical bargaining chip with the Axis powers.9 The French navy was 
indeed a powerful force. It was the most modernised and least demoralised of 
all the French armed services. This was a result of the huge sums of money 
invested in it between 1922 and 1940 and the fact that in June it remained 
undefeated.10 Its importance, as second in size only to the British fleet, was a 
source of strategic concern throughout the British policy making process.  
To London and the Admiralty, it represented a dangerous liability while its 
neutralisation would send a powerful message of British power. On 23 June 
King George VI sent a message to French president Albert Lebrun. In it, he 
expressed his concern over the safety of the French fleet.11 Messages such as 
this one quickly became a source of great annoyance to the French. The 
Americans, a report from the French Foreign Ministry complained, were just as 
paranoid and pushy as the British. President Roosevelt had also written, on 16 
June, recommending that the French fleet be sent to British ports as soon as 
possible.12  
Even before the Franco-German and Franco-Italian armistices went into 
effect on 25 June, the British were considering how to approach the French 
fleet. In particular, the fate of two modern battleships, Dunkerque and 
Strasbourg, was quickly becoming a source of significant anxiety. They were 
first mentioned on 15 June in a message from First Sea Lord Dudley Pound to 
admirals Andrew Cunningham and Dudley North. This note, authorised by 
Churchill, suggested using gun and torpedo fire to destroy the ships in question 
if they were in immediate danger of falling into the hands of the enemy.13 At a 
meeting between Churchill, Pound and First Lord of the Admiralty V.A. 
Alexander on 17 June, there was a general discussion regarding “the disposal 
of the French Fleet which would arise in certain eventualities.”14 The fleet was 
undoubtedly important, as we can see here, for strategic reasons. The War 
Cabinet considered taking action as early as 22 June to secure Oran as an 	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alternative British naval base to Gibraltar.15 Admiral James Somerville, who led 
Force H, which was stationed at Gibraltar, expressed concern, writing on 24 
June in his pocket diary, “news about French Fleet not so good.”16 Alexander 
Cadogan, Permanent Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, highlighted the 
extent to which questions regarding the fleet consumed policy makers in the 
wake of the collapse. Writing on 24 June he reflected on the three Cabinet 
meetings that had taken place that day. The majority of the time was spent 
“discussing the awful problem of the French Fleet.”17 
On 26 June the general conclusion reached by the War Cabinet 
(Churchill himself was absent from this discussion) was that there was little 
hope of further French resistance in North Africa or continued naval 
participation.18 This realisation prompted cabinet members more seriously to 
consider possible solutions to neutralise the fleet. In fact, steps had already 
been taken to secure the key French ship Richelieu and take it to a British port 
for at least the duration of the war. This move was to be explained to the 
Captain of the Richelieu as stemming not from British scepticism of Admiral 
Darlan’s promises, but, rather, a rational inability to depend upon the word of 
Germany or Italy.19 At the same meeting Pound reported upon the situation at 
Oran. The admiralty was worried that Dunkerque and Strasbourg would depart 
for a French or Italian port on the north coast of the Mediterranean and had 
stationed two British submarines outside of the port to stop any movement. 
Further discussion within the Cabinet centred upon whether the submarines 
should engage exclusively in surveillance of the ships, or if they should “take 
action against them.”20 Although officials did not reach a decision on this 
question immediately, their discussions were part of a broader sentiment, which 
recognised the importance of the French fleet and the understanding that 
violence was a defensible means to secure its nonparticipation in the on going 
conflict.  	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On the British side, this sense of uneasiness surrounding the French 
fleet was based on a number of factors. We have seen that as a military asset, 
the fleet was certainly of great value. Pound estimated that the Germans would 
be able to achieve full operational capabilities of the fleet in only 2-3 months.21 
The contemporary accuracy of this statement matters less than its perceived 
accuracy in 1940. Admiral Darlan’s repeated promises that the fleet would in no 
circumstances be allowed to fall into German hands were of little value to the 
British. War Cabinet discussions confirmed the opinion that the French would 
not be able to honour this promise while under the German thumb. More 
importantly, Germany was unlikely to uphold any agreement of non-
interference. However, a third issue also impacted considerations towards the 
fleet: the necessity of demonstrating on a local and global level Britain’s 
strength and resolve in continuing the war effort. In the final analysis, the 
decision to “take action” against the fleet was not synonymous with its 
destruction. Rather, its neutralisation on British terms would make it unavailable 
to the Axis powers while simultaneously showcasing British power. This thinking 
will be crucial in understanding how and why British policy towards the fleet was 
discussed and agreed upon over the next week. The following section will 
examine this idea in more detail. Namely, it will suggest that policy makers 
operated under two main assumptions. First, some elements of the French fleet 
were strategically more important than others. This assertion has already been 
touched upon in the early discussions surrounding the fate of Dunkerque and 
Strasbourg. Second, the symbolic importance of taking confident and decisive 
action against the fleet played a significant role in how Catapult was planned. 
This argument will be especially evident in the attention that policy makers paid 
towards avoiding action that would lead to civilian causalities. Alternatively, they 
were anxious to endorse action that would meet the approval of American 
opinion. 
 
Formulating Catapult and the American Factor 
Philip Lasterle has pinpointed 27 June as the day that Churchill “imposed” his 
solution regarding the French fleet upon the Cabinet:  
The continuing deterioration of Franco-British diplomatic and naval 
relations contributed to a climate of “deep mistrust of France,” which 	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led even the most reluctant ministers, tired of resisting, to accept the 
option by which Churchill hoped to kill two birds with one stone: 
preclude the Kriegsmarine from running off with the flower of the 
French Navy and solidify his authority as war leader in the country.22  
This was also the date that Somerville received notification that he would be 
commanding Force H in securing “the transfer, surrender or destruction of the 
French warships at Oran and Mers el Kébir, so as to ensure that these ships 
could not fall into German or Italian hands.”23  
Arguing that Churchill pressured his cabinet to ratify hostile action against 
the French navy, however, is an oversimplification of the decision-making 
process that surrounded the Catapault operations. It also ignores the broader 
symbolic value of the operation as a resolution to successfully prosecute the war 
and signal to the Americans that Britain was indeed a safe investment. As we 
saw in the previous section, there was general consensus between Churchill, his 
Cabinet, and the Admiralty that action should be taken to “neutralise” the fleet, 
or strategic ships within it in order to safeguard the war effort and better prepare 
for the defence of Britain.24 This point was reiterated at the 27 June War Cabinet 
meeting as members noted, “The real question at issue was what to do as 
regards the French ships at Oran.”25  
At this point, Churchill presented three options. First, the ships could 
immediately be mined with magnetic mines. Second a British naval contingent 
could give those ships a number of alternatives including demilitarisation under 
British control, transfer to British ports, or to be sunk in three hours. Last, was 
the possibility of posting two submarines outside Oran, which would sink the 
ships if they attempted to leave.26 The use of destructive force remained 
throughout the operation a last resort, although a possibility nonetheless. The 27 
June Cabinet meeting was crucial for two reasons. First, as discussed above, it 
made very clear that the ships currently berthed at Oran, specifically, the military 
port of Mers el-Kébir, were of crucial importance to British interests. Although 
the possibility of combining operations at Oran with others in the Mediterranean 	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or with attempts to secure the Richelieu and Jean Bart, was mentioned, plans 
for Oran continued to take priority. 
The second part of the meeting addressed British public opinion 
surrounding the French fleet. This discussion made it clear that policy makers 
were considering and taking measures to try to influence how wartime 
operations were likely to be received by members of the public. 
In discussion, the view was expressed that it was most important to 
take action to ensure that the French Fleet could not be used against 
us. Public opinion was strongly insistent that we should take action on 
the lines of the measures taken at Copenhagen against the Danish 
Fleet. In this connection, however, references which were now 
appearing in the Press, as to measures which might be taken against 
the French Fleet, were greatly to be deprecated, and instructions 
should be sent to ensure that this matter was not discussed in the 
Press.27 
The War Cabinet simultaneously agreed that action should be taken 
against the fleet and that public opinion was already both receptive to and actively 
advocating for this approach. Analyses of the British press sent to Vichy by Roger 
Cambon, the French Charge d’Affaires in London, concluded that confidence in 
Britain remained relatively strong after events in France. The population was 
focused largely on the battle ahead and the possibility of German invasion.28 A 
decisive solution to the uncertain future of the French fleet would further bolster 
public confidence. Having noted that much of the British population was likely to 
approve of operations against the fleet, the War Cabinet agreed that it would be 
best if any hypothetical operation were not discussed in the press. Members 
decided that the press should be told, “discussion of such measures might have 
an unfavourable reaction in French circles which we hoped to rally to our side.” 29 
Certainly, at this juncture, attempts to bolster the image of General Charles de 
Gaulle as an alternative to Pétain’s government had had little effect. Cunningham, 
the Commander in Chief of the Mediterranean fleet, would write to Pound in 
regards to de Gaulle, “No one has any opinion of him.”30 Nevertheless, London 	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was also motivated to quash any speculation in the press. Doing so would give 
them a clean slate upon which to provide their own explanations for how and why 
operations had been carried out. The War Cabinet also agreed to move forward 
with preparations for an ultimatum. Pound and Alexander received instructions to 
begin arranging for an operation of this type at once.31  
 Over the next few days, the Cabinet commissioned a number of 
investigative studies, their goal being to understand how operations against the 
French fleet were likely to affect a number of stakeholders. These reports shed 
light on the role that Catapult would play both on a strategic and symbolic level. 
On 29 June Churchill requested a memorandum analysing the “Implications of 
Policy Contemplated in Respect of the French Navy.”32 An initial report, 
compiled by the Cabinet’s Joint Planning Sub Committee (JPSC) reached 
several conclusions. The first concerned the American reaction. It suggested 
that American good opinion of the British would increase in response to the 
proposed action and that as a result of the Franco-German armistice American 
opinion was at present favourable towards the British at the expense of the 
French.33 This belief was echoed in Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax’s report. 
Drawing on information provided by the American Undersecretary of State, he 
suggested “In the view of the American Government, the surrender of the 
French Fleet was the most degrading surrender in history…. It seemed safe to 
assume that any action which we might take in respect of the French Fleet 
would be applauded in the United States.”34 American approval was and would 
continue be a frequent consideration in British wartime policy. Roosevelt’s likely 
endorsement of Catapult would be reiterated in a War Cabinet meeting on 3 
July.35 However, the JPSC report concluded with a warning: French hostility 
following British action against the fleet, although not certain, would be harmful 
if it were to transpire.  
At the worst the French re-actions might be extremely serious and 
would then immensely complicate the already heavy task. If, therefore, 
there is a genuine danger that the action proposed would lead to the 	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active hostility of France and of her colonial possessions, we do not 
consider that the destruction of these French ships by force would be 
justified.36  
However, the Chiefs of Staff (COS) did not believe that a French 
declaration of war was likely. Of course, they were correct. Their estimations 
were based upon the belief that there were strong strands of defeatism in both 
metropolitan and colonial France and thus a high unlikelihood that French 
officials would be able to raise a force of any significance against the British.37 
More importantly, the plans that were being negotiated within the War Cabinet 
continued to look specifically towards the principle ships at Mers el-Kébir and 
the use of violent measures against them. The installations and proximity to 
civilian enclaves of Algiers and Alexandria largely ruled out the use of naval 
bombardment and made the operations at Mers el-Kébir highly unique.  
On 30 June the War Cabinet COS Committee compiled a final report, 
which took into consideration the recommendations that had been discussed 
over the past week. It also further emphasised the relative importance of the 
fleet at Mers el-Kébir and included six alternative courses of action: 1) 
requesting active participation by the French Navy in the war 2) requesting 
French ships to come to British ports where they would not be actively involved 
in the war 3) demilitarisation of French ships 4) scuttling of French ships 5) take 
no further action if the French do not agree to any of the above four 
alternatives. Only the sixth option provided for a military assault, stating “in the 
last resort to take action against the French Fleet at Oran.”38 The study 
concluded with the following recommendation:  
We have given most careful consideration to the implications of taking 
action against the French Fleet at Oran and, after balancing all the 
arguments both for and against such action, we have reached the 
conclusion on balance that the operations contemplated should be 
carried out.39  	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This aide memoire reflected the key concerns that had been evident throughout 
the decision-making process, namely the French contingent at Oran. Option 
five, to refrain from further action should the French refuse all of the options, 
was quickly eliminated. This decision was indicative of the British need to 
showcase their resolve and win over support from both a domestic and global 
audience.  
At the same time that Churchill and his staff were meeting to discuss the 
proposed Catapult operations, the Admiralty was providing operational 
instructions to admirals Somerville and Cunningham. Communications directed 
to Somerville’s Force H between 29-30 June illustrated two familiar 
preoccupations: the perceived importance of Dunkerque and Strasbourg, and 
the necessity of avoiding civilian causalities. Force H was instructed not to carry 
out earlier proposed operations at Algiers, given that the “strength of defences at 
Algiers and impossibility of avoiding destruction of town, it is not, repetition, not 
considered justifiable to carry out an operation against that place.” [sic]40 On 30 
June the Admiralty sent a signal to Force H and Admiral Cunningham with 
provisional details of the decision to take action against the French fleet at Mers 
el-Kébir. A separate naval cypher was also sent to Force H stating: “It is the firm 
intention of H.M.G. that if the French will not accept any of the alternatives which 
are being sent to you their ships must be destroyed.”41 The ultimatum contained 
four alternatives, which Somerville should deliver to Gensoul. Paraphrased, they 
included: 1) French ships sailed to British harbours to continue the fight 2) 
French ships sailed to British ports where they would be kept until the 
conclusion of the war 3) French ships immediately demilitarised to British 
satisfaction 4) French ships would scuttle themselves.42 These alternatives were 
later modified, to remove the option of demilitarisation and add the option of 
sailing to a French port in the West Indies. Demilitarisation would only be 
available if the French suggested it themselves after rejecting all of the other 
alternatives.43  
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 The Admiralty provided further instructions in the final paragraph of the 
ultimatum. They reiterated the necessity of removing from service key ships in 
the French fleet:  
If none of the above alternatives are accepted by the French you are to 
endeavour to destroy ships in MERS EL KEBIR but particularly 
DUNQUERQUE and STRASBOURG, using all means at your disposal. 
Ships at Oran should also be destroyed if this will not entail any 
considerable loss of civilian life.44  
This directive is crucial because it demonstrates that the object of Catapult 
was never to achieve destruction of the fleet as a whole. From the first 
mention of the danger that the French fleet posed in the context of the 
French capitulation, Dunkerque and Strasbourg were pinpointed as the most 
immediate threat. All reports considering action against the fleet 
acknowledged that the use of force was viable only within the port of Mers 
el-Kébir. A similar naval bombardment at Alexandria was not feasible as it 
“would seriously damage Britain’s own naval installations…”45 Indeed, 
although the Admiralty did suggest that Godfroy might scuttle his ships, they 
specified that this would have to be done outside of the harbour. 46  
 Ultimately, Alexandria would be given a more lenient ultimatum. The 
ships at this port simply did not have the same strategic value as those at 
Mers el-Kébir. Cunningham did not receive instructions from the Admiralty 
concerning Godfroy’s fleet until 2 July. The Alexandria ultimatum first 
expressed the desire to obtain the ships for British use. It then included two 
options if Godfroy refused: leave the ships at Alexandria in “non-seagoing 
condition” with skeleton crews, or request Godfroy to scuttle the ships at 
sea.47 The Royal Navy did undertake operations at both Mers el-Kébir and 
Alexandria. However the attitudes and risks associated with the two ports 
differed according to the perceived value of the ships in question and the 
port installations themselves. Indeed, it was not until 30 June that the War 
Cabinet decided that Catapult would include French “men-of-war” in the 
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eastern Mediterranean and British ports, not just focus upon Mers el-Kébir.48 
The period over which Catapult developed shows very clearly that British 
policy towards the French fleet was extremely nuanced. Acknowledging this 
complexity is important as we move from the initial decision to secure 
components of the fleet towards the process of explaining publically why 
such measures were thought to be necessary.  
 Indeed, developing a strategy towards the French fleet was a far 
more complex undertaking than Churchill simply forcing a pet project onto a 
reluctant Cabinet. What became the Catapult operation can only fully be 
appreciated by examining the British attitude towards the different ships that 
made up the fleet. The memorandums produced within or for use by the War 
Cabinet combined these concerns with the desire to use action against the 
fleet as a way to showcase British power, particularly to an American 
audience. Certainly, Churchill played a large role, not only in the formulation 
of policy, but also in its dissemination to the public through his own 
speeches and statements. For example, Churchill contributed to this draft 
message:  
It is impossible for us, your comrades up till now, to allow your 
fine ships to fall into the power of the German or Italian enemy. 
We are determined to fight on to the end, and if we win, as we 
think we shall, we shall never forget that France was our ally, that 
our interests are the same as hers, and that our common enemy 
is Germany. Should we conquer we solemnly declare that we 
shall restore the greatness of France, and that not an inch of her 
territory shall be alienated. For this purpose we must make sure 
that the best ships of the French Navy are not used against us by 
the common foe.49  
This excerpt was included as paragraph four in the message given to Admiral 
Gensoul at Mers el-Kébir. However, the Admiralty themselves also edited and 
contributed to the message. In addition, the COS played an important and 
influential role in the policy that became operation Catapult. They backed 
Catapult but refused to sanction operation Susan, a plan to set up a French 	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Government outside of metropolitan France, despite heavy pressure from 
Churchill. Episodes such as these demonstrate a more even distribution of 
power and influence, particularly at a point when Churchill had yet to completely 
win over the government.50    
 On 1 July at a meeting of the War Cabinet at 6 p.m. members reviewed 
the documents that had been prepared for the Catapult operations, which 
included revised communications to be given to Admiral Gensoul. French Naval 
Attaché Admiral Oden’hal had earlier told the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff that 
Darlan had telegrammed asking the British to reserve final judgment until the 
details of the armistice conditions were known. Churchill had replied: 
“discussions as to the armistice conditions could not affect the real facts of the 
situation.”51 It was also at this meeting that members decided that the option of 
demilitarisation, as it was originally included in the draft instructions sent to 
Force H, should not be offered to Gensoul.52 The final British ultimatum was 
written in such a way that it presented the French and British as partners in 
safeguarding French honour. In the original version, the text suggested that the 
French reputation would be tarnished if Germany were to successfully seize the 
fleet. However, the wording was modified to emphasise the positive outcome 
that would result from complying with British demands, rather than the negative 
consequences of inaction. The final version claimed “that the arrangements that 
we were proposing was consistent with French honour” [sic].53 Thus, the British 
ultimatum made the request for French action synonymous with French honour. 
The final text of the message containing the four alternatives to be given to 
Admiral Gensoul was sent to Somerville and copied to Cunningham. The 
instructions also included the addendum that if the French suggested 
demilitarisation in place of the other alternatives, this would be acceptable so 
long as the process was completed within six hours and would render the ships 
useless for a year.54 In the days to follow, tensions built around the 
developments at Mers el-Kébir. Despite Cunningham’s best efforts to moderate 
discussions at Alexandria, news of the bombardments by Force H would see 
tensions spike, an outcome that Cunningham attributed to Godfroy’s obstinate 	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hope for “honour and glory…”55 More importantly, the inception of events would 
see each side battle to frame its own interpretation of the actions through 
competing ideas of honour and wartime necessity. 
 
Policy Justification in the Public Sphere 
In July 1940 Churchill’s government had little room to manoeuvre. In this 
atmosphere, the War Cabinet tended to back actions that were not only militarily 
feasible, but would also demonstrate an unwavering commitment to the 
continuation of the war effort. In the specific case of the French fleet, it seemed 
inconceivable to leave such a valuable asset available to the Axis powers. At the 
same time, policy makers acknowledged the desirability of publically supporting 
some semblance of the pre-armistice relationship between France and Britain. 
Similarly, they recognised that it was important to achieve a positive response 
from the public, and were therefore aware that the outcome of Catapult had to 
be justified within this sphere. By comparing the discussions that took place in 
the War Cabinet and the Admiralty to the statements that were later issued to 
the press and public it will become evident that justifying a policy was 
considered to be a vital part of the policy as a whole. Aspects such as the 
uncertain reputation of the French public within metropolitan Britain remained a 
real concern for policy makers throughout the conflict, and especially in the 
immediate aftermath of the Franco-German armistice. In other words, policy 
makers were influenced by how they thought different sectors of the public, both 
locally and internationally, would respond to a given operation. We have already 
seen this concern evident in how the British safeguarded the Anglo-American 
relationship. In this final section, it will become clear just how strategically policy 
makers sought to take control over or influence the public response through the 
carefully conceived rhetoric of official statements.  
Two things are important when examining the link between policy making 
and the subsequent messages that were being created for public listeners or 
readers. First there must be an understanding of where this rhetoric was being 
distributed. Second, the strength of the argument within these texts must be 
judged as much as possible within its historic context and not through the lens of 
British victory in 1945. Certain voices, such as Churchill’s, certainly held a large 
and rather loud role in the public sphere, however, given his role as Prime 	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Minister this tendency appears less unusual. It would be too easy to place all of 
the blame for this event upon one individual, simply because his voice, as 
wartime leader, was loudest in the aftermath. Rather, a more fruitful analysis 
reconstructs British policy as one that consisted of both a rational cost/benefit 
analysis in terms of military feasibility and the likelihood that it could be 
explained or justified to a number of interested publics.  
Just prior to 3 July, officials in the Admiralty began finalising the content 
of public statements for Catapult. On 2 July Lord Alexander gave Churchill a 
rough draft of the opening statement for a press release to give to the Ministry of 
Information (MOI) after the operations had commenced. This rough draft 
contained two sub sections. The first suggested a timeline for publication and 
the second an actual draft text of the release. The timing of the press release 
was thought to be the most crucial element, and would depend upon how well 
the operations had proceeded or were proceeding. Alexander considered two 
likely scenarios. In the first, the text would be released after the operation was 
completed. “The publication of the news of our action in regard to the French 
Fleet must be carefully timed. If things go well it would be desirable to wait until 
the operation whatever form it takes is complete, and then to announce it with a 
justification of our actions.”56 In the first scenario, which would see Gensoul 
accepting British terms and avoiding bloodshed, Catapult would be neatly 
explained and justified to the public at its completion.  
In the second scenario, some sort of resistance from the French and 
perhaps clashes between the French and British squadrons called for a slightly 
different approach. If the operation did not go as planned, than the MOI would 
release information justifying the actions that were currently being taken before 
the conclusion of the event. “…trouble may ensue and it will then be necessary 
to explain our attitude and the reasons for the action which we are taking.”57 
These two alternatives for the timing of the official explanation of the 
proceedings were important. What was most evident was the desire to control 
as much as possible the dissemination of potentially negative or divisive news. 
Recall that the War Cabinet had earlier agreed to suppress discussion in the 
press of possible action against the fleet. This tactic allowed official explanations 
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to be written and published without having to first address or acknowledge prior 
speculations.  
Fear of British public outcry after the population had been kept in the dark 
and fed false information about supposed Allied successes in the battle for the 
Low Countries and France and the subsequent Dunkirk evacuations also 
influenced policy maker’s attitudes towards press statements. There was an 
overwhelming demand among much of the population to be kept informed about 
the war, whether the news was good or bad. The draft publicity releases relating 
to Catapult in July 1940 addressed this sentiment and devised tactics designed 
to avoid the backlash liable to result, not from keeping the public uninformed of 
events as they happened, but from keeping the public uninformed of events not 
going to plan. This distinction was key. The British government wished to 
construct a particular image of itself to present to the public: a decision making 
body that was capable of successfully prosecuting the war. Keeping the 
population abreast of developing operations, even if they were in the midst of 
crisis, contributed to a sense of credibility and trustworthiness. 
It stands to reason then that the content of Alexander’s press 
communiqué was just as important as the timing of its publication. “But in any 
event it would seem that the basis of justification for our action is to be found in 
the communication which the Vice-Admiral Commanding has been instructed to 
make to the French Commander, and this could well be published as it stands, 
together with any necessary information.”58 What was striking throughout 
Alexander’s plan was the emphasis that was placed upon justifying the event to 
the public. The connotation of justification denotes a need to not only explain 
one’s actions, but to convince the audience of the necessity of carrying out 
those actions.  
Within the body of the draft press statement itself, several features in the 
text were notable. First, at no time was blame placed upon any individual. 
Rather, the document referred only to the vague body of “the French 
Government” in describing or justifying the actions that were taken by the British. 
This technique, in addition to the overall tone of the piece, gave the reader the 
sense that while the French seemed to be at fault, blame was being 
administered in a rather vague way on French leadership, not the population as 
a whole. There was a realistic concern within the War Cabinet that the French 	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collapse would lead to a resurgence of Francophobia throughout Britain and the 
Dominions. This issue was also a point of concern in French circles, and was 
being monitored from London by Cambon. Prior to Catapult he reported that 
although there was continued anxiety about the fate of the French fleet, the 
British public remained sympathetic to the plight of the French population more 
broadly.59  
The entire argument in the draft report was designed first to delegitimise 
the French decision to request an armistice and, second, to use this as a basis 
to justify, or indeed suggest the inevitability of, a British military response. These 
strategies served to convince the reader not only of the necessity of British 
action, but also, crucially, of its moral and ethical correctness. The core of the 
argument was framed in the opening sentence: “The French Government felt 
that they were unable to continue the struggle on land against Germany and in 
spite of agreements solemnly entered into with His Majesty’s Government, 
sought an armistice of the German Government.”60 In the second half of the 
statement, Alexander stipulates that seeking the armistice was a violation of the 
Anglo-French agreements not to conclude a separate peace. This claim 
established the British right to engage in actions that would rectify the damage 
caused as a result of breaking this contract. Following this introduction, the draft 
set out to assert two facts. First, the French fleet and its fate were vital to the 
British ability to win the war. Second, despite honourable British actions to 
secure the fate of the fleet prior to the armistice request, the French had not 
acquiesced. This refusal left the British no choice but to take further action in 
order to secure her well-being and indeed the well-being of her citizens from 
German and Italian perfidy.61 The British were in the unenviable position of 
being required to trust the word of the Germans and Italians in connection to the 
non-use of a vital asset in the on-going war effort. This position, the press 
release emphasised, forced the British not to act, but to react. 
The grammatical construction of the draft press release also emphasised 
the agency or the wilful actions of the French in the days leading up to Mers el-
Kébir. “The French Government” as an active subject represented the main 
protagonist in the first half of the narration. In sum:  	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The French Government felt that they were unable to continue the 
struggle on land…, the French Government approached the German 
Government with a request for an armistice…, The French 
Government…assured His Majesty’s Government that they would 
never sign “dishonourable terms of an armistice with the enemy”…, 
…the French Government have put themselves in a position in which it 
may be impossible for them to give effect to those assurances…62  
The British Government, on the other hand, was referred to only in the passive 
tense, giving the allusion that it was being acted upon, rather than acting. 
Instead of stating, for example, that Churchill’s government emphasised the 
importance of the French fleet to the on-going war effort, the publication stated 
that this fact “was pointed out to them…” Passive voice makes the subject 
implicit by placing emphasis on the direct object. This had the effect of making 
Catapult appear inevitable, or a natural outcome following French action.  
It was only in the second half of the draft statement that the British 
government began to take a more active role. However, the construction still 
relied substantially upon broad arguments of inevitability. The British were 
portrayed as having little choice in their subsequent actions: “In these 
circumstances His Majesty’s Government have felt constrained to take action to 
ensure that important units of the French Fleet shall not come under enemy 
control for possible use against the British Empire.”63 Again, we see the use of 
the word ‘felt’, but this time it is followed by an adverb: ‘constrained’. This 
addition again lends a sense of inevitability to Catapult by implying that there 
were no alternative strategies. The tone achieved in this piece allocated full 
responsibility for the chain of events leading to 3 July on the French government 
and eliminated British agency. This left the reader with the perception that there 
was simply no other course of action that the British could have followed. This 
draft was, in essence, an ideal response to an outcome that was as yet 
unknown. Unfortunately, Catapult did not go as smoothly as this draft envisaged.  
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Conclusion 
British policy towards the French fleet rested upon a broad two-part consensus. 
First, the importance of the fleet required its neutralisation. Second, this process 
would take different forms according to the actual circumstances at each port 
and the ships that were docked there. From early on, military considerations 
played a crucial role. They included the actual material requirements of the 
British naval forces as well as the nature and extent of the French response 
towards British actions, especially hostile actions. Previous studies have failed 
to consider both the nuances and limitations of British policy. This chapter has 
laid out these differences as crucial to understanding how rhetoric would, in the 
aftermath of the bombardments, distort policy in favour of a coherent image of 
British strength and resolve. This outcome will become more apparent in the 
following chapter. 
 From the initial stages of the policy formation, it was clear that 
neutralising the ships at Mers el-Kébir, particularly Dunkerque and Strasbourg 
was of the greatest strategic value to the British. Their location, within a military 
port also meant that bombardment was feasible, as collateral damages such as 
civilian causalities and the destruction of the town were not pertinent factors. 
Considering and limiting Catapult based on the possibility of civilian deaths 
reflected the present belief within the Cabinet that civilian death in wartime was 
still indefensible, or at least difficult to justify. In essence, these discussions 
showed that the decision making process not only encompassed what was 
possible or feasible on a purely military level. They also accepted the need to 
explain and justify wartime operations on a normative and moral level within the 
public sphere. Essentially, in anticipating how the public might respond to a 
particular operation, policy makers were incorporating popular opinion (or at 
least their conception of it) into the policy itself. In this instance the perceived 
innocence of civilians acted as a limiting factor just as material strength.  
 Examining the policy making process that was being carried out within 
the War Cabinet has made clear that assessments of public opinion did play a 
role in the minds of decision makers. This was apparent in the early 
acknowledgement that British public opinion was already receptive to action 
against the French fleet as well as the strategic considerations and carefully 
worded structure of the draft press release explaining the operation. 
Furthermore, the desire to maintain pro-British sentiments in metropolitan 
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France would serve as an additional check on British rhetoric. Of course, policy 
makers could and would attempt to sway or influence the press or public 
response through their strategic use of rhetoric.  
 Understanding the Catapult operations through the planning process and 
the aftermath of the bombardments must also take into account how secretive 
policy making became official explanations. The early draft press release 
displayed a clear attempt to exonerate and justify British actions on a moral 
level, and essentially blame the French government without alienating the 
broader French public. This approach attempted to maintain a sense of the 
partnership that had existed so recently between the French and British under 
the premise of the continuing struggle and eventual rescue of the French by the 
British. As events around the fleet unfolded, policy makers would be forced to 
modify their press releases to not only reflect but more importantly justify, the 
starker reality of the outcome. How they would do this would reveal the ever-
present concern not only in regards to public sentiment at home, but also the 
continuing attempt to publically delegitimise the French government while 
maintaining the support of the larger population. 
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Chapter 4: Making Mers el-Kébir Inevitable 
“There is Agreement Everywhere that the British Had No Other Choice”1 
 
Introduction  
On 3 July 1940, in an 11:30 a.m. War Cabinet meeting, British ministers made 
three decisions. First, they agreed not to release precise statistics concerning air 
raid deaths and injuries to the public as this was likely to harm morale. Second, 
they sent a noncommittal note to former French premier Édouard Daladier in 
response to his request to come to Britain. The reason for this delaying tactic 
was that his arrival in the UK “might be embarrassing politically.”2 These two 
examples demonstrate the strength that intangible, but nonetheless powerful 
factors such as morale and political embarrassment (both of which were 
ultimately linked to public support) held within the minds of policy makers. 
Specifically, these decisions were motivated by the fear of precipitating adverse 
reactions from the British public. Finally, Churchill’s ministerial colleagues 
confirmed that the Prime Minister would address the Commons the following day 
regarding the operations currently underway to contain the French fleet.3 
Churchill’s speech, moreover, was only one in a series of public announcements 
concerning the fleet. As the Catapult negotiations dragged on, these policy 
makers continued to revise and re-revise press statements and speeches 
explaining why the Royal Navy had just engaged in what was ostensibly an act 
of war against its former ally.  
The planning process has demonstrated how a variety of factors and 
concerns shaped the operational boundaries for Catapult. In particular, the 
previous chapter highlighted the importance of the French fleet to both Pétain’s 
government and the on-going British war effort. In the British case, it stressed 
the extent to which policy making drew upon strategic concerns and less 
tangible factors such as being able to justify the use of violence against 
particular parts of the fleet. Bearing in mind that military operations against the 
fleet were viable from a material perspective, more symbolic ethical and moral 
considerations played a key role in limiting violent action to specific zones in 
which the risk of extensive civilian causalities was minimized. This chapter will 
begin by examining the course of events as they developed on 3 July. Such an 	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approach will demonstrate, first, that material factors such as limited time and 
poor communications impacted on the outcome at Mers el-Kébir. Second, one 
cannot understand the subsequent rhetorical justification of the bombardment 
without fully appreciating the discontinuity between the relatively straightforward 
timeline of events on the one hand and the interpretation of events as both more 
subjective and emotional on the other hand. Official communiqués, in other 
words distilled the policy making process in such a way that the bombardments 
appeared to be a tragic but unavoidable element of war.  
The bulk of this chapter will be taken up by analyses of official statements 
and media responses from both sides of the Channel. Until operation Catapult 
commenced on 3 July, British policy makers had to formulate detailed publicity 
plans based upon a number of possible outcomes. An examination of this 
process will illustrate that the operations at Mers el-Kébir were more than a 
strategic gambit. For many within Britain, they were the manifestation of a 
broader sentiment that called for - and indeed craved - decisive action. 
Moreover, the press releases and radio addresses that emerged from the War 
Cabinet and Admiralty offices highlighted the desire to gain approval not just 
from the British public but also from further afield. Specifically, from within 
governing circles in Washington and the wider American public. This goal made 
the public representation of the operations crucial. Indeed, considering and 
planning how to present the outcome of Catapult made up a significant part of 
the planning process that unfolded in the War Cabinet.  
What emerged from this process, on the British side, was a series of 
statements that described the bombardments as a literal demonstration of 
British strength and determination. At the same time, the French condemned 
British policy at Mers el-Kébir for its brutality against a neutral state and its 
alleged failure to engage in established patterns of conventional diplomacy. The 
British may not have had many military options available to them in July 1940. 
However, this weakness was certainly not evident in the rhetoric that followed 
the fleet bombardments. Rather, justifications pressed home the inevitability of 
the operation and framed the bombardments as a sign of unswerving British 
resolve and the country’s undiminished capacity to face the broader struggle 
against the Axis Powers. At the same time, Britain continued attempts to foster 
the support of metropolitan France by rhetorically exonerating the general 
French population from the “Men of Vichy.” While Pétain and Paul Baudouin’s 
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Ministry of Foreign Affairs likewise attempted to sway American and global 
opinion against the “British aggressions,” it quickly became clear that the vast 
majority of the international press was more inclined to believe the 
bombardments were a reasonable course of action.  
Following on official statements, speeches and broadcasts, mass media 
outlets in both France and Britain remained consistent with or even expanded 
upon these pre-established arguments. The British press drew on an abundance 
of historic imagery to further justify the brutality of the operations. This tactic 
connected past victories with the present conflict in order to suggest future 
success. On the French side Mers el-Kébir was the pivotal event that dictated 
how Anglo-French relations were portrayed for the rest of the war. It was 
described as the resurgence of a British policy of territorial violation and blatant 
aggression. After the conclusion of the Franco-German armistice, the legitimacy 
of unoccupied France as an imperial nation depended hugely on its ability to 
maintain the territorial integrity of both the metropole and its colonies. British and 
later Free French incursions were at the very core challenges to French 
sovereignty, and specifically the legitimacy of Pétain’s government. Countering 
this challenge by claiming the rights of a neutral nation and dismissing the 
Gaullist movement was of paramount importance. Both of these concerns were 
represented throughout the mass media. What follows is a more detailed study 
of first, how negotiations at Mers el-Kébir ultimately led to naval bombardment 
and second how both governmental and media outlets dealt with and tried to 
explain these events from their respective positions either inside or outside of 
the on going conflict.    
 
Timeline of Events 
In the days leading up to 3 July Admiral Somerville finalised detailed operational 
plans that tried to anticipate and prepare for how Admiral Gensoul, the leader of 
the Force de Raid moored at Mers el-Kébir, would respond to the ultimatum. On 
30 June flag officers and senior commanding officers met on board the battle 
cruiser HMS Hood. Here, they agreed that were it to become necessary, a 
bombardment at Mers el-Kébir would be carried out in three phases. First, 
Somerville would order rounds to be fired purely as a means to scare the French 
and indicate British resolve. If the French still refused British terms, limited 
gunfire and bombing would be initiated to prompt evacuation of the ships. Last, 
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torpedoes or other means would sink the ships. Similar destructive action at the 
nearby non-military port of Oran was, as we know, not considered permissible 
due to the likely high loss of civilian life.4 Operational orders dated 1 July 
formalised this three-stage approach. Stage II parts 1 and 2 were described as 
follows: 1) “Show that we are in earnest by offensive action without endangering 
French ships. 2) “Destroy the French ships by our own actions.”5 This was a 
coherent plan created by British admiralty commanders to disable vital units of 
the French Fleet at Mers el-Kébir. It anticipated only very limited casualties due 
to the two-stage warning system. 
 At 10:45 a.m. on 3 July, Admiral Somerville noted in his diary that the 
French were furling their awnings, an act which could only be construed as 
readying for a fight. The Admiralty subsequently suggested seeding the harbour 
with magnetic mines to prevent the fleet’s escape.6 Early that same morning, 
Somerville had received another message from the Admiralty. It stated that 
although there was no time limit linked to the French response, it was important 
that the proceedings be completed, whatever the outcome, before the sun went 
down that day.7 This stipulation had a direct impact on the negotiations because 
it imposed a highly restrictive time frame. Somerville’s Vice Admiral Cedric 
Holland delivered the terms of the British ultimatum and the accompanying 
message to the French Admiralty between 11:00 a.m. and 11:15 a.m. on the 
morning of 3 July. Holland was a fluent French speaker and had been given the 
unsavoury task of delivering the ultimatum to Admiral Gonsoul. However, 
Gensoul, offended that a ranking captain had brought the message, and not an 
admiral, refused to see Holland, forcing him to wait in his boat for the French 
Admiralty barge to deliver a response.8 Gensoul was proving highly 
uncooperative even though, as one of the only Protestants in the heavily 
Catholic French Navy, Somerville considered him to be relatively Anglophilic. On 
24 June British Admiral Dudley North had visited Gensoul in an attempt to take 
advantage of his personal sympathies and persuade him to continue the war 
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alongside Britain. However, he had refused on the grounds that he was bound to 
obey the orders of the French government.9  
At 11:30 a.m., First Sea Lord Pound sent a message informing Force H 
that he was drafting a signal that would offer the French immediate 
demilitarisation in addition to the options stated in the ultimatum. However, 
Pound telephoned Somerville at 12:32 p.m. to inform him that the draft had not 
been approved and that “Admiralty orders V.A. (H) to inform French Fleet that if 
they move he will open fire if he considers that they are preparing to leave 
harbour.”10 Gensoul had, in the meantime, conveyed the British ultimatum to his 
superiors at the Admiralty, although he failed to mention the option to move the 
fleet to a port in the French West Indies or the United States.11 However, given 
Gensoul’s clearly stated refusal of the ultimatum as well as his belief that the 
British were in any case unlikely to open fire on the fleet, it was improbable that 
knowledge of this option would have radically changed the outcome of events.12 
Through the negotiation process, Gensoul made no move to evacuate his ships 
against the possibility of attack, nor did he display any real intention to concede 
to any of the British requests. This inaction was a symptom of the belief on both 
sides that actual bombardment was highly unlikely. To the British the most 
important outcome was the public display of Pétain’s government yielding to 
British strength and resolve. The decision not to offer demilitarisation after 
having delivered the original ultimatum rested upon this idea. War Cabinet 
minutes stated that to do so “would look like weakening.”13  
 Following the receipt of the British ultimatum, both admirals waited for his 
counterpart to yield. At 11:51 a.m. and again just after 12:09 p.m., Gensoul 
repeated his resolve to fight, rather than acquiesce to the British terms. 
Somerville prepared to open fire.14 However, Vice Admiral Holland suggested 
waiting and Somerville extended the ultimatum deadline.15 From this point 
onward, the decisions taken by Gensoul and Somerville illustrated a high level 	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of uncertainty on both sides, further impacted by the setting sun. Like Gensoul, 
Somerville himself believed his counterpart would ultimately yield. He was also 
loath to open fire upon the French ships and interpreted French inaction as a 
sign of weakening. He extended the deadline for British action to 3:30 p.m.16 
Gensoul eventually agreed to meet the British delegation, and a meeting 
aboard the Dunkerque commenced at 2:15 p.m. The British Admiralty had 
informed Somerville on 2 July that the French had in place a procedure for 
demilitarising their ships, which could be completed in two hours. Somerville 
informed Holland that “should necessity arise” he should discuss this plan with 
the French during negotiations and ascertain if the process would put the ships 
fully out of commission for 12 months.17 However, the impending arrival of 
French reinforcements from Toulon and Algiers heightened tensions in the 
negotiating environment. An Admiralty signal sent to Force H at 4:14 p.m. 
instructed Somerville that it was imperative to quickly resolve on going 
operations as “he may have French reinforcements to deal with.”18 Gensoul 
received a similar message from Admiral Le Luc, Chief of Darlan’s personal 
staff, at 5:18 p.m.19  
As darkness encroached, both sides were under pressure to end the 
standoff. Negotiations drew to a close and Gensoul issued a final written 
statement reiterating his intention to respond to force with force.20 The British 
report of the final moments described the scene upon the French ships as being 
in “an advanced state of readiness for sea…tugs were ready by the sterns of 
each battleship. Guns were trained fore and aft.”21 At 5:53 p.m. Somerville gave 
the order to open fire upon the French fleet and reported to the Admiralty that he 
was being heavily engaged at 6:00 p.m. A delayed signal arrived from the 
Admiralty at 6:26 p.m. after the bombardment was in progress, informing Force 
H that the French must comply with British terms, scuttle themselves, or be sunk 
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by the British before dark.22 The fact that this signal arrived after the 
bombardment was already underway suggests that although Somerville may 
have had reservations about firing upon the fleet, his decision to do so was not a 
result of a final direct order from either Churchill or the Admiralty. Rather, 
Somerville, in his position as the local commander of this operation, gave the 
order to fire in response to real-time pressure. Ultimately, the ten-minute 
bombardment of the fleet at Mers el-Kébir left 1,297 dead and 351 wounded on 
the French side. The British suffered two light injuries.23  
Factors such as poor and delayed communications, the threat of French 
reinforcements, and approaching darkness clearly influenced the final outcome 
at Mers el-Kébir. Not knowing when and if French reinforcements were likely to 
arrive, Somerville, particularly in the final hours of negotiations, was making 
decisions while under immense time pressure. Hesitations on both sides also 
contributed to the relative chaos of the final moments. Gensoul, to the very last, 
made no move to evacuate his ships, still believing that his recent comrades 
would never follow through on their threats. Holland also doubted that force 
would be necessary, writing in his report of events, “My answer to ask for a final 
reply before fire was opened was based on my appreciation of the French 
character since I have often found that an initial flat refusal will gradually come 
round to an acquiescence.”24 Both actors misinterpreted the situation to the 
extent that they refused to believe that the other party would consent to the use 
of force. However, it was the British command to fire directly at the fleet without 
first giving the French the opportunity to evacuate that would in later years be 
held up as a callous and brutal display of violence. Nevertheless, the broader 
context of the situation was also relevant. Namely, Britain was under threat of 
imminent invasion. Taking action to decisively neutralise the French fleet would 
free up British ships from shadowing their French counterparts and allow them 
to return to home waters to patrol against invading forces.25 In addition, even if 
Somerville had reached an agreement on French disarmament of the fleet, it 
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could not have been carried out within six hours given the approaching darkness 
as well as the impending arrival of reinforcements. 
 Seeing how operation Catapult unfolded in real time on 3 July makes it 
clear that both Somerville and Gensoul were making decisions in a highly 
uncertain environment. With France newly withdrawn from the war, it was still 
unclear how official sentiments and loyalties would align themselves. The British 
were, in all respects, very limited militarily. They were preparing for a defensive 
phase of the conflict, which would require the most efficient use of their naval 
resources. There was also a strong desire to dispel uncertainty and bolster 
morale within Britain while encouraging pro-British sentiment in America. In this 
sense, the willingness to take hostile action against the fleet was tremendously 
symbolic. This symbolism will become more apparent in the following sections.  
 
Revision: Redrafting Press Releases and Statements 
In his typically sarcastic style, Alexander Cadogan wrote on 3 July of his role in 
penning “a draft to French explaining why we were blowing their fleet out of the 
water.” [sic]26 The bombardments at Mers el-Kébir signalled the inception of a 
rhetorical battle in which Vichy and Britain each put forward their own 
interpretation of events via their respective media sources. Furthermore, each 
press release or speech was written in the hope that it would receive validation 
from American leaders. Diplomat Robert Vansittart was at the time suggesting a 
more robust programme of pro-British propaganda in the United States “to meet 
the Franco-German drive against us there.”27 Broadly speaking, British official 
publications mobilised two main themes. First, they suggested that the 
operations to contain the French fleet were an inevitable outcome of the Franco-
German Armistice. Second, they argued that the bombardments did not 
constitute a rupture in Anglo-French relations. British victory, which could only 
be secured by maintaining such determined policies, was the sole means of 
freeing France from its German occupiers and Pétain’s defeatist government. 
Examining a series of initial publicity releases generated by the War Cabinet and 
Admiralty as well as Churchill’s 4 July Commons speech in greater detail will 
show how these ideas were carefully spun into this rhetorical claim.   	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The first was a radio address, which First Lord of the Admiralty Alexander 
prepared and edited prior to its broadcast on 4 July. In it, Alexander maintained 
that Britain was forced to act because it could not in good faith leave the fate of 
the fleet to the credibility of German promises. These claims were crucial in 
allowing Alexander to frame the bombardments as unavoidable while at the 
same time refraining from overt criticism of the French nation as a whole. For 
example, his address described the operations as “…the steps we have been 
compelled to take…”28 He also praised Somerville and Force H for “…not 
shrinking when it became inevitable to take the action necessary in their duty 
towards their country and the cause of liberty.” The use of the passive voice in 
the first instance removed a visible subject, or driver of action from his depiction. 
In other words, it suggested but did not name the individuals (Pétain, Darlan or 
Gensoul, for example) whose actions had made it necessary for Britain to take 
offensive measures against the fleet. This grammatical formulation was used to 
the same effect in describing the moment that the British contingent opened fire. 
“Only when all the alternatives had been rejected did the Navy take the action 
which His Majesty’s Government had considered themselves compelled to order 
in the last resort.”29 Alexander’s statement also changed references to the 
“Pétain” government to the “Bordeaux” government. This reflected the 
understanding that Pétain himself was a popular figure amongst the French 
public. Overt personal criticism of the Hero of Verdun risked alienating a 
significant part of the population. 
The second document in question was a revised press statement, 
prepared jointly between members of the War Cabinet and the Admiralty. It 
would be issued through the Ministry of Information (MOI). Similar to the above 
radio address, it emphasised the dishonesty of the German and Italian victors, 
the resulting necessity for British action, and the inevitability of the outcome 
given Gensoul’s misplaced allegiance to the new metropolitan government. After 
again reminding the reader of the Franco-German armistice and the proven 
untrustworthiness of the Axis Powers, the article immediately justified British 
actions. The line, “HMG…felt that they were compelled, not only in their own 
interests, but also in the hope of restoring the independence of France and the 	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integrity of the French Empire, to take steps…,”30 cast Britain as the guardian of 
the legitimate French state and its environs. In doing so, the statement 
undermined the validity of Pétain’s government and purported that altruism, 
rather than national self interest, was driving British foreign policy. This claim will 
be discussed in more detail as one of the main themes of Churchill’s Commons 
address. The wording of the sentence also subtly distanced the British from the 
decision to take action. The government “felt that they were compelled” to take 
action.31 As we saw previously, including the word ‘felt’ added emotion and 
uncertainty to the process. The second part of this phrase, “they were 
compelled,” demonstrated the inevitable nature of the final choice, again giving 
the British only a passive role as decision maker. Lastly, this and future 
references to the empire recognised how important overseas territories were to 
a nation’s legitimacy and power. Akhila Yechury and Emile Chabal have 
examined the role that empire played wartime policy writing, “In the same way 
that Dunkirk marked a point of sharply diverging memories between the two 
metropolitan powers, Mers el-Kébir inaugurated a period in which the empire 
played a vital role in shaping the future of both nations.”32 This theme will be 
expanded upon further in the upcoming chapters. 
This press release was edited further to downplay any suggestion of overt 
Anglo-French hostility. The original text depicting the Franco-German armistice 
stated that the French government “undertook by the terms of the Armistice to 
hand over their Fleet to the enemy.”33 The words “hand over” were changed to 
“allow,” transferring agency from the French to the Germans.34 The following 
excerpt, with edits noted shows how further revisions changed the tone of the 
writing. Note in particular how the word “hostilities” was replaced with 
“operations.”  
H.M.G. deeply regret that the French Admiral in command at Oran 
refused to accept any of the conditions proposed, with the 
inevitable result that hostilities broke out between British and action 
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had to be taken against the French vessels in that locality. These 
hostilities (operations) are still proceeding. 35 
This excerpt proposed that Catapult, and the bombardments that resulted, were 
an ethical course of action during a time of war. Discussions within the War 
Cabinet had earlier vetoed the possibility of offering compensation for the 
families of French personnel killed at Mers el-Kébir. It was thought that such a 
move would be “misinterpreted” as an apology and acknowledgement of 
wrongdoing.36 These discussions sat uncomfortably alongside Somerville’s 
carefully prepared plan for warning shots and evacuation. The article as a whole 
displayed an attempt to maintain some semblance of the Anglo-French 
partnership that had existed before the armistice by refusing to acknowledge the 
proposed state of neutrality imposed by the metropolitan government.  
While this draft was being edited, the War Cabinet met to determine when 
the statement should be released to the local press. They also talked about 
producing a second announcement for the American press.37 These 
preparations anticipated the impact that the operations would have in the 
metropole and on a more global stage. In the days following the bombardment, 
Political Intelligence Reports compiled by the Foreign Office concluded that the 
general effect, “especially in the United States, has been to enhance British 
prestige.”38 British ambassador in Washington Lord Lothian also sent news that 
the American response had been positive. However, he warned that German 
and French sources would be anxious to portray the French as victims. British 
publicity, he suggested, should be prepared to counter French attempts to depict 
the operations as “treacherous.”39 Alexander’s second radio broadcast, which he 
produced for an overseas audience, certainly spared no effort in emphasising 
the tragic necessity of the operations while hinting at the continuity of Anglo-
French comradeship. The following excerpt with edits highlighted Britain’s lack 
of options when it came to the French fleet: “In British ports and at Alexandria 
we are thankful to have been able to (had to) taken under our control…”40 The 
substitution of “had to” in place of “are thankful to” and “been able to” indicated 	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both the absolute necessity of the operation and justified the tragic results. 
Moreover, having to do something, as opposed to being thankful that something 
has taken place (lack of agency) highlighted British determination to take steps 
to successfully prosecute the war. The same address also reinforced the moral 
superiority of the British, Imperial and American struggle: “…united as never 
before in defence of Christianity, of civilization and of the kindly, tolerant way of 
life which we have evolved through the centuries and which has developed with 
equal calm and fruitful benevolence among our sister nations the British 
Commonwealth and in America. Our cause is wholly righteous.”41 After the 
statement was released over the radio in mid-July, Alexander concluded that the 
American response had been generally positive. He described the American 
public as hopeful that the British public were as resolved in the upcoming battle 
as their leadership appeared to be.42  
Churchill’s 4 July Commons address was perhaps the most exhaustive 
official response to appear in the aftermath of the attacks. The extent to which it 
would be featured in the press warrants a more detailed analysis. This speech, 
while similar to the press releases in some respects, provided a clearer 
delineation between Pétain’s government and the French nation as a whole. It 
was also more overt and grandiose in promising eventual British victory. In this 
manner, Churchill shifted the focus away from the ruthlessness of the 
bombardments, presenting the entire policy not as a choice, but rather as a 
logical response to the French refusal to guarantee the safety of the fleet. Before 
analysing the actual content of Churchill’s address, it is important to note that 
Lord Halifax, on the same day in the House of Lords, gave an identical speech 
explaining and justifying what had taken place at Mers el-Kébir. The point of 
mentioning this parallel statement is that Churchill’s position as Prime Minister 
lent his words more weight in shaping how this wartime episode would be 
remembered, both at the time the speech was given and today. Rhetoric then, is 
given short-term value according to who the statements are attributed. Its 
staying power, or long-term significance only appreciates if the arguments that 
were being made are later validated. In this case many of Churchill’s statements 
were confirmed because of the British victory not because of their inherent 
oratorical value. 	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 Early in the speech, Churchill linked the idea of British victory with 
French prestige: “But the least that could be expected was that the French 
Government, in abandoning the conflict and leaving its whole weight to fall upon 
Great Britain and the British Empire, would have been careful not to inflict 
needless injury upon their faithful comrade, in whose final victory the sole 
chance of French freedom lay and lies.”43 First, the choice of language in this 
excerpt, compared to that of the draft press releases, was much more 
aggressive. It employed strong verbs such as ‘abandoning’ and ‘inflict’. Both 
suggested malicious intent on the part of the French government. On the other 
hand, the text clearly marked the British as very much a father figure to France, 
who had no chance of victory, or indeed future political influence, without their 
assistance.  
After denigrating the new government, Churchill unreservedly separated 
the will of the French people from the defeatist origins of the Bordeaux/Vichy 
government. “Thus I must place on record that what might have been a mortal 
injury was done to us by the Bordeaux Government with full knowledge of the 
consequences and of our dangers, and after rejecting all our appeals at the 
moment when they were abandoning the Alliance, and breaking the 
engagements which fortified it.”44 Equating the current position of the French 
fleet to a “mortal injury” to the British war effort left no doubt as to the validity of 
the British actions that followed. This sentence also made it clear that the 
“Bordeaux Government” could not claim the popular support that would have 
made it a truly representative government. This notion of illegitimacy was built 
upon in the following paragraphs.  
 Churchill described the final weeks of June and the Franco-German 
armistice negotiations: “There was another example of this callous and perhaps 
even malevolent treatment which we received, not indeed from the French 
nation, who have never been and apparently never are to be consulted upon 
these transactions, but from the Bordeaux Government.”45 This claim was 
unsubstantiated and greatly exaggerated. In the chaos of the exodus, most 
refugees and even French soldiers met Pétain’s call for an armistice with 
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relief.46 In addition, Pétain’s government did not experience serious dissent, and 
in fact was relatively popular until at least the close of 1941.47 What Churchill’s 
speech and the two draft press releases tried to do was maintain the illusion 
that the French nation remained tied to the Allied war effort. They did this by 
distancing the French public from the metropolitan government, which, by the 
same token, implied that the French people favoured Britain and de Gaulle’s 
alternative French movement. France’s new government, referred to as the 
“Bordeaux Government” and later the “Vichy Government” was described not 
only as unrepresentative of the French people, but as an illegitimate governing 
body. This policy was reiterated throughout the war. On 8 July Desmond Morton 
requested that the MOI instruct the BBC and press sources to refer to the 
metropolitan government as the “Vichy Government” or “Pétain Government” 
but not “France” or the “French Government.”48 
Churchill closed his address by stressing that the War Cabinet had 
embarked upon Catapult with a heavy heart but a unanimous sense of 
purpose.49 He suggested that the bombardment, however tragic, was an 
eventuality for which the Cabinet and Admiralty were well prepared. 
Unsurprisingly, he did not mention why the ships had not been evacuated prior 
to the bombardment. Portraying the outcome at Mers el-Kébir as an “unfortunate 
necessity” normalised the deaths of the French sailors as causalities of war. 
Churchill made a strong case that accomplished three things: it validated British 
actions, defended the French citizenry, and castigated the Bordeaux 
government for betraying its British allies and the French nation. In concluding, 
he employed a classic rhetorical technique: he appeared to give his audience 
the opportunity to digest the facts for themselves and reach a logical conclusion. 
“I leave the judgment of our action, with confidence, to Parliament. I leave it to 
the nation, and I leave it to the United States. I leave it to the world and to 
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history.”50 Churchill understood that rhetoric was persuasive. More importantly, 
though, he understood that it needed to strike a delicate balance between 
presenting an argument for consideration and blatantly telling the public what to 
think. Moreover, remember that the War Cabinet was confident of receiving 
support for a strong policy towards the French fleet. This knowledge makes 
Churchill’s statement, which boldly called for the world to judge British actions at 
Mers el-Kébir appear far less daring.  
Churchill’s Commons speech was reportedly met with great approval from 
both sides of the House, and a feeling of relief, reflected by two full minutes of 
cheering. Even Chargé d’Affaires Roger Cambon acknowledged its undeniably 
warm reception. Writing to Foreign Minister Baudouin, he described the general 
sentiment of both the political establishment and the broader population as one 
of determination and refusal to compromise on issues that were perceived to 
affect the prosecution of the war.51 Cadogan wrote in his diary that day that 
while the results of Catapult were not ideal, “Winston was able to make good 
enough showing in House and had a good reception.”52 [sic] John Colville 
echoed this sentiment, adding that global reactions were supportive of the 
bombardments. “There is a strange admiration for force everywhere today,” he 
mused.53 Immediately after the bombardments, there was a strong consensus, 
certainly within Britain, but also in the United States, that this was the right 
policy. Churchill’s private secretary Eric Seal wrote to his wife regarding the 
address, “The speech was good, but not better than the others… I think that 
there had been a great deal more anxiety than we realized about the French 
Fleet, and there was a general relief that such vigorous action had been 
taken.”54 
As far as the French war effort led from London was concerned, its leader 
General Charles de Gaulle had no part in the British decision-making process. 
De Gaulle nonetheless issued his own response to the operations. Spears 
reported to Churchill that de Gaulle’s reaction to the bombardments was “on the 
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whole better than I should have expected.”55 De Gaulle’s radio address on 8 July 
echoed the British official line, recognising that the enemy would surely have 
used the French fleet against Britain, as well as the French empire.56 He called 
on Frenchmen to see the tragedy as one more step towards victory, or from the 
“point of view of victory and deliverance.”57 Behind the scenes, de Gaulle was 
seething. He described his “pain and anger” over Mers el-Kébir, and his 
particular dislike of the way the British appeared to “glory in” the operations.58 
His willingness, however grudging, to support the efficacy of the bombardments 
publically showed how little room de Gaulle actually had to act unilaterally. More 
importantly, however, it demonstrated that being in the same camp as the British 
rhetorically was a means to assert power and legitimacy by appearing to 
sanction or condone such high level policies. Challenging British policy towards 
the French empire and metropolitan France would only reveal how little 
influence the Free French actually had. 
In Vichy, Baudouin was also using rhetoric as a means to build up 
support for the metropolitan government in American circles. Pétain even 
penned a three-page letter to Roosevelt urging him to see the injustice of British 
policy.59 Baudouin issued French communiqués to the U.S. State Department 
with the expectation that the information would be passed on to the American 
press. These communications presented a straightforward case of British 
aggression including the ultimatum, the use of magnetic mines to seal off the 
port and final command to open fire.60 High commissioner for propaganda, Jean 
Prouvost reported to the American press that Churchill had undertaken an act of 
aggression “unprecedented in history.”61 Baudouin also prepared talking points, 
which he sent to French embassies and consulates around the world. He hoped 
to validate the position of the Vichy government by depicting the bombardments 
as an unwarranted act of violence. Writing to the diplomatic mission in Berne, 	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Switzerland, Baudouin described the attacks as “brutal and inexcusable.”62 He 
directed diplomatic staff to impart upon the public and government officials in 
their respective postings the terrible nature of the British attack and Churchill’s 
tendency to “alter the truth” of what had happened.63 Despite Baudouin’s best 
efforts, however, the results were disappointing. Only international responses 
from Spain, Bulgaria and Romania appeared to be sympathetic to the French 
plight.64   
Within metropolitan France, guarding the sovereignty of the unoccupied 
zone, the fleet, and the empire was of primary importance to France’s survival 
as a nation state. Doing so through rhetoric that portrayed British operations as 
a violation of the rights of a sovereign and neutral country would become a tactic 
that was repeated after each fresh offense in Dakar, North Africa and the 
Levant. Moreover, the French decision to break off diplomatic relations following 
the bombardments was, not unlike the British case, a way to underline the 
symbolic importance of a strong response. Roger Cambon explained his 
resignation and departure from London in a note to Churchill and Halifax. In it, 
he described hearing Churchill’s Commons speech and knowing that the events 
that had taken place over the last few days, and the British descriptions of them 
made it impossible to continue in his current position.65 
Ultimately, the strategic context that developed after the French 
capitulation was both limiting and highly complex. Britain needed to demonstrate 
its resolve to continue the war, yet was in no position to place boots on the 
ground in a direct assault against the Germans. Action against the fleet was one 
of the few options available at the time and it was mobilised to serve a highly 
symbolic purpose in addition to strategic considerations. The metropolitan 
French government was likewise in a tenuous situation. It had to respond to the 
attacks in a manner that would confirm its newfound position as a non-
belligerent, avoid German reprisals in the unoccupied zone and attempt to 
strengthen its own legitimacy both at home and abroad. In both countries many 
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of the official statements that were issued after Mers el-Kébir not only appeared, 
but also were greatly elaborated upon throughout the press.  
 
Going to Press: French and British Responses 
The themes that emerged or echoed official statements in both the British and 
the Vichy press after the Mers el-Kébir bombardments evoked images that 
would become familiar throughout the war. This long-term rhetorical continuity 
illustrates the importance of the role that Catapult played as a watershed 
moment in the Anglo-French relationship. Or more specifically, how the Anglo-
French relationship was portrayed throughout the mass media. In particular, 
popular opinion and the press within Britain were marked by resolute support for 
those military operations that they viewed as moving in the direction of ultimate 
victory. The moral dilemma of violence, and specifically civilian death appeared 
to be less important and indeed easily justifiable within the broader context of 
the war. The British press, and specifically The Times and The Guardian 
routinely vindicated and even praised the action taken towards the French fleet. 
We have already addressed the argument of inevitably, which played a leading 
role in official explanations of the operations. This feeling of inevitability was 
even more evident within the British press. Indeed, what made it unique was the 
heightened sense of historic nostalgia and emotive language. Churchill himself 
took on an important role in the media, not as a policy maker, but as a heroic 
and historically significant figure. The Vichy French press, much like Baudouin’s 
press releases, sought to re-assert France’s status as a sovereign nation with a 
great empire. British “aggressions” were immoral. However, they were also 
consistent with the British attitude during the present conflict, in which France 
was portrayed as having shouldered the entire burden of the war effort, and in 
this sense were unsurprising.  
 
British Press Responses 
On 5 July Cambon summarised the response to Mers el-Kébir across the British 
press: “The English press is unanimous in approving the decision of the British 
government to seize the French fleet by force.”66 Within the British metropole, 
the vast majority of press commentary on Catapult appeared between 5 and 6 
July. Many articles used Churchill’s Commons address as the basis for their 	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description and analysis of the fleet operations, an understandable approach 
given the limited availability of first hand information. Most notably, however, the 
tone and language of stories in both newspapers deliberately employed historic 
imagery and symbolic references, which suggested that Churchill’s position as a 
great statesman was already assured. An article in The Guardian by the political 
correspondent described the reception to Churchill’s speech, “One liked to think 
there was a cloud of unseen witnesses, not strangers to Westminster either, nor 
untried in ordeals of England wishing the Commons’ House well in this moment 
of destiny – Pym and Hampden, Walpole and Chatham, Fox, Burke, Pitt, 
Wellington and Gladstone. For of what was Mr Churchill speaking – “The eve of 
battle for our native land.””67 Using highly emotive ideas such as “destiny” and 
conjuring up triumphant historical figures did more than vindicate Churchill’s 
actions. These tactics further implied that victory itself was simply a matter of 
time. The article went on to say that after the speech, “…the cheers were loud 
and sustained, and one particularly noticed Mr Chamberlain foremost in the 
demonstration waving his order papers.”68 This imagery described the symbolic 
passing of power to Churchill, who although had been named Prime Minister in 
May, had yet to receive the full approval of the House and the British citizenry. 
On 7 July the Observer reported during a discussion of his speech “He took his 
place with the greatest of our historic men. He ranked with Cromwell and 
Chatham.”69 What can be seen within these articles was a deliberate choice to 
portray Churchill, not as a politician who had backed the right policy, but to mark 
this decision as the one that had vaulted him to historic greatness. This was 
despite the fact that the battle was in fact, just beginning. 
The Times also featured high praise for Churchill. The highest 
commendations were linked to his speech and its thunderous reception. “It is not 
often that the House is so deeply moved. The Prime Minister’s speech matched 
a theme which had the qualities of a Greek tragedy, and it will live as one of the 
most memorable in the history of Parliament.”70 Another article described the 
reaction to his address: “…and the whole House rose to cheer loudly and with a 	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note of fierce resolve his declaration that the war should be prosecuted with the 
utmost vigour until the righteous purposes for which we entered upon it had 
been in all respects fulfilled.”71 Churchill became, in these depictions, not just a 
successful orator, but the embodiment of British resolve in the on going war. 
Why was Churchill portrayed in this way? I argue that the embodiment of 
Churchill as a national hero reflected a broad public sentiment that both 
demanded and subsequently rewarded decisive action in the continuing 
prosecution of the war. Mass Observation research carried out on 5 July in the 
London districts of Chalk Farm, Limehouse, and Hampstead found support for 
the bombardments (although some respondents had yet to hear of the event) 
with animosity aimed at the French leadership rather than the French people. 
One fifty-year-old female commented, “I think it’s a damn good thing. Don’t 
you?”72 While a few respondents displayed open hostility towards the French 
and even understanding for the Germans, these responses were rare and likely 
to be motivated by individual beliefs, rather than in direct response to Mers el-
Kébir. Importantly, this elevation of Churchill throughout the press was not 
always mirrored in public opinion studies. Mass Observation responses included 
only one direct reference to Churchill’s apparently superior leadership.73 The 
success of actual operations themselves appeared to be more important than 
the man or men behind them. The apparent discrepancy between the exorbitant 
praise for Churchill in the press and the more calculated response found by 
Mass Observation analysts is itself an interesting point that could be expanded 
upon after further research. In any case, what is clear in both these sources was 
the substantial agreement that Somerville’s decision to fire had been the correct 
one. 
What was not mentioned in the broadsheet press was the possibility of 
open conflict with France. This concern was, however present in individual 
responses to the operations. A thirty-five-year-old female from North London 
commented that The Evening Standard hinted, “that Petain may declare war on 
England.”74 Other respondents expressed a similar worry. However, neither The 	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Times nor The Guardian speculated upon this possibility. Both papers focused 
upon showing, again, the tragic inevitability of the bombardments. In The Times, 
the “tragic necessity” of events at Mers el–Kébir was confirmed by the unity with 
which the Commons supported the outcome.75 The same sentiment was echoed 
in The Guardian. Under the subheading “No Alternative” an article discussed the 
positive reaction of the Commons to Churchill’s speech. “Heartrending it was, 
but let there be no mistake about it: the House to a man and with swelling 
cheers approved the cruel necessity. There was no alternative.”76 Nevertheless, 
facts such as the death toll of French naval personnel were conspicuously 
absent from these reports.  
Likewise, The Guardian was hardly subtle in discussing the unavoidability 
of the bombardments. “The need for silence about the French fleet in the past 
fortnight will now be apparent to everyone. The most strenuous efforts have 
been made by the Government to avoid the painful, but ultimately inevitable use 
of force against a recent ally…”77 A total of twelve articles concerning the fleet 
were published in the 5 July edition, eclipsing all other topics. Articles drew up a 
clear argument for readers to follow. They referenced the positive global 
reaction to the bombardments as proof that this was the best course of action to 
take. “It is universally agreed that Britain’s action was made unavoidable. Britain, 
it is recognized fully, was not in a position to incur further dangers to the cause 
which is also that of France.”78 The press also justified the uniquely violent 
outcome at Mers el-Kébir as compared to the other ports. An article in The 
Times entitled “British Action at Oran” cited the ease of the British takeover of 
French ships in British ports as evidence of how effortlessly the Germans could 
have taken over ships in other French ports.79 On a whole, the press engaged 
only minimally with the simultaneous operations that were undertaken in British 
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ports and at Alexandria. Not until 8 July was tentative success reported on the 
demobilisation of ships at Alexandria.80  
 There was another theme that was present throughout the British press: 
American approval. This is not surprising given its earlier prominence within War 
Cabinet discussions. It too, however, was symptomatic of the very public 
expectation that American intervention would be forthcoming. The Guardian ran 
an article containing statements from several American senators and 
newspapers, all of which applauded the tenacity of British action towards the 
fleet. The article commenced by saying, “Britain was completely justified in 
attacking the French fleet at Oran. This is the general feeling in naval quarters in 
Washington.”81 Between 5-6 July four articles reiterated American opinion 
towards the actions against the French fleet. They drew upon the statements of 
not only the American government but also the response of the American 
population. “Mr Churchill’s speech today in the House of Commons was fully 
reported on the American wireless and has created a profound impression here. 
There is no doubt that the people of the United States wholly understand and 
sympathise with the necessities which compelled Great Britain to attack the fleet 
of her late Ally.”82 One article consisted almost entirely of direct quotes taken 
from The New York Times, The New York Herald Tribune, and The Baltimore 
Sun. This study of the American press concluded, “American sympathy is 
overwhelmingly with Great Britain in her action against the French Fleet.”83  
The press also praised Churchill’s distinction between the French 
population and their leadership. Editorial commentary suggested that official 
speeches on this topic were being followed and discussed. A key article in The 
Guardian, for example blamed the bombardments on the Bordeaux leadership 
and Gensoul’s general lack of character.  
From what I know of Admiral Gensoul, he must have been completely 
under the thumb of his Bordeaux masters. He was reactionary in his 
political views and was regarded in naval quarters as unimaginative, 
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unenterprising and scarcely intelligent. It was this “dull dog” … who 
gave the ghastly order to his men to go and fight the British.84 
The article went on to comment upon the “abyss which the battle of Oran 
has revealed between the Bordeaux Government and the common people 
of France…”85 In The Times the caption under a photo of Gensoul read, 
“Admiral Gensoul in command of the French Fleet at Oran. He refused to 
adopt any of the honourable alternatives offered by the British 
Government.”86  
Like the media reactions to Churchill’s speech, these articles invoked 
historic themes to create sympathy for metropolitan France. “It is difficult to 
believe that the French people, with all of their proud history behind them, 
can be content to become a vassal state, lending their ancient prestige to 
the very forces that Revolutionary France and Catholic France have 
combined in denouncing as a new barbarism.”87 J. Nicholson Balmer 
applauded this distinction in a letter to the editor. He wrote, “Sir, - No 
reasonable person questions the wisdom of the decision of the Government 
of Britain in the grim choice set before it at Oran and we welcome the 
distinction drawn between the French nation and its Fascist Government.”88 
Here, history was used with the intent of provoking a kind of nostalgia or 
sense of pride for the past. This selective use of history was particularly 
interesting given that the Anglo-French relationship itself had such an 
acrimonious foundation. Indeed, The Times cited the 1807 British seizure of 
the Portuguese and Danish fleets as a defensive measure against 
Napoleonic invasion as justification for the current operations at Mers el-
Kébir. “From the supreme crises of our history we have always emerged 
with spirit purged and ennobled.”89 Later, we will see how the Vichy press 
drew on this more troubled side of the Franco-British relationship to make a 
case against Anglo-Free French imperial incursions.  
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French Press Responses 
In an ironic turn of events, on 3 July as Admiral Somerville was squaring off 
against Admiral Gonsoul, Le Temps published a celebratory story entitled 
“The French Navy.” The article looked back on the 1921 naval conference in 
Washington, after which the French navy had received greater recognition in 
the press and amongst the public. It was lauded for the traditional strategic 
importance of Oceanic naval forces and their links to the empire. French 
naval policy was, “in spite of political fluctuations and unceasing changes of 
government…worthy of a great country and its global empire.”90 This 
publication, just prior to the public rupture of Anglo-French diplomatic 
relations, did not hold up the fleet solely as a military asset. It depicted it as 
an essential part of the French nation and her empire. The fleet, moreover, 
was portrayed as the thread of continuity linking the at times tumultuous 
French political scene. Now, its retention by Pétain’s government made the 
fleet more important than ever.  
 After the bombardments, it was not surprising that the French press 
unanimously described the violence at Mers el-Kébir as unjustifiably 
aggressive. The French position, furthermore, was depicted as honourable 
while British actions were considered dishonest and unsportsmanlike. These 
arguments asserted the right of the new French government to withdraw into 
ostensible neutrality. What follows is a discussion of these main press 
themes, including how word choice impacted the tone of the message. 
Compared to the previous analysis of the British press, this section will be 
much shorter because the themes in question were very straightforward and 
highly repetitive. Many of the articles, in fact were simply reprinted official 
statements. 
 The most prevalent theme running through the French press was the 
odiousness of the British “aggressions.” The official government 
communiqué, which was broadcast on the evening of 4 July, appeared in 
print the following day, as did Prouvost’s letter to the American press. Both 
the official commentary and material written by press correspondents 
unreservedly condemned the attacks. The articles described Force H and 
the British government more broadly as “the aggressors” while the 
operations at Mers el-Kébir were depicted as “the aggression, the crime, the 	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attack and the hostilities.” In addition, many articles described the operations 
as an “ambush.”91 This had the effect of making British actions appear at 
least petty and at worst immoral. The French, both as a government and a 
nation, on the other hand, were portrayed as victims of British violence. 
Worse, Britain had acted despite numerous French guarantees that all 
precautions had been taken to make certain that the fleet would be 
protected from German designs. After Churchill’s Commons statement, 
Baudouin published a tell-all piece, in which he examined the state of Anglo-
French relations since the outbreak of war in 1939. He argued that since 
1920, France had put in all the effort to mobilise forces for the upcoming 
battle, while the British had hoarded men and material to protect itself. 
Because of this, the French people had borne alone the suffering that 
should have been the common cause of “two people.”92 This line of 
reasoning was not altogether inaccurate. Martin Alexander has argued 
convincingly that throughout the phoney war Whitehall remained “obsessed 
with a vision of the onset of war that came straight from H.G. Wells. …the 
shape of things to come admitted only the flattening of industries and cities – 
and British ones at that.”93 Coupled with the British obsession with the 
spectre of the air war in Britain, there was a culture of overconfidence within 
the service ministries aimed at French military capabilities.94 Still, this 
French narrative of victimhood was important because it stressed that 
metropolitan France remained a sovereign nation with a legal government – 
not an occupied state. It was also a way to demonstrate to the armistice 
commission Vichy’s integrity and willingness to abide by the rules laid out in 
the armistice. Pétain’s government, the press reported on 6 July, had 
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requested greater leverage to use air and naval forces to protect French 
territory.95 
 French victimhood, when contrasted with British hostility also 
promoted the idea of French honour. The armistice itself was portrayed as 
demanding but honourable. Likewise, the actions taken by Gensoul in 
refusing to accept the ultimatum were “heroic” and taken in defence of 
French honour.96 Broadly speaking, the image presented through official 
statements and reiterated throughout the press distanced the metropole and 
the empire from the on going war. They did so by constantly restating how 
aggressive, unjustifiable, unexpected and dishonourable British actions 
were. These same themes will re-emerge time and time again as British and 
Free French forces clashed with Vichy throughout the empire. In this 
instance, Vichy’s statements did not mention de Gaulle’s rival forces. 
Indeed, calling attention to his presence would only complicate Vichy’s 
claims as the sole representative of French interests. Similarly, because so 
much of the international press was sympathetic to the British cause, 
Baudouin was unable to assert, as Churchill had done, that he had received 
any significant support outside of the metropole. By 9 July, discussions of 
the bombardments were fading from the press. A final account from New 
York described the American reaction as one of “painful surprise” but 
admitted that the press was not condemning British actions.97 
  
Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that on both sides of the Channel rhetoric was 
deployed as a strategic tool of both domestic and foreign policy. For Britain, 
it was intrinsic to the policy-making process. The War Cabinet used the 
metropolitan press, diplomatic reports and intelligence reports to conclude 
that action against the fleet was likely to receive support among the majority 
of the British public and American officials. Senior figures in the Admiralty 
then used this information to write and revise numerous carefully crafted 
press statements and broadcasts. Studying these communications 	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highlights the value of Catapult not only as a strategic military operation but 
even more so as a symbolic declaration of absolute determination to carry 
on the war. The violence of the bombardments was justified using language 
that promised ultimate victory. These promises were further justified through 
references to heroic victories in the past. Within these depictions, France 
played the role of a beleaguered nation under the thumb of both Germany 
and the defeatist Pétain government. Its only chance to overcome this 
domination was through British victory and rescue. At the same time, 
international, and particularly American approval or criticism of the choice to 
fire on the French fleet was something that British and French leadership 
were both eager to gain. British press statements, Churchill’s Commons 
address and corresponding press articles all drew on the idea of American 
support. In fact, they cited examples of American backing as a way to justify 
overall policy towards the fleet.  
 French criticism of British policy towards France’s naval forces did not 
gain much international recognition apart from a few nations such as 
Bulgaria and Turkey. Foreign Minister Baudouin made concerted efforts to 
gain international approval, issuing instructions to overseas representatives 
to promote sympathy for the French as victims of a British attack. However, 
even he recognised the paucity of international support for this version of 
events. Nevertheless, French rhetoric after Mers el-Kébir is instructive 
because it lays the groundwork for much of what would be written over the 
next two years, prior to the total occupation of the metropole late in 1942. 
The themes that were present in Baudouin’s communiqués and Pétain’s 
statements were part of a larger narrative that attempted to preserve French 
interests and French sovereignty in the aftermath of a devastating defeat 
and armistice. At the heart of many French publications was the assertion 
that, despite British claims, Pétain’s government was the only true 
representative of French interests. Equally importantly, Pétain and his 
government were asserting their positions as members of a neutral nation in 
the current conflict. French rhetoric in the wake of Mers el-Kébir revolved 
around one core image: the British as aggressors against the French nation. 
The word ‘aggression’ or variations of it appeared repeatedly throughout 
official statements and the press. Moreover, via the mass media, Baudouin 
suggested that French neutrality was brought on by Britain’s failure (or 
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perhaps refusal) to build up sufficient arms and men for the European 
struggle. They preferred to barricade themselves on their island, hoarding 
materials for their own defensive stand, he claimed.  
 Clearly, the events at Mers el-Kébir held major significance for both 
sides. In the coming weeks and months, the bombardments would fade from 
British memory, if not the French. Indeed, in the French case the 
bombardments would be referred to again through the media and in 
propaganda materials. By late September a British memorandum would 
describe the impact of Mers el-Kébir on the Anglo-French relationship as, “a 
period of intense suspicion and anti-British feeling gradually readjusting itself 
to the present attitude, which is the maintenance of the status quo.”98 
However, what remained was the positivity and praise that greeted the 
event, both within Britain and amongst its target audience of the United 
States government and people. The rhetorical portrayal of operation 
Catapult served to bolster both of these forces, building up a dialogue of 
inevitability and certainty within a wartime context of great uncertainty and 
even doubt. On the French side, it laid the foundation for what would be 
described as a string of violations of French sovereignty, neutrality and 
honour. 
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Chapter 5: Justifying Military Failure at Dakar, September 1940 
“A Glaring Example of Miscalculation, Confusion, Timidity and Muddle”1 
 
Introduction 
Writing in 1943, historian Emil Lengyel emphasised the strategic importance of 
Dakar (and the French empire in Africa more generally) in deciding the current 
conflict. The overtly racist and imperialist tones of the book prop up a broader 
argument that depicts France’s colonial presence in Africa as both a bulwark 
against Germany and a source of revitalising power. “Africa was a raison d’etre 
of French imperialism.”2 Lengyel believed that Britain should have taken over 
the Senegalese port city of Dakar, federal capital of the French West African 
federation, immediately following the French defeat in June 1940, rather than 
waiting until September. This strategic argument is situated rather 
uncomfortably beside praise for the famed humanity of French colonial 
administration and unflattering comparisons between French and British 
imperial rule. While the British are fair and treat local populations well, he 
argues, they are cold and impersonal. However, within the French empire, “the 
natives can warm to the French, for whom they feel affinity and attraction. The 
sunny disposition of the Frenchman is ingratiating, and the native too likes to 
laugh.”3 Alice Conklin has argued that French policy-makers employed a 
“civilising logic,” or justificatory rhetoric based upon liberal values that made 
French colonialism “as much a state of mind as it was a set of coercive 
practices and system of resource extraction.”4 
 These depictions of two contrasting imperial approaches illustrate an 
important issue of periodization. This was the imperial mind-set prevalent at the 
time, one that weighed not only the material and strategic features of a region, 
but also linked the very idea of empire to national greatness. It was this 
symbolic importance of empire, manifested through rhetoric, which became for 
Vichy a vital source of legitimacy. Ruth Ginio argues, “In ‘normal’ circumstances 	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no empire had ever pleaded for its subjects’ loyalty and legitimacy was quite 
irrelevant. Now, suddenly, France’s colonial subjects were no longer taken for 
granted.”5 Likewise, Desmond Dinan stresses that despite the lack of strategic 
or economic value of de Gaulle’s newly acquired territories in French Equatorial 
Africa (AEF), this territory was hugely important both symbolically and 
psychologically for the legitimacy of the fledgling movement.6 The conflict that 
erupted between the Anglo-Free French and Vichy forces at Dakar between 23 
and 25 September 1940 was the first of several Franco-British battles for 
colonial territory. The operation was complex. Strategically, Dakar was a naval 
base and commercial port with the best harbour facilities in West Africa 
between Casablanca and Cape Town, as well as a modern airfield.7 Being 
defeated here would have direct effects both in the loss of strategically valuable 
territory and in the twin blows to de Gaulle’s prestige and that of his British 
patrons. The latter, in particular, needed to maintain the image of solidarity and 
strength that had been achieved at Mers el-Kébir three months earlier. Issues of 
prestige, or perhaps more appropriately, face saving, made up a core 
component of this operation, from the planning process to its eventual 
justification. Specifically, War Cabinet personnel were ultimately much more 
reticent about carrying on with the operation. Their estimations, of the potential 
political fallout both in the form of criticisms at home and a loss of prestige in the 
eyes of the metropolitan French and American populations, attached greater 
repercussions to failure than pure military estimations. Thus, the official 
response, insofar as there was one, particularly in the early days, consisted 
largely of Free French rhetoric. 
Events were further complicated by tension between the British 
government and the new Free French movement. The former carefully situated 
themselves as supporters of de Gaulle while simultaneously withholding agency 
from the movement in regards to foreign policy formulation and the running of 
the war. Ultimately, however, British attempts to subtly shift the blame for the 
failed operation to de Gaulle were unsuccessful. Dinan has argued that both the 	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press and public opinion within Britain unanimously blamed de Gaulle for failing 
to capture Dakar.8 However, the following analysis challenges this argument. 
The British press called for parliamentary explanations, a point that 
demonstrated the extent to which large sections of the population believed that 
de Gaulle’s movement lacked any substantial autonomy. The following sections 
will look in turn at the planning phase of the operations before turning to the 
attempts to justify the ultimate failure to capture Dakar. Similarly to the 
bombardments at Mers el-Kébir, the British mass media as well as Ministry of 
Information (MOI) and Foreign Office intelligence reports tended to interpret the 
operation through a unique framework of wartime morality. This was especially 
notable in the competing narratives of the popular press and the officially 
sanctioned press releases. Classic conceptions of a “just” war consider “the use 
of armed force as an instrument of public authority in the service of the common 
good….”9 Free French justifications of the withdrawal from Dakar stressed 
peacetime ideals of empathy for the local population and a desire to avoid 
risking heavy casualties. The popular press throughout Britain criticised both of 
these arguments on the grounds that they were inconsistent with ideas of 
victory, which both necessitated and permitted violent acts that would remove 
obstacles along the way. What will become increasingly clear throughout this 
chapter is the complexity of nascent Anglo-Gaullist relations, both real and 
rhetorically constructed, within a context that remained uncertain throughout 
autumn 1940. 
In the closing months of 1940, the British embassy in Madrid served as a 
covert back-channel to maintain communication between Britain and Vichy. 
Despite this evident willingness on the part of the British government to 
maintain some ties with Vichy, more significant was Britain’s refusal to publically 
acknowledge either the legality or the legitimacy of Pétain’s government. At 
every turn, British political leaders considered how material actions would affect 
local and international perceptions of Britain’s war effort or even broad foreign 
policy motives. International Relations scholar Michael Butler has argued, 
“…the public presentation of the war-decision should be understood as in fact, a 
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matter of vital and practical importance to the effective conduct of statecraft.”10 
This assertion convincingly argues that intangible factors such as morale and 
broad societal support are of vital importance within the policy making process.  
The decision, ultimately sanctioned by the British War Cabinet, to 
attempt to forcibly shift the loyalty of French Senegal from Vichy to de Gaulle’s 
Free French, precipitated a rift in Anglo-French relations. However, this crisis 
was also a symptom of a deeper, social and national rivalry between Vichy and 
the Free French in which each party attempted to publically assert itself as the 
legitimate representative of the French nation state. The British Chiefs of Staff 
(COS) had earlier argued that the Free French, as a movement that was hostile 
to the Pétain government, must carry out any incursions onto French colonial 
territory. Likewise, the War Cabinet was aware of the likelihood of an increase 
in Anglo-French tensions and planned accordingly. As the retaliatory bombing 
of Gibraltar by Vichy forces would show, the metropolitan French Government 
presented the colonial incursions as a crisis in Anglo-French relations, and 
imperial relations more specifically. At the same time, Vichy actively avoided 
any interpretations that acknowledged the involvement of the Free French as an 
autonomous strategic actor. This left Vichy and de Gaulle to engage in a 
rhetorical battle attempting to confirm their own representative legitimacy as 
rightful imperial rulers, defining empire as an obvious source of both symbolic 
and strategic power.  
 
Planning and Background 
Arthur Marder’s archive-based book, Operation ‘Menace’, The Dakar Expedition 
and the Dudley North Affair, remains the most comprehensive record of how 
this operation was planned and carried out.11 What follows here is a brief 
discussion looking in more depth at the concerns voiced by key individuals in 
the decision-making process. They included the War Cabinet and, immediately 
below that, the Joint Planning Sub Committee (JPSC) and to a lesser extent de 
Gaulle and his lieutenants in Carlton Gardens. The JPSC in turn, provided 
reports and recommendations, some of which articulated the views of leaders 
on the ground, namely Edward Spears, General Noel Irwin and Admiral James 	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Cunningham. Ultimately, operation Menace was dramatically reconfigured a 
number of times. These changes were the result of more than applying material 
resources to best effect. Rather, their chief variable was force composition. 
Ultimately, the force assembled was meant to underline both the shared British 
and Gaullist wish to emphasise the French character of the operation, 
regardless of the overwhelming British administrative and military power lurking 
in the background. Dakar was certainly strategically vital from a military 
perspective. However, what is emphasised here is its importance from the 
perspective of the legitimacy of the Free French movement. De Gaulle hoped to 
convince Governor General Pierre Boisson that continuing the struggle at the 
side of the Free French was the correct, and indeed moral choice.  
After discussions between de Gaulle, Spears, and Churchill’s valued 
assistant and key intelligence adviser, Major Desmond Morton, a note was 
circulated on 4 August proposing a mainly Free French operation to secure the 
occupation of Dakar.12 This initial plan envisaged de Gaulle sailing from Britain 
on 15 August, rallying the federation of French West Africa13, occupying its 
capital, Dakar, and consolidating for Free France the colonies in West and 
Equatorial Africa.14 In this original plan, Operation Scipio, de Gaulle stated 
clearly, “if he meets opposition from French sea, air or land forces, the whole 
operation will be impossible and he would in fact not consider continuing it.”15 
The General’s professed unwillingness to participate in a struggle between 
Frenchmen remained rhetorically consistent throughout, despite his pragmatic 
recognition of the need to allow British contingents to use force in case of 
resistance. He realised that the outcome of this attempt to gain control over 
Vichy colonial territory would affect broader perceptions of the Free French 
movement and he wished to avoid appearing to force his countrymen into his 
camp at the barrel of British guns. De Gaulle insisted that in case of resistance 
at Dakar, the Free French forces travelling with the British naval squadron 	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should attempt to establish themselves at another base: Pointe-Noire in the 
French Congo. The location was also strategically significant owing to its 
proximity to Brazzaville, the capital and governing seat of AEF. This move, he 
stressed, would not only be strategically valuable, but would serve to save face, 
a consideration that recognised the manner in which justificatory rhetoric would 
be sold to an “audience” of onlookers acutely sensitive to military failures.16  
On 8 August the War Cabinet tasked the JPSC of the COS to prepare a plan 
specifically to capture Dakar, installing de Gaulle there in two possible contexts: 
a local welcome of the Free French leader or in face of determined resistance 
and the hostility of French West African forces. Notably, this plan was to 
proceed initially without de Gaulle’s knowledge. This approach was consistent 
with the broad reluctance within the British bureaucracy to lend unqualified 
support to a large-scale dissident French movement. Desmond Dinan, for 
example, has documented the indifference and at times open hostility within the 
service ministries towards the development of an effective Free French fighting 
force.17 This early plan, which laid the groundwork for Menace, was based upon 
telegrams received from West Africa, which highlighting growing anti-British 
sentiment in Dakar as well as uncertainty regarding Boisson’s attitude. The 
service ministries were reluctant, therefore, to sanction an operation that they 
believed was likely to be met by stiff resistance.18 The JPSC believed that the 
operation would only be successful if carried out by highly trained British forces 
with a viable plan of attack and the element of surprise (thus going against de 
Gaulle’s stated opposition to the use of force). General Irwin (military forces) 
and Admiral Cunningham (naval forces) were joint mission commanders. They 
would only give the order to land the Free French after resistance was 
subdued.19  
By mid August, however, the JPSC had revised the operation to include 
more Free French elements, as had initially been envisaged. The previous, 
British-led plan, which incorporated a surprise landing of British troops at six 
beaches and only a small Free French contingent was not feasible due to 	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problems of swell.20 The Vice-Chiefs of Staff (VCS), de Gaulle, Spears and 
Churchill met on 20 August to discuss revisions.21 Ideas from this meeting 
formed the basis for the final version of Menace. In this version, de Gaulle 
would issue an ultimatum to the garrison at Dakar, bringing in British support 
only if resistance was serious. Although showing restraint at first, if determined 
Vichyite opposition continued, “…the British force would use all the force in their 
power to break down resistance. It was essential that by nightfall General de 
Gaulle should be master of Dakar.”22 De Gaulle continued to emphasise the 
necessity of promoting the French character of the operation and avoiding 
bloodshed at all costs.23 The contradictions and uncertainties at this early date 
were striking. The prevalent belief in the JPSC and COS, that a successful 
operation would require a substantial use of manpower, was difficult to 
reconcile with real fears that the takeover would only be perceived as legitimate 
if the Free French were welcomed voluntarily. General Irwin had similar doubts 
about the operation, warning that current information showed “a marked 
difference” in opinions and attitudes of the Dakar garrison and population. This 
disparity was a severe hindrance in an operation that relied upon favourable 
local conditions.24  
The War Cabinet gave its final approval to Menace on 27 August, believing 
that Commander Rushbrooke and Captain Poulter, liaison officers with the 
French in Dakar, would not be back in time to advise planners on local opinion 
and conditions. Although Vice Chief of the Imperial General Staff (VCIGS) Sir 
Robert Haining suggested postponing the operation by four weeks, the Cabinet 
declined.25 In any case, Rushbrooke and Poulter provided intelligence on 29 	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August, 2 days before the expedition sailed from Scapa, the Clyde and 
Liverpool. Both officers emphasised the strength of defences and the loyalty of 
troops to the commander of the Dakar garrison and Pétain.26 The official British 
Admiralty recounting of the final days of August argues that despite receiving 
this reliable intelligence, nothing could be done because the final approval had 
already been given.27 Contemporary arguments by Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and 
Claude Huan have pointed out that the operation never had much chance of 
success in the face of a symbolic, but nonetheless very real resistance.28 Einar 
Ramsland, a Norwegian 3rd Officer at Dakar in the wake of the French 
capitulation later described the population as divided into three sections: “the 
pro-British, the anti-British and those who maintained a discreet silence.”29 De 
Gaulle’s stated refusal to use force himself, but willingness to allow his British 
backers to do so was also inconsistent. However, both de Gaulle and the COS 
ultimately converged in the belief that regardless of how victory was achieved, it 
was vital to create a perception of legitimacy around the operation. Churchill 
himself also recognised that failure to bring Dakar onto the side of the Free 
French would have a negative impact upon British prestige at home, within 
metropolitan France and likely the United States as well. The War Cabinet 
devised what they saw as a credible justification to the population of Dakar: 
“Every endeavour would be made to secure the place without bloodshed, on the 
plea that an Allied force had come to prevent the Germans seizing Dakar, and 
to bring succour and help to the colony.”30 Notably, a report completed by the 
JPSC just a few days later stated that German or Italian occupation of Dakar 
was unlikely to be successful.31  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to sail until she was found. ‘Admiralty Record Office, “Unofficial Account of 
Operation, Major P.R. Smith Hill, Royal Marines”’, ADM 199/907, TNA. 
26 “The Dakar Operation, August and September 1940,” May 1942, WO 232/13, 
TNA. 
27 Captain S.W. Roskill, The War at Sea 1939-1945, Vol. 1, The Defensive 
(London: Her Majesty’s Sationery Office, 1954), 308. 
28 Hervé Coutau-Bégarie and Claude Huan, Dakar 1940 La Bataille Fratricide. 
(Paris: Economica, 2004), 231. 
29 “Dakar, Military and Political Intelligence Reports,” December 1940, WO 
208/2852, TNA. 
30 W.M. (40) 225th Conclusions, Minute 6, Confidential Annex, 13 August 1940, 
CAB 65/14/21, TNA. 
31 “Possibility of a German or Italian Occupation of Dakar, Report by the Joint 
Intelligence Sub-Committee,” 17 August 1940, CAB 80/16/49, TNA. 
	   129	  
Around 10 September the War Cabinet considered a note from COS 
Secretary, General Hastings Ismay. He expressed concern about the possibility 
of reprisals from Vichy, a risk increased in his view because a lack of secrecy 
was jeopardising the operation.32 Although an earlier War Cabinet session had 
concluded that the likelihood of Vichy declaring war on the British was not very 
high, adverse repercussions for British colonial possessions were thought to be 
likely.33 The Joint Planning Staff (JPS) anticipated four possible reactions: air 
attacks on Gibraltar and/or Malta, attack on British trade in the Atlantic by 
submarines, and active operations by contingents of the French Fleet.34 
However, between 26 and 29 August, Chad, the French Cameroons and the 
French Congo all rallied to the Free French. This happy outcome initially made 
Churchill and the COS willing to continue with the operation despite possible 
reprisals. After the departure of the task force, however, a separate incident 
threatened to derail the operation, namely the unwelcome arrival of a French 
squadron at Dakar.  
The Consul in Tangier and the Naval Attaché in Madrid both warned London 
on 9 and 10 September respectively that a French squadron was set to pass 
through the straights of Gibraltar on the morning of 11 September. These 
warnings were immediately forwarded to the War Cabinet.35 Admiral Dudley 
North, Admiral Commanding of the North Atlantic, did not detain the ships and 
three French cruisers and three destroyers from Toulon passed through the 
straights on 11 September. On enquiry, North reported that having received no 
further instructions following either original message, he conferred with 
Gibraltar-based Vice Admiral James Somerville, and they decided that as the 
French ships were not attempting to disguise themselves and were acting with 
friendly intentions, there was no reason not to let them pass. The ships were 
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allowed to pass, and North even sent a friendly message: “Bon voyage.”36 In 
the War Cabinet, however, this event rocked the foundations of the operation. 
In the discussions that took place, it is possible to better understand how 
intangible factors such as prestige and credibility, which formed the base of 
later rhetorical justifications, impacted willingness to proceed with the event. 
The War Cabinet considered these concerns in tandem with the balance of 
military power at Dakar.  
From an ideological perspective, the British decision to commit resources to 
back a Free French takeover in Dakar was closely linked to the desire to 
demonstrate the validity of de Gaulle’s leadership. More importantly, de 
Gaulle’s legitimacy was directly linked to his decision to continue the struggle 
on the side of the British. Arthur Marder wrote that he saw Menace as 
something of a sequel to Oran, a need to consolidate militarily strategic assets 
in the wake of the French defeat.37 However, this observation overlooks the 
symbolic role that such operations can and do play within a wartime context. 
Such considerations are crucial to understanding the plethora of motivations 
underlying how the operation was both planned and carried out, in the War 
Cabinet, the Service Ministries and the Free French Headquarters at Carlton 
Gardens. Vichy, in constructing the idea of empire as both a strategic material 
asset and “a myth that was to compensate France for its defeat,” also worked to 
sustain this myth through active resistance to any threat.38 Indeed, from the 
inception of Scipio to the finalisation of Menace, British policy was formulated 
based upon the understanding that seizing French territory resided in a different 
category than ensuring that the fleet didn’t fall into enemy hands. Political 
considerations for the Dakar operations, and indeed throughout the war, 
emphasised that any operation involving French colonial territory should appear 
to be carried out by French forces.39 Avoiding accusations of imperial rivalry 
was one reason for this approach. Maintaining the credibility of de Gaulle’s 
movement as a real alternative to Pétain’s government was a second. The very 
real need to manage limited resources was a third. Haining was adamant during 	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the planning process that a hostile reception at Dakar would require the use of 
ground forces and “withdrawals from the defence of Great Britain which cannot 
be justified at the present time.”40  
After the arrival of the squadron of French ships at Dakar, the War Cabinet 
cancelled the expedition on 16 September, an outcome that relieved 
Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Alexander Cadogan.41 “The French ships 
have forestalled us in Dakar, and so ‘Menace’ is off! I cannot truly say I am 
sorry!”42 De Gaulle had earlier expressed his concern surrounding the ships to 
General Spears. “General de Gaulle feels that everything possible must be 
done to prevent the six French ships reaching Dakar or other French West 
African Harbour. [sic] If they reach Dakar it is most unlikely the place will 
surrender to him.”43 However, these sentiments were contradicted by later 
correspondence, in which de Gaulle, Spears, Cunningham and Irwin argued 
that Menace should go forward as planned.44 These arguments were based 
upon the reinforcement of Britain’s Force M by two cruisers from the South 
Atlantic Fleet.45 Churchill recorded in his memoirs that, although he “had no 
doubt whatever that the enterprise should be abandoned,” the unexpected zeal 
showed by military leadership on the ground, caused him to change his mind.46 
De Gaulle himself, notwithstanding continued assertions that he would not 
involve himself in a fight amongst Frenchmen, agreed that if met with resistance 
and his troops were unable to land, British troops would use force to install 
him.47 Churchill and the COS were both hesitant to reinstate the operation, a 
mood that contrasted sharply with Spears, Irwin, Cunningham and de Gaulle. 
Two different factors were motivating policy formation in London and at Dakar 
respectively: political concerns and military utility.  
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 De Gaulle, although aware that excessive force could adversely affect 
the reputation of the Free French, believed that it was more important to 
achieve tangible, territorial gains and protect recent advances in Equatorial 
Africa.48 Likewise, Cunningham and Irwin both believed that the prospect of 
military success made the operation attractive. On the other hand, back in 
London, Secretary of State for War Anthony Eden argued that de Gaulle would 
not have a political future if he didn’t proceed with the operation and Spears 
argued that “the political consequences of ordering de Gaulle to abandon 
Menace and proceed to Duala may be serious, since…they might result in de 
Gaulle representing himself as abandoned by the British Government.”49 It is 
notable that these political reports and opinions were not centred upon the 
likelihood of military success. Instead, they anticipated how the outcome of 
operations at Dakar would shape intangible factors such as how neutral 
countries, including the United States, viewed the Anglo-Gaullist relationship. 
After the War Cabinet agreed to reinstate the operation, Churchill sent a 
telegram to President Roosevelt on 23 September. In it he wrote, “It looks as if 
there might be a stiff fight. Perhaps not, but anyhow orders have been given to 
ram it through.”50 The cavalier tone of the message illustrates the importance of 
fostering American perceptions of Britain as a capable and plucky fighter, a 
solid investment for American arms and eventually men. Desmond Dinan 
places much of the blame for Menace on Churchill, writing that his “obsessive 
involvement in its planning and execution was characterized by impatience, 
impetuosity, and a disregard for essential logical considerations.”51 Certainly, 
Churchill may have been impatient but even he had to work within the confines 
of the War Cabinet and its full ministerial complement. Moreover, “logical 
considerations” were not purely military or strategic. It will become abundantly 
clear that in this endeavour, just as in the bombardments at Mers el-Kébir, 
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strategic operations did fulfil military targets and goals; however, they also 
acted more symbolically to illustrate tenacity and boost prestige.  
The exchanges leading up to Menace being reinstated on 18 September 
revealed the tension that existed between the use of military force and the 
ability to control how these operations were perceived. Military incursions into 
Vichy territory had to be framed as a legitimate and publically supported French 
venture. Major General Irwin conveyed this sentiment to forces participating in 
the operation when he emphasised the political importance of installing de 
Gaulle as a leader within the broader region of French West Africa.52 Sailing 
orders for the operation similarly emphasised the need to “make every effort 
clearly to establish the Free French character of your force,” partially as a way 
to avoid dissent from residents of Dakar, but also, arguably, to preserve the 
legitimacy of the operation from a broader perspective.53 Crucially, concerted 
efforts to maintain the Free French nature of the event were more nuanced than 
a simple desire to legitimise de Gaulle’s movement. The British continued to 
foster Anglophilia within the French metropole, an endeavour that was not 
always supportive of the Anglo-Gaullist relationship. On 20 September the MOI 
expressed concern that Menace might irreparably damage the recent positive 
shift in French opinion. French journalists had reportedly said the previous night 
that if British ships fired on French ships again, it could end the de Gaulle 
movement.54 A report around the same time from the British consul in Geneva 
passed on information from an M. Ruffin, who said he had good reasons to 
believe that Vichy leadership had asked the press not to attack the British so 
strongly.55 The significance of diplomatic contacts between Vichy and Britain 
through Madrid in the autumn of 1940 hardly constituted any concrete 
agreement or relationship. However, these tentative communications were 
symptomatic of British willingness to entertain a broader concept of Anglo-
French relations alongside the Anglo-Gaullist relationship.  
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Carrying Out the Operation: Force vs. Face 
After being postponed for twenty-four hours, Menace was launched in the early 
morning hours of 23 September. Initial reports received by the War Cabinet via 
British operational headquarters on board the Barham indicated that Vichy 
forces were firmly resisting and that the Cumberland had been hit. The War 
Cabinet instructed the MOI to issue a statement that would encourage a 
framework for further discussion. Notably, the directions stressed that this 
statement should be issued before the Germans were able to comment upon 
events.56 The resistance met by the Anglo-Free French force devastated plans 
for a smooth takeover. However, official responses, most of which were 
formulated by de Gaulle and issued by Carleton Gardens, showcased how 
important it was to both the Free French movement and their British backers to 
preserve an image that placed them squarely on the moral high ground. This 
approach again echoed representations of Catapult at Mers el-Kébir. Likewise, 
timing was clearly important. Being the first to publically acknowledge, and 
importantly, explain what had happened, contributed to the credibility of the 
statement. Like the Free French response, the few official British statements 
issued by the MOI attempted to create rather than respond to a framework for 
discussion.  
 Amidst heavy fog, from on board the Westerland, at 6:00 a.m. de Gaulle 
began to radio appeals to Dakar to join the Free French while British planes 
dropped pro-Allied pamphlets to the city’s inhabitants. However, these 
messages appeared to have little effect. Batteries from the French ships Goree 
Island and Richelieu opened fire almost immediately after de Gaulle’s unarmed 
negotiators attempted to land, shortly after 7:00 a.m.57 Free French forces 
attempted at 1:38 pm. to begin landing operations at Rufisque as part of plan 
Charles, however fierce resistance led to its cancellation at 4:47 p.m.58 De 
Gaulle and Cunningham lost communication early in the operation and the latter 
was unable to locate the transports carrying Free French troops in the heavy 
fog. Both factors contributed to the decision to cancel the attempted landing.59 	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At 11:45 p.m. that evening Cunningham issued an ultimatum to Governor 
Boisson informing him that if he did not surrender the garrison by 6:00 a.m. the 
following morning, the British ships would have no choice but to open fire. His 
threat received an all too familiar rejection.60 Cadogan remained sceptical, 
writing in his diary that evening, “‘Menace’ going none too well.”61 
The morning of 24 September dawned with continued poor visibility and 
British naval bombardment began at 6:25 a.m.62 British forces opened fire, 
which the Vichy garrison returned with deadly accuracy.63 Disappointment was 
high among Free French and British personnel and Spears reported that 
although commanders were in favour of stopping the engagement, de Gaulle 
was hesitant, arguing, “in view of the ultimatum this could be taken as nothing 
less than an acknowledgment of complete and absolute failure.”64 Faced with a 
“rather depressing” situation, the tension between the broad political objectives 
and the actual military obstacles was more evident than ever. De Gaulle in 
particular recognised that if the Free French were to lose all credibility, he would 
be hard pressed to attract followers from within metropolitan France, or 
recognition from the United States as a valid resistance force. Eventually, 
Cunningham and Irwin decided to end the bombardment and try once more the 
following day.  
This decision, which Free French reports stressed was made jointly 
between themselves and the British, was no doubt difficult.65 However, it was 
the subsequent responses and justifications surrounding these joint decisions 
which illustrated just how aware both partners were of the need to shape how 
the public responded to this military failure. Ismay reported to Spears that de 
Gaulle had “suggested a good temporary face saving” when he advocated 
telling the Dakar population that the bombardment was to cease at his 
request.66 Goodwill, rather than a lack of military force, explained the decision to 	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withdraw. De Gaulle sought to create an image of moral accountability and 
altruism. He deliberately, and understandably, tried to hide the fact that his own 
movement was hardly an unbridled success, and that he was reliant upon the 
British for military means, and indeed political recognition. The same telegram 
stressed that when communicating the outcome of the event, “it is essential to 
suggest that de Gaulle’s Emissaries were fired at majority wounded…that same 
applies British who also suffered loss before returning fire [sic].”67 This 
approach reasserted the good intentions of the Free French, whose unarmed 
negotiators had suffered the indignity of being shot at as they sailed away. The 
British forces had returned fire only in self-defence. Oliver O’Donovan has 
drawn on similar attitudes in his studies on just war theory. He argues that 
contemporary wartime attitudes tend to envisage and portray war more broadly 
as an act of self-defence, rather than a punitive conflict. Engagement thus 
becomes an all-encompassing act of national self-defence.68 As will become 
clear, Vichy also employed a similar model to criticise the Menace operations, 
but did so from the perspective of a neutral nation.  
On 25 September officials at the scene of the operation and in London 
debated how long operations against Dakar should be maintained. A War 
Cabinet meeting the previous evening had found most members, including 
Foreign Secretary Lord Halifax, Eden and First Lord of the Admiralty Alexander, 
in favour of ending the conflict. However, members also discussed two related 
issues. First, they noted the need to address likely public agitation within Britain 
as a result of the French cruisers being allowed to pass through to Gibraltar. 
Second, members believed that Vichy’s position would be strengthened by a 
decision to abandon the operation.69 Ultimately, British forces carried out a final 
bombardment of Dakar between 9:00 a.m. and 9:25 a.m. that morning, before 
de Gaulle decided that he should go to Konakry to try and rally French Guinea. 
He cited real concern that French public opinion would be irreparably alienated 
if he were seen to engage his forces against Frenchmen.70 However, as the 
response from the British press made clear, Menace was not, and certainly was 	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not perceived as, an exclusively Free French operation. The reaction of the 
British press was almost unanimous in demanding that the operation should 
have been carried through, or not attempted at all. 
The close of the operation on 25 September precipitated renewed efforts 
to salvage the situation, at least from a rhetorical perspective. Spears 
immediately sent information to General Ismay (Signal G) “…suggesting a way 
of presenting the operation to the public.”71 What was notable about the press 
requirements that de Gaulle’s circle created was the desire to maintain the 
benevolent nature of the operation, while pinning most of the blame on the 
Germans. Churchill again wrote to Roosevelt, claiming that the operation had 
failed because of the presence of Vichy partisans who had “gripped and held 
down…all friendly elements.”72 Nevertheless, like other public communiqués, he 
was careful to avoid implying that Vichy had achieved any meaningful level of 
popular support. The Free French movement was still fragile. Strengthening its 
image would mean delegitimising Pétain’s government. Explanations of the 
operations were consistent across communiqués issued by Carleton Gardens 
and the British Admiralty: numerous French citizens wishing to continue the 
fight against Germany had requested de Gaulle’s presence in Dakar. These 
reports emphasised the ruthlessness and, by association, the immorality of the 
Vichy forces. While still on board the Westerland, Free French personnel wrote 
press releases, which were sent through Cunningham to the London Admiralty 
Offices and General Ismay for publication. In a press release that arrived in 
London on 24 September, de Gaulle used a “call of duty” argument to shift 
agency away from the Free French forces while simultaneously blaming the 
failure of the day’s events on Vichy leaders under the thumb of the Germans: 
“Called to Dakar by numerous Frenchmen anxious to continue the fight at his 
side…”73  
This excerpt justified de Gaulle’s actions, not as territorial 
aggrandisement or aggressive confrontation, but as a natural reaction to 
popular cries for help. This was an explanation that most readers could identify 
with. Like the press publications that followed the collapse of France, those 
prepared by de Gaulle’s team placed blame squarely on the authorities at 	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Dakar for opening fire on defenceless emissaries. This tactic further served to 
legitimise his movement at the expense of Vichy officials. Lastly, in a refrain that 
would be repeated many times over the next few days, the communiqué argued 
that de Gaulle “withdrew his troops and his ships not wishing to be party to a 
fight between Frenchmen.”74 Invoking the image of numerous “true” Frenchmen 
who were desperate to join the Free French allowed de Gaulle to avoid 
potentially unfavourable comparisons with Vichy by simply making it “un 
French.” Similarly, blaming the withdrawal upon German infiltration allowed de 
Gaulle to strip away the violence of own actions. By answering rather than 
anticipating a call for assistance he became a saviour, not an invader. 
Interestingly, these reports also attempted to turn the British contingent of the 
operation into a purely diplomatic force. “They [Vichy] also opened fire on 
British ships which were merely observing the situation and it was only after 
they had suffered serious casualties that the British Fleet opened fire in 
retaliation.”75 Notably, the War Cabinet was hesitant to publish the communiqué 
in British papers, and only decided to do so after seeing that it had already 
appeared in the American press.76  
From a grammatical perspective, the Free French description of events 
portrayed the operation in a static rather than a fluid sense, thus minimising the 
reality, in which each side was forced to make calculated and strategic choices 
over a period of time. In this way, it was easier to direct attention towards a set 
of motivations and subsequent outcomes, maintaining a sense of inevitability 
rather than agency on the part of the Free French. A 27 September cypher 
message from de Gaulle to AEF and specifically General de Larminat, Leclerc, 
and Governor of Chad, Félix Éboué illustrates this approach and was entitled 
“facts which should be known and repeated.”77 The message contained a list of 
what could be described not as facts, but as justifications for both the initial 
action and its subsequent outcome. They are reproduced in summary form 
below: 
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1. Initiation of the operation due to requests from elements within 
Senegal 
2. Totally French in nature; the British were present only to observe 
3. Following German demands, Vichy sent a squadron to Dakar, which 
forced the defences and arrested French partisans 
4. The British opened fire only after sustaining causalities 
5. The bombardment was ceased by request of de Gaulle because he 
was not in favour of the result it would achieve.78 
Even more so than the British operations at Mers el-Kébir, there was a deep 
awareness of the need to present the operation as both ethically and militarily 
expedient.79 The above description of the British role solely as an observer was a 
blatant lie. Nevertheless, it illustrates the extent to which de Gaulle was trying 
desperately to assert his own authority and political agency. In the final point, it is 
clear that de Gaulle hoped to imply that while military force could easily overcome 
the defences at Dakar, he made the strategic and humanitarian choice to 
withdraw to avoid further loss of life. De Gaulle continued to maintain an almost 
palpable concern when it came to the perceived legitimacy of his own movement, 
which until 10 September had only attracted 2,172 Frenchmen to join the Free 
French Naval Force despite early hopes for resistance within both the Naval and 
colonial spheres.80 However, notwithstanding the best efforts of de Gaulle and the 
Admiralty, the following days would see strong criticism from press sources in 
Britain, the United States and, obviously, Vichy. Spears himself acknowledged, 
“…the effect of Dakar on English and American opinion has been absolutely 
disastrous.”81 Churchill’s later justifications of the withdrawal as one of the 
“unforeseeable accidents of war” acknowledged that, to the rest of the world, the 
operation “seemed a glaring example of miscalculation, confusion, timidity and 
muddle.”82 
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Press Responses  
In the aftermath of the failed attempt to secure Dakar, Churchill received a 
telegram from Quebec from Harold Rothermere identifying what he saw as a 
massive gap between the press and public response: “Dakar incident ridiculously 
magnified by carping newspapers. Nobody in Canada or United States gives a 
thought to it. Every Britisher throughout world knows you are winning the war and 
that is all that matters.” [sic]83 Rothermere identified something that was very 
important: the need to convince the outside world that Britain would win the war. 
However, information gathered by Home Intelligence (the social research arm of 
the MOI) and Cabinet discussions involving negative press representations 
contradicted this cavalier attitude. Regional information officers reported a “violent 
reaction to the Dakar incident” stressing that general sentiment was highly critical 
of the decision to back down. “To win this war we must take the gloves off and 
fight.”84 This sentiment (the necessity of taking a tough line) echoed public 
responses to Mers el-Kébir, and would re-emerge again during Anglo-Free 
French attempts to capture the Levant states in 1941. Leo Amery, Secretary of 
State for the Colonies, received a letter from MP Robert Bower expressing 
concern in the wake of the withdrawal. “I am at the moment with a considerable 
part of the fleet. The feeling about Dakar is very strong. Norway all over again! It 
will do the Government a lot of harm unless drastic steps are taken.”85  
Press releases issued by the MOI and published on 24 and 26 September 
illustrate concerted attempts to convince the public that British political 
involvement in Menace was minimal. The Gaullist operation, the initial press 
release asserted, was merely “accompanied by a British force, which will lend him 
full support.”86 Within metropolitan Britain, German bombing was thought to have 
dampened public attention towards more international issues. Nevertheless, de 
Gaulle was deeply pained by the fallout from the failed invasions, writing in his 
memoirs that the American and British press blamed him for the debacle. 
Churchill’s outwardly supportive attitude, he argued relieved pressure from 
parliamentary and press sources.87 However, a closer look at the British media 	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reveals that the issue of blame was far more complicated. The press did not 
acknowledge the operation as exclusively Free French. Moreover, I argue that 
blame levelled on de Gaulle was secondary. A write-up of American responses to 
the event concluded with a telling quote from The New York Times: “It would be 
folly for the British or their friends to minimize the probable effects of this 
defeat.”88 The British media first blamed the British government for failing to 
properly plan and research the operation. On the other hand, the garrison’s 
resistance against Anglo-Gaullist forces was a propaganda coup for Vichy, who 
held it up as proof that a substantial number of French forces both believed in and 
were willing to fight for Pétain’s new government.89 In an argument that would be 
played out repeatedly, Vichy rhetoric claimed that metropolitan France was a 
victimised and misunderstood nation, whose leaders were struggling to protect its 
empire from the hands of its greedy former ally. Building on these themes, what 
follows is a closer examination of the range of reactions to operation Menace in 
the British and French metropoles and amongst the rival representatives of 
French spirit, de Gaulle’s Free French movement and Pétain’s Vichy government.  
 
A Stunned Silence: Responding to Local Criticism  
During and immediately after the Dakar operations, British political circles closely 
followed the discussions emanating from the local press and public. The British 
mass media based stories on reports coming out of Vichy, which makes it 
possible to see how the responses on each side of the channel differed. Initial 
reports published in the British press on 24 September included information from 
Vichy claiming that British ships had shelled the port after the ultimatum was 
refused in addition to the initial statement from the MOI. The latter justified the 
attempted incursion as forestalling German plans to take over the port. The MOI 
statement also claimed that “friendly elements” in Dakar had requested Allied 
assistance.90 These initial British reports generously recognised the Free French 
element of the operation, as titles like “De Gaulle’s Move in West Africa” and 
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“Operations at Dakar: How they Arose, Explanations by Free French” show. 91 
The press also described metropolitan French leaders as “French Hirelings” 
controlled by their German masters. This categorisation made it clear who was 
really in control of French affairs and lent further legitimacy to Free French 
rhetoric.  
Metropolitan France as a whole was depicted as irrational and deluded, a 
spent force relying upon glories of the past in order to conceal the present 
catastrophe. The Guardian’s former Paris correspondent wrote, “This blissful 
ignorance of German and Italian plans is being assiduously cultivated by the 
Vichy press and wireless, which continues to talk about “our magnificent Colonial 
Empire.””92 Still, as fighting at Dakar dragged on, British press responses frankly 
admitted that there was little reliable or concrete information regarding the on-
going operations and that most reports were coming directly from Vichy. 93 At the 
same time, the British press began to criticise Menace in earnest around 27 
September. MOI and Free French press releases alike continued to argue that de 
Gaulle’s original intelligence citing considerable French support for his movement 
in Dakar and the rest of Senegal was authentic. However, press correspondents 
challenged the wisdom of the operation.  
The Guardian in particular called for fuller government explanations: “At 
present the causes of the blunder remain obscure. The mystery is how so great a 
mistake came to be made.”94 The same issue also asserted that “public opinion is 
disturbed by the Dakar fiasco,” and is calling for a fuller statement and cross-
examination of the issue in Parliament (an event which did not take place until 8 
October).95 Nevertheless, as noted, the significance of the withdrawal amongst 
the British public was likely dampened by concerns over home defence. MOI 
intelligence claimed that Londoners showed little interest in Dakar, being 	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preoccupied with nightly bombing. This attitude coincided with the opinion of the 
“vast masses of largely inarticulate people,” and was also comparable to MOI 
studies carried out earlier in the month.96 Press analyses put together by the 
British Admiralty following the disastrous attempts to win over Boisson noted that 
strong criticisms of Dakar in the London press were juxtaposed against reports 
that praised the morale of the British people under nightly bombing raids.97 At the 
same time that the Dakar “fiasco” was being dealt with, the MOI instructed the 
press to limit the publication of photos showing bomb damage in London, as this 
was liable to dampen public spirits.98 The British population, and in particular 
Londoners, faced a plethora of daily issues and concerns that likely outranked the 
formulation of any actionable response to Dakar. Indeed, MP Aneurin Bevan 
would shortly criticise Churchill for failing to pay attention to real opinion – 
resentment in the East End due to a lack of deep shelters.99  
This did not mean, however, that criticisms aimed at the operation were not 
taken seriously. Churchill in particular responded strongly to the negative press 
reception. Despite the abovementioned MOI reports that indicated a certain level 
of public disinterest in regards to the Dakar operations, Menace, remained a topic 
of discussion within the War Cabinet, and the fallout was monitored closely 
through Admiralty Home Press Summaries. The press remained important 
because those groups that monitored public opinion considered it to be a viable 
window into local and international sentiment. Prior to the decision to withdraw 
from Dakar, press sources across England and Scotland allocated “front and 
leader page splashes” to the on-going operations.100 Consistent with earlier 
sentiments praising operation Catapult for its tenacity and resolve, none of these 
stories criticised the grounds of the operation. Following the 26 September 
announcement that the Dakar expedition would be suspended, the press 
maintained this same line, arguing for non-compromise in the very much British 
war effort.  
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Notwithstanding de Gaulle’s insistence that to continue would mean 
entering at best a morally ambiguous (and consequently difficult to justify) zone 
involving a fight between Frenchmen, the overwhelming majority of British press 
sources emphasised two key points. First, despite efforts to portray the British as 
having played only a supporting role, the press called for explanations from 
Parliament and the War Cabinet, not from de Gaulle.101 Second, the operation, 
and crucially, the decision to withdraw, was largely seen as a failure, despite 
official arguments underlining the ethical justifications for backing down. Oliver 
O’Donovan has argued in a theoretical approach to war that being able to access 
heroic courage is an important part of the combat situation. Included in this ability 
is a cache of characteristics including “self-master, decisive action and contempt 
for death.”102 Withdrawal, in the case of Dakar, violated core concepts of how 
wars are fought and won. Namely, achieving a rightful victory allowed for the 
temporary normalisation of extraordinary conditions including the extension and 
legitimisation of government force outside traditional zones of sovereignty.103 
Churchill’s private secretary, John Colville, noted in his diary that criticism for the 
debacle in Dakar was strong in both local and American papers.104 Even The 
Times, the least critical of the papers, published an article arguing that the British 
should not have undertaken the task unless it had enough forces to see it 
through. This created a sense of distrust between the public and its political 
leadership that had not been felt since the fall of Chamberlain’s government.105 
The Mirror was especially critical, writing, “Where is Parliament these days? The 
nation has a right to the truth concerning this lamentable fiasco which suggests 
that we are still in the stage of gross miscalculation, muddled dash and hasty 
withdrawal, wishful thinking and half-measures.”106  
The War Cabinet was correct in thinking that operations in Dakar would 
adversely affect British prestige. Arguably, both the COS and the War Cabinet as 
a whole underestimated the extent to which Free French actions were considered 
to be subordinate to British controls. The conflict was a British conflict. Messages 
that attempted to justify failure by citing altruistic or humanitarian factors 	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contradicted definitions of war based on hard work, sacrifice, and commitment. 
When planning for the bombardments at Mers el-Kébir, we know that the War 
Cabinet sanctioned extensive press releases, which responded to a number of 
possible outcomes. Prior to the Dakar excursion, neither Carlton Gardens nor the 
MOI sufficiently considered or prepared for the likelihood of outright failure. 
Failure made it impossible to convince the British public and mass media that 
withdrawing from Dakar rather than pursuing the fight was the correct choice. 
Churchill’s popularity was slightly damaged after the Dakar operations, and a 
censor wrote “Whereas in June people seemed to feel that only Churchill stood 
between them and disaster, now the ordinary people of England have shown that 
they too could play just as stubborn and important a part.”107  
 
Competing Legitimacies and National Identity  
The Dakar operations also stoked hostilities between the Free French and the 
Vichy government, this time over national legitimacy. Both sides leveraged broad 
ideals of national identity in an attempt to discredit one another. Radio 
transmissions from the BBC Daventry transmitter in Britain to France reminded 
listeners that de Gaulle was the grandson of the famed Marshal Foch. They 
depicted the authorities of Dakar as weak men under the orders of German 
oppressors, descendants of the thieves who first stole Alsace Lorraine.108 Falling 
in line with earlier depictions after the collapse of France more than three months 
earlier, the British press continued to stress the illegitimacy of the Vichy 
government, and its alienation from the rest of the nation. Vichy, argued one 
article in The Guardian, was “helpless” and totally under Hitler’s control, largely 
deluded into thinking that by acting submissively, it would gain real 
concessions.109 Vichy communiqués were also familiar. They reiterated the 
response to the July fleet bombardments, describing France as a victim of 
aggression. France, one Vichy wireless report argued, “is the victim of a fresh 
aggression on the part of England. The cowardly and bloody attack at Mers el 
Kébir (Oran) is being repeated at Dakar.”110 Propaganda posters portrayed the 	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violence at Mers el-Kébir and Dakar side-by-side asking, “where else will Britain 
spill French blood?”111 
 British and Vichy official responses in the form of press releases and radio 
transmissions attempted to affiliate the event with de Gaulle and the British 
respectively. More specifically, these depictions alternately claimed that Pétain or 
de Gaulle was the authentic representative of France and her overseas empire. 
William Hitchcock has rightly pointed out that one of the fundamental questions of 
Vichy was, “could it be that one could serve one’s country yet defy its allies?”112 
This question underlay much of both Vichy and Free French rhetoric, and, 
arguably, limited British abilities to publically criticise de Gaulle for fear of 
delegitimising their chosen representative. Behind this rhetorical blame game 
were clear motivations on the part of each of the three actors (Britain, Vichy and 
the Free French) to either associate or disassociate itself from the Dakar 
operations.  
Vichy’s general refusal to associate the attack with the Free French was 
not lost on the British press. The Guardian pithily pointed out “It would appear that 
Vichy describes all the actions of General de Gaulle and his forces as British.”113 
Although Vichy was simultaneously dealing with a Japanese ultimatum over Indo 
China, news concerning Dakar dominated much of the press. On the evening of 
23 September, Foreign Minister Paul Baudouin met with representatives of the 
French and foreign press to inform them of Franco-Japanese negotiations and the 
British treachery at Dakar.114 He expressed his frustrations in a telegram bound 
for British Ambassador in Madrid Sir Samuel Hoare. In it he criticised British 
actions, blaming them for upsetting the progress in Anglo-Vichy relations made in 
the last few weeks. A telegram from Vichy to French overseas representatives 
described the aggression, which the British government had brought against 
French military possessions. Britain and “l’ex-général de Gaulle” were using force 
to gain what they could not get through honest means.115 This theme was rife 	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throughout the French press. In Le Temps every news story that dealt with the 
event carried a title depicting L’Agression Anglaise, L’Agression Britannique, or 
L’Escadre Britannique.116 L’Echo d’Alger took the same approach. Not a single 
story mentioned Free France or the French elements of the operation. Moreover, 
although these stories were published under slightly different headlines, the body 
of text was often identical. Vichy, through the Service de la Propagande and 
Service d’Information Presse et Censure clearly had a powerful role in what was 
printed, and in maintaining rhetorical consistency.  
Still, Vichy could not simply ignore the fact that it was de Gaulle, a French 
general, who had delivered the ultimatum to Pierre Boisson. Seeking to ignore 
competing narratives of Frenchness, Vichy depicted de Gaulle as a solitary traitor, 
certainly not the leader of a broad-based movement. The ultimatum became part 
of a British attempt to dismember the French empire.117 This approach allowed 
Vichy to acknowledge that de Gaulle was “leading” the operation in name, but 
only as a British pawn. L’Echo d’Alger wrote that de Gaulle had decided to 
terminate “the English attack against Dakar.”118 Through further depictions of 
Menace as an escalation of Mers el-Kébir, Vichy was able to disassociate the 
operation from de Gaulle and his alternate claim of Frenchness. This tactic in turn 
reasserted the right of the French nation to self-defence in the face of “a British 
desire for French property.”119 Cablegrams, which Vichy made available for public 
consumption reinforced this argument and were published in both the French and 
British press. Publication of Pétain’s cable to Boisson as the operation progressed 
emphasised the emotive and moral aspects of the struggle: “France is following 
with emotion and confidence your resistance to mercenary treason and British 
aggression.”120 
On the other hand, de Gaulle’s aforementioned inclination to take 
ownership of the operation as a way to demonstrate autonomy and initiative on 
the part of the Free French movement was very clear. Press releases issued by 	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his office complemented the British desire to be disassociated as much as 
possible from the expedition. Churchill’s 8 October Commons address was 
characteristic of this approach. In it, he described the events at Dakar as 
“primarily French” while simultaneously defending de Gaulle’s assertion that the 
majority of Frenchmen in Dakar were naturally inclined towards the Free French 
cause but were unable to act freely, being “employed as the tool of German and 
Italian masters.”121 Publicly supporting de Gaulle’s initial instincts avoided having 
to directly address how British intelligence failed to anticipate such high levels of 
resistance. Despite Churchill’s evident willingness to defend de Gaulle, the 
relationship between his government and the Free French was hardly without 
strain. In the weeks to come, discussions within the War Cabinet and statements 
issued by the MOI would reveal the highly complex nature of the Vichy, Free 
French and British relationship.  
 
Balancing Relationships: Between Allies and Enemies 
An MOI statement published on 26 September subtly shifted blame onto faulty 
Free-French information and the broader threat of German infiltration. “His 
Majesty’s Government were all the more ready to afford General de Gaulle this 
support (granted firstly after claims of ready support for de Gaulle in Dakar) as 
information had reached them that German influence was spreading to Dakar.”122 
The underlying message implied that while de Gaulle’s information regarding his 
own popularity may have been faulty, British intelligence based on the likelihood 
of German infiltration was sound. British communiqués suggested that military 
backing was provided only on the back of Free French initiative. This assertion 
attempted to further distance British leadership from the decision-making and thus 
the political aspects of the operation. British Daventry broadcasts in French took a 
similar line, arguing that Menace was both Gaullist and, shockingly, non-military in 
nature. De Gaulle, it was argued, knew that the majority of the population was 
resolved to rally to the Free French cause, and it was only German and Italian 
infiltration that forced Vichy to stop pro-allied elements from acting.123 The 
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Daventry broadcasts were also proof of continuing efforts to shore up support 
within metropolitan France for the British war effort. 
Prior to the inception of Menace, London believed that French public 
opinion was shifting towards a more pro-British position. Although they believed 
the failure of the operation might have reversed this trend, the War Cabinet 
speculated that French self-confidence could still be strengthened, developing 
into pro-British sentiment.124 Churchill informed Roosevelt, “in spite of the Dakar 
fiasco the Vichy Government is endeavouring to enter into relations with us which 
shows how the tides are flowing in France now that they feel the German weight 
and see we are able to hold our own.”125 It is easy to believe that Churchill 
exaggerated Vichy’s growing confidence in Britain in order to encourage 
Roosevelt’s support. Nonetheless, the Foreign Office made similar speculations 
regarding opinion in Vichy as early as 18 September. Intelligence reports 
concluded that the French population was slowly beginning to believe that only a 
British victory could save their future.126 The Foreign Office continued to monitor 
opinion in mainland France throughout the war, paying close attention to the 
popularity of the Pétain government, and above all, Pétain himself. The far from 
universal popularity of the Free French movement within France meant that 
continuing to cultivate popular support for the British war effort was not always 
compatible with the Anglo-Gaullist relationship.  
Importantly, Vichy rhetoric also recognised the need to balance Anglo-
Vichy relations somewhere between ally and enemy; in other words, pushing 
Vichy’s case for sovereign authority over an empire threatened by British 
incursion without, in the process, making such hostile intervention more and not 
less likely. Baudouin’s office at the Foreign Ministry issued a report that waffled 
between the possibility of gaining German concessions and alienating Britain 
completely. The edited title, “Conséquences de l’agression la victoire de Dakar,” 
is illuminating. Ultimately, Baudouin chose to emphasise the outcome of the 
event: victory and therefore legitimacy for the Vichy government, rather than 
highlighting British actions. Although believing that resistance at Dakar could lead 
to German concessions, the report emphasised that it was nonetheless crucial 	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not to engage in a cycle of retaliation that would make them allies of Germany 
and Italy without any of the real advantages normally accrued in such a 
partnership.127 In fact, it speculated that the Dakar episode would actually serve 
to bring Britain and France closer together by encouraging the British government 
to stop supporting the Gaullist movement.128  
The mass media encouraged this idea by heaping blame upon de Gaulle 
for leading the British to believe that the French colonies were ready to defect. 
Britain, it was argued, had foolishly allowed itself to be caught up in the doomed 
adventure.129 Intelligence reports from the French Foreign Ministry emphasised 
that de Gaulle was not the obvious British choice for a Free French leader, and 
that his movement did not have complete freedom.130 Vichy was also gathering 
intelligence from servicemen who had been repatriated to the metropole. Many of 
them cast doubt over the popularity of de Gaulle’s movement among the British 
public. These reports, moreover, estimated the strength of the movement at only 
5000 members in mid September.131 Interviews carried out from 16 September 
concluded that an influential contingent of British opinion was hostile to the Free 
French.132 On 24 September a second report concluded that Menace was not an 
attack against the Vichy government, but rather, an effort to continue the war 
against Germany and Italy. It also identified the real threat that German forces 
would use Anglo-Free French operations as a pretext for occupying the Free 
Zone and French North Africa. 133 This contrast between the strong moral 
condemnation contained within the Vichy press and the more tempered analysis 
and on going information gathering behind closed doors, illustrates how rhetoric 
was employed in an attempt to maintain support for the new status quo while not 
slamming the door on its former ally.  
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Relations between metropolitan France and Britain, as between Britain and 
de Gaulle, remained complicated. Neither Britain nor Vichy wished to isolate the 
other completely, and in fact, both sides attempted, to varying extents, to diminish 
de Gaulle’s ability to manoeuvre politically. British Foreign Office intelligence 
shortly after Menace reported “a recognised Anglophil [sic] movement in 
Metropolitan France as well as in the empire.134 As a dissident movement, de 
Gaulle and his Free French remained reliant upon the British, a status quo that 
was to become a source of growing tension between these professed allies. 
Indeed, having already been forced to swallow the British actions at Mers el-
Kebir, the unplanned withdrawals from Dakar left de Gaulle with even less 
influence amongst his British backers.  
 
Conclusion  
The rhetorical aftermath of the Anglo-Free French operations at Dakar was a 
product of both military limitations and political manoeuvring on all sides. In the 
British metropole, the mass media was highly critical of the lack of preparation 
leading up to the invasions and the decision not to follow through with the 
occupation. Calling for parliamentary explanations, these criticisms demonstrate 
that de Gaulle’s Free French movement was simply not conceived of as an 
independent actor amongst the British public and press. We know that de Gaulle 
was fully reliant upon the British for financial support and military backing. It is 
now possible to conclude that de Gaulle’s movement also lacked legitimacy on a 
more fundamental level. In other words, the movement’s lack of material assets 
contributed to their lack of political capital. Indeed, while Churchill was able to 
largely resist calls for a parliamentary enquiry into the affair, blame was ultimately 
allocated to the British Admiral North. Somerville wrote to North on 26 September 
following a BBC bulletin discussing the French ships that had been allowed 
through the Straight of Gibraltar, “I wonder if they will try and make me a 
scapegoat for this blob.”135 After North’s dismissal, Cunningham made it clear that 
he interpreted the move as an attempt to sweep the debacle under the rug. “Of 
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course much as I admire W.C. he is thoroughly dishonest and always has 
been.136 
 Operation Menace was very much a British-led event wearing a Free 
French mask, and not a very convincing one at that. The manner in which the 
ultimate withdrawal from Dakar was represented in British, Free French and Vichy 
rhetoric betrayed the complex and at times highly uncertain relationships between 
the three actors. Although the British may have thought that the Free French 
nature of the event, at least in rhetorical terms, would avert criticism from 
themselves in case of failure, and perhaps give them increased leverage in 
limiting de Gaulle’s decision-making capability, the actuality was more 
complicated. Both British press correspondents and Vichy official and mass 
media responses emphasised the strong British role, although Vichy was careful 
to avoid mention of the Free French movement more generally, focussing upon 
the traitorous ex-general de Gaulle.  
 Perhaps most evident, however, was the conflict between two competing 
sources of Frenchness and the extent to which Britain was attempting to balance 
between the two sides. This idea of contested legitimacy for the French nation 
state was one that Vichy and de Gaulle would fight throughout the war, and would 
often be set in an imperial context. Britain was placed in a difficult position, forced 
to be rhetorically supportive of de Gaulle and the Free French movement more 
generally, while also maintaining at least a sliver of hope that Vichy would limit or 
renege entirely on its agreement with Germany. More importantly, Britain sought 
to sustain pro-Allied sentiment amongst the French population. Given the early 
unpopularity of the Free French movement, this approach was not always 
compatible with backing de Gaulle. Notably, this position would become even 
more difficult in the coming years as American pressure forced Britain to allow 
relief aid to reach unoccupied France. The United States would shortly gain even 
more influence after becoming a co-belligerent in December 1941.  
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Chapter 6: Operation Exporter and the Struggle for the Levant  
“Hitler will be in Moscow before British are in Beyrouth”1  
 
Introduction 
The French mandate states of Syria and Lebanon were one of the most 
contentious imperial battlefields of the Second World War. Here, adding to the 
bitter Anglo-French arguments, rhetorical skirmishes pitched the voices and 
interests of French governors (actual and potential), against their local, often 
nationalist opponents for the first time. Although the collapse of France may 
have “created a tortuous imperial predicament for the French and, 
consequently, for the British,” neither of these imperial protagonists had given 
much thought until now to the local populations of the territories involved.2 The 
role that the Levant States played, both rhetorically, and strategically, as 
emblematic of continuing French imperial power or, alternatively, as evidence of 
Vichy’s craven submission to Axis demands, had been a source of speculation 
from the moment of the French defeat. A British statement issued on 1 July 
1940, just before the bombardments at Mers el-Kébir, betrayed the expectation 
that the Levant would remain strategically important in the conflict. It stressed 
that enemy infiltration of this region would be unacceptable. However, it was not 
until spring 1941 that plans began to seriously coalesce around an actual 
military operation in the area, plans that culminated in the 8 June invasion by 
Anglo-Free French Forces as part of operation Exporter.  
 The complexity of this operation made it unique in several different ways. 
First, long-established nationalist claims to sovereignty and self-rule, particularly 
within Syria, left the Free French struggling to maintain a sense of legitimacy 
within the region despite attempts to fashion the Gaullist administration as a 
liberating force. General George Catroux, who de Gaulle chose as Delegate 
General to the Levant may have been an expert in Middle East affairs, having 
served in 1921 as then high commissioner General Henri Gouraud’s 
representative in Damascus before heading the Mandate’s influential military 
intelligence service de renseignements. However, the British and Imperial 
ground forces far outnumbered Catroux’s resources. Under the direction of 
General Henry Maitland-Wilson, British forces were more successful in 	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attracting positive support from the local Syrian population, substantially 
because they offered an alternative – and a potential escape – from French 
rule. However, the British desire to consolidate American support coupled with 
their continuing distrust of the Free French3 drove a wedge between the new 
British occupiers and their Gaullist counterparts, the latter of whom were loathe 
to renounce what they judged to be France’s legitimate political and cultural 
influence within the Levant. Perhaps most importantly, however, the 
strengthening of nationalist demands for independence in the Levant was 
watched closely by neighbouring Arab states, many of who had similar 
ambitions. As William Roger Louis has rightly pointed out, “The issue of 
independence in the Levant became a test case of whether or not the British 
would fulfil their wartime promises.”4 This chapter, and the additional two 
chapters that examine the Middle East, will consider the case of the Levant as 
inextricably linked with the broader Arab world.  
It is worth emphasising from the start that France had a history of 
violence in the Levant in response to nationalist opposition. James Gelvin has 
argued that shifts in the organisation of traditional political structures in the 
Levant made mass politics following the First World War not only possible, but 
also inevitable.5 This is not to say that nationalist sentiment was either 
completely unified or consistent in its demands. Mount Lebanon, the home of 
the Maronite Christian minorities and the vast majority of French cultural and 
educational institutions, was historically supportive of continued French control. 
Syria, however, despite having a large Christian population, did not have 
significant ties with France. More importantly, its social structure was 
fragmented into a number of hostile minority populations, including the Alawites 
in the North and the Druzes in the South.6 While the former practiced a form of 
Shiite Islam, the latter were an endogamous community whose religion drew 	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from “an eclectic mix of Islamic, Christian, Greek, and pagan concepts.”7 Any 
successful treaty would, moreover, have to protect this blend of religious 
minorities from dominance by the Sunni Muslim population. Perhaps most 
importantly, the traditional ruling class in Syria was made up of clans of 
notables who had traditionally benefited from a system of “honourable co-
operation” with the French. D.K. Fieldhouse has suggested that there were 
different “shades of nationalism” amongst the notables, whose primary aim was 
to maintain their own positions as a class of wealthy and powerful landowners.8  
As a mandatory power installed after the Great War, France faced 
growing discontent from Syrian nationalists, culminating in the 1925 Druze 
revolt and the repeated French shelling of Damascus, ordered by General 
Maurice Gamelin. These uprisings also stoked traditional French imperial 
distrust of the British, a suspicion nurtured by allegations that they had offered 
rebel factions arms and refuge. Notably, the man who would later become the 
Vichy High Commissioner in the Levant, General Henri Fernand Dentz, had 
succeeded Catroux as the chief of military intelligence during this period and 
from then on harboured deep suspicions of British intentions. Despite 
widespread local and international condemnation of French atrocities during the 
unrest, the League of Nations Mandate Commission stood firm, agreeing to 
uphold French authority in exchange for a rhetorical commitment to League 
ideals, even if the events confirmed French illegitimacy in the eyes of the local 
population.9 In 1936, by which time French expenditures on the mandate were 
estimated to be 4 billion francs, negotiations for independence were begun 
under Léon Blum’s socialist-led coalition.10 Blum’s Popular Front government 
eventually signed a Treaty of Independence in December of that year, but the 
French National Assembly refused to ratify it before war broke out in 1939. In 
1941 the issue of independence resurfaced to again become a major source of 
friction. This time, however, the British had publically tied themselves to the 
eventuality of a self-governing state or states, as a Syrian and Lebanese union 
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had not yet been ruled out.11 Although the conflict remained subject to the 
unending Middle Eastern rivalries between France and Britain, the opinions of 
the local populations in Syria and Lebanon – as well as the violence they had 
experienced at the hands of two occupation regimes – further distinguished the 
Syrian crisis from previous sites of conflict in the French empire. 
 Unlike previous colonial confrontations involving the French fleet in North 
Africa and the strategic port of Dakar, Exporter was a protracted military 
engagement lasting from 8 June-14 July 1941. This made it impossible for 
policy makers to withhold news from press sources until its conclusion. The 
extent to which the War Cabinet and Chiefs of Staff (COS) were aware of strong 
calls for effective action against German infiltration in the region affected how 
Exporter was planned and what reactions were anticipated. Success was 
imperative in order to avoid a serious blow to British prestige, with potentially 
much stronger regional repercussions than those suffered following the failed 
Dakar operation. However, although early official communiqués emphasised 
inevitable and swift victory, sustained resistance from Vichy forces eventually 
necessitated modification of this rosy prediction. Ministry of Information (MOI) 
Home Intelligence Reports identified heightened criticisms and growing anti-
French sentiment amongst the broader British public. The Soviet Union’s entry 
into the war in late June alleviated criticism somewhat within metropolitan 
Britain. However, after General Dentz surrendered to the British in mid-July, the 
Middle East rapidly became the regional crucible in which Anglo-Gaullist 
tension was most severe, the issue at hand being the long-term future of the 
Levant mandates. The controversy surrounding both the Syrian operation itself 
and its aftermath make it a rich source for developing an understanding of the 
complexity of the relations between the warring parties involved. This was a 
region that was home to long-standing British and French cultural, strategic and 
economic interests. Examining operation Exporter and the negotiations that 
followed it will lay the groundwork for later analyses of conflicts in the same 
region in 1943 and again in 1945. The aim is to provide a rich comparative 
analysis that investigates official rhetoric in order to highlight deeper sources of 
Franco-British friction, including the real disparities in military power between 
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them and their profoundly different priorities as the context shifted from wartime 
engagement to the prospect of post-war withdrawal.  
 In addition to the desire to maintain its own prestige at home, official 
British representations of the attack were influenced by the desire to avoid 
Vichy and German accusations of imperial expansion. Nazi propaganda 
depicted Hitler’s Germany as the only nation that could be relied upon to grant 
independence to the Levant. British participation, it argued, was motivated 
solely by the desire to win a broader struggle for imperial supremacy in the Arab 
world. In an attempt to combat these depictions, British official communiqués, 
emphasised the Free French role in the invasions. This approach was 
compatible with de Gaulle’s own attempts to present his movement as the sole 
representation of French interests. However, the political environment within the 
Levant was extremely complicated. Nationalist groups in both Syria and 
Lebanon placed Britain under real pressure to ensure that Catroux’s promises 
of self-governance and independence were carried out. At the same time, Free 
French rhetoric began to assume familiar, Vichyite tones. It stressed historic 
claims that France traditionally held in the Levant. The British official line 
supported an interim Free French administration, which would retain office in 
wartime prior to eventual Syrian and Lebanese independence. However, this 
tactic came under mounting political pressure not only locally, but also 
regionally, throughout Palestine, Iraq and Egypt. Arab nationalists in all three 
countries had displayed troubling, pro-Axis sympathies.12 In response, the 
Foreign Office chose to carve a middle line that avoided specific commitments 
and timelines in regard to any transition from French rule to formal 
independence, preferring instead to mould Britain into the figure of arbiter 
extraordinaire. Nevertheless, as Vichy’s colonial power waned with the loss of 
its toehold in the Levant, Britain found itself with a new Middle Eastern imperial 
rival in the shape of a fiercely independent Free French administration in Beirut. 
 Occupation of the territory brought to the fore rhetorical battles, which, 
unique to this setting and previous operations, attempted to mobilise the 
support of a local population that was already deeply engaged in their own 
nationalist struggle. Once again, French forces would accuse Britain of using 
Arab nationalism “as a pretext and means to oust us from Syria.”13 In the final 	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analysis, while British political and military leaders were willing to acquiesce to 
Free French desires for continued influence in the Levant, the reality and 
strength of nationalist movements such as the Syrian People’s Party (founded 
by nationalist leader Dr Abd al-Rahman Shahbander in 1925) limited their ability 
to manoeuvre following the invasion. Indeed, if Britain was to continue to enjoy 
the regional benefits granted her through preferential treaties with Iraq and 
Egypt, she had to maintain her credibility throughout dealings with the Levant. 
This meant upholding rhetorical promises of independence, promises that the 
Free French were reluctant to carry out. Gaullist depictions of the Levant made 
it seem as though the two states had deep and incorruptible ties with France. 
However, as tensions escalated from 1941, it became clear that de Gaulle’s 
claims could not have been further from the truth. 
 
Planning Exporter 
Ashley Jackson rightly identifies the Mediterranean and Middle East as the 
“Empire’s central front.”14 Italian incursions into Egypt and Greece, the vital 
importance of the Suez Canal and the possibility of German forces cutting off 
access to crucial oil supplies in Iraq and Iran all made the protection of this 
region important for strategic and economic reasons. German domination in the 
Balkan Peninsula as well as continual Italian threats to British shipping between 
Suez and India led to fears that Gibraltar and Suez would be seized by the Axis 
powers. This would eliminate the remaining strategic Allied holdings in the 
Middle East.15 For Britain, the Middle East also represented the last bastion 
against total dependence on American assistance and its hoped for source of 
post-war influence.16 In this context, the Levant states, always the vital strategic 
pivot in the Middle East, became not only a military, but also a rhetorical 
battleground. Here, more than ever, the complexity of relations between Gaullist 
and British forces at a military, political, and cultural level were impossible to 
separate. Each affected the manner in which both military operations and 
crucial political decisions were planned, carried out, and justified in the years 
between 1941 and 1945. At a basic strategic level, the War Cabinet agreed that 	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achieving support in the Levant as well as the broader Middle East region was 
paramount. Ensuring regional tranquillity meant that vital sources of manpower 
could be allocated more efficiently to engage with German or Italian forces.  
However, major differences of opinion quickly developed between British 
and Gaullist factions over how to deal with deeply rooted nationalist groups in 
both Levant states. During the interwar years anti-imperial sentiment in the 
Levant and other Middle Eastern mandated territories like British Palestine, was 
an almost constant source of instability. Aviel Roshwald has identified 
contrasting French and British responses to such tension, arguing that while the 
former were unwilling to relinquish any influence, the British were prepared to 
place strategic and economic interests ahead of political influence.17 These 
alternative approaches to Mandate governance mirrored Anglo-French tensions 
between the two world wars, when Britain, and particularly the Foreign Office 
feared that “…too close an identification with France’s anti-nationalist and pro-
Christian policy could seriously jeopardize Britain’s standing in the Muslim 
world.”18 Other scholars have argued that British rule in the Middle East was 
designed to be more tolerable than the comparatively transformative and 
culturally imposing approach taken by their French counterparts.19 A relevant 
example of the French attitude can be seen in the professed attachment to 
Lebanon, one based on historical claims by the Catholic Church to protect the 
Levant’s Maronite Christian and other ethnic minority populations. French 
Catholic schools and missions also existed in Syria, as a way to spread French 
“civilisation.”20 These attachments, which were deeply cultural and highly 
emotive, continued between British and Gaullist forces.  
 Certainly, British interest in the fate of the Levant was not a new 
development in June 1941. Immediately following the French collapse in June 
1940, the COS emphasised the importance of maintaining sympathy for the 
British cause in Syria and Lebanon. At this point, they preferred to preserve the 
status quo rather than become engaged in costly military operations.21 French 
news agency Havas did speculate in mid September that year that the situation 	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in Syria was on the point of “boiling over,” with a high likelihood that the French 
population would shortly rally to de Gaulle’s Free French. However, nothing 
came of these conjectures.22 By the end of the year, British hopes for continued 
Syrian resistance had also faded. High Commissioner Gabriel Puaux had 
maintained a studied ambiguity but his political star was falling, a fact confirmed 
by a disappointing meeting that December between Syrian exiles and British 
diplomats.23 Shortly after, the hard line Vichyite General Fernand Dentz 
replaced Puaux, snuffing out any residual hopes of a peaceful change at the top 
of the administrative tree. 
By early spring 1941 Syria’s formal neutrality, and the consequent 
maintenance of the regional status quo were rapidly eroded by German 
demands for transit rights, refuelling facilities, and other strategic privileges, 
demands in which Vichy Foreign Minister Admiral François Darlan seemed 
willing to acquiesce. The War Cabinet, by this time, also suspected that Vichy 
was actively collaborating with Germany’s occupation administration and its 
Armistice Commission envoys in North Africa. A series of low-level, but 
politically significant Anglo-Vichy armed clashes only served to confirm this 
belief. On 30 March Royal Navy ships intercepted a convoy of four French 
merchant vessels off the coast of French North Africa. Vichy responded by firing 
at the British warships from coastal batteries and later engaging in the aerial 
bombardment of Gibraltar from Tafaraoui.24 Two months later, naval tensions 
between Britain and Vichy peaked with the British bombardment of Axis 
shipping in the Tunisian port of Sfax. Turkey was also showing an interest in 
establishing a route through Syria in order to receive British supplies. Agreeing 
to arrange such a route with Syrian authorities was a tempting possibility in 
London. A formal Anglo-Turkish arrangement might be the prelude to Turkish 
entry to the war alongside the Allies – a prospect dangled but ultimately 
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unfulfilled during Anglo-French-Turkish staff talks before war began in 1939.25 
However, the British were not prepared to use force in Syria to achieve this 
end.26 Their reluctance to push matters to the point of violent confrontation was 
only broken after German infiltration in Syria and Iraq as spring 1941 wore on. 
The anti-British coup in Iraq between April and May 1941, a takeover led 
by the nationalist army officer Rashid Ali al-Ghailani, and supported by German 
forces using Syrian aerodromes, became the primary catalyst, both strategically 
and rhetorically, for British action. In late April, General Archibald Wavell, 
Commander in Chief of the Middle East (until his replacement by General 
Claude Auchinleck on 21 June) received a telegram from Field Marshal Sir John 
Dill, Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS). It cited the danger of German 
involvement in Syria. It was imperative, Dill emphasised, to prepare a force to 
support French resistance to a possible German invasion.27 However, the fact 
remained that Vichy resistance against further German incursions in Syria was 
unlikely. Darlan met with Hitler at Berchtesgaden in the Bavarian Alps on 11 
May. There, he agreed to allow Germany the use of bases in Syria from where 
they would assist in the Iraqi revolt against British power.28  
The British military response was swift. Wavell drew up draft plans on 23 
May, which highlighted the continued reluctance within the British service 
ministries to collaborate with de Gaulle and the Free French more generally. “I 
do not trust discretion of French generally. Though am sure de Gaulle himself 
entirely discreet.” [sic]29 He also communicated general uncertainty about Free 
French abilities to successfully plan and carry out operations. In a letter to 
Churchill he wrote, “Previous experience has made me somewhat sceptical of 
information on Syria from Free French sources and Free French plans 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For more on Anglo-Turkish negotiations see: Martin Thomas, “Imperial 
Defence or Diversionary Attack? Anglo-French Strategic Planning in the Near 
East, 1936-40,” in Anglo-French Defence Relations Between the Wars, eds. 
Martin Alexander and William Philpott (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), 
157-185.  
26 “Syria, Planning and Operations,” 22 July 1940, WO 32/11434, TNA. 
27 CIGS to C in C Middle East, 27 April 1941, WO 32/11434, TNA; Although 
Wavell was replaced 21 June, Auchinleck was not installed in Cairo until after 
the armistice negotiations. 
28 Robert O. Paxton, Vichy France: Old Guard and New Order 1940-1944 (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1972), 117. 
29 Wavell to CIGS, 23 May 1941, WO 32/11434, TNA. 
	   162	  
sometimes take little account of realities.”30 The British partnership with the 
Free French was, undoubtedly, a complex one. Wavell’s concerns centred on 
those military factors, which he identified as most liable to affect the immediate 
success of a full-scale invasion of the Levant States. In reality, Exporter 
spanned a much larger timeframe. Bound to unfold over a period of weeks and 
months, it raised a number of additional preoccupations, which were distinct 
from immediate military or security concerns. These latter anxieties were linked 
to broader intangible factors such as prestige and trust. After achieving a 
military victory, the COS anticipated how the operations would be received in 
the Levant, across the Middle East and at home in Britain. In other words, as in 
previous operations, the success of Exporter was judged on two levels: first, 
victory in purely military terms; second, victory in the battle to win the hearts and 
minds of different, sometimes disparate constituencies of opinion. Churchill’s 
government, in particular, had to convince Syrian and Lebanese nationalist 
groups and the wider populations of the Middle East that Britain’s role in the 
operations was, first and foremost, driven by wartime expediency and 
emphatically not by imperial ambition. France, as represented by de Gaulle, 
was posited as the legitimate administrator of the Levant – still, in other words, 
the tutelary mandate holder. In this vein, press releases consistently described 
the operation as Free French in nature, one supported by British and Imperial 
forces but not led by them. However, this tactic also placed British leaders in the 
more complicated position of acting as guarantor to French promises of 
independence – another commitment of the mandate holder, which, in this 
case, was already written into a treaty (the agreement signed in December 
1936).  
Churchill’s ostensible readiness to temporarily underwrite a veneer of 
Free French power in the Levant disguised the preeminent concern of British 
foreign policy: the conservation of what residual pro-British sentiment remained 
throughout the Arab world. Given the importance of upholding British prestige in 
the Middle East, London could not allow a Gaullist administration to simply 
replace the Vichy regime. Nationalist groups would consider this a blatant 
betrayal of both British and Free French promises of independence. Churchill, 
in a 19 May note wrote regarding the approach to be taken in Syria: “We must 
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have an Arab policy.”31 The prime minister, provocatively, went on to suggest 
that the course to be taken if the Vichy French army in Syria would not come 
over to the side of the Allies would be to claim that the mandate had lapsed. 
This, he argued, would result in the Arabs moving over to the British side in an 
effort to capitalise on their desires for independence. “The French have forfeited 
all rights in Syria since they quitted the League of Nations and we are entitled to 
argue that their Mandate has lapsed. Furthermore, none of our promises to de 
Gaulle cover mandated territories.”32 These issues of prestige and political 
alignment had a material impact on the operational decisions taken in the War 
Cabinet. Churchill’s key intelligence advisor, Major Desmond Morton confided 
on 30 March, “The Chiefs of Staff have told my committee on more than one 
occasion that they would consider the rallying of Syria to our side a matter of 
high importance…”33 Edward Spears echoed the same sentiment shortly after 
this message. On 10 April, in a note to Churchill, Spears speculated that, due to 
skilful German propaganda, local populations might have become substantially 
pro-German in orientation. He also emphasised that it was crucial to construct 
an image of Allied strength to shift Syrians into the Allied camp. This would, he 
argued, have a considerable effect on the opinion of several groups including 
the senior officers and men of the French fleet and would “tend to bridle Vichy’s 
pro-German tendencies.”34  
As the COS debated the merits of the operation it became clear that a 
significant portion of the British public also supported demands for action. Home 
Intelligence Reports identified a widespread “critical attitude over our apparent 
inactivity towards Syria.”35 Notably, the reservations expressed in the aftermath 
of the Dakar expedition, rather than waning, had strengthened. Specifically, 
growing resentment towards metropolitan France following what was seen as 
Darlan’s growing collaborationist tendencies resulted in a surge of support for 
the Free French. Free French press analyses celebrated 5 April as the first time 
that The Times had taken a clear position in favour of Free France.36 Although 
the British government in early April still encouraged the press to criticise both 	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Vichy and Darlan, they also advised that Pétain should not be directly 
condemned for fear of provoking a counter-reaction among French and 
American opinion, which continued to hold him in high esteem.37 By late May, 
Home Intelligence indicated a growing unwillingness among Britons to 
distinguish between the French people and the Vichy government, leading to 
popular demands to declare France an enemy nation and seize Dakar and 
Syria.38 These calls for committed and successful action in response to the Axis 
threat further reinforced the COS conclusion that once begun, withdrawing from 
an attempt to capture the two Levant states was not an option.  
Nevertheless, such strident calls for action were not always consistent 
with Wavell’s strategic calculations. He voiced further concerns over the 
likelihood of military success in Syria, calling the operation “a gamble” and 
“problematical” as late as 4-5 June.39 It was only at this late date that the Vice 
Chiefs of Staff, drawing directly on lessons from Dakar, suggested that 
increased air support would be beneficial for the start of the operation. The 
failure to achieve the planned objective in Syria would, they argued, “add to the 
severity of the blow to our position and prestige.”40 This recognition added to 
the belief that British policy makers in the War Cabinet and COS must maintain 
control over operational planning. The Anglo-Gaullist relationship came second 
to fostering, if not a pro-Allied, than a pro-British sentiment amongst Syrians. 
The onus that Churchill, his advisors, and the ambitious Spears placed on 
concepts such as prestige indicated the extent to which media sources and 
public reactions served as a measure of military success. Unlike the operations 
at Mers el-Kébir, during which speculation surrounding the fate of the French 
fleet was suppressed, press reports in the weeks leading up to Exporter 
emphasised the threat of German infiltration in the region and thus helped 
foster deeper popular antagonism towards Vichy. Foreign Minister Anthony 
Eden lent force to these early and strengthening demands for invasion by 
pointing to German infiltration in the region. In mid-May he made a highly 
publicised address in the House of Commons, stressing American displeasure 
over the German use of aerodromes in Syria. He concluded by warning that 	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Britain could respond militarily to curb the German threat. This likelihood was 
duly included in Vichy’s own press analyses.41 Eden also fostered regional Arab 
support in a 29 May speech at the Mansion House, in which he gave his 
support to the Arab Union project.42 
 Vichy officials noted the burgeoning press coverage given to the Levant 
states in the weeks leading up to Exporter with trepidation. The threat of British 
action was compounded by the worsening instability within the two mandates. 
Severe food shortages in Syria through 1941 had provoked strikes and 
demonstrations, contributing to a general sense of unrest in the region.43 Press 
reviews arriving in Vichy from the French Embassy in Dublin anticipated British 
attacks on the Levant states as early as 9 May. These analyses noted that the 
British press speculated that Germany was planning to use Syria as a base for 
attacks on Suez and other strategic nodal points in the Middle East. They noted 
the “sensational” rhetoric of the article, a tactic, it was argued, which could 
serve to goad the British government into taking preventative measures.44 
Similarly, press bulletins in late May concluded the British were treating the 
Levant as enemy-occupied territory.45 This early mobilisation and the 
publication of justificatory rhetoric on the British side was met by hasty attempts 
by Vichy to counter these claims and prove that any German interference in the 
region had long since ended, a claim that would allow them to criticise any 
subsequent British attacks as unjustified. A telegram from Darlan to the French 
embassies in Washington and Madrid requested that they make known to their 
British counterparts that following Vichy requests, Germany had removed all 
war material from Syria. This appeal, Darlan added, was catalysed by British 
radio broadcasts that asserted that Syria had fallen under the German thumb.46  	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In the final days of May, legalistic issues over the Mandate and the 
timing of Syrian and Lebanese independence came once again to the fore. 
These questions rapidly coalesced into sharper sources of friction between the 
British and Free French leadership. On 24 May Catroux publically echoed 
British proclamations endorsing the early recognition of Levant state 
independence. De Gaulle resented this policy, not least because he did not 
believe Churchill’s repeated claims that the British had no interest in usurping 
the French in the Levant.47 Certainly, there was a general consensus 
throughout the British government that it was not worth jeopardising vital British 
military interests in order to placate French sentiments. A 14 May cypher from 
the War Office stated this position clearly: “You are certainly free to act against 
German aircraft in Syria and on French aerodromes irrespective of possible 
effects of such action on relations with Vichy and Free French.”48 Spears, in 
turn, became suspicious of de Gaulle’s reticence, writing in a cypher to Churchill 
and the Foreign Office that he feared the General would not give proper 
assurances of independence to Syria and that this would cause tension in the 
region and embarrassment to Britain. “The Arab question…as de Gaulle should 
understand because of our paramount interest in the neighbouring countries,” 
he stressed, “is one we cannot afford to dispute.”49 Spears recognised that 
although there were two strands of opinion in the Levant (French and Arab), 
one was far more important than the other. “The former, once rallied is of little 
interest to us.”50 Spears wrote that if the Free French were to declare and the 
British to guarantee Syrian independence, this move “would do much to allay 
Arab hostility.51 Arab support throughout the Middle East could, moreover, ease 
pressure on the British in their Palestinian mandate.  
Indeed, de Gaulle’s conception of independence for the Levant had a 
different timeline and a different endgame from that being called for by most 
local nationalist groups. His declarations promising independence were 
principally designed to quell any local resistance, while his primary goal 
envisaged, first and foremost, the revitalisation of the French nation. A crucial 	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part of this recovery was France’s ability both to maintain control over her 
formal empire and to conclude highly favourable treaties with her mandated 
territories.52 Such agreements would guarantee “the rights and special interests 
of France.”53 Because local nationalist sentiment in the Levant was implacably 
opposed to becoming part of France’s informal empire, this would put the British 
under mounting pressure to back up their own lofty promises of independence. 
In turn, Free French determination to negotiate a French exit on their own terms 
widened the gap between their own regional priorities and British foreign policy 
within the Middle East. Tensions mounted in the days following 8 June as 
British strategic justifications and attempts to mobilise local sentiments clashed 
with what de Gaulle continued to see as French historical rights in the region. 
Meanwhile, relinquishing this vital region left Vichy, in turn, with a decidedly 
reduced claim to imperial sovereignty.  
 
Invasions and Independence  
Unlike previous operations, which began and ended in a matter of days, 
Exporter lasted over a month, and the nature of the subsequent occupation 
further distinguished it from the brief engagements fought at Mers el-Kébir and 
Dakar. As General Wilson’s two-pronged invasion via Lebanon and Iraq 
towards Beirut and Damascus began on 8 June, Catroux made a grand 
declaration promising independence to Syria and Lebanon. Wavell had written 
to the War Office on 19 May on the topic of independence for Syria and 
Lebanon. He argued that “General de Gaulle [should] be pressed” to endorse 
full independence for both states, and that this statement should subsequently 
be endorsed by the British Government. Wavell believed that these promises 
were essential for two reasons. First, they would garner support from Arab 
contingents in Syria and, secondly, they would counter competing German 
claims that only they would grant the region independence.54  
 The Foreign Office, and Wavell directly, had a hand in tailoring the 
content of Catroux’s declaration, and communicated their guidelines through 
the British ambassador in Cairo, Sir Miles Lampson. Catroux’s draft statement 
contained two key assertions, the first of which established the Free French as 	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the true voice of France. The second promised an end to the mandate and, 
subsequently, independence, but only after the conclusion of a treaty 
“conceived in the spirit of [the] Anglo-Egyptian treaty.”55 However, the Foreign 
Office objected to some of the content of Catroux’s draft, and responded with 
some guidelines for revision. Most notably, they excised sentences that alluded 
to an inherent bond between the Levant and France. In Catroux’s original 
statement, he had first criticised the Vichy government for failing to live up to 
the promises it had made, independence above all. However, he followed these 
claims by saying that he had come “to make France live again for you.” The 
Foreign Office instructed Lampson to omit this sentence from the statement as 
it would hardly endear the Arabs to Free French intentions. They also requested 
that Catroux’s promise that the Levant would become “two sovereign states 
bound to us by a treaty of alliance” be modified, replacing the phrase “bound to 
us” with the more positive and less coercive sounding “united with us.” Wavell 
had similar reservations over the statement. He recommended via the War 
Office that references to the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty should be avoided due to its 
general unpopularity throughout the Middle East. Likewise, repeated mentions 
of France more generally would only inflame Arab opinion, which was already 
anti-French.56 Spears wrote to Churchill in early June, summarising the 
importance of making certain that Arab opinion remained supportive of the 
Allied cause in general, and Britain’s Middle Eastern presence in particular. He 
immediately identified this issue as part of a specific Middle East problem, 
writing, “Our own influence in the Arab world will not be increased by being 
instrumental in substituting one kind of French rule for another.”57 
 However, as mentioned above, publicity in the Levant had to account for 
the likely reactions amongst both the French and multiple Arab populations, 
each of which had different views about the future of the Levant. In late May 
and early June, both Spears and Wavell alternately argued for a pro-Free 
French and a pro-Arab language to be employed in communications. Spears, 
on 29 May wrote that statements issued in the Levant should be not only anti-
Vichy but also pro-Free French. He claimed that British declarations in favour of 
Free France would encourage opposition to German infiltration among the 	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current French administrators and their families. Spears was offering 
recommendations on how to garner support from two distinct elements of the 
local population. In targeting French colonials and the more pro-French 
Christian minorities in Lebanon, he employed a number of recognisable 
approaches. Above all, Spears believed that British statements should be 
“careful to dissociate French people from their Government” making it clear that 
they had been betrayed by their leaders, thereby arousing a “sense of 
honour.”58 He even suggested quoting past French heroes in order to 
consolidate opinion against Vichy. Napoleon, unsurprisingly, made his list of 
historical figures. Spears believed that his adage that “the man who obeys the 
orders of a captive General is a traitor,” would be particularly effective.59 The 
following day Wavell, in line with Spears, recommended that a British 
propaganda campaign should be mounted with the goal of discrediting Vichy 
and supporting the Free French.60 This existence of two sources of public 
opinion within the Levant, each with an opposing view of the future of French 
rule, made it difficult to maintain a clear line within public statements. 
Catroux issued his revised declaration in tandem with a British message of 
support. This was only the beginning of the attempts made, both on the part of 
Britain and Free France, to consolidate their respective influence within the 
Levant and throughout the Arab world. To this end the War Office stressed the 
importance of setting up a “propaganda machine” in the region as soon as 
possible.61 However, justifications of Exporter were formulated on a broad 
scale, not just within the Middle East. The outpouring of official rhetoric following 
the invasion and occupation of the Levant can be broken down into three 
different categories. These categories represent the different levels of opinion 
and the particular national audiences to which British wartime and foreign policy 
sought to appeal. The first included British justifications and analyses directed 
at the British public and dealt largely with criticisms surrounding the efficacy of 
the operation. The second was a battle between British and Vichy rhetoric, in 
which the latter would unsuccessfully rehash worn out arguments based on its 
own legal and national standing. The third was aimed largely at the local 	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population within Syria and concentrated upon garnering support through 
rhetoric fixated upon promises of independence. This last platform would 
become an increasing source of conflict between British and Gaullist forces.  
 
Press Responses within Britain: Countering Criticism  
Given the already extensive speculation around German infiltration in the 
Levant, it was not surprising that after 8 June the British press continued to 
support action to quash this threat. Nevertheless, in official quarters, the idea of 
Anglo-French cooperation, at least for public consumption, was never 
abandoned. The War Office issued instructions that press reports for 
publication should “refer to French opposition as Vichy troops or Vichy planes 
not (repeat not) as enemy.”62 However, high levels of resistance from Vichy 
troops in the Levant made it difficult to depict their armed forces as a victim of 
German domination. These divisions threatened to jeopardise Catroux’s early 
claims that the Free French would be welcomed as liberators. Having 
anticipated the eventuality of resistance in Syria, the Foreign Office had 
already adopted a plan, which justified Allied actions while vindicating the 
French public. It blamed the mounting collaborationism between Hitler and 
Darlan for putting the Allies in an impossible position and forcing them to act, 
however reluctantly.63 
 This justification chimed with previous approaches by describing Allied 
actions as not only necessary, but inevitable. However, the continuing, and at 
times noticeably slow-moving, drive into the interior of both countries made it 
hard to formulate a straightforward explanation for the operation. Vichy’s 
decision to resist meant the Foreign Office was forced to balance between a 
hard line rhetoric, which received positive support at home, and a desire not to 
alienate metropolitan French sentiment with excessive bloodshed. Early press 
releases, including the following quote, justified what were described as actions 
taken by Free French forces, with a supporting contingent of British Imperial 
forces. “His Majesty’s Government could not be expected to tolerate such 
actions…Free French troops have, therefore, with the support of Imperial 	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forces, entered Syria and the Lebanon.”64 The conscious decision to portray 
the event as a Free French operation was reminiscent of the failed invasion at 
Dakar. However, in the case of Exporter, there was a greater 
acknowledgement of the role British forces were playing, even if the Free 
French remained in theory the legitimate beneficiaries. Recall that following 
Dakar there was a great deal of criticism directed towards the British 
government for failing to follow through with the operation. During Exporter, 
Churchill’s government in London had to contend with similar challenges, 
which were rooted in the public desire for clearly perceptible progress in the 
war effort. 
 The withdrawal from Crete in the week prior to Exporter had seen 
disappointing morale reports and criticism in the press. Home Intelligence 
concluded, “General feeling about the progress of the war is possibly more 
pessimistic this week than at any period since the fall of France.”65 In the War 
Cabinet, policy makers faced an anxious public who were calling for real 
wartime victories. Commenting upon the above decline in sentiment, the same 
report stated, “In its almost unanimous outburst of criticism, the press seems 
not to have led public opinion but to have followed.”66 Although early media 
publications indicated that Vichy troops were not showing much resistance, 
prolonged fighting called these claims into question.67 A 16 June war 
communiqué was one of the first to admit that Vichy troops in Syria were 
putting up a fierce struggle.68 Wavell’s report on the invasion force’s approach 
to Damascus was even bleaker: “Politically and psychologically Free French 
almost universally unpopular in Syria.”69  
 The MOI swiftly linked negative public responses to what appeared to be 
a lack of conviction behind Allied advances. Intelligence reports that surveyed 
opinion on Exporter operations indicated widespread disappointment that “our 
progress is not overwhelming and rapid, in the grand German manner.” 
Explanations for this outcome included both fears of offending the French and 
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meeting greater than expected resistance.70 However, media publications that 
appeared to show sympathy for the Vichy troops were viewed negatively. A 17 
June article in The Times wrote, “Fighting is being resorted to only when gentle 
persuasion fails.”71 Reports like this one, which depicted a less hard-line 
approach, became a source of frustration in the War Cabinet. Churchill, writing 
to Wavell only the day before, made it clear that despite the “rumours” present 
in the press that the slow progress of the operation was due to attempts to 
“avoid shedding French blood,” only military factors should be taken into 
consideration.72 Replying to Churchill’s query, General Blamey stated that 
although there was no truth to the rumours, the operation simply could not 
move any faster as his units lacked the strength to deal effectively with high 
levels of Vichy resistance.73  
 There was little actual concrete information on troops movements and 
locations, and yet media stories remained descriptive as well as emotive in 
nature. The troops, one article asserted, “do not conceive of themselves as 
invaders, nor is this in intention an operation of war.”74 Clearly, this was a 
substantial exaggeration. This tactic illustrates the substitution of an aggressive 
idea (invasion), with a less specific, morally comforting image. Word choice 
was used strategically to promote victory as a foregone conclusion, particularly 
after it became clear that the operation would not be resolved quickly. In order 
to reinforce this contrast between local collusion and dogged Vichyite hostility, 
the colonial regime was portrayed using language that personified its governing 
body as an entity distinct from French opinion. Bad deeds perpetrated by 
“Vichy men”, allegations that “Vichy’s conscience is not clear” and discussions 
of Vichy’s embarrassment over the struggle all worked to draw a clear line 
between “the few” that engaged in collaborative crimes and the vast majority of 
French opinion.75 Exporter was a liberation by the legitimate representative of 
France, not an occupation by a hostile power. Churchill firmly grounded this 	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sentiment in his 10 June Commons address. “We shall do all in our power to 
restore the freedom, independence and rights of France.”76 This claim was at 
the heart of a broader justificatory rhetoric that sought to determine who the 
rightful mandate holder was, and therefore, the legitimate source of 
Frenchness. At the same time, an increasingly hostile Vichy response alleged 
that Exporter was merely a British attempt to expand its own empire.  
 
Competing Rhetoric between Britain and Vichy  
From a purely practical point of view, during this period Vichy faced the added 
struggle of maintaining a functioning press. Le Temps was unavailable for 
much of 1941, and other popular dailies including Le Figaro only published 8 
editions between June and July. A 3 July letter from the Secrétaire général 
adjoint de l’information informed newspaper offices that the press situation had 
become critical due to serious paper shortages.77 Shorter newspapers, often 
consisting of only three or four pages, had to prioritise official press releases 
and communications made by Vichy officials, meaning that the actual number 
of independent articles and indeed the availability of news itself was much 
sparser than in Britain. April 1941 had seen increased censorship on a broad 
scale, with the removal of books from public libraries that were forbidden by the 
German authorities on the grounds of either political extremism or alleged 
moral degeneracy.78 Official communiqués from Vichy or statements issued by 
Pétain made up the vast majority of the press coverage in those papers that 
were able to print as well as colonial editions such as L’Echo d’Alger. They 
were also widely available in the British press.  
 As we have seen, accusations and criticisms surrounding Vichy’s 
collaborationist policies in the Levant were rife throughout the British media in 
the days leading up to the operation. Pétain confronted these allegations in his 
official radio address following the invasion. Addressing the Levant directly, 
Pétain accused British propaganda of forging a pretext for aggression.79 Vichy 
officials claimed that British accusations were merely an excuse to seize the 
region for themselves, and further Vichy reports went on to suggest that the 	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British government had worked up American opinion by citing false information 
about Syria.80 Pétain, whose addresses were always highly emotive, called 
upon Frenchmen in Syria “to fight in a just cause and for the integrity of the 
territory entrusted to France by history.”81 The official Vichy communiqué 
issued in response to 8 June predictably identified British troops as the 
aggressors.82 Subsequent press responses followed a familiar line of 
argument: British aggression threatened the territory of a sovereign and neutral 
state. They described a history of hostility, citing earlier operations at Mers el-
Kébir, Dakar and Sfax.  
 Subsequent Vichy communiqués also made it clear that while Gaullist 
troops were being used as part of the operation, the moving force and 
therefore the fault lay with the British. Pétain’s initial radio declaration, 
subsequently published in the press, directly attacked de Gaulle’s 1940 
rhetoric, in which he had sworn never to engage in a fight against Frenchmen. 
This was an obvious attempt to delegitimise the movement. “The attack is led, 
as at Dakar, by Frenchmen serving under a dissident flag. Supported by British 
Imperial forces, they are not hesitating to spill the blood of their brothers 
defending the unity of the Empire and French Sovereignty.”83 The Vichy regime 
thus attempted to frame the incursions in the Levant as a direct violation of the 
rights of a neutral nation. Such depictions deliberately challenged British 
justifications, which argued that the use of armed force for the “greater good” of 
one’s own community and “the international order” was acceptable and 
desirable.84  
 Official Vichy statements also attempted to address the awkward issue of 
Franco-German collaboration. They argued that German planes were only 
transiting through Syria. The British press countered this explanation, 
reasoning that surely Germany was not to be trusted. Vichy, merely by 
admitting that German troops had at one point been in Syria, had effectively 
justified Exporter. As the Times diplomatic correspondent suggested, 	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“Germany’s pretence at withdrawal was only a typical German trick to try to 
prove the British the aggressors.”85 There likewise appeared to be little 
sympathy amongst the British public for Vichy’s explanations. Home 
Intelligence Reports concluded “The resistance of the Vichy forces intensifies 
dislike and contempt for the French, and there seems to be little attempt to 
distinguish between Vichy and Frenchmen generally.” The same report 
suggested implementing an intense propaganda campaign to combat anti-
French feeling following reports of attacks on Free French sailors, allegedly 
mistaken as Vichy troops.86  
 The German invasion of the Soviet Union on 22 June 1941 did result in 
some improvement in popular British morale. Churchill’s Commons address in 
reaction to news of Barbarossa was reportedly met with great approval and 
“quelled a rising tide of criticism and doubt of the higher direction of the war.”87 
This significant development also became the main focus of news for the Vichy 
French press. Nevertheless, despite this shift in focus amongst the two 
metropolitan medias, a new source of tension began to develop within the 
Levant States themselves, this time between the British and the Free French. 
The former’s broad strategic concerns began to depart from the latter’s 
resolute desire to protect the traditional French role in the Levant. 
 
Between Two Allies: Power, Prestige and Independence  
On 8 July Spears wrote to Robert Parr, the British Consul General at 
Brazzaville, noting “…that the country [Syria], insofar as it has an opinion at all, 
would gladly sever its connexion with France.”88 The increasingly undeniable 
strength of local opinion in the Levant had a tangible impact both on British and 
Free French policy considerations, and on the way in which the future of the 
two mandates was discussed. At the crux of this issue was the idea of 
independence, an outcome promised to Syria and Lebanon by both the British 
and Free French. The two European contingents tried to mobilise rhetoric that 
appealed to nationalist sentiments and bolstered their respective prestige. 	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However, it quickly became apparent that each had entirely different 
motivations for pursuing this approach. The Foreign Office knew that the fate of 
the Levant states was important because the broader Middle East was 
watching closely to see if Britain would put pressure on France to follow 
through on independence. De Gaulle, on the other hand, preferred to resist 
nationalist demands as long as possible in order to ensure that his Levant 
representatives would retain the manoeuvrability to conclude favourable 
Franco-Syrian and Franco-Lebanese treaties. As underlying British and Free 
French political and military tactics clashed, local voices became a useful 
barometer to gauge respective successes and internal prestige.  
 The operations in Syria were further complicated by the obvious 
superiority of British military power over that of the Free French. British and 
imperial troops made up the bulk of the invasion and occupation forces. Spears 
had argued that troops from as many nationalities as possible should take part 
in the operations as this would have a great “psychological effect” on Vichy 
troops.89 Official statistics reported that the operation included 9000 British, 
18,000 Australian, 2000 Indian and 5000 Free French troops.90 However, even 
though the British promoted the Free French as the political custodians of the 
Levant states, the reality was that there was little they could do without British 
backup. This reality was a great source of frustration for de Gaulle. Eden 
reaffirmed the British policy of Syrian independence following the cessation of 
hostilities on 14 July, writing to Cairo-based British Minister of State Oliver 
Lyttleton in these terms: “It was never our intention that Free French should 
virtually step into the place of the Dentz Administration or that they should 
govern Syria in the name of France.”91 Prior to departing his post, Wavell 
expressed similar concerns that if the local population came to believe that the 
Free French planned to renege on their promises, this would have a negative 
effect upon British prestige locally and throughout the Arab world.92 To this 
end, the British sought to bolster their own legitimacy in the Middle East 
through renewed proclamations of independence.  
 At the same time, there were other risks involved. Appearing publically to 
subjugate Free French interests in favour of British ones risked losing support 	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within metropolitan France. This meant that internal disagreements had to be 
carefully hidden. De Gaulle was also in favour of masking the level of British 
power behind the invasion and occupation. This approach would advance his 
legitimacy, at least on a rhetorical level. He also predicted that if the Anglo-
Gaullist alliance fell apart, this would allow the Axis and Vichy to turn French 
opinion against them.93 Similarly, in what can be construed as a veiled threat 
he warned Churchill that international opinion would be “watching closely the 
attitude which Great Britain will take towards the position of France in this 
region.”94 Undoubtedly, de Gaulle still considered the Levant as a French 
mandate, one whose future was very much in French hands. He was 
fundamentally unwilling to relinquish French political primacy in what he 
believed were now Free French imperial territories. While his plan in case of 
local opposition called for assuring independence to the two states, it also 
emphasised the continuation of established French institutions.95  
 The British were not fundamentally opposed to this arrangement, but 
they also had strategic and equally troubling regional interests of their own in 
Palestine, Egypt and Iraq to consider. Churchill, responding to rumours that 
Britain desired to usurp the French role in the Levant, wrote to former League of 
Nations delegate René Cassin “This country has no intention of upsetting 
French rights in Syria. On the contrary, we desire to assure those rights against 
every other power.”96 Ultimately, however, Churchill’s assurances, both 
privately and in the Commons were never carried further than vague promises. 
Nowhere in the British government was the preservation of French influence a 
priority over Britain’s own regional interests. Even Spears, the original champion 
of the Free French movement, was clear on this matter. Writing to Consul-
General Robert Parr at the Spears Mission in Brazzaville in late July he stated 
decisively, “No French officer however high in rank must ever be allowed to run 
down British authorities and if any should forget, as some apparently do, that 
we are the predominant partner in the Alliance, they must be gently reminded of 
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this fact. No French soldier would have a rifle in his hand or a franc in his pocket 
were it not for us.”97 
 British concerns surrounding the stability of the Arab region were evident 
throughout the operation. Most importantly for this analysis, they impacted on 
Wavell’s attempts to explain the invasions to local audiences in the Middle 
East. He soon abandoned his initial attempts to legitimise the operation by 
arguing that troops were meeting little or no resistance from Vichy. He decided 
these depictions were no longer credible and were in fact creating suspicions 
of British duplicity among those observing the course of the invasion in 
Palestine and Egypt.98 He informed the War Office “We are now taking line that 
opposition was in fact thin and sporadic at first but that in the nature of things 
fighting once started does spread and consequently opposition is now more 
general and fighting has been severe in places.”99 Unlike previous operations, 
the absolute necessity of managing Arab opinion in response to the invasions 
was considered within the operational plans constructed by the War and 
Foreign Offices. Wavell was responsible for issuing “proclamations” to local 
press agencies in Cairo and Jerusalem immediately following the inception of 
Exporter while the Foreign Office managed the invasion-related propaganda in 
India and Turkey.100  
 Although Wavell’s early reports stressed that the Arabs seemed generally 
pleased at the British arrival, tensions between the British and Gaullist 
leadership soon became apparent.101 A telegram from the War Office informed 
Wavell that after Dentz’s 10 July request to negotiate terms for an armistice, de 
Gaulle appeared to have ceded General Catroux the full powers previously 
enjoyed by Dentz. This, he hoped, would exclude the British from any real 
control.102 De Gaulle was apparently also increasingly anxious about the 	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emerging power structure in the Levant. He believed that the departure of 
Wavell from Cairo to his new position as Viceroy of India had “left the field clear 
for the passions of the “arabophiles”.”103 Dentz’s subsequent refusal to 
negotiate with the Free French further annoyed de Gaulle, especially when 
Churchill informed Lyttleton that it was crucial that terms were signed even if it 
meant agreeing to such a stipulation.104 On the evening of 12 July General 
Wilson and Dentz’s representative, General Joseph de Verdilhac, signed 
armistice terms. These were ratified on 14 July, after which the War Cabinet 
quickly created the Committee on Foreign (Allied) Resistance in Syria. Led by 
Major Morton, this new committee became the central informational and policy-
making hub. The committee began meeting on 18 July and was kept informed 
of both military and political issues in the Levant by the War, Foreign and 
Colonial Offices.105 However, in the weeks to follow it became clear that Anglo-
Gaullist interests in the region were not always compatible. This resulted in 
competing discourses that fought to gain support within the Middle East and 
Levant States alike.  
 
Post Armistice: Imperial Tension and Rhetorical Battlegrounds 
Philip Khoury has argued that “The catalyst for independence was the 
establishment of a large British presence in the heart of Syria.”106 Certainly, 
independence movements had existed prior to the outbreak of war, although 
there was never one distinct idea of Arab nationalism.107 It was, arguably, 
much more than simply the presence of a British or Imperial force within Syria 
that spurred on these movements. The Foreign Office was instrumental in 
encouraging local representatives like Lampson and Lyttleton to garner Arab 
support regardless of the consequences for Free French prestige. De Gaulle 
wrote bitterly of the armistice agreement that it did not contain “a word about 
the rights of France, either for the present or for the future,” and accused the 
British of imperial greed.108 On 16 July de Gaulle left Brazzaville for Cairo, 	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reportedly in a very “anti British mood.”109 His early disappointment regarding 
the armistice would soon be magnified when he discovered the existence of a 
secret protocol, which forbade personal contact between Vichy French and 
Allied forces. In the months to come he continued to object strongly to Britain’s 
Arab-centred policy. What was most galling was that Arab opinion, and not 
Free French demands, held sway throughout the Foreign Office and within 
Middle East Command (MEC). 
 A Foreign Office memo to Churchill expressed concern that Arab opinion 
would react badly if too much power was granted to the Free French in Syria, 
especially if the British were seen to be playing little or no role.110 More explicit 
instructions sent to Lampson from the Foreign Office emphasised, “support of 
Arab world is of greater importance to us and we must not risk losing this in our 
material desire to meet Free French wishes.”111 Lampson and Auchinleck (now 
Commander in Chief Middle East) were instructed to prioritise responses to 
Arab concerns over any moves that could be viewed as prejudicial to 
independence.112 However, while the Foreign Office and MEC were primarily 
concerned with Arab reactions, Churchill and the MOI stressed the need to 
maintain positive imagery within Britain of Anglo-French relations more 
generally. This latter concern highlighted the difficulty of addressing opinion 
locally in the Levant and in the metropolitan centres of France and Britain. 
 The end of the Syrian campaign was met with “relief everywhere” on the 
British home front.113 British press responses to Dentz’s request for an 
armistice encouraged speculation over the future of the French position in the 
Levant. Most articles pointed out that the German threat had required 
engagement in a campaign that was “forced upon the British and the Free 
French against their will and against their hearts.”114 Both The Times and The 
Guardian emphasised the regrettable necessity of the invasion and argued 
that, far from wanting to fight the British, sustained struggle was in fact the 	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result of German conniving.115 An article entitled “French Dupes in Syria” 
stipulated that prisoner statements showed that Vichy troops did not want to 
fight the British, but had been deceived by the Germans, who convinced them 
that they had never used and never would use Syria as a base for operations 
against their former ally. Thus, they mistakenly believed they were simply 
defending their territorial integrity following an unprovoked Anglo-Free French 
invasion.116 Another article portrayed General de Verdilhac as no less than an 
honourable Frenchman, who, upon arriving at the negotiations, “winked 
broadly, drew his hand quickly across his throat, and whispered in a voice full 
of meaning, “Les Boches.””117 These assertions, and others that celebrated the 
rapid transition of Vichy troops to the Free French side were greatly 
exaggerated, even if they attempted to give de Gaulle an elevated role in the 
conflict. In fact, these approaches were symptomatic of the repeated attempt to 
discredit a very specific circle of “Vichy men,” paving the way for the 
exoneration of the majority of “common” Frenchmen. 
 Still, de Gaulle remained unhappy with the content of the armistice, 
particularly the additional protocol. This led to an exchange of letters between 
Lyttleton and de Gaulle, culminating in the Lyttleton-de Gaulle agreement. This 
understanding simply put in writing Lyttleton’s assurance that Britain had no 
desire to usurp the Levant from the French. He confirmed “…on the British side 
we recognise the historic interests of the French in the Levant. Great Britain 
has no interest in Syria or the Lebanon except to win the war.”118 Churchill 
attributed de Gaulle’s frustration to the latter’s failure, not only to rally Vichy 
troops to his cause, but also to gain recognition for the Free French movement 
as the “true France.” Even at this stage, the Armistice Convention listed de 
Verdilhac as the representative of the French government, and not the Vichy 
government.119  
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 The Free French movement was certainly not awarded the primary 
political role envisaged by de Gaulle. For example, prior to his departure, 
Wavell issued instructions to the British mass media to avoid using the word 
‘armistice’ in all reports. They should instead describe the agreement as a 
‘convention’. When the War Office asked Wavell for clarification on this issue of 
word choice, he responded that the press should be told that a convention was 
a lasting agreement, rather than a temporary expedient.120 Of course, calling 
the agreement a convention also avoided connotations of animosity that were 
inherent in the term ‘armistice’. In any case, these strategic efforts to recast 
Exporter outside of a military framework using neutral vocabulary were 
thwarted when the British media received a telegram from New York 
announcing that an armistice had been signed one hour prior to British 
instructions. Thus, “the whole of the British press had made use of the word 
“armistice” and not “convention” etc.”121 Arguably, these tactics were not 
employed solely or even primarily to placate the British public. The MOI had 
already concluded that the majority of British people were not only sympathetic 
towards the operation, but in favour of a harsher stance towards metropolitan 
France as a whole. Rather, the British government’s media manipulation 
underlined the continued belief within the War Cabinet that the idea of Anglo-
French alliance should not be abandoned. This belief looked towards the end 
of the war and eventual Allied victory as a time when this relationship would 
have to be reforged.  
 These simultaneous attempts to protect both the Anglo-French and the 
Anglo-Arab relationship only became more challenging to maintain as time 
went on. As will become more apparent in the final two chapters on the 
unfolding Levant situation, this was because the British were forced to take 
decisive action in response to unilateral and violent Free French policy 
initiatives in 1943 and 1945. In 1941, by contrast, it was still possible to engage 
in a wait and see approach. Lyttleton’s negotiations with de Gaulle were a good 
example of this frame of mind. They underlined the hope that current tensions 
between Free French and (particularly Syrian) nationalist groups could be 
solved without damaging British regional prestige. In the Commons Churchill 	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had addressed this same sentiment publically. After announcing the conclusion 
of a military convention in Syria, he emphasised that Britain had no territorial 
ambitions; rather, “our only objective in occupying the country has been to beat 
the Germans and help to win the war.122 However, this position gradually 
became untenable as it became obvious that regional stability and Syrian and 
Lebanese independence were closely intertwined. This conflict between Anglo-
Free French Middle Eastern policies was difficult to maintain on a rhetorical 
level, because portraying the on-going occupation as an Allied operation 
connoted a single strategy. A Free French memo noted that although 
difficulties might be encountered between themselves and the British regarding 
the administration of Syria, it was essential to present the image of an entente 
parfaite to the Syrian population.123  
 By late July the British press had stopped reporting extensively on the 
Levant, instead focusing upon the newly opened Russian front. However, 
regional issues in the Levant continued to complicate Anglo-Free French 
relations. De Gaulle’s advisors informed him that the attitude of the British in 
Syria was dictated by Britain’s imperial engagements with the Arabs and the 
desire to cultivate better relations with the Turks.124 His response was to 
embark on an extensive press campaign, the goal of which was to re-establish 
French legitimacy in the region, as well as on a global level. Working alongside 
the Free French Press Services, de Gaulle recognised that the French position 
here would need international backing and acquiescence in order to wield a 
free hand. Since late July he had instructed Catroux to compile “precise facts” 
regarding German activities in Syria in order to clarify world opinion.125Although 
Catroux declared Syrian independence on 25 September and Lebanese 
independence on 27 November, the administrative reins of power nevertheless 
remained in French hands.126 Responding to pressure from the Foreign Office, 
Catroux had reinstated the 1936 constitution, but the coinciding Cabinet was 	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appointed, not elected.127 At its head as president was Shaykh Taj al-Din al-
Hasani, who D.K. Fieldhouse has described as “the central all-purpose French 
ally in Syria.”128  
 This consolidation of power by the Free French and their noted reluctance 
to relinquish the mandate brought the issue of empire and imperial rivalry to the 
fore. Still smarting from what he believed were British intrigues in the Levant, 
on 1 September de Gaulle conducted an interview with George Weller from the 
Chicago Daily News. He claimed that Vichy was serving as an intermediary 
between Britain and Germany, and that, like Germany, Britain’s role was also 
to exploit Vichy.129 After being confronted by Churchill, de Gaulle, although 
apologising, maintained his belief (arguably rightly so) that the Free French role 
in Syria was under threat.130 Official communiqués issued by Carleton Gardens 
employed themes of sovereignty, much like Vichy had done a few months 
earlier, in order to build up legitimacy for the Free French in the Levant. 
Rhetoric like this directly contradicted local calls for independence.  
 Paul Henri Siriex, Chief of Free French Press Services, wrote numerous 
press releases, which emphasised again and again the extent to which the 
Levant states were not merely under French rule. They were willing 
participants in a broader resurrection of French greatness, an objective they 
shared and understood. One report hailed as indistinguishable the patriotic 
sentiments of both the French and Lebanese populations in Beirut. “For the 
first time since the Armistice, the inhabitants of Beirut can show freely their 
patriotism and attachment to France; the spontaneous celebration contrasted 
with the oppressive and sad regime instituted by Vichy.”131 This celebration of 
local affinity for the French was hardly a new tactic. Eugene Rogan described a 
similar episode during the centenary festivals in Algiers in 1930. Here too, the 
French used rhetoric to commemorate local fealty and “undying attachment to 
the motherland.”132 As de Gaulle travelled throughout Syria that autumn, the 
Free French Information Service issued a steady stream of press reports that 
emphasised the French spirit of the Levant and the attachment of the general 	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population to the Free French cause.133 However, in the following years these 
depictions began to falter.  
 
Conclusion 
In October, Churchill appointed Spears as Minister of State, Beirut. The role 
that he eventually played in brutally pushing for independence would be the 
source of untold friction.134 Even before his appointment, Lyttleton had 
requested to Catroux that Spears be present at treaty negotiations between 
France and Syria/France and Lebanon. De Gaulle was fundamentally opposed 
to this idea. He argued that if this request was in line with the general 
sentiment of the British government then it was evidently a political line that 
was “irreconcilable with the sovereign rights of France.”135 After Exporter the 
ultimate fate of the Levant states quickly became a vital issue in British foreign 
policy, and remained so into the post-war period. The War Cabinet confirmed 
its attitude at a meeting on 5 September: “No action should be taken which 
would indicate that Syria was necessarily to remain under Free French 
control.”136After successfully ousting General Dentz and the Vichy 
administration from Syria, the British government as a whole was forced to 
confront a situation in which competing French, Syrian, Lebanese and Arab 
ideas of nationalism were of primary importance. By publically supporting a 
policy of independence, Britain hoped to strengthen its own reputation 
throughout the Middle East, and particularly in Palestine. The following 
chapters will build upon these early efforts, identifying how changes in the 
broader wartime context, including the entry of the United States into the fray 
and the growing likelihood of Allied victory configured the contours of British 
Middle Eastern strategy as refracted through Syria. In particular, this approach 
will consider how publically espoused policy actually limited possible responses 
to the French arrest of the Lebanese Parliament in 1943 and bombardment of 
Damascus in 1945.  
 Amongst the British public the Exporter operations were initially criticised 
for progressing too slowly, an outcome that was attributed to misplaced 	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sympathy for Vichy troops. On the other hand, the entirety of the operation had 
been planned from the premise that it would be more successful if it was 
represented as a Free French initiative. While British policy makers in both the 
Cabinet and Foreign Office hoped that this approach would lend the operation 
increased legitimacy and forestall Vichy and Axis propaganda based on claims 
of British expansionism, stiff opposition from Vichy troops and the general 
unpopularity of the Free French amongst the local population resulted in further 
complications. This was especially evident in the extent to which British rhetoric 
tried to shore up both the Anglo-Free French and the Anglo-Arab relationships. 
Specifically, the British could hardly support both Gaullist policy, which 
persisted in maintaining France’s “rightful” place in the Levant, while at the 
same time polishing their image amongst Arab nationalists, unless, that is, the 
latter were willing to conclude a treaty in line with French demands. Certainly, 
from a strategic point of view, the on-going conflict and the pressing need to 
reallocate scarce men and resources meant that unrest in either the Levant or 
the broader Middle East was highly undesirable. When push came to shove, 
the British would choose regional security and longer-term prestige over 
placating Free French desires for continued influence. While the British were 
careful to construct a rhetoric based around promises of independence, 
thereby assuring themselves of local support, the following weeks and months 
would see these claims tested by de Gaulle’s reluctance to give up the territory. 
Indeed, Exporter laid crucial groundwork for a shift from an Anglo-Vichy to an 
Anglo-Gaullist conflict based on all too familiar claims of sovereignty and 
imperial rights. 
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Chapter 7: Moral Failure and Operation Torch 
“A Monumental Piece of Effrontery”1   
 
Introduction 
In the early morning hours of 8 November 1942, Anglo-American forces moved 
into action with the goal of consolidating Allied power in French North Africa. 
Operation Torch represented a turning point in the nature of the Allied struggle, 
as, for the first time, American forces took precedence in a military operation. 
Churchill later recorded in his memoirs that when General Alphonse Juin, the 
Commander in Chief of forces in Algeria and alleged Allied sympathiser, 
informed former Minister of Foreign Affairs Admiral François Darlan of the start 
of operations, Darlan responded, “I have known for a long time that the British 
were stupid, but I always believed that the Americans were more intelligent!”2 
Darlan’s reaction, and his identification of the Americans as the primary actors 
in the drama, fulfilled an important part of the Allied plan. Namely, it sought to 
portray Torch as a purely strategic endeavour. It was important that there was 
no room to misrepresent the invasion through the lens of imperial rivalry. By 
stressing American leadership, American President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
and the Combined Chiefs of Staff (CCS) hoped to contain any resistance from 
Vichy forces that harboured numerous grudges against the British in the years 
following the French defeat. 
While local French opposition was indeed quickly subdued, wider Allied 
operations in North Africa were more protracted as U.S. troops pushed 
eastwards in an effort to take Tunisia3 in the months following the initial Algerian 
landings. Previous studies have made a thorough analysis of the broader 
political, military and logistical aspects of these operations.4 Deserving of more 
attention here, however, is the growing American role and, more specifically, 
Roosevelt’s central part in the maintenance of Darlan as head of government in 	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2 Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 4, The Hinge of Fate 
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3 Governor General of Tunisia, Jean-Pierre Estava was strongly in favour of the 
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French North Africa. It is also worth revisiting the attendant tensions resulting 
from the American and British public revulsion at the so-called “Darlan deal,” the 
rhetorical arguments over which complicated an otherwise straightforward 
military strategy. Research by Philip Bell and T.C. Wales has identified the 
adverse impact on British public opinion of the arrangements made with Darlan. 
The legitimacy of the pro-allied resistance movements sponsored by the British 
Special Operations Executive (SOE) and the American Office of Strategic 
Services (OSS) also suffered.5 Building on these latter studies, this chapter will 
focus upon the contradictions between the military expediency of working with 
Darlan and the public backlash that this decision caused, particularly in Britain. 
Specifically, it will examine how British and American foreign policy makers tried 
to respond to the ethical criticisms surrounding the Darlan deal while 
simultaneously acknowledging that such decisions represented the most 
strategically viable local option. Even more than previous operations against 
Vichy French territory, Anglo-American planners worked on a number of fronts 
to garner support amongst the population of metropolitan France. They also 
sought to secure the acquiescence of Franco’s Spain, the approval of Salazar’s 
Portugal, and more active support from their respective overseas territories. In 
addition, public sentiment within Britain remained highly critical of the 
agreements made with Darlan. This placed pressure upon the newly minted 
Anglo-American alliance and raised difficult questions about the use of 
censorship and moral leadership.  
Orchestrating the Allied justification for carrying out the Torch invasions 
involved a complex array of letters, statements, leaflets and broadcasts, which 
attempted to anticipate – and thus to pre-empt - varying levels of dissent from 
numerous interested parties. Nevertheless, Ministry of Information (MOI) Home 
Intelligence Reports indicated that the criticism in the British mass media of the 
Darlan affair derived from moral qualms rather than any strategic doubts about 
the wisdom of the North African landings. This leads to the observation that 
public estimations of military progress, or indeed victory, were still measured 	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against certain ethical standards. More importantly, the analysis that follows 
illustrates that while the JPS was finalising the details of Torch, its members 
were working to reconcile competing military and political agendas. Doing so 
demanded discrete rhetorical strategies. Central to the aftermath of the 
invasions was the perceived need to work with Darlan, an individual who was 
judged to be morally compromised. More importantly, the JPS was painfully 
aware that this choice needed to be justified and, in some measure, played 
down. British official rhetoric in particular, responding to harsh criticism at home, 
attempted to distance British policy from any deals made with Darlan. The 
emphasis on American leadership and its leading role in Allied decision making 
about Torch was one plank of the resultant strategy. The other was equally 
negative, a form of damage control typified by Churchill’s outright refusal to 
discuss the deals on the floor of the House of Commons. Both stratagems 
pointed to an underlying acknowledgement that the agreements made were 
perhaps neither as temporary nor as contingent as public and parliamentary 
sentiment would have liked. Explicit promises to remove Darlan from his role as 
head of the Algiers government could not be made in good faith. 
The following analysis of the Torch operations will focus upon these dual 
concerns, in other words, on how the requirements of military efficiency were 
balanced against the ethical acceptability of the arrangements made after the 
landings. It will assess how each contributed to moulding the British 
government’s rhetorical justification of the events. Given the relatively broad 
scope of operations, such a thematic approach will allow us to focus upon the 
initial concerns evident within the planning process, most notably the desire to 
maintain the image of American primacy within the operation, before turning to 
the growing British discomfort over the role played by Darlan until his 
assassination on 24 December 1942. 
The commanders of the Anglo-American task force believed that it was 
of primary importance that North Africa be captured with a minimum of 
resistance from Vichy forces. The implications of this objective were far 
reaching in moulding the nature of the operation itself. In particular, this goal 
necessitated that Torch’s senior American commanders retained great flexibility 
in their dealings with the Vichy officials in situ. American willingness to 
ultimately sanction dealings with Admiral Darlan led to sustained criticism on the 
part of the British public and indeed throughout parliamentary circles. In sharp 
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contrast to the willingness evident amongst the American press and public to 
accept Darlan’s assistance as a matter of military necessity, the British 
response betrayed a deeply personal connection to the moral identity of the 
war. By examining the number and content of official communiqués and press 
releases a number of points become clear. First, there were a number of groups 
who were either directly affected by the invasions or were likely to have a strong 
opinion about them. These included the metropolitan populations within Britain 
and France, Vichy troops and white settlers in Algeria, and, importantly, the 
Soviet Union. Having entered the conflict in June 1941 following invasion by 
German troops, the Soviets had been pressuring the Allies to open a second 
front. This would remove pressure from beleaguered Soviet troops. As will 
become clear, Roosevelt supported rhetoric that portrayed Torch as an effective 
second front even though it fell far short of this level of commitment. More 
importantly, neither Churchill, Roosevelt or the CCS considered Torch to meet 
Soviet Leader Joseph Stalin’s demands. Rhetoric, then, was used as a means 
to confirm wartime ideals. It was also a way to publically declare that Torch 
fulfilled Anglo-American commitments to their Soviet Allies.  
 
Planning: A Joint but American Operation  
A second front would take pressure off of the Russians fighting in Stalingrad 
while also satisfying growing public demands, particularly in the United States, 
for a grand offensive gesture. These two considerations are key to 
understanding early inter-allied negotiations and later post-hoc representations 
of the Torch operation. Early 1942 was not short of disasters for the Allied war 
effort. In the Far East Malaya, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies and Burma 
all fell to Japan. Losses in the Middle East to General Erwin Rommel at Tobruk 
in June and the annihilation of a Canadian assault force at Dieppe in August 
further contributed to public frustration in Britain. Only seven days after the 
Tobruk victory Hitler also launched a powerful summer offensive in the Soviet 
zone.6 British operations to take Vichy Madagascar had dragged on for six 
months and in July of that year Churchill faced a parliamentary vote of no 
confidence, albeit one he passed easily. During his visit to Moscow that August 
Churchill faced stern pressure from Stalin for the opening of a second front. 	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While the British premier precluded a risky landing in France, he came away 
from the Russian capital convinced that action in 1942 was crucial in order to 
reassure the Soviets. So, too, did Roosevelt.7 Anglo-American negotiations at 
the Washington-Based Arcadia Conference in December 1941 illustrated this 
shared desire for a successful offensive action, which needed to take place 
before the end of 1942.  
 However, the American military establishment under Secretary of War 
Henry Stimson was opposed to Churchill’s North African policy. American Chief 
of Staff General George Marshall put forward American proposals for a small-
scale cross-channel attack in 1942 (Operation Sledgehammer), followed by a 
large-scale invasion of Western Europe in 1943 (Operation Round-up). 
However, his British counterpart, Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir Alan 
Brooke was notably hesitant, as was Churchill. Keith Sainsbury described these 
negotiations as “the last period in which a fully mobilized Britain was able to 
make its ideas prevail over those of a largely unmobilized United States.”8 
Similarly, Desmond Dinan depicts Torch as “almost exclusively American in 
Design and Execution but completely British in conception.”9 In actual fact, 
Roosevelt’s personal inclination for the North African operation, as well as 
agreement that action in 1942 was highly desirable, also encouraged the Allies 
along this course of action. Churchill also attributed Head of the British Military 
Mission in Washington and close friend of Marshall, General John Dill, with 
helping to seal the North African policy.10 In a meeting on 25 July 1942 the CCS 
agreed to focus upon first invading North Africa. A joint Anglo-American 
planning staff immediately set to work in drafting plans from their base at 
Norfolk House, London. On 14 August they appointed American General 
Dwight D. Eisenhower as Allied Commander in Chief and the battle-seasoned 
Admiral Andrew Cunningham as Allied Naval Commander Expeditionary Force. 
On 29 September and 2 October the American and British Chiefs of Staff (COS) 
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approved the resulting plans and operational orders were issued on 8 
October.11 
As planning began in earnest that August, it became clear that the 
success of the landings would depend upon the level of resistance encountered 
from Vichy forces. Political intelligence provided by Robert D. Murphy, the U.S. 
State Department representative stationed in North Africa, concluded that while 
the British were strongly disliked in the region, the Americans were not.12 This 
observation had two repercussions. Firstly, the CCS agreed that the event 
would be represented as American in order to avoid arousing anti-British 
sentiment from local forces still resentful about the clashes at Mers el-Kébir, 
Dakar and Syria. This decision had subsequent, and arguably beneficial, 
repercussions for Britain. It allowed Churchill’s government to distance itself 
from the decision to collaborate with Darlan. Secondly, Free French13 leader 
Charles de Gaulle was to play no part in the planning of the operation and upon 
Roosevelt’s insistence, was not to be told of its existence until landings had 
taken place. Thus, the framework in which the operations were planned and 
carried out inextricably linked the success of Torch with the manner in which it 
was interpreted within North Africa. Indeed, these assumptions formed the basis 
upon which the planning committee prepared rhetorical justifications of the 
invasions prior to 8 November. Intelligence had indicated that Vichy forces were 
less likely to resist an American invasion. This led to the conclusion that 
resistance itself was not inevitable and was at least in part symbolic. Although 
conceivably fighting for the same cause, the Americans had not precipitated 
attacks on Vichy installations or supported what was in essence a rival 
government. Even more importantly, they were not suspected of stealing 
French colonial territory.  
The Foreign Office concurred with the benefits of the appearance of 
American leadership. Information gathered by American intelligence officers 
suggested that servicemen’s morale in North Africa was worsening due to an 
increasing dislike of Vichy Foreign Minister Pierre Laval (who had returned to 
office on 14 April 1942) and rising German demands for French food and 
workers. Laval’s reinstatement was also a substantial blow to Franco-American 	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relations. The State Department recalled Vichy ambassador Admiral Leahy for 
consultations and the Administration suspended the supply of goods to 
Morocco.14 However, the navy remained strongly anti-British. Although the army 
and air force were inclined to be more sympathetic, it was reported that they 
were even more pro-American.15 Communications between the Foreign Office 
and Lord Halifax, now British Ambassador to the United States, recognised that, 
despite joint planning of Torch, the operation must “in its initial stages bear a 
predominantly American appearance.”16 Churchill himself wrote to Roosevelt in 
late October suggesting that the American Atlantic Flotilla loan four American 
destroyers to sail with British units inside the Mediterranean. He believed that 
offensive action by the French fleet would be reduced by the presence of these 
tag-alongs, and the auspicious presence of the American flag.17  
Similarly, in the case of de Gaulle and his Fighting French movement, 
the British were aware that associating his cause with the invasions would only 
stiffen Vichy resistance. There were other problems to contend with, however. 
Not informing de Gaulle of Torch planning not only risked a crisis in Anglo-
Gaullist relations, but threatened to “damage his prestige in Metropolitan 
France, where his name has a strong symbolic value as a focus of 
resistance…”18 Set against this, Vichy’s understandable insistence on 
delegitimising de Gaulle and his movement had already registered tangible 
repercussions in past Anglo-Free French operations. At Dakar and Syria, for 
example, local garrisons had fought unexpectedly hard. Responding to the 
above report, Churchill expressed his own, rather more pessimistic belief, that 
both the military and civil authorities, as well as the majority of the French 
population within North Africa, were hostile to de Gaulle and to the British.19 
Ultimately, there was, broadly speaking, little disagreement that the Free French 	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should be kept in the dark about the organisation of the Torch operation. While 
Churchill did suggest informing de Gaulle of the landings a few hours before 
they were due to take place, he was vetoed by Roosevelt, and presented little 
objection.20 Ultimately, Churchill explained to de Gaulle that he was not 
included in Torch because it was “a United States enterprise and a United 
States secret.” To placate him, Churchill planned to allow de Gaulle to 
announce General Paul Legentilhomme as the Governor-General of 
Madagascar that Friday. This latter move, Churchill informed Roosevelt, “we 
have been keeping for his consolation prize.”21 For Roosevelt, there was never 
any doubt that de Gaulle should be denied any knowledge of the operation. He 
replied to Churchill that the announcement of the Governor General would be 
perfectly adequate to save de Gaulle from any embarrassment or loss of 
prestige.22 François Kersaudy’s study of the Churchill-de Gaulle relationship 
identifies personal dislike, American policy towards Vichy, and a willingness to 
deal with other Frenchmen as key in Roosevelt’s decision. As Kersaudy 
concludes, “Roosevelt had disliked de Gaulle from the start, he distrusted him 
since Dakar, and hated him since St. Pierre et Miquelon.”23  
Meanwhile, the Anglo-American planning committee moved forward on 
the assumption that the appearance of American leadership and initiative would 
positively affect the outcome of the Torch invasions. In the initial landings they 
believed that both British and Gaullist elements would compromise the ability of 
troops to consolidate local support quickly. Roosevelt himself was so sure of 
pro-American sentiment that he considered resistance to American landing 
personnel unlikely, a belief that would prove misguided. In the course of 
September and October each side began coordinating a series of press 
releases, broadcasts, appeals and literature that they believed would play a 
vital role in consolidating support for the operation in a number of crucial 
spheres. The informational material and statements were produced largely by 	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the American side of the planning staff but were critiqued by the Foreign Office. 
They appealed to the white settler population within North Africa and also 
addressed the people of metropolitan France, drawing historic and emotive 
links between American intervention in 1917 and in 1942. Crucially, after some 
discussion, the planning staff agreed to depict Torch as a kind of second front. 
This decision made public the claim that the Allies were pulling their weight in 
the war. However, the construction of the invasions as the first step towards 
impending liberation and Allied victory only months after a series of bitter 
defeats ran into complications. Political and military aspects of the operations 
began to clash with public perceptions of the moral direction of the war. 
 
Planning for Public Representation  
As was briefly discussed above, one of the concerns surrounding the portrayal 
of the North Africa operations was managing the anticipated Soviet short-term 
reactions. The alliance that brought the United States, Britain and the Soviet 
Union together was far from perfect. Britain’s failure to conclude an agreement 
with Stalin prior to the outbreak of war, the later conclusion of the Molotov-
Ribbentrop pact and core ideological and political differences meant that both 
parties continued to harbour deep suspicions over the other’s wartime 
intentions. Stalin had placed tremendous pressure on both Roosevelt and 
Churchill to open a second front and thereby relieve some of the burden from 
the Eastern front. However, the rhetorical justification of Torch was concerned 
with far more than just the Soviet response. Within Britain, Home Intelligence 
Reports noted a worrying decline in public engagement with the conflict. This 
was attributed to the series of recent military disappointments.24 On the other 
hand, by late October, further reports indicated the general expectation that 
something was about to happen: an offensive move, “which has been anxiously 
awaited so long.”25 In addition to the British public, the American Office of War 
Information drafted a series of carefully crafted press releases and broadcasts. 
These targeted the North African population, the people of France, the 
American population, and the neutral states of Spain and Portugal. These latter 
two audiences took on special importance. The planning staff believed that by 	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taking control of strategically vital French colonial territory, particularly French 
Morocco, the imperial sensibilities of the respective leaders in neutral Iberia, 
Francisco Franco and António Salazar, might be sufficiently affronted to cause 
them to enter the fray on the side of the Axis powers. French Morocco was at 
this time under the pro-Laval leadership of Resident General Charles Nogues. 
The preparation and content of these numerous communiqués offers further 
insight into the relationship between Britain and the United States, and their 
own complex relationship with Stalin. 
 Of primary importance was the broader American justification for 
undertaking the operations. A successful operation would minimise Vichy 
resistance to the invading forces. In content, it mirrored British justifications in 
earlier operations. Indeed, in late September the Foreign Office suggested that 
their colleagues at the Office of War Information should follow the British lead in 
preparing Roosevelt’s messages to French leaders. Thematically, the American 
communiqués asserted that German occupation was imminent and Allied 
intervention was necessary and indeed inevitable to forestall such a disaster. 
Highly reminiscent of the operations at Dakar, one memo advised explaining 
the arrival of American troops as a pre-emptive salvation from German 
occupation, one devised “to secure this area for France at the request of 
patriotic Frenchmen who have called upon their friends for assistance.”26 In 
regards to ownership, however, early communiqués stressed that the invasions 
were primarily American in nature. The British played a supporting role in the air 
and through naval action. No mention would be made of the use of British 
ground troops, a decision which again pointed to the belief that Anglophobic 
sentiment within North Africa could have a major adverse impact upon the 
course of the operation. 
 The first two documents earmarked for release after the operation 
commenced were an initial military communiqué and a broadcast message to 
the French people recorded in French by Roosevelt. The Foreign Office didn’t 
think much of Roosevelt’s recording, which they described as, at most, 
intelligible. This initial communication argued predictably that the operations 
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had become necessary in order to deal with the threat of Axis incursion.27 
Roosevelt’s broadcast was to be issued simultaneously with the military 
communiqué and was addressed to both France and French North Africa. The 
Foreign Office felt that it was crucial not to address the local population of 
French North Africa in a separate address. Historic anti-imperial American 
rhetoric might lead Vichy to suspect, or at least accuse America of fostering 
local independence movements.28 Edits to the American documents, largely 
requested by the Foreign Office, demonstrated that although official British 
policy was willing to prioritise the American complexion of the operation at its 
inception, they were insistent upon maintaining and receiving credit for the 
landings as a joint endeavour once British troops had also established 
themselves on the ground. Roosevelt’s initial broadcast to the French people 
made no reference to British forces and was given only in the name of the 
United States. Following Foreign Office requests, a line was modified to make 
reference to the United Nations. This would allow the British more easily to 
explain their role in later communiqués.29 The address now read: “The 
Americans, with the help of the United Nations, are doing all that they can to 
ensure a sound future, as well as the restitution of ideals, of liberties and of 
democracy to all those who have lived under the Tricolour.”30  
In addition to the initial American releases, a British statement would follow, 
expressing full support for American actions. A joint Anglo-American 
communiqué in the form of a broadcast and a mass consumption leaflet was 
aimed exclusively at metropolitan France. The two Allies hoped to forestall any 
premature attempts within the metropole to try and overthrow the Germans. 
They believed this would only provoke total occupation. The communications 
urged the people of metropolitan France to “remain calm but on the alert,” as 
“we enter today, into the offensive phase of the War of Liberation.”31 Roosevelt 
himself attached primary importance to the need to carry French opinion on the 
side of American operations. Sensitive to the closeness of past American 	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diplomatic relations with Vichy, Marshall stressed that no direct statement be 
made - or line be taken - towards Vichy, and that policy should be portrayed 
only as working towards the “defeat of the axis powers and the preservation of 
French administration in the colonies.”32 The Allied messages attempted to lend 
symbolic greatness to the invasions by representing them as a liberating force 
and indeed portraying Torch as a turning point (the offensive phase) in the 
conflict. 
It is worth addressing in greater detail how the content of Allied 
communiqués aimed to represent the invasions in two ways. First, they were 
strategically inevitable. Secondly, they were a step towards the moral renewal 
of nations previously under Axis control. The Foreign Office suggested to the 
Office of War Information that in order to consolidate French support, it would 
be crucial to point out the role that Germany was playing in the destruction of 
their beloved nation and its empire. A part of this plan meant disassociating the 
French population from such a betrayal, “in which they had no voice whatsoever 
and against which they had protested at the cost of lives and suffering.”33 
Arguments citing German abuses of French rights, particularly those linked to 
collaboration for the economic strengthening of Germany should be used to 
demonstrate “the German plan to destroy France morally, as in other fields she 
is endeavouring to destroy her physically.”34 The British communiqué in support 
of American action likewise described the operations as leading to the 
restoration of “the independence and greatness of France.”35 These writings 
attributed to France emotive characteristics such as greatness and morality, but 
only through association with Allied forces. In this area, unlike the Levant, local 
voices mattered very little because there was much less of an immediate threat 
of coherent nationalist action. Instead, by calling upon Vichy forces to lay down 
their arms, the Allies also portrayed themselves as a benign force, which had 
no designs upon French sovereignty or imperial rights. 
A joint Anglo-American document on psychological warfare aimed at France 
and the French Empire drew on historic links between the United States and 	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France in order to remind the latter that Americans could surely be trusted to 
keep their word, particularly when it came to French colonial rights. This would, 
however, develop into a sticking point with the Foreign Office. They viewed 
repeated American promises to guard the French empire as offensive to their 
own guarantees. The offending paragraph of the document pledged the United 
States to proving “that Great Britain’s assurances that French territory will be 
restored are fully supported in fact, law and morality by the pledged word of the 
American Government and People.”36 As has been clear, previous operations 
involving French colonial territory and the French fleet had led to a resurgence 
of imperial rivalry. Accusations on this front had originated from both Vichy and 
Gaullist sources and Anglo-French relations were at the same time deteriorating 
in the Levant. Nevertheless, pledges that appeared to insinuate British bad faith 
were an unacceptable challenge to British credibility and prestige.  
Some American rhetoric however, continued to rely on historic sentiment 
that focussed exclusively on the past Franco-American relationship, to the 
detriment of their British partners. Foreign secretary Anthony Eden described 
the American attitude towards France as the “Lafayette problem.” He believed 
that the Americans thought that they knew better how to deal with the French 
than their British counterparts.37 Certainly, despite the joint nature of the above 
document, leaflets and communiqués contained scant reference to British 
contributions. Specifically, Annexe III called for the dropping of an eight-page 
folder over unoccupied France, which was “strongly emotional – recalling by 
photographic illustrations, U.S.A.’s participation in France 1917-1918.”38 The 
emphasis remained upon American troops. Instructions for the media stated 
that accounts of the landings should avoid drawing attention to any resistance 
and “give the impression that our forces landed as allies.” They attempted to 
create an image of Franco-American cooperation and partnership where British 
attempts had failed.39 Earlier, Roosevelt had refused Churchill’s request to drop 
leaflets in North Africa explaining the use of British ground forces. Churchill’s 
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reluctant acquiescence in the matter highlighted further the extent of American 
control over initial rhetoric in the Torch operations.40 
During the final preparations for the landings, Roosevelt shared a press 
release with Churchill. It was written for consumption by the American public. Of 
course, this release and the others aimed at specific sections of the population 
all found their way into the British press. But it was this communiqué that set the 
tone for overall interpretations of the invasions. Most notably, it described the 
landings as the key turning point in the war and attributed the bulk of the credit 
to the Americans, despite making reference for the first time to future British 
ground reinforcement.41 There was also a return to the question of the second 
front. British ambassador in Moscow A. Clark Kerr wrote to the Foreign Office 
as early as 17 October with his own advice for Torch. “When it comes to its 
psychological effect upon the Russian people, which we must naturally wish to 
be important and stimulating, [it] will depend largely, if not entirely, upon the 
way in which the operation is presented to them.”42 However, early Political 
Warfare Executive analyses concluded that portrayals of Torch as a second 
front would not be credible. Rather, the operations should be presented as a 
step towards a second front.43  
Even the original propaganda directive issued by the Foreign Office was 
clear in stating that the invasions should not be referred to as a second front. 
However, this directive was altered after Roosevelt submitted his own press 
release.44 Roosevelt himself expressed to Churchill in late October his desire to 
be able to make the argument to Stalin, that obligations towards the Soviet 
Union had been met.45 The American release blatantly characterised the 
invasions as providing “effective Second Front assistance to our heroic Allies in 
Russia.”46 Such an approach had benefits for Britain as well. Such a confident 
statement could quiet Soviet frustration with what was perceived to be British 	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cowardice over their refusal to attack the German rear.47 Churchill wrote to 
Eden and Permanent Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs Alexander Cadogan 
that he believed such a reference would get them out of a tight spot with their 
Eastern allies.48 The conscious decision to portray the North African operations 
as a fulfilment of Soviet demands illustrated the importance of presentation in 
foreign policy. Torch would be the first major joint Anglo-American operation. 
More importantly, it would be the first time that the British ceded so much 
operational and rhetorical initiative to their new ally. However, Eisenhower and 
Cunningham soon found themselves reacting to a situation on the ground that 
was vastly different from what they had anticipated. This would force the Allies 
to justify highly controversial and unforeseen decisions.  
 
Dealing with Darlan 
In the early morning hours of 8 November Torch operations commenced. There 
were three main points of attack: Algiers, Oran and Casablanca. The attack was 
comprised of approximately 70,000 British and American assault troops and at 
Algiers and Oran included a maritime force of 340 British ships.49 The 
operations at Casablanca were carried out entirely by American troops. Prior to 
arriving, British ships had been forced to pass through the narrow (only eight 
miles in width) Straights of Gibraltar. Cunningham believed this endeavour was 
one of the riskiest of the operation.50 Eisenhower recorded that although the 
landings at Algiers met with almost no opposition, resistance from local naval 
forces at Oran was particularly stiff.51 He hoped that his deputy commander, 
General Mark Clark, who Cunningham described as having a “rather predatory-
looking nose”52 had been successful in attempting to contact and win over the 
French military authorities after being landed west of Algiers just prior to the 
attacks.53 More importantly, and crucial for understanding the reasoning behind 
later decisions, was Eisenhower’s firm belief that a military occupation of French 
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North Africa was simply not feasible. It would be too costly in terms of men and 
materials.54  
General Henri Giraud, who the British submarine Sibyl had embarked 
from a beach near Toulon on the night of 6 November, had sterling credentials 
after escaping from a German prisoner of war camp earlier that April. Personally 
loyal to Vichy leader Marshal Philippe Pétain but strongly anti-German his 
credentials seemed ideal to take up leadership in Algiers.55 He was to be 
virtually installed by the Allies in the wake of the operation. However, increasing 
resistance, even against American troops, coupled with the fact that the “King 
Pin” was not only unrecognised, but also quite unpopular, called these earlier 
assumptions into question. Darlan’s unanticipated presence in North Africa 
during the invasions led to his involvement in negotiations to stem fighting and 
encouraged Allied hopes that the fleet and Dakar would soon also join their 
side. Eisenhower, echoing the sentiment of other military reports at the time, 
argued that the mentality in North Africa was completely different from what he 
had anticipated. “Any proposal was acceptable only if “the Marshall would wish 
it.””56 During communications with the CCS he went as far as to advise that due 
to Giraud’s non-recognition, publication of his name in North Africa should be 
avoided.57 
 Eisenhower’s belief that only Darlan had the public credibility to issue 
orders in the name of Pétain was swiftly criticised throughout the British, and to 
a lesser extent, the American media. Darlan’s involvement with the Allies also 
divided opinion within the French metropole and contributed to furthering the 
Anglo-Gaullist rift. The basis of these responses was that such “collaboration” 
was not fitting with the type of moral war that the Allies claimed to be fighting. 
De Gaulle himself took full advantage of his exclusion from the operations to 
place himself on the moral high ground and garner support and sympathy from 
the broader public. Responses to the landings released through the French 
National Committee58 (CNF) were scathing and clearly distinguished between 
Gaullist elements and Allied actions. Broadly, there were three main time 	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frames over which the operations – and the wider public reactions to them - 
took place. These included: the initial reaction to the invasions, further reactions 
following the 13 November agreement making Darlan head of the civil 
government and Giraud head of armed forces, and, finally, the responses to the 
22 November signing of the Clark-Darlan agreement. This latter agreement put 
an end to French resistance and made Darlan High Commissioner of French 
North Africa. 
 The commencement of the landings set off a flurry of planned media 
activity as radio addresses by Roosevelt and Eisenhower were broadcast, 
British assurances of full support and backing were issued and leaflets 
delivered to metropolitan France. Vichy would of course issue its own counter 
argument, immediately calling on its citizens not to be fooled by foreign radio 
addresses. These communications reminded listeners that the source of the 
attacks was, shockingly, a nation for which France had once shed its own 
blood.59 Notably, despite Allied attempts to depict events as American, Vichy 
press responses immediately identified the “agression” as perpetrated by both 
American and British forces. Pétain’s response (written by Laval) to Roosevelt’s 
personal message was printed throughout the press, and focussed, as always 
upon creating an image of solemn duty towards the defence of the empire 
against all aggression.60 Vichy’s rhetoric remained consistent with earlier 
responses to British territorial incursions. Such an approach drew upon themes 
of duty and honour based upon depictions of the binding legalistic nature of the 
armistice and the heroic if weary figure of Pétain.  
Concepts of obedience, and similarly honour in duty, were mainstays of 
Vichy rhetoric. This tendency drew upon traditional cultures of loyalty, 
particularly within the armed services, and recalled Pétain’s 1940 argument that 
only a metropolitan government could be considered a legitimate French 
government. Although Le Temps reported progress towards agreements in 
North Africa, headlines focused upon the valour of soldiers in doing their duty: 
“obeissant a l’ordre du chef de l’etat nos soldats et nos marins font vaillamment 
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leur devoir.”61 This excerpt emphasises the importance of not only having a 
strong leader, but in trusting and following his orders. Another article, centred 
upon the tragedy of events, again justified Pétain’s response as in fitting with 
the “obligations” imposed upon France by the armistice. These obligations 
necessitated the protection of the empire.62 The broad failure of L’Echo d’Alger 
to employ a similar kind of rhetoric, however, was understandable. It now urged 
civilians to remain calm and imparted news of negotiations for an armistice.63 
L’Echo would, throughout the operations, remain sympathetic to events on the 
ground and supportive of the new Darlan administration. The German 
occupation of the Southern Zone of metropolitan France from 11 November and 
subsequent scuttling of the French ships at Toulon on 27 November, however, 
saw news split between on going reports of Anglo-American operations and 
Pétain’s protests against German violations of the Armistice. Even at this 
juncture, Pétain’s communiqués presented German moves as strategic, and 
indeed defensible, rather than an incursion upon French sovereignty.64 The 
French metropolitan press, nonetheless, became increasingly difficult to 
maintain. Even in the days immediately following Torch communiqués with 
information from the operations were two days behind. Le Temps discontinued 
its paper from 30 November. 
Within Britain, initial press responses were unsurprisingly positive. 
Contrary to Vichy, they remained consistent in depicting the landings as 
American and recorded the lack of resistance to their forces as proof that 
French elements “had no desire to oppose the entry of American troops into this 
territory.”65 Home Intelligence Reports covering 4-10 November described 
growing jubilation following events in North Africa. Not only had criticism on 
almost all matters declined, but this period was described as “the best week of 
the war,” with spirits rising “to fresh heights over the Anglo-American landings in 	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French North Africa: they are now descried as at a higher level then “since the 
war began.””66 Notably, the same report cited the overwhelming belief that 
resisting French forces should not be given leniency.67 This attitude was 
consistent with previous operations against Vichy French forces, in which public 
sentiment in Britain maintained a strongly negative connotation of Vichy 
elements, and indeed the French metropole more broadly. These attitudes were 
linked to ideas of betrayal and collaboration. Certainly, following the total 
German occupation of France, a string of Home Intelligence indicated little 
sympathy for the French plight. Four reports cited blatant mistrust or dislike of 
these former allies, “particularly amongst men who served in the last war.”68 In 
addition to downplaying the amount of resistance met by Anglo-French forces, 
British press responses also portrayed a huge amount of support for General 
Giraud, as “a gallant and skilful military leader.”69 Despite noted uncertainty and 
a lack of information surrounding Darlan’s whereabouts and position, the press 
hailed Giraud’s assumption of the “leadership of the French movement to 
prevent Axis aggression in North Africa.”70  
 Only three days after the initial invasion, reports that Darlan had issued a 
cease-fire and begun negotiations were arriving at Whitehall courtesy of the 
SOE unit stationed at Gibraltar.71 Resistance at the Algiers harbour had ended 
by 19.00 on 8 November.72 However, news of developing arrangements was 
notably absent from the press, which expressed puzzlement over Darlan’s 
current position but lacked any substantial information.73 Writing to W.H.B. 
Mack, British Civil Liaison Office to Eisenhower, Cadogan warned of the danger 
of working with Darlan, asserting that “If Darlan would give us [the] fleet and 
Tunisia, I should be very grateful – and then throw him down a deep well.”74 	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Although this was a view allegedly shared by Churchill, it became increasingly 
evident that Darlan had little ability to deliver on either of these fronts.75 His 11 
November message to Admiral de Laborde, commander of the French fleet at 
Toulon, failed to convince him to join the Allies.76 In The Times, news of 
Darlan’s new role on 16 November was communicated alongside the 
assumption that “no doubt the status is only temporary…”77 The Times itself 
would, alongside the government line, maintain a relatively neutral stance until 
mid-December even if public sentiment remained uneasy.78 The Guardian, less 
willing to refrain from criticism, nevertheless shunted blame onto American 
policymakers, writing, “this country has had virtually no part in the political 
arrangements made by Allied headquarters.”79 The Foreign Office instructed 
Washington Ambassador, Lord Halifax on 13 November to make it clear to 
Roosevelt or Secretary of State Cordell Hull that unless Darlan was able to 
deliver the French Navy, his inclusion in the North African administration would 
be highly unpopular.80 Eden, who remained solidly against working with Darlan, 
gave a second statement to Halifax on 17 November, which stated, “We are 
fighting for international decency, and Darlan is the antithesis of this.”81 The 
Foreign Office remained insistent that “justification of such policy is almost 
impossible.”82 The stance within this office was clear. Although there were 
military benefits to working with Darlan, his reputation as a collaborator made it 
less than desirable to associate him with the Allied war cause. In recognising 
the public backlash that was likely to accrue from this relationship, the above 
officials recognised the role that popular opinion played in the political sphere. 
At the root of this recognition was the idea that justificatory rhetoric could be 
employed in an attempt to influence it.  
Close press analysis by the CNF revealed growing sympathy in the 
British press for de Gaulle’s movement and universal disgust over the 
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“disturbing” events unfolding.83 The leading article of the press organ of the 
Fighting French unreservedly criticised Darlan, and was reprinted by The 
Guardian. It drew upon increasingly familiar themes, repudiating Darlan “in the 
name of morality, of patriotism, of democracy and of just laws.”84 Home 
Intelligence again highlighted a growing sense of moral injustice, which 
focussed very specifically on Darlan’s privileged position under the 
arrangements made in Algiers. Not only did no one display any trust for Darlan 
in light of his much publicised indiscretions, one respondent asserted, “General 
Eisenhower had better not trust Darlan further than he can throw a piano.”85 
Linked to this distrust was the feeling that de Gaulle was being treated unfairly. 
The British press praised de Gaulle’s broadcast over the BBC on 8 November, 
which implored those in French North Africa to rise up and fight against their 
oppressors for “la salut de la Patrie86 A week later, in a meeting on 16 
November, de Gaulle implored Churchill to reconsider Darlan’s position. He 
expressed his surprise that the British would allow themselves to be led by the 
Americans in such an endeavour and urged Churchill to “take over the moral 
direction of this war.”87 De Gaulle’s argument highlighted the existence of two 
competing motivations governing the direction of Torch. The first was to put an 
end to fighting on the ground, using whatever resources were available, 
including the assistance of Darlan. The second recognised that public support 
back in the metropole, which was hostile to the idea of working with 
“collaborators,” was also an important way to measure the success of an 
operation. Although the former course of action largely prevailed, de Gaulle’s 
argument illustrated the various ways in which wartime success was measured. 
He stressed that should Churchill choose to publicly take steps to move away 
from Darlan, all of world public opinion would stand behind him,88 
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In the French metropole, headlines largely turned to attempts to clarify 
the consequences of “l’agression anglo-américaine.”89 By 16 November, the 
French press was beginning to publish the news that Darlan was acting in 
opposition to Pétain’s repeated orders to resist. He was criticised over his 
continued claims to act in the name of the French head of state.90 Le Temps 
published Pétain’s 14 November message to Darlan, ordering him to defend 
North Africa against “l’agression américaine” and telling him not to act against 
Axis forces.91 Giraud was also accused of betraying Pétain.92 This portrayal was 
in sharp contrast to the Algiers press, which was now writing from a pro-Allied 
perspective, publishing a large photo of Giraud under the caption, “Un Grand 
Soldat.”93 While the North African press was moving towards the Allied camp, in 
mainland France, Pétain had just ceded his administrative powers to Laval. 
Under Act 12 Laval was now able to enact laws under his own signature. 
Meanwhile, difficult questions over the present deal with Darlan began to 
emerge insistently, particularly from British diplomatic circles. Minutes submitted 
by Foreign Office Official and head of the Reconstruction Department Gladwyn 
Jebb argued that while military expediency may lend credibility to the 
agreements, the moral aspect of the decision, “perhaps in the long run is even 
more important.”94 For example, one historian has argued that the agreements 
with Darlan led to Allied clandestine groups SOE and OSS facing a “moral 
hazard” by jeopardising their perceived validity in the eyes of other European 
resistance movements.95 This course of action struck hard at British moral 
credibility, particularly in their relations with other nations who were living under 
German occupation. It was also highly inconsistent with previous portrayals of 
the war, which depicted the British struggle as a righteous one. De Gaulle 
warned Eden that the effects of the agreements had been disastrous amongst 	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the population of the whole of Metropolitan France.96 The Torch operations, and 
particularly their extended aftermath can only be fully understood by viewing the 
tension between these arguments of military expediency and moral 
compromise. The validity of such a compromise had real consequences for 
policy makers, forcing them to choose how strong a stance to take in their 
recognition that the agreements were far from ideal. At they same time, they 
realised that events on the ground left little room for manoeuvre both as a 
matter of military expediency and American preference.  
Clearly, Churchill faced criticism over the deal, despite the fact that the 
local press continued to portray it as a broadly American decision. Writing to 
Roosevelt on 17 November, Churchill argued that any deals with Darlan must 
“only be a temporary expedient justifiable solely by the stress of battle.”97 
Roosevelt responded by issuing a press release that practically copied this line. 
In it he also argued that by working with Darlan, the Allies were saving time and 
casualties by avoiding a “mopping up period”.98 The Times responded 
favourably to Roosevelt’s statements, emphasising the agreement’s temporary 
and local nature alongside the tangible military benefits it conferred such as 
additional time to prepare for an eastward advance into Tunisia and the loss of 
life averted by a rapid ceasefire.99 Nevertheless, the following day it printed 
another article, which drew on American Undersecretary of State Sumner 
Welles’ analysis of events. In both a subtle critique of policy and a blame shift 
onto the Americans, the article criticised Welles for making “no direct reference 
to the bewilderment and disappointment expressed in Fighting French and 
some other quarters over allied acceptance of the aid of Darlan…”100 Reactions 
in The Guardian to Roosevelt’s assurances of a temporary arrangement 
remained scornful of Darlan. They made comparisons with 19th century political 
opportunist Joseph Fouché: “Fouché never did a quicker turn.”101 However, it 	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became increasingly clear that despite attempts to calm public criticism within 
Britain, the political situation in North Africa remained uncertain, as did the 
actual length of the “temporary” expedient. Darlan himself made it clear to 
General Clark that he interpreted Roosevelt’s use of the word ‘temporary’ as 
meaning “until the liberation of France is complete.”102 Herein lay the difficulty of 
attempting to acknowledge public sentiment while simultaneously focussing on 
military strategy. South African Field-Marshal Jan Smuts acknowledged this 
problem in a letter to Churchill sent from Gibraltar on 22 November. He reported 
that the present military situation might call for Darlan’s retention for a “fairly 
long period,” and warned that any “impression[s] to the contrary should not be 
publicly created.”103  
Churchill would, in his private communications with Roosevelt, 
repeatedly emphasise the need to alleviate criticism that painted Allied actions 
as immoral. The conflict with Germany had, on the Allied side, always been 
described as a noble struggle against tyranny and darkness. Allowing Darlan 
into the Allied camp was a sharp departure from this stance and risked 
jeopardising Churchill’s credibility. One such communication argued: “A 
permanent arrangement with Darlan or the formation of a Darlan government in 
French North Africa would not be understood by the great masses of ordinary 
people whose simply loyalties are our strength.”104 Churchill’s rhetoric had 
consistently portrayed the British, and later the Allied struggle through a 
straightforward framework of good vs. evil. Such understandings, however, 
were in actuality quite complex, and carried deep connotations based on 
morality and the acceptability of punitive action. This point is illustrated below 
through a related event that clarifies the basis upon which Darlan was rejected 
as a valid Allied contributor.  
First, at the same time as the Darlan affair, there were strong negative 
reactions towards images of the commander of the British Eighth Army, General 
Bernard Montgomery, entertaining the German General Wilhelm von Thoma. 
Von Thoma had been captured outside of El Alamein on 4 November. Home 
Intelligence Reports summarised sentiment towards the man who was 
responsible for the Guernica massacre as having “increased the distaste felt at 	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treating him as if he were the captain of an opposing cricket team.” In the same 
report, there was a strong sense that it was not only desirable, but also right to 
“punish” those who had broken a moral code. This idea of acceptable retribution 
was represented by repeated calls for Britain to launch a series of punitive 
bombing raids on Italy. “The Italians supported Mussolini, just as the Germans 
supported Hitler, and the only thing to do with them is to hit them hard and tell 
them there is more to come.”105 Such sentiments framed the war through a 
deeply personal understanding, allowing for punishment and retribution in 
certain instances. It would also form the basis of the public reaction against the 
Darlan affair. The same British public that was able to justify the bombardments 
at Mers el-Kébir as a necessary act towards a just victory failed to accept 
arguments of military expediency on the basis of immorality, and indeed, a deep 
sense of unfairness.  
During this period, commentary by presenter Ed Murrow from London, 
although broadcast for American listeners, received sympathetic press 
coverage in British papers. Murrow reported that although the British press and 
radio were following government instructions to emphasise the military nature of 
the agreements, public opinion disparaged the move. He quoted one man as 
saying, “We shouldn’t have done it. We shouldn’t have done it not even if he 
brought his tupenny navy with him.”106 Crucially, he too emphasised the nature 
of the agreements as “a matter of high principle in which we carry a great moral 
burden which we cannot escape.”107 Such criticisms were consistent with a 
broader Allied construction and understanding of the conflict. They emphasised 
deeply ingrained cultural ideals such as fair play and drew on ethical standards 
that allowed for punishment, and causalities as long as they stayed within the 
perceived confines of a “moral” war. In such a situation, de Gaulle found himself 
rising in popularity, not as a result of his military accomplishment, but because 
of his apparent moral credibility. His published communiqué, stating that the 
CNF was not currently and would not in future play any part in negotiations 
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under way, effectively separated this group from unsavoury dealings with 
former Vichy officials.108  
Churchill wrote, in his extensive review of the war years, an account that 
almost seemed to exonerate Darlan by arguing that the agreement concluded 
by Clark and Eisenhower, displayed “a high level of courage and good 
sense.”109 Nevertheless, he also acknowledged that the decisions had raised 
many “issues of a moral and sentimental character.”110 Churchill was in a 
difficult situation throughout the operations, as he attempted to maintain good 
relations between the Americans, the Free French and his own constituents. 
Increasing pressure from both the mass media and political quarters like the 
Foreign Office had made it difficult to take a clear line on present 
circumstances. The press was dominated by discussion over Darlan, which 
even eclipsed the publication of the Beveridge Report on 1 December.111 
Roosevelt’s “temporary expedient” announcement may have briefly alleviated 
criticism in the press. However, as events continued to evolve in favour of 
Darlan, particularly following the conclusion of the Clark-Darlan agreement, 
criticism once again dominated the mass media throughout December. De 
Gaulle himself continued to profit from extended press criticism. He expressed 
pleasure at the critical and moral stance being taken by the London press in an 
internal communication.112 However, following Roosevelt’s statement, there 
appeared to be an increasing gap between the relative willingness of British and 
American public opinion to acquiesce in the current state of affairs. The final 
section will focus upon this development alongside rising criticism from the 
British Parliamentary sphere. It will examine how official British rhetoric avoided 
taking a strong stance despite mounting press criticism. This was largely in 
response to the growing recognition that there was little alternative but to 
continue working with Darlan.  
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Constrained by Events on the Ground 
The ultimately protracted nature of the North African operations, a situation 
brought about by determined German resistance and the arrival of Wehrmacht 
reinforcements in Tunisia, remained overshadowed by sustained press 
coverage and public interest in the Darlan affair throughout late November and 
into December. The British press used de Gaulle’s statements to condemn the 
Darlan regime as unconstitutional and his actions as treasonous. One 
publication of The Guardian in late November argued that Darlan’s position as 
an officer made his actions even more insidious than Laval’s.113 Home 
Intelligence Reports summarised the general sentiment in Britain: “…it is 
doubted whether “even the expediency of military necessity” can have justified 
this stratagem.”114 The same report listed the top three reactions to the affair as 
increased sympathy for de Gaulle, placement of responsibility on the Americans 
and questions about what the future held.115 As discussed previously, increased 
solidarity with de Gaulle and the Fighting French was a direct response to the 
belief that he had been taken advantage of.  
Later reports added that, even in areas such as Portsmouth where the 
Gaullist movement was very unpopular, “the English love of fair play makes 
people consider they have been very shabbily treated.”116 Additionally, despite 
a not insignificant amount of pressure, Churchill had refused to make detailed 
explanations in the Commons and would only do so in a secret session on 10 
December. The content of this statement was not available for public 
consumption. MPs had, in late November, tabled a motion criticising British 
association with Darlan as being contrary to the ideals of the war.117 Lord 
Vansittart also submitted a paper for debate in the House of Lords. He hoped to 
address fears that the installation of Darlan as High Commissioner indicated a 
trend towards using other “Quislings” in the administration. The War Cabinet 
requested that Vansittart refrain from his questions, particularly in open 
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session.118 Although Churchill later wrote that his secret session address had 
completely removed parliamentary opposition, and had quenched “the hostile 
Press and reassured the country,” Home Intelligence Reports indicated 
otherwise.119 
 At this juncture, total German occupation made it impossible to maintain 
the fiction that metropolitan France remained sovereign and independent. Still, 
press reports from Vichy continued to attempt to construct just such a 
perception. Laval, in a radio address that was published extensively in the 
press, focussed upon criticising the American policy of aggression towards the 
French state, and insisted that an agreement with Germany was the only way to 
uphold peace in Europe.120 Laval attempted to absolve the German violation of 
the armistice and occupation of the Southern zone. He argued that Anglo-
American forces were to blame because they had infringed upon French 
sovereignty in North Africa and threatened German security. Laval’s argument 
that North Africa was a natural extension of the metropole itself was useful in 
depicting the operations as an act of war against the body of France.121 Imagery 
of Pétain, who remained titular head of state after ceding leadership to Laval, 
was crucial in these depictions of the largely imaginary French state. In its final 
days, Le Temps printed and quoted from a number of telegrams that expressed 
loyalty to Pétain, and thus the French nation. The hero of Verdun embodied the 
fictional existence of the state.122 Articles such as this became a regular feature 
in the last days of November. References to sovereignty as a justification and 
means to condemn Allied actions had, since June 1940, encapsulated a crucial 
part of Vichy’s source of perceived legitimacy. Following the German 
occupation, official statements, and therefore press sources, attempted to 
maintain such arguments, but with an increasing gap between rhetoric and 
reality.  
 What became more apparent in the days leading up to Darlan’s eventual 
assassination on 24 December was the extent to which the public response in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
118 Conclusions of Meeting of the War Cabinet, 21 November 1942, PREM 
3/442/10, TNA. 
119 Home Intelligence Weekly Reports, 17 December 1942, INF 1/292, TNA. 
120 “La France devant l’agression Anglo-Ameéricaine,” Le Temps, 23 November 
1942, 1. 
121 Ibid. 
122 “Les messages de fidélité au chef de l’état,” Le Temps, 25 November 1942, 
1. 
	   215	  
Britain was influenced not only by a deep sense of right and wrong but by 
longer personal experience of involvement in the conflict. Examining contrasting 
press responses in Britain and the United States sheds light on this attitude. 
Press analyses carried out by the CNF’s Commissariat de Information noted 
that although the American press described the event as only a temporary 
military necessity, British media sources continued to emphasise its moral and 
sentimental aspects.123 Although Darlan featured prominently in American press 
sources, broadcasters largely justified the decision as a military one, ignoring 
political repercussions.124 An article in The Guardian pointed out that while in 
Britain there are “no defenders of the past role of the Admiral…except a few 
cranks and a few sophists,” there were plenty to be found in America.125 
Additionally, the same article criticised press censorship for suppressing the 
expression of Anglo-American disagreement on the matter. Additional analyses 
carried out by the Foreign Office confirmed that American opinion regarding 
Darlan had remained consistent throughout, “justifying the Allied policy of 
temporary recognition.”126 When examining British opinion, however, reports 
emphasised that few trusted Darlan. He was labelled as a traitor. Moreover, 
many assumed that he would turn against the Allies again if it suited him.127 
Importantly, this contrast was also mirrored in the strength of the political 
reactions within Britain, most notably in the Foreign Office and Parliament. 
Churchill’s reluctance to debate the Darlan affair in open session had led to a 
general uncertainty surrounding the details of the agreement, and more 
importantly, its duration. Given information already discussed, it was clear that 
Darlan’s tenure was uncertain, and was likely to be longer than the words 
“temporary expedient” suggested. The British media, which de Gaulle believed 
was consistent with broader public opinion, continued to demand clarification on 
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the Darlan affairs throughout December.128 Darlan’s position, and move to 
convene an Imperial Council caused further scepticism within the British press. 
He appeared to be consolidating his political position rather than serving purely 
to facilitate military operations.129 
 In light of Foreign Office, MOI, Parliamentary and press reports criticising 
Darlan’s continued role in the Algiers administration, Churchill’s 10 December 
Commons address in secret session appeared as almost an about face marking 
as it did a broad acceptance of the current state of affairs. His earlier 
assurances to de Gaulle that “you have been with us during the war’s worst 
moments. We shall not abandon you now that the horizon shows signs of 
brightening,” appeared to have been abandoned for this address.130 While 
subtly shifting blame into the American camp by emphasising ownership of 
military and political control, Churchill also stepped back from de Gaulle. 
Churchill employed the principle of droit administratif, arguing that since in 
French culture obedience to authority was considered supreme, de Gaulle’s 
actions and his person were understandably distasteful to those who had 
remained “loyal” following the collapse.131 However, he went even further. 
Churchill claimed that while no promises had been made to Darlan, equally, de 
Gaulle did not “have a monopoly on the future of France.”132 Churchill used the 
same argument that Vichy employed, namely, obedience to authority, in order 
to explain the current situation. Likewise, he pointed to earlier disagreements 
with de Gaulle in Syria in order to muddy the ethical separation between him 
and Darlan. By pointing out that neither party had clean hands Churchill hoped 
to place the Darlan affair into a broader and more complex context, in which, 
neither leader was clearly ideal.  
 Darlan’s assassination put an abrupt end to speculation surrounding his 
tenure as High Commissioner. However, lingering public distaste for the deal 
illustrated the strength of opinion that it had engendered. Ideas of moral 	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behaviour resurfaced in the public response. Home Intelligence Reports 
recorded general relief at the news of Darlan’s death coupled with the surfacing 
of much discussion over assassination as a means to get rid of someone. 
“People ‘feel they ought not to approve of assassinations,’ but the majority are 
inclined to make an exception in this case.”133 The Guardian wrote, “the 
assassination of Admiral Darlan opens a way out of one of the worst tangles of 
the war.”134 Indeed British press sources into 1943 continued to criticise 
American policy in France over the Darlan affair. This issue was raised in a War 
Cabinet distribution linked to concerns that broader Anglo-American relations 
could be damaged.135 The strength of opinion surrounding Darlan remained so 
consistent that Churchill confided to Eden that he believed the military victory 
itself had been “tarnished and tainted.”136 He went on to add, “There is a deep 
loathing in this country, particularly strong among the working classes, against 
what are thought to be intrigues with Darlan and Vichy which are held to be 
contrary to the broad and simple loyalties which united the masses throughout 
the world against the common foe.”137 Darlan’s death may have eliminated the 
controversy surrounding the duration of his rule, however, it did not eliminate 
the bitter taste of the willingness of Allied forces to work with someone who had 
been repeatedly discredited by past official rhetoric. That the issue resurfaced 
in relation to the moral conduct of the war illustrated that victory could not 
always serve to justify military actions.  
 
Conclusion 
From the moment that planning for Torch commenced in earnest, the Anglo-
American joint planning staff attached a great deal of importance to the manner 
in which events would be portrayed, and, as a result, to the ways in which Torch 
would be viewed by individuals and governments. Despite a shared belief that 
Vichy forces were relatively unlikely to resist an American invasion and the 
American contention that Giraud would make an ideal and uncontroversial 
leader in North Africa, such calculations were proven incorrect. Nevertheless, 	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the meticulous drafting and sequencing of press releases and communiqués 
demonstrated the lengths to which the Allies were willing to go in order to 
reassure all interested parties of their good intentions. Core justifications 
suggested that the invasions were mounted in order to forestall German 
occupation while simultaneously beginning the restoration of France to her 
rightful place in the civilised world. Such depictions instilled the operations with 
a great deal of early significance. Not only did American press releases 
deliberately choose to represent the events as satisfying Soviet demands for a 
second front, they also attempted to establish their significance within the 
broader context of the war. This was done well before victory in North Africa, 
and, more specifically, in Tunisia, was assured.  
  Although early responses to the operations were understandably 
enthusiastic on the Allied side (an enthusiasm at least partly attributable to the 
disappointments of the previous months and years), the deals concluded with 
Admiral Darlan led to mounting criticism within both metropolitan France and 
Britain. The U.S. public reacted more favourably, an indulgence also reflected in 
the greater willingness amongst American media sources to consider 
arguments of military expediency. This perhaps illustrated the vastly different 
wartime experiences of the two Allied partners rather than any deeper cleavage 
over a compromise deal with the Algiers authorities. While Darlan’s actions 
were considered morally repugnant, and indeed were typecast as the epitome 
of treason on the British and Free French sides, the American press and public 
had little personal experience upon which to base such harsh judgements. 
Striving to balance the requirement of the Grand Alliance with the sterner views 
of domestic critics, the Churchill government chose to keep its rhetoric low-key, 
in marked contrast to the voluble condemnation of the Darlan deal in the 
numerous Gaullist publications that emanated from Carlton Gardens in the 
wake of Torch. This silence, in response to both press and parliamentary 
criticism, illustrated the difficulty of the situation and the extent to which 
Churchill’s Ministers and senior officials were limited in what they could say by 
the overarching requirements of the Anglo-American relationship. Certainly, the 
reality of events on the ground, including the expectation that Darlan would 
retain nominal power, meant that following Roosevelt’s 17 November press 
release, few other arguments could be advanced to exculpate British choices. 
That Churchill opted not to expand on the event in a Commons debate in open 
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session pointed to his acknowledgment of the strength of public opposition to 
the arrangements made with Darlan, as well as his underlying hope that time 
would damp down such criticisms.  
 Vichy likewise drew on well-worn ideas of violated honour in order to 
criticise aggression against its sovereign imperial territory. This moral outrage 
did not last. The German occupation of the Southern Zone in late November 
1942 placed both Pétain and Laval in an increasingly invidious position as they 
attempted to justify even this move as only natural and indeed a defensive 
response to Allied “aggression.” The farcical nature of French sovereignty was 
increasingly projected onto the figure and image of Pétain, with the publication 
of fealty to what he represented as the patrie. The coming years would see the 
further disintegration of any meaningful Vichy sovereignty and a consequent 
shift in emphasis towards the damage done by a treacherous Anglo-Gaullist 
alliance, which, it was claimed, had helped bring France to its knees.  
 The moral tone that underpinned criticisms surrounding Torch remind us 
of an important point: in the eyes of domestic opinion within the major Allied 
nations military victory could not, as yet, be justified at any cost. De Gaulle 
capitalised on the ethical qualms expressed about the Darlan deal, and his 
office profited from the publication of strong statements that condemned Darlan 
without reserve, something that no Ministry in the British government was able 
to do. That de Gaulle was largely powerless in this situation made his rhetoric 
credible, not as a promise of action, but as a moral absolute, an ethical stance 
that chimed with public sentiment in Britain more broadly. Additionally, the 
sympathies of the British public, as the Foreign Office and MOI tracked them, 
were moulded by the belief that de Gaulle had been treated unfairly. His loyalty 
had been trampled on in favour of an inglorious, if expedient, marriage of 
convenience with Darlan’s followers in Algiers and Rabat. What was notable 
about the criticisms surrounding Darlan, whether they were propagated by the 
press or voiced by figures such as Eden, Cadogan or Vansittart, was that they 
all argued that a moral compromise of this calibre risked compromising – and 
indeed overriding - the material gains of a military victory. From June 1940, 
British rhetoric spanning official statements, Churchillian speeches and press 
interpretations, had all described the “men of Vichy” as venal defeatists: the 
antithesis of the war effort. Rehabilitating a member of this group into the Allied 
camp was virtually impossible from a moral point of view. The operation itself 
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could easily be described as a military victory. The fact that its very success 
was called into question by the Darlan agreements highlights the fact that the 
justification of any event consisted of more than simple definitions of success or 
failure. Rather, events were still judged and discussed on an ethical platform as 
much as a military one.  
 
	   221	  
Chapter 8: Under Pressure, The 1943 Lebanese Parliamentary Crisis  
 
Introduction 
In a pair of articles published in 2007 and 2010 respectively, Meir Zamir argued 
that Free French leader Charles de Gaulle precipitated crises in the Levant as a 
means to demonstrate his own importance and signal disagreement over 
broader Allied war strategy.1 However, Zamir’s inclination to minimise the wider 
significance of events in this region, and indeed the Middle East as a whole, 
fails to acknowledge the vital importance of The Mediterranean and Middle 
East, both strategically and symbolically, in French and British foreign policy. 
From a strategic point of view, this area provided vital communication and 
shipping links as well as crucial reserves of oil. By 1940, the bifurcated pipeline 
that terminated in Haifa and Tripoli supplied enough oil to keep the entire 
Mediterranean fleet in service.2 Egypt and the Suez Canal base zone was at the 
centre of Britain’s Middle Eastern war effort, containing the largest 
concentration of British military resources, administrative support and security 
staff outside the British Isles.3 However, the strategic side of the equation only 
explains half of the story. The ties linking France to the Levant were long-
standing, complex, multi-dimensional, and preserved in ideas of historic rights 
and cultural connections. French links with Christian minorities had existed 
throughout the region since the first crusades between 1096 and 1099.4 French 
interests in the eastern Mediterranean were gradually enshrined in cultural 
institutions such as mission schools, ostensible claims to protect the Christian 
minorities and trade links. By the mid 20th Century, French refusal to relinquish 
control or influence over the Levant was deeply rooted. Specialised interest 
groups such as silk firms in Lyon, traders in Marseille and those with shares in 
French infrastructure projects were essentially united in their primary view of the 	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Levant as a monetary asset. The French armed forces, on the other hand, 
represented another important vested interest that viewed access to Lebanese 
ports as vital to the preservation of France’s Mediterranean power.5 Still, as 
D.K. Fieldhouse, Aviel Roshwald and C.M. Andrew and A.S. Kanya-Forstner 
have convincingly argued, Syria and Lebanon’s importance to France was 
closely linked to ideas of national prestige, power and the French civilising 
mission.6 Bruce Marshall has argued likewise in regard to the rigidity of 
France’s historic regional role, “With the lines of rivalry and policy so long 
established, there was a sort of fatalism surrounding both de Gaulle’s policies 
and their ultimate failure.”7  
 This chapter will consider the impact that traditional rivalries and 
relationships had on Gaullist policy. It will also examine the November 1943 
parliamentary crisis in Lebanon as a precursor to French imperial withdrawal in 
1945-1946. This crisis was precipitated by Jean Helleu, the man selected as 
Georges Catroux’s replacement as Delegate General to the Levant. Helleu’s 
decision, that November, to arrest the newly elected Lebanese Prime Minister, 
the President and several members of the Beirut Cabinet threw Anglo-Free 
French relations and the broader Arab world into turmoil. Anglo-Gaullist clashes 
in the Levant in 1943 showcase the complexity of the relationships that 
European powers held, not just with the Levant states, but also with the entire 
Arab world – itself the centre of a vibrant, multi-faceted public sphere in which 
British and French actions were the subject of constant, and often hostile 
scrutiny, whether in the press and other print media, in national parliaments, or 
in the politics of the Arab street. A study of the Levant, and of Anglo-French 
rivalry within this specific area must also include a discussion of how their 
regional interventions were interpreted and criticised throughout the Middle 
East. Put simply, the foreign policy that Britain conducted towards the Levant 
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had real repercussions for her standing in key states including Palestine, Egypt, 
Iraq, and Saudi Arabia.  
 During the Second World War, the British government sought to avoid 
renewed outbreaks of disorder within its Arab territories, aware that the costs of 
suppressing unrest would divert vital wartime resources. Wartime strategy then, 
was to “bolster the region’s friendly regimes.”8 Between 1918 and 1939, Britain 
had faced costly uprisings in all of its newly acquired Mandates in addition to its 
Egyptian protectorate. In 1936, Britain sent 20,000 troops to Palestine to put 
down a revolt that dragged on for three years. The destruction that followed saw 
more than ten per cent of the male Palestinian Arab population killed, injured, 
exiled or interned.9 To signal support for moderate pan-Arabist sentiment, and 
in an effort to placate nationalism more generally, the Foreign Office had in 
1941 announced its support for the eventual formation of an Arab League. 
However, as the Iraqi revolts in 1941 and growing unrest in Palestine showed, 
unhappiness with British interference persisted.  
 Since late 1942 the Jewish Agency under the leadership of David Ben-
Gurion had begun spending fifteen percent of its £1 million annual budget in 
training the Haganah, the Jewish defence organisation.10 Revelations 
surrounding the extent of Nazi extermination efforts were already prompting 
increased Jewish militancy in Britain’s Palestinian mandate and heightened 
calls to open the borders to Jewish migrants, to the chagrin of the Arab 
population. An anti-British offshoot of the Haganah, which was established in 
the midst of the 1936-1939 Arab revolt, the Irgun Zvai Leumi had been 
organising attacks and sabotage operations against British targets since May 
1939. Zionist terrorism represented the most violent expression of Jewish 
opposition to Britain’s restrictive immigration policy and its preference for the 7 
July 1937 recommendations of the Peel Commission to partition Palestine.11 
Although the Irgun had suspended such attacks at the outbreak of war, another 
Zionist militant, Abraham Stern, responded by creating the Stern Gang from a 
dissenting faction of the Irgun. Its fighters continued to resist British policy, 
eventually carrying out the assassination of British Minister of State Lord Moyne 
in November 1944. The Irgun, under the new leadership of Polish-born 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Jackson, British Empire, 97. 
9 Eugene Rogan, The Arabs, A History (London: Penguin Books, 2012), 257. 
10 Barr, A Line in the Sand, 245. 
11 Jackson, British Empire, 140-141. 
	   224	  
Menachem Begin also resumed operations in December 1943, compounding 
the worsening instability in the region. British Middle East policy necessarily had 
to consider how its stance towards the Levant and France’s place there would 
impact upon its ability to control its own Middle East Empire effectively.  
Central to this volatility and at the heart of the upcoming crisis in the 
Levant was the troubling question of independence: what did it mean and when 
would it be granted? More importantly, and what makes this analysis unique 
from previous strategic and diplomatic studies, was another pressing question: 
how would the process of independence negotiations affect the prestige and 
influence of Britain and France, both in the Levant and throughout the broader 
Arab world? Moreover, how could these European nations frame their policy in 
a way that would make their continued influence in the Middle East acceptable 
and even desirable? On the one hand, we know that France had proclaimed the 
independence of both Syria and Lebanon in July 1941. In practice, this pledge 
remained unfulfilled. Indeed, evolving Free French discussions of independence 
for Syria and Lebanon were increasingly tied to the assumption that lasting 
connections with France would remain enshrined in the form of binding treaty 
obligations. Such a treaty would grant France enduring economic, strategic and 
cultural rights over her former mandates.  
Susan Pedersen addressed this difference between political and 
economic sovereignty in her brilliant study on the League of Nations Permanent 
Mandates Commission (LON PMC). Specifically, she points to the emergence 
of a “new definition of ‘independence’” in the late 1920s, as the great powers 
relinquished claims of legal sovereignty, moving instead towards a form of 
economic sovereignty.12 The precedent set in the Middle East by the Anglo-Iraqi 
treaties of 1922 and 1930 and the Anglo-Egyptian treaties of 1922 and 1936 
entrenched the assumption that nominal independence need not preclude the 
mandate holder from retaining strategic and economic rights. This approach, 
which combined the cession of sovereign rights with the preservation of 
reserved rights for the Mandate holder, sought to pacify nationalist demands 
while allowing the guiding state to continue to enjoy an array of benefits 
including military bases and access to oil resources. From the French 
perspective, managing this transition, from formal to informal influence, was 	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vital for a number of reasons. First, the combination of British military and fiscal 
superiority, French wartime failures and American anti-imperial rhetoric made 
the Free French intensely suspicious of both Anglo-Saxon intentions and local 
nationalist unrest. When examined purely from the viewpoint of military 
strength, de Gaulle simply did not have the resources to maintain unilateral 
control in the Levant. Second, the Levant, and particularly the Maronite 
Christian community, held a great deal of intangible, cultural value, and was 
equally esteemed by the competing Gaullists and Giraudists of the French 
Committee of National Liberation (CFLN), the proto-government which was 
officially formed in June 1943 and had its headquarters in Algiers. In practice, 
however, the mobilisation of culture as a political tool only weakened French 
influence further. Between 1941 and 1945, de Gaulle’s policies combined 
insecurity over France’s political position in its mandates with an unbending 
belief in French cultural superiority. Compromise became impossible. Jennifer 
Dueck examines the contradictions evident in French policy during this period, 
observing that “…culture and politics were interwoven in the tapestry of 
decolonisation in Syria and Lebanon.”13 
Maintaining an empire, or in this case supervising its demise, was made 
all the more complicated because this tangled web of strategic and cultural 
factors was closely linked to national prestige, both at home and abroad. 
Understanding this means looking beyond military manoeuvres. It 
acknowledges that no matter how callous and underhanded British policies may 
have been, they were still formulated with an eye towards maintaining local 
support and prestige, both in the Levant and in the broader Middle East. Thus, 
in many ways, adverse local reactions substantially limited Britain’s practical 
options, the more so as the incipient crisis in Palestine intensified during 1943-
44. In an attempt to stave off the question of independence in its own 
mandates, Britain sought to maintain what became a carefully constructed 
identity as an impartial and inherently benign arbiter. Current research rightly 
points out that Britain had to simultaneously protect the Middle East from Axis 
invasion without in the process alienating public, and overwhelmingly 
nationalist, opinion in the Arab World.14 The following two chapters will examine 	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how rhetoric, or a lack of it, was an essential part of this strategy. However, first, 
it is important to understand the longer history of both Arab nationalism and 
Anglo-French relations in the Middle East. This history serves as a frame of 
reference in which Anglo-French policy can be understood, both in 1943 and 
later, at the close of the mandate period in 1945.  
 
Shades of Independence and Historical Rivalry  
The question of independence for what is today Syria and Lebanon had been 
posed most recently, between the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the 
formalisation of the French mandate in the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne. Then, too, 
the French administration rapidly resorted to violence in response to populist 
nationalism. Still, the idea of a historically coherent and united nationalist 
movement against the French mandate should not be overstated. Nationalism 
was itself a relatively new phenomenon in the Arab world, gaining in popularity 
in the late nineteenth century in response to European imperialism and the 
attendant emergence of secular republicanism in late Ottoman Turkey.15 Even 
then, Arab nationalist movements were not as firmly secular as those of 
European “modern” nationalism and the potential boundaries of what could or 
would constitute a particular nation state were as yet unclear. Lebanese 
nationalism between 1900 and1940 developed around a particular geographic 
area. At the same time, another, broader form of Arab nationalism coalesced 
around cultural and ethnic values.16 To complicate matters, the Arab world was 
itself a heterogeneous mix of religious and tribal identities.17 Certainly, as D.K. 
Fieldhouse has suggested, one of the fundamental points of disagreement 
between Muslim and Christian notables in Lebanon were their respective 
attitudes towards France.18 As a geographical entity, Lebanon was comprised 
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largely of intensely competitive tribal societies, a fact that hardly engendered a 
common sense of nationhood.19   
 Following the Druze massacres of over 10,000 members of the Christian 
population in 1860, western pressure forced the Ottomans to create the 
autonomous province, or sanjaq, of Mount Lebanon. However, the roughly 
2,600 square miles of territory had neither port access nor arable land, making 
it reliant upon imported wheat and other food products.20 Lebanon was unique 
amongst other holdings in the Ottoman Empire. The extensive powers of the 
elected twelve-member Administrative Council of Mount Lebanon and its 
membership divisions or system of concessions between Maronites, Druzes, 
Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Shia and Sunni religious populations had a 
lasting impact on political thought and structures in Lebanon. 
 Eugene Rogan identifies three competing trends in interwar Lebanese 
politics.21 First, by the close of the First World War, the Administrative Council, 
and specifically the Maronites and Greek Catholics agreed that their present 
territory should be expanded and then granted independence under French 
guidance. Knowing that France had traditionally looked favourably upon the 
idea of a “Greater Lebanon,” which would encompass the seaport cities of 
Tripoli, Beirut, Sidon and Tyre and extend to the fertile Bekaa Valley in the East 
and the Anti-Lebanon Mountains in the west, the Administrative Council sought 
to use the mandate as a way to satisfy its own territorial ambitions and move 
towards eventual complete independence. However, many of the over 100,000 
strong individuals making up the Lebanese émigré community argued strongly 
for independence, again under French tutelage, but within the geographical 
confines of an independent Syria. The third strand included Sunni Muslims and 
Greek Orthodox Christians in the province of Beirut, who wanted to avoid 
becoming minorities in an expanded Lebanese, Christian dominated state. This 
group opted to support Amir Faysal’s Damascus-based government in the 
hopes of becoming part of a larger, Arab kingdom. There were also deep 
division within the Council itself. The Druze remained strongly opposed to a 
continued role for France in Lebanon while the Shii Mutawallis, who inhabited 
the southern region of Jabal Amil favoured a loose affiliation with Syria. These 	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differences of opinion illustrate the less than straightforward nature of the 
nationalist movements that continued to develop in Lebanon and Syria over the 
next 25 years.  
 Ultimately, both initial Lebanese and Syrian attempts to negotiate 
independence failed. In July 1920, seven members of the Administrative 
Council became concerned over the increasingly heavy-handed French politics 
of mandate rule. In a last-ditch attempt to avoid French occupation, they sought 
an agreement with Faysal to achieve immediate and complete independence. 
French high commissioner General Henri Gouraud responded by arresting 
these alleged traitors to the French cause.22 In the weeks that followed, French 
troops delivered a series of crushing blows to Faysal’s aspirations of statehood, 
culminating in the French siege of Damascus on 24 July, in which an estimated 
five thousand Arabs were killed.23 Incorporating this historical background 
shows the depth of French ambition in the Levant and the extent to which local 
political movements were highly fragmented. The early willingness of two of the 
three strands of Lebanese political opinion to acquiesce to some kind of 
continued French presence in the region further illustrates the framework of 
thought in which early nationalist movements formulated their own policies.24 
 On the other hand, Anglo-French political manoeuvring within the Middle 
East also has a long history. Greater Syria, encompassing modern-day Syria, 
Lebanon, Palestine and Jordan, had been a recurrent source of Anglo-French 
rivalry since the early nineteenth Century. In 1841, communal fighting amongst 
the Muslim Druze and Christian Maronites, the two dominant groups residing in 
the Lebanese highlands of Mount Lebanon, was exacerbated by British support 
for the former and French support for the latter.25 The much-vaunted 1904 
Entente Cordiale, far from a simple mutual assistance pact, while resolving 
differences in Franco-British arguments in North Africa fomented others in the 
Middle East by facilitating European empire building in Western Asia. In 	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addition, this agreement removed all time constraints on the British occupation 
of Egypt and in turn acknowledged French “rights” in Morocco. Imperial 
bargaining of Arab futures became the norm. The period leading up to and 
immediately following the conclusion of the First World War was packed with 
intrigue. The Sykes Picot agreement, concluded in October 1916, originally 
gave Britain the Ottoman provinces of Baghdad and Basra, the French the 
Syrian coastal region and Cilicia and envisaged Palestine under international 
guidance.26 Still, despite regional agreements such as these, Anglo-French 
relations in the Middle East were more often fraught with tension. Ignoring the 
August 1919 findings of the King-Crane Commission, which recommended the 
creation of a single Syrian State under a constitutional monarchy led by Amir 
Faysal, Britain and France carved out the territorial boundaries that remained in 
place when global war broke out again twenty years later. 
 The unrest in the Middle East that punctuated the interwar period 
likewise contributed to the hardening of nationalist sentiment directed against 
the mandate regimes. This in turn informed a recognisable pattern of responses 
in British and French mandate policy. Within the PMC, Palestine/Transjordan 
and Syria/Lebanon were the most discussed of any of the mandates, taking up 
17.3% and 14.3% of the PMC’s thirty-seven sessions respectively.27 After the 
June 1940 assassination of Syrian Nationalist and People’s Party leader, Dr 
Abd al-Rahman Shahbander, his deputy, Shukri al-Quwatli rose to power as the 
leader of the National Bloc, which had been formally established in 1931.28 This 
was the largest, most widely supported group that fought for Syrian 
independence during the French mandate period. Future president of Lebanon 
Bishara al-Khoury founded the mirror image, Constitutional Bloc in 1936, which 
likewise advocated for the dissolution of the Mandate and its replacement with a 
Franco-Lebanese treaty. The National Bloc, whose leadership consisted largely 
of wealthy urban notables, lost a great deal of credibility after its failure to 
conclude a binding treaty with France and prevent the cession of Syrian 
Alexandretta to Turkey in 1939. At the time of the Exporter invasions in June 
1941, it had become opportunistically pro-Axis in the hope of securing Berlin’s 
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backing for immediate independence.29 And, by 1943 it had revived itself as the 
Nationalist Party.30 The British decision in early 1942 to begin dealings with al-
Quwatli led to the choice later that year to press for his return to Syria (following 
his self-imposed exile to Baghdad). This conciliatory gesture flew in the face of 
French wishes.31  
 Indeed, by 1941, when Anglo-French forces occupied the Levant, 
tensions were developing along the predictable lines of nationalist demands for 
independence. However, Free French military subservience to the British in 
Syria and Lebanon, and the Middle East as a whole further complicated the 
politics of independence negotiations. The Middle East War Council (MEWC), 
which was comprised of leading British (and, from May 1942, American) officials 
in the region, and chaired by Minister of State Richard Casey following his 
arrival in Cairo on 5 May, believed that the expulsion of the French from the 
Levant was desirable.32 However, there was still a high level of indecision both 
within Whitehall and inside Churchill’s Cabinet. Churchill himself remained firmly 
opposed to any efforts to oust the French from the Levant in favour of British 
leadership. 
 What became the public face of British policy was in fact influenced by a 
plethora of factors including the looming shift from wartime operational 
expediency to post war planning. The emergence of the U.S. and Soviet Union 
as “the big two” marked a significant change in the balance of global power. 
Indeed, the crisis in Lebanon could hardly have happened at a worse time, 
unfolding on the eve of Churchill’s meeting with Roosevelt in Cairo between 22 
and 26 November 1943 and the Teheran Conference of 28 November to 1 
December. American Secretary of State Cordell Hull was at the time 
considering publically denouncing de Gaulle over Lebanon. Roosevelt’s prior 
dislike of de Gaulle was likewise strengthened, confirming his decision that the 
Gaullist movement did not deserve formal Allied recognition as the legitimate 
French government.33 For Britain, the strength of American power was 	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undeniable. It was true that being able to consolidate regional supremacy in the 
Middle East after the conflict hinged upon the British ability to placate demands 
for reform or withdrawal from Palestine, Egypt and Iraq. However, without, at 
the very least, American acquiescence in these endeavours, Britain had little 
chance of success.  
 With their own expectations of exit from empire very much in mind, the 
governments and populations of the Arab States were also severely critical of 
French intransigence in Lebanon. Britain was well aware that their response to 
the Lebanon crisis was being closely watched throughout the region. It was this 
interconnectedness that made Middle Eastern politics so complex and placed 
constraints upon British policy. Since the outbreak of War in 1939, British 
governance in Palestine was largely consistent with the pro-Arab tradition of the 
Foreign Office Middle East Department, which countermanded the residual 
Zionist sympathies among certain Colonial Office personnel. However, by 1943 
there was a strong consensus amongst the Jewish community in Palestine, 
known as the Yishuv, that the only acceptable post-war solution was total 
independence, even if this meant an outright conflict with the British.34 Arab 
Palestinians, and indeed the broader Arab world, were resolutely opposed to 
the formation of a Jewish homeland in that region. As the primary land route for 
vital oil flowing from Iran to Haifa, and part of the overland communications link 
to India, both Palestine and Iraq were of great strategic importance to the British 
war effort. The Iraqi Kirkuk oilfields produced an annual four million tons of 
crude oil.35 At the same time, Egyptian aspirations as a regional leader could 
not be ignored. British foreign policy between 1943-45 encouraged Egyptian 
leadership in the Arab world under the assumption that Cairo’s continued 
influence would limit Palestinian weight in any regional league. This, it was 
hoped, would allow Britain to avoid demands for the implementation of an 
exclusively Arab state.36  
 Additionally, the undeniably crucial role that Egypt played as the lynchpin 
of the British war effort in the Middle East meant that it was vital to remain (as 	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much as possible) on good terms with King Farouk’s government. British 
Ambassador in Cairo Miles Lampson had successfully pressured Farouk into 
dismissing his pro-German Prime Minister, Ali Mahir in 1940. However, 
nationalist rumblings from the likes of future presidents Gamal Abdul Nasser 
and his fellow army officer Anwar Sadat were symptomatic of a broader desire 
to rid the country of their British occupiers.37 Worryingly, these sentiments were 
too often coupled with support for the Axis powers. In February 1942, after the 
resignation of Egyptian Prime Minister Husayn Sirry, Lampson demanded that 
Farouk appoint Wafdist leader Mustafa el-Nahhas Pasha. In a strange twist of 
fate, the national Wafd party was the only Egyptian political faction that was still 
credibly antifascist. Lampson responded firmly, ordering that Farouk’s Abdin 
Palace be surrounded with British troops and armoured vehicles. However, this 
show of imperial strength did nothing to endear the British to the Egyptian 
political elite in the long term.  
By the time of the Lebanese parliamentary crisis, British policy in the 
Levant combined the long-term intention to conserve regional influence with the 
short-term desire to avoid jeopardising the public image of the Anglo-Gaullist 
partnership. This attempt to balance two fundamentally opposing viewpoints 
was echoed in the official history of British foreign policy during the Second 
World War. Sir Llewellyn Woodward avoided placing blame, arguing instead 
that the British view was that, although the French should not have taken such 
“high-handed measures” in November 1943, the Lebanese were equally rash in 
unilaterally revoking French privileges.38 These dual goals resulted in often-
contradictory British policy initiatives emanating from within the Middle East and 
London. Specifically, officials working on the spot like Spears and Casey would 
actively work with local nationalists, advising them to refrain from violent 
retaliation as a way to build international sympathy for their claims. However, in 
London, British Foreign Office officials hoped to retain a neutral stance. They 
knew that backing the French would jeopardise Anglo-Arab relations while 
forcing the French to back down would further undermine any residual Anglo-
French cooperation. The CFLN, itself increasingly recognizable as a fully-
fledged government-in-waiting, was intent on consolidating continued French 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37 Jackson, British Empire, 118. 
38 Sir Llewellyn Woodward, British Foreign Policy in the Second World War 
(London: Her Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1962), 261. 
	   233	  
influence in the Levant. But the CFLN’s lack of resources meant that Fighting 
French administrators were compelled to rely upon vastly superior British 
manpower to maintain a viable bureaucracy in Syria and Lebanon. Meanwhile, 
the local governments and national parliaments of both Levant states were by 
this time in complete agreement about working towards separate and complete 
independence without any sort of compromise with the French.39  
In the case of the CFLN and then de Gaulle’s provisional government, 
the means to realise continued influence would follow a not unexpected path. 
French policy in 1943 (and again in 1945) would illustrate the extent to which a 
policy based on repression and colonial violence was central to the established 
practices of French imperial power. This remained the case even as policy 
makers debated a more liberal framework. The use and justification of violence 
as a demonstration of power assumed that the traditional repressive reaction to 
local revolts remained defensible. Indeed, these actions, and their justification 
under the guise of French cultural and political superiority bore striking 
similarities with the suppressions of the 1925 Druze revolts.40 Although in 1943 
the French sought to negotiate agreements that would allow them to maintain 
military bases and cultural institutions rather than indefinite mandate rule, the 
sentiment behind such intentions was similar. The perpetuation of an historic 
paternalistic attitude towards the indigenous population continued to inform 
French rhetoric. However, this time, as Bruce Marshall points out, France and 
Britain were not military equals and “the other interested parties were far more 
influential.41 Given France’s lack of military capabilities and the refusal of the 
American and Soviet governments to uphold French claims, as the League of 
Nations had done, France was crippled.  
 The restoration of France as a great power necessitated national unity 
alongside the renegotiation and strengthening of colonial ties. However, in 1943 
the German defeat was still a remote prospect and neither the CFLN nor 
certainly Vichy could claim uncontested control over a French nation or empire. 	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Syria and Lebanon may not have been part of France’s formal empire, 
however, the administrative rights bestowed on it through the mandate fostered 
a similar sense of ownership, making empire a useful and relevant framework of 
interpretation. Article 22 of the LON Covenant charged France, an “advanced 
nation,” with the administration and development of the Levant. However it 
provided no further details as to how long this obligation was to continue, nor 
how the transition to independence was to be made. Whatever the final 
outcome, de Gaulle and the CFLN were adamant that France would negotiate 
the future of these states, and that this future would include a place for France.  
 This section has examined the often-tumultuous history of the Middle 
East, as it emerged from four centuries of Ottoman rule and into European 
domination. As a relatively new concept, Arab Nationalism was still in its early 
stages when war broke out in 1939, and traditional divisions between religious 
and tribal communities rendered a coherent approach towards independence 
commensurately difficult. The following section will build upon this historical 
background, looking specifically at the Lebanese parliamentary crisis in 
November 1943. It will examine how British and French efforts to uphold their 
influence in the Middle East were impacted by local sentiments and material 
capabilities. In doing so, it will illustrate the extent to which official rhetoric was 
guided or limited by both traditional understandings of empire and the growing 
strength of nationalist demands. 
 
Hopes of Empire and the Tide of Nationalism: Lebanon 1943  
In December 1942 the French National Committee (CNF)42 finally agreed to 
hold national elections in Lebanon. The elections, organised from Beirut in late 
August 1943, resulted in nationalist victories, an outcome that de Gaulle blamed 
on British interference.43 Al-Khoury (former adviser to General Gouraud) 
became the new president alongside Sorbonne-educated Riad al-Solh as Prime 
Minister. The new government abolished the French Mandate on 8 November 
and made Arabic the sole national language. Local French officials, under the 
orders of French Delegate General Helleu, responded swiftly. Early on 11 	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November Helleu arrested the president, prime minister, three ministers and 
one deputy. They were interned in a fortress in the southern town of Rashaya. 
He appointed Émile Eddé, the pro-French candidate, as the provisional 
president. Helleu’s actions were unreservedly criticised within the British War 
Cabinet, not least because the members regarded Eddé as “a notorious drug 
trafficker.”44  
Violence erupted in the streets of Beirut in response to the subsequent 
dissolution of the Lebanese Chamber of Deputies. Meanwhile, Helleu tried to 
contain the crisis, ordering the seizure of all printing presses in the Levant as a 
way to suppress publication of the controversy.45 At the same time, Spears was 
quickly becoming a vocal proponent of Levantine independence. On 24 
November, the Lebanese newspaper Al-Hayat published an extensive article 
praising Spears’ role in the movement towards independence. In the interview, 
Spears took a decisive stance on the side of the nationalists, an attitude that 
would become a source of untold frustration in London. Moreover, he told his 
interviewer that the first thing he did after president al-Khoury’s son informed 
him of the arrests was to publicise them. He sent a messenger to Palestine to 
broadcast Helleu’s actions in English and Arabic. He also coordinated transport 
for journalists between Beirut and Cairo.46 Responses on both the French and 
British sides illustrate how important it was to control press reactions within the 
immediate region. The responses of local and regional groups, the CFLN and 
British official sources will illustrate how each side sought to carve a space for 
themselves within the Arab world and how rhetoric played a crucial role in these 
endeavours.  
Britain’s extremely delicate position in the Middle East was apparent in 
the contrast between the reserve that characterised the British official response 
and the more virulent condemnation of French actions within the mass media 
both at home and throughout the Middle East. Official reluctance to take sides 
in the debacle indicated how closely British prestige throughout the Middle East 
was tied to their response within the Levant. Moreover, unlike previously 
discussed operations, the crises in 1943 and 1945 forced the British to react to 	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events as they unfolded, leaving them little time formulate a strategic rhetorical 
strategy. This fact is crucial, because it situates the crisis as an impediment to 
British policy, when previous operations were undertaken to further their 
interests. Specifically, the silence of British officials, or the lack of detailed 
information from traditional sources like the Foreign Office, was a deliberate 
response. Overt support for the nationalists would call into question British 
rights in her own mandates as well as the status of treaties with Iraq and Egypt, 
which both nations were eager to exchange for unhindered independence. 
Equally, it would cause irreparable damage with the CFLN. On the other hand, 
backing Helleu’s heavy-handed efforts to force the nationalists to come to terms 
with the French presence would jeopardise British credibility and therefore the 
likelihood that they would be able to either conclude useful treaties with any of 
these nations or effectively quell unrest in Palestine. 
The situation was further complicated by the early stages of post-war 
planning. After Giraud’s resignation as co-leader of the CFLN on 8 November 
1943, de Gaulle had quickly consolidated his personal power as premier and, 
effectively, president-in-waiting of the French provisional government expected 
to emerge from the CFLN. While in Algiers, he remained reluctant to 
compromise the political future of his movement and avoided committing to 
precise political plans for the post war reconstruction of France.47 However, 
from mid-1942 the CFLN had begun to consider possible routes to a post-
liberation administration. Despite potential challenges from internal resistance 
groups, the organisation remained better placed to contribute such plans. It had 
both physical security and the organisational framework of a governmental 
structure. In October 1942, de Gaulle created the Commission du 
Débarquement, a committee to supervise decisions on the administration of 
France during the liberation.  
Andrew Shennan has identified two core components of Free French 
ideology, each of which was closely tied to the Gaullist conceptualization of 
post-war reconstruction: patriotism and imperial unity.48 De Gaulle made it very 
clear in his memoirs that it was of primary importance for France to regain her 
rightful place as one of the world powers. She could do this as a result of her 	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historical prestige and remaining overseas territories.49 Crucial to this 
restoration of French sovereignty was the ability to formulate, to implement and 
to legitimise policy both at home and abroad. In 1943, French justifications of 
the parliamentary arrests were committed to the legitimisation of the French 
position in the Levant. Aimed at consolidating international, and particularly 
American support for the French role, such rhetoric construed the Lebanese as 
rash and immature. At the same time, it raised the spectre of independence, 
with the understanding that this could only be granted by French authority. The 
official statements that supported this policy were accompanied by a well-worn 
discourse of indigenous inexperience and the assumption that independence 
meant different things for “modern” and “pre-modern” states.  
French communiqués sought to frame Helleu’s actions within an 
essentially moral, humanitarian and legalistic framework. Gaullist statements, 
which claimed the right and responsibility to uphold the mandate, were 
consistent with interwar constructions that viewed colonial culture and 
indigenous inabilities to rule as justifications for French tutelage.50 From the 
inception of the crisis, communiqués issued by Henri Bonnet, de Gaulle’s 
Commissioner for Information, underscored the legal grounds of French actions 
and the inherent bad faith of the Lebanese government. Al-Khoury, Bonnet 
argued, presented the French with a “fait accompli.” Helleu had been sent to 
begin negotiations for independence, and it was only the blind and inherently 
irrational nationalism of the Lebanese cabinet that resulted in the attempt to 
take by force what they were on the cusp of receiving “de bon gré.”51 On 16 
November de Gaulle addressed the Provisional Consultative Assembly to 
reiterate the appropriateness of French actions. The mandate, he stressed, was 
an international statute that neither the governed population nor the governing 
party had the authority to renounce.52 The French position as “puissance 
mandataire” was obligatory, not voluntary.53 Going further, the French press in 
Algiers argued that the Lebanese press expressed approval of the attitude of 	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French authorities in rightfully seeking to preserve strong ties with the French 
nation.54 This was largely a result of Helleu’s 14 November statement broadcast 
via Radio Levant claiming that he had received countless messages of thanks 
for the actions he had taken.55  
The invocation of the French Delegation General as a responsible 
authority bound by France’s status as a mandatory power signified an attempt 
to create a framework in which French actions were driven, not by any 
unwarranted desire for continued influence, but by a solemn legal obligation. 
Within this context, Helleu’s actions were “perfectly justifiable” and indeed, 
consistent with French obligations.56 Catroux’s arrival in Beirut to resolve the 
crisis provided further opportunities for the CFLN to demonstrate good faith as a 
protector and guide. France would bestow on “cette jeune nation, en marche 
vers sa complète indépendance, une nouvelle marque de son affectuese 
sollicitude.”57 Nevertheless, Casey warned Catroux, “public opinion in the world 
and particularly in Lebanon would be unimpressed by legal niceties.” They, and 
the rest of the world would only remember that France had promised 
independence and at the first opportunity reneged on these promises.58 
Catroux’s original plan to win France “moral credit” in the eyes of the Levant 
through a seemingly liberal approach towards independence faltered under this 
sustained pressure.59 
In the British camp, responding to the arrests meant acknowledging a 
range of violent criticism without too overtly taking the side of the nationalists. 
The British press had been printing prominent stories about rising tensions in 
Lebanon from 10 November, the day prior to the arrests.60 Subsequent reports 
contained news of violence, demonstrations and strikes, which Bonnet 
countered. He maintained that not only were such stories hugely exaggerated, 
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a state of calm existed throughout the region.61 British media responses were, 
unsurprisingly, the cause of friction between the CFLN and London. Foreign 
Office official R.M. Makins, who was assisting Resident Minister in Algiers 
Harold MacMillan, reported to London that Commissioner for Foreign Affairs 
Réne Massigli had requested that press and wireless sources be restrained 
from exaggerating the level of unrest outside of Beirut.62  
In London, the desire to avoid regional unrest throughout the Middle East 
triggered a more ambivalent response that neither condemned French actions 
nor invalidated nationalist claims. At the same time, the seriousness of the 
situation left the Foreign Office in no doubt that the French must be privately 
forced to comply with British demands. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden’s initial 
telegram to Macmillan instructed him to make it clear to the French that their 
actions were “wholly indefensible.” The note went on to threaten that if British 
demands for the recall of Helleu and the release of the ministers were not met, 
“we should be compelled to take a line which would certainly imply dissociating 
ourselves completely from the French, and might entail consequences which 
would be most unpleasing to them.”63 This threat implied a public disavowal of 
French actions in the Levant followed by their forcible reversal. The War 
Cabinet, however, took a stand from early on against the use of armed 
intervention except as a last resort. Their preference was instead to threaten to 
revoke Britain’s de jure recognition of the CFLN. Threatening to withdraw 
recognition from de Gaulle’s Algiers institution relied upon rhetorical pressure as 
a legitimate means of intervention and a diplomatic means to resolve the crisis. 
Ultimately, the Foreign Office view, which favoured the threat of martial law 
combined with a subtle distancing from French actions became the foundation 
for the British ultimatum.64  
From a material perspective, Britain, and more specifically Middle East 
Command (MEC), easily had the resources to supplant French forces in the 
Levant. De Gaulle routinely complained that while Britain had hundreds of 
thousands of troops in the Middle East, French forces amounted to only three 	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Senegalese battalions and the 18,000 local volunteers who made up the 
Troupes Speciales.65 The 70,000 strong Armée du Levant, traditionally made up 
of a majority of Senegalese, Madagascan and North African regular troops, had 
been disbanded after the Exporter operations in 1941.66 British Foreign Office 
documents demonstrate that Arab attitudes, not just in the Levant, but also 
throughout the Middle East, outranked the demands of the metropolitan press 
and home sentiment. However, there were still differences of opinion over how 
to achieve Arab support and at what cost. While Spears and Casey prioritised 
finding a solution that would bolster Arab opinion towards Britain even at the 
expense of de Gaulle, in Algiers, Macmillan was reluctant to compromise Anglo-
French relations.67 Nevertheless, the most significant question on the table was: 
when it came to independence, would the British stand by their wartime 
promises?68 This combination of growing pan-Arabism (even if traditional 
rivalries lingered69) and French sensibilities led the Foreign Office to encourage 
depictions of Britain as a disinterested but helpful negotiator. Just as de Gaulle 
hoped to preserve French influence in the Levant, so too broad British policy 
sought to preserve the British presence in strategic zones of interest. Following 
the Lebanese parliamentary crisis, this meant contending with a swathe of anti-
French responses from governments across the Middle East.  
Writing from Cairo, British diplomat Terence Shone expressed his 
concern over Egyptian reactions. The Egyptian press, he argued, was 
unabashedly on the side of the Lebanese. Egyptian publications were 
mobilising the democratic principles expressed in the Atlantic Charter70 as proof 
of the indefensibility of French actions. The daily Wafdist newspaper Al Misri, 
followed the 8 November pronouncements closely, calling upon the French 
Committee to recognise the death of imperial regimes and the incompatibility of 	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Allied principles with the domination of a large nation over a small one.71 If 
Britain chose to step in on the side of the French, this “would be extremely 
awkward,” Shone continued.72 Saudi monarch Ibn Saud also cited the 
democratic themes of the charter in his telegram to Churchill. He invoked a 
highly cultural image of the British, which drew on ideas of fair play and historic 
commitment to champion the cause of the underdog.73 The Iraqi response was 
no less scathing. On 13 November the Chamber argued that continued British 
support for and backing of the CFLN facilitated their continued presence in the 
Levant. A few members even called French troops “British mercenaries.”74 The 
following day, British ambassador in Baghdad Sir Kinahan Cornwallis reported 
that the Iraqi press was united in their condemnation of French actions in 
Lebanon. Citing a number of examples, Cornwallis stressed that the mass 
media was inciting Arab nationalist militancy.75  
In the midst of this strong response, it is easy to recognise the reluctance 
within the British government to risk publically taking sides. An official 
communiqué published on 13 November confirmed prior promises of 
independence but lacked any real commitment as to how and when this would 
be achieved.76 In the Commons, Undersecretary of State Richard Law 
described the arrests as causing “great public excitement” in Lebanon and the 
broader Middle East. He explained that this was due to the perception that they 
“were regarded as unjustified by the circumstances.”77 Notably, this statement 
neither passed judgment on the arrests nor portrayed Britain as being on the 
same side as the Lebanese nationalists. It only described the response within 
Lebanon. Instead, Law reaffirmed British commitments to the 1941 promises of 
independence and the importance of Lebanon to the on-going war effort, still 
without committing to a particular course of action. Official communications 	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throughout the crisis remained vague. They reverted to broad promises rather 
than endorsing a specific strategy. BBC Europe’s broadcasting instructions 
stressed the need to impart the “moral, political and strategic” position of Britain, 
an approach, which again credited the British as a kind of helpful diplomatic 
presence in the current affair within the broader confines of the war.78  
However, as the crisis escalated, it became increasingly difficult to 
maintain this position of neutrality. Alarmed by reports of worsening unrest, the 
Foreign Office began to prepare an ultimatum, which would be given to 
Catroux, with the goal of forcing him to release the internees. There was a 
strong possibility that the ultimatum would become public should Catroux 
refuse. This recognition meant that an intrinsic part of the ultimatum included 
considering how British prestige could be protected against criticism both from 
nationalist quarters in the Middle East and Metropolitan France. On 19 
November Casey delivered what he subtly called an “aide-mémoire” to Catroux. 
It demanded that the internees be released by 10.00 on 22 November or Britain 
would declare martial law and free the arrested officials.79 Although de Gaulle 
later argued that Catroux had already taken steps to liberate the ministers on 
his own, and the British did not in fact intervene militarily, the debates that 
surrounded the ultimatum remain instructive.80 Specifically, British Foreign 
Office reports stressed the need to prepare appropriate responses justifying 
British actions, should intervention become necessary. Decision makers in this 
office and the War Cabinet were fearful that too strong of a British response 
would reflect badly upon a French audience. Moreover, it would provide an 
opportunity to showcase Allied disunity through British exploitations of the 
French.  
Intervening on the side of the nationalists might also compromise British 
standing in the Middle East. A Foreign Office directive noted that British 
intervention and the blatant championing of the nationalist cause could provide 
an opportunity to question “British hypocrisy in posing as the champion of 
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oppressed native populations in view of India, Palestine, etc.”81 On 19 
November, the Foreign Office, after consultation with Minister of Information 
Brendan Bracken, wrote to Casey explaining how to “prepare public opinion” in 
the event that Britain declared martial law. Press correspondents “should 
emphasise [the] gravity of [the] local situation, the rising anxiety in neighbouring 
countries and danger of letting the situation remain as it is…”82 Further 
directives stipulating how the crisis should be discussed publically emphasised 
the legitimacy of British actions by connecting them to American and Soviet 
policies. In the case that the French refused the ultimatum and Britain declared 
martial law, one document stated that it should be made clear that British action 
was only taken after consolation with the U.S. and the Soviet Union when 
attempts to compromise had failed.83 Interestingly, the Free French also 
attempted to emphasise Soviet support as a way to underline the internationally 
recognised right to conclude strategic treaties. Spears wrote to the Foreign 
Office to report that a poster depicting de Gaulle and Stalin side by side had 
been posted all over Beirut on 10 November. This was a consistent part of 
French propaganda, Spears argued, which implied Soviet backing for French 
actions in the Levant.84 Although the Soviets did not issue a single statement 
during the Lebanon crisis, they and the United States became increasingly 
involved in the Levant in the following years.85 These directives illustrate how 
the British response was constrained as a result of pressure from both French 
and Middle East nationalist groups. Maintaining the perception of French 
agency in the issue allowed Britain to focus her policy through rhetoric rather 
than overt military action. However, it also fostered the French belief that an 
agreement with the Levant states was still possible.  
Media reports, particularly within Britain, complicated official neutrality as 
news stories spread beyond British shores. Nationalist audiences within 
Lebanon also read and interpreted stories from the British press. Writing to the 
Foreign Office, Spears reported that the opinions in these articles were 	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considered to be equivalent to British policy. The article that precipitated 
Spears’ note was published on 15 November in The Times. It suggested that 
the Lebanese government had “acted with misplaced haste.” The French cited it 
to justify the arrests. More importantly, many Lebanese, who believed The 
Times to be the “mouthpiece” of the British government, concluded that Britain 
was on the side of the French.86 A few days later, the Foreign Office issued a 
political directive to officials in Beirut. It cited another, much more blatantly pro-
Lebanese article from The Times calling for the immediate release and 
reinstatement of the arrested officials. More importantly, the directive 
acknowledged that it was now largely impossible to avoid looming questions 
about independence.87 A memo from Spears analysing the Lebanese election 
crisis concluded, “What can only be described as the flowering of national 
consciousness in the Lebanon has proved to be much stronger than religious 
fanaticism or sectarian fears.”88 Excluding the above offending article, the vast 
majority of British press publications were indeed uncompromisingly pro 
Lebanese.  
The strength of the British media response also highlighted the disparity 
between official and popular sentiment (to the extent that it was reflected in the 
press). It illustrated how, much like criticisms over the Darlan deal, within Britain 
the conflict was interpreted according to a strict moral and ethical code. Official 
analyses of the crisis noted the discrepancy between official rhetoric and the 
press response: “As if at a single command, the entire British press has 
launched a large-scale campaign against the Committee of National 
Liberation.”89 The British press drew on themes of fair play and credibility when 
they criticised Gaullist policy and demanded that Britain intervene in order to 
uphold her own honour. One article summarised the crisis by illustrating the 
French actions as contrary to the rights of a self-governing and sovereign state: 
“…few people imagined that the local French authorities would go to the length 
of suppressing the National Parliament freely elected…in accordance with the 
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promises of independence…”90 The availability of press reports from the 
broader Middle East also influenced the tone adopted by the British press, just 
as The Times had affected sentiment within Lebanon. The Times pointed to the 
homogeneity of local opinion in the Middle East, writing that Egyptian and 
Muslim objections were united against the harshness of the French reaction.91 
The CFLN was portrayed as clinging to the “almost non-existent” juridical 
foundations of the mandate.92  
The British press did not stop at criticising Free French policy. They 
launched direct calls for British action, a response that made Whitehall anxious. 
Although The Times took a slightly more reserved stance than The Guardian, 
both called for Britain to involve herself in order to avoid “grave 
embarrassments,” and to protect her honour.93 At the centre of the issue, once 
again, were honour and prestige. Britain must act to uphold her own honour, 
even though this would likely have negative repercussions for the French 
position in the Levant. The British press was dominated by the crisis and it was 
not uncommon to find forecasts predicting both a decline in French prestige and 
a rise in tensions between Britain and France. The extent of criticism against 
the CFLN was so pronounced that the Foreign Office expressed concern that 
Anglo-French relations could be irrevocably damaged. An article in the 
Observer calling for Churchill to “publicly pillory de Gaullism” was cited as a 
particularly concerning example.94 Additionally, initial reactions in the 
Commons, led by the MP for East Fulham Mr William Astor, made it clear that 
he linked British actions to guarantee Lebanese independence with the 
maintenance of British honour.95 MP for Oxford Quintin Hogg argued that the 
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Lebanese, as “among the most gifted of the Arabs,” should not be pressured 
into a treaty they did not wish to make.96  
What emerges particularly clearly when examining the Lebanese 
parliamentary crisis were the different sources of pressure that impacted upon 
British foreign policy. The British mass media, Lebanese nationalist groups and 
British mandate governments in the Middle East all called on Britain to have the 
internees released and reinstated. However, doing so would severely 
compromise Anglo-French relations with de Gaulle. Moreover, by intervening, 
Britain could open the door to criticism over her own imperial policy. Counter-
intuitive as it may seem, British intervention, through the use of an ultimatum, 
represented a compromise that allowed Churchill’s government to resolve the 
crisis without adopting too vigorous a stance. French acquiescence in releasing 
the internees allowed Britain to maintain its position of relative neutrality while 
still conceding to France the ever-decreasing possibility of concluding a 
favourable treaty with her mandate governments. This British reluctance to be 
tied to too rigid a policy, whether on the side of the nationalists or in favour of 
continued French influence, was signalled through the absence of official 
rhetoric in favour of one alternative or the other. Despite pressure from MPs and 
the mass media to intervene publically on the side of the nationalists, this 
approach remained inconsistent with long-term British interests in the region as 
a whole. This crisis was just the beginning of France’s decent towards imperial 
violence in the early post-war period. The following chapter will examine how de 
Gaulle’s tenure as provisional leader of a liberated French state was, much like 
Vichy, primarily concerned with the rehabilitation of the empire and the French 
nation as a whole.  
 
Conclusion 
On 21 November, the CFLN announced the release of the internees and the 
reinstatement of President al-Khoury. However, the crisis was hardly forgotten. 
For nationalist groups in the Levant it reaffirmed the unacceptability of 
continued French rule. For de Gaulle it confirmed British duplicity. As the Allied 
victory appeared more assured, issues of post-war governance, reconstruction 
and, crucially, French standing in the global order, became supremely 	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important. The rhetoric of imperial reform during this period was inextricably 
linked to French sovereignty.97 In 1943, de Gaulle could not yet claim 
leadership over metropolitan France, however, he was increasingly asserting 
power over the empire.98 His uncompromising attitude towards the Levant 
remained a source of concern for his British colleagues. Foreign Office 
directives instructed that comments on the freeing of the Lebanese officials 
should remain relatively suppressed and refrain from emotive or highly 
opinionated comment.99 Again, this stance reaffirmed the British desire to avoid 
choosing sides. However, nationalist movements within the Levant continued to 
mobilise rhetoric that confirmed their unwillingness to mitigate their demands for 
complete independence, even in light of French pressure. After the release of 
the internees, French rhetoric, in line with underlying policy, indicated a 
fundamental failure to acknowledge that they had lost all legitimacy within the 
region.  
 For de Gaulle and the CFLN, portraying the event as a French affair was 
a sign of both their own power and legitimacy in the Levant. This remained the 
case even as the Anglo-French relationship was placed under increasing 
pressure. Bonnet’s press release argued that the decision to release the 
arrestees was not due to “outside pressure” or “made in answer to anybody.”100 
De Gaulle defended his policy in his memoirs, writing that not only had the 
decision to release the ministers been made long before the ultimatum, the 
British threat was itself a ploy to “create the impression of a French loss of 
face.”101 His assertion illustrates his own concerns over the power differences in 
the relationship and the need to “set the record straight” publically. More 
importantly, it was part of a continuing rhetoric that sought to guarantee a 
meaningful place for France in the post-war world. This crisis in 1943, and the 
mentalities which underlay the actions and reactions on all sides, laid the 
groundwork for a second series of clashes, this time in Damascus at the close 	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of the war. It is fitting to conclude this broader discussion of war, rhetoric and 
empire with a crisis that saw the end of conflict in the European theatre and 
signalled the gradual inception of decolonisation.  
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Chapter 9: Renegotiating Empire at the Close of the War 
“Yesterday was the time for battle; the hour for settling accounts had 
come:”1  
 
Introduction  
On the evening of 29 May 1945, the Syrian city of Damascus was eerily dark. 
Widespread protests had broken out in response to the French refusal to 
relinquish control of the local security forces, or Troupes Speciales. De Gaulle’s 
provisional government was continuing to insist on the conclusion of a 
preferential treaty prior to granting Syrian independence. In the midst of the 
emerging melee, French commander General Oliva Roget decided to bomb the 
city into submission. At his orders, telephone lines in the Syrian government 
offices were severed and the supply of electrical power to the entire city was cut 
off.2 The bombardments carried out over Damascus between 29-30 May were a 
stark reminder of how frequently violence was thought to be a legitimate 
response in the struggle between imperial dominance and nationalist 
aspirations. However, this clash had a different outcome, unlike previous 
occasions when French colonial violence was, if not accepted, then largely 
ignored by the international community.  
 On 1 June Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Anthony Eden assured 
MPs that de Gaulle’s provisional government had instructed its regional officials 
in Damascus and Beirut to follow the orders of the British Commander in Chief 
Middle East, General Bernard Paget, in restoring order in the region. William 
Thorne, representative for West Ham Plaistow asked Eden, “What has been the 
cause of all this trouble?”. Eden’s response, “It would take rather long to 
explain,” was fitting given what we know about the long history of Anglo-French 
rivalry within the Middle East.3 It is hardly surprising that tensions remained 
between the ostensible Allies. As the preceding chapters on the Levant have 
made clear, at all levels British policy was never just about the fate of Syria and 
Lebanon. It encompassed regional politics that accounted for the increasingly 
acrimonious state of affairs in Palestine and the broader rise of pan Arab 
nationalism. Moreover, the end of the war in the European theatre resulted in a 	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decisive shift in power structures, alliances, and, most importantly, in the way in 
which the post-war future was understood and discussed.  
 A study that examines the close of the mandate period in the Levant 
must acknowledge this broader context. Eugene Rogan has argued that the 
Arab states had historically exerted greater influence during periods in which 
more than one dominant power was present in the Middle East.4 One of these 
occasions was the close of the Second World War, when nationalist groups in 
Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt and Palestine were able to turn Anglo-French 
rivalry to great advantage. The French bombardment of Damascus had real 
consequences for the international standing of France and to a lesser extent 
Britain. Faced with a strong anti-imperial rhetoric from the United States, both 
nations moved quickly to elaborate an imperial policy centred upon liberal 
reforms. Although Martin Shipway has pointed out that American threats to the 
imperialists had always been “more rhetorical than actual” this did not rule out 
real concerns regarding imperial integrity.5 And, although direct American 
intervention to secure Levantine independence was unlikely, American 
rhetorical support to this end was. Crucially, French actions in Syria and 
Lebanon in 1943 and again in 1945 would invoke strong international 
condemnation of the use of force against indigenous populations. International 
revulsion also had the effect of legitimising longstanding nationalist claims. 
These responses placed Britain’s self-appointed role as regional arbiter and 
supporter of Egyptian-led Arab unity under constant pressure, both regionally 
and internationally. In order to maintain pro-British sentiment within the Arab 
world, British rhetoric was tied to nominal support of Arab unity under the Arab 
League, which became the public counterpoint to covert pressure on Arab client 
regimes to abide by British wishes. If Britain could appear to guide rather than 
obstruct the Arab world, it was hoped that her influence could shift attention 
away from the futures of both Palestine and Syria.6  
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 Britain, in a bid to enhance its own influence within the Middle East, 
would decide to undermine French policy in the Levant the better to win over 
moderate Arab opinion. This policy of necessary sacrifice would gain credibility 
as French violence escalated. Taking a more decisive and decidedly public 
stance against French violence in the Levant represented a new phase – and a 
chronic breakdown - in the Anglo-French relationship just as the European 
conflict came to a close and metropolitan France joined the ranks of the victor 
nations. The overwhelming preoccupation of political rhetoric and press 
discussion in France at the time centred upon national renewal, and not unlike 
1940, insisted upon French metropolitan and imperial sovereignty. The conflicts 
in the Levant during this period were indicative of the French desire to control 
events from a position of power. Their disorderly turn thus mirrored a growing 
frustration among French leaders over the extent to which the British could and 
would frustrate such plans, first in the Middle East and later in French Indo 
China.  
The French bombardments of Damascus ushered in a post-war phase of 
Anglo-French relations that would be dominated by issues of European 
reconstruction and the changing relationships between European states and 
their protectorates. Stuart Ward has recently argued that the term 
‘decolonisation’ became part of a broader European vocabulary employed to 
cope with the series of changes that were developing throughout the interwar, 
post-war and eventually post-imperial world.7 In this context, decolonisation was 
more of a conceptual framework than a strategic plan, “an idea crafted in 
Europe to address a European state of mind.”8 In the 1940s, an era that 
scholars now consider the beginning of the collapse of the maritime empires, 
the appearance of the word ‘decolonisation’ remained sporadic and Eurocentric. 
Indeed, in line with Ward’s analysis, the close of the war in 1945 was more 
typical of an attempt to renegotiate rather than completely destroy the bonds of 
empire.  
Between 1943-1945, the imperial powers each sought ways to reorder 
the traditional basis of empire to make it compatible with American anti-
imperialism and their own reduced economic and financial circumstances. 	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Nevertheless, what makes the withdrawal from the Levant so captivating was 
the continued significance of colonial attachments, and, particularly on the 
French side, the material impact of an abiding imperial rivalry with Britain. This 
is where the circle turns fully, as de Gaulle assumed Vichy’s conviction that the 
retention of colonial possessions guaranteed the conservation of French global 
influence, or at the very least, the ability to lay claim to great power status.9 
Following the Lebanese parliamentary crisis in 1943 and the eventual exit of 
both French and British troops from the Levant in April 1946, de Gaulle would 
employ increasingly hostile rhetoric against British policies that he believed 
sought to negate French influence throughout the two states.  
 The analysis that follows is structured to facilitate an examination of the 
underlying motivations that drove British and French policy. To that end, it will 
recreate the context within which decision-making – and its rhetorical 
representation - was shaped. These contextual discussions will precede a more 
detailed exploration of the rhetoric that followed the inter-allied breakdown in 
the French Levant in 1945. Understanding the interests and motivations of each 
player facilitates a comparative discussion of their respective policies. This 
approach, in turn, will allow us to see how rhetoric was employed as a 
reputation-building tool. It was often at odds with the underlying strategy of both 
British and French policy. Ultimately, this investigation will lead to three 
conclusions. The first is that, broadly speaking, the French political spectrum 
agreed that the restoration of French imperial power was necessary, albeit that 
doubts remained as to how to achieve this. Although the French provisional 
government with de Gaulle at its head did not intend to renege on promises of 
independence to the Levant states, it continued to insist that the transfer of 
power take place under French control and guidance even in the face of 
overwhelming nationalist pressure. The provisional government’s refusal to 
come to terms with the inexorable rise of nationalist power was evinced in a 
willingness to employ displays of violence and repression while simultaneously 
promising greater freedoms to local populations within the colonial framework of 
a reconstituted post-war French Empire. On an ethical level, perceptions of the 
validity of the French civilising mission remained intrinsic to the French imperial 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Martin Thomas, “Divisive Decolonization: The Anglo-French Withdrawal from 
Syria and Lebanon, 1944-46,” The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth 
History 28, no. 3 (2000): 71. 
	   253	  
mind set and encouraged the production of rhetoric that was alternatively liberal 
and patronising. 
British concerns, on the other hand, remained resolutely focused upon 
consolidating their own political and strategic influence within the Middle East. 
This outcome was to be achieved, if necessary, at French expense. Ironically, 
for all its underlying ruthlessness, playing the role of impartial, fair-minded 
arbiter was crucial to British rhetorical ploys devised either to keep or to win 
friends in the Arab world. This desire to advance a particular public image would 
place real limitations upon policy making, particularly in the weeks and months 
following the Damascus bombardments. Seen from a Gaullist perspective, 
British tactics appeared hypocritical, self-serving and, at root, anti-French. 
Reluctant to intervene militarily but quite ready to undermine the French 
position politically and administratively, British Ministers, as well as Britain’s 
regional officials throughout the Middle East, strove to sharpen the rhetorical 
divide between Britain’s support of independence for Syria and Lebanon and 
France’s apparent reluctance to concede it. France was thus backed into a 
corner rhetorically as well as more tangibly left isolated on the ground in Beirut 
and Damascus. In one sense, this British tactic failed. The dramatic escalation 
in the use of violence by French forces in Damascus in May 1945 would 
ultimately force the British to intervene lest they jeopardise their own credibility 
in the Middle East as a peacekeeper and, increasingly, peace-enforcer. 
Finally, nationalist forces in Syria and Lebanon successfully exerted 
pressure on the British to act as their proxy protector, an ability that exploited 
Britain’s determination to uphold its broader Middle Eastern interests, not least 
in Palestine. Syria’s nationalists became the determined occupants of the moral 
high ground. They did so by unreservedly condemning the Provisional 
Government’s failure to honour its 1941 promises of independence. And they 
demanded unmitigated sovereignty, which ruled out the conclusion of a 
preferential Franco-Syrian treaty. The Syrians and their Lebanese cousins 
consolidated this position by first seeking and then securing international 
condemnation of French violence. French actions were contrasted with 
depictions of a defenceless civilian population in the Levant states chafing 
under French colonial oppression. Levant leadership worked through the newly 
formed United Nations, continuing to exploit the language of the August 1941 
Atlantic Charter alongside American and Soviet anti-imperial rhetoric. 
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Ultimately, Syria’s nationalists successfully pressed their demands for 
statehood, making France’s denial of self-determination appear both 
anachronistic and cruel.  
 
Towards Crisis: Early Post-War Policies and Motivations, 1944-1945  
The question at hand is this: how did post-war imperial thinking affect French 
responses towards the demands of their Middle East mandates? In 1944 de 
Gaulle’s recently-established provisional government was embarking on plans 
to insert the nation into the victor’s circle. In both the official and public mind it 
was broadly assumed that the empire would remain an important part of post-
war France. Martin Thomas has discussed this sentiment and the consensus it 
produced amongst officials that, in part because they did not hold themselves 
responsible for past colonial mistakes, they were well placed to launch new 
schemes of “cultural improvement.”10 Gaston Monnerville, former 
Undersecretary of State for the Colonies and an erstwhile resister, wrote in May 
1945, “Without the empire, France today would be just another liberated 
country, but thanks to her Empire, France is a victorious country.”11 De Gaulle’s 
personal political ideology made French grandeur or greatness a central 
element of post-war policy.12 In the opening paragraph of his Mémoires de 
Geurre he remarks, “In short, to my mind, France cannot be France without 
greatness.”13  
 Indeed, French policy towards the Levant in the early post-war years 
bore striking similarities to the interwar infantilisation of colonised populations in 
French black Africa as “big children” who needed guidance from a superior 
“modern” state.14 This stance reflected essential assumptions about historic 	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rights within the region, rights that had been routinely upheld by the Mandates 
Commission throughout the interwar period. However, in May 1945, 
fundamental divisions still existed within the provisional government as to how 
the empire should be governed. British policy further impeded French ability to 
exercise a free hand in the Levant. On the British side, the reality of French 
violence clashed with their wish to consolidate regional Arab sympathies and 
avoid becoming embroiled in the inter-communal confrontation unfolding within 
Palestine. The complexity of these extraneous considerations bore directly on 
the policies of both sides. The need to rebuild at home and in the empire, 
anticipations of upcoming elections, and the greater predominance of the 
United States and the Soviet Union in global politics all played an important role 
in shaping the context within which policy was created and communicated.  
 In June 1944 de Gaulle became the head of the French provisional 
government, returning to Paris that August. This position, and the earlier, 
ignominious downfall of the Vichy regime sealed his legitimacy as the voice of 
France. However, the day-to-day concerns that overwhelmed the immediate 
post-liberation period impinged upon his ability to develop a precise programme 
of reform or to establish a clearly defined Gaullist political movement.15 
Individual supporters of the Free French movement were never universally 
Gaullist. Rather, they had been pulled towards the movement for reasons 
ranging from shared views on his ideas of French greatness to a basic desire to 
fight against Nazism.16 Post liberation France was itself in a state of political 
flux. As Bruce Marshall has pointed out, the collapse of Vichy left a vacuum on 
the political right of the party spectrum, right-wing political parties and employer 
groups being tainted by association with Pétain’s regime. Domestic politics were 
in disarray following the post-liberation purges of suspected collaborators and 
the rise of new faces to leadership positions.17 The French Communist party 
(PCF) had emerged as the most dynamic and the most popular political party, 
although closely followed by the Christian Democrats of the Mouvement 
Républicain Populaire (MRP) and, to a lesser extent, the newly-reconstructed 
Socialist Party. De Gaulle was quick to neutralise any would-be challengers 	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from the three major resistance movements: the Conseil National de la 
Résistance (CNR), Commission d’Action Militaire (COMAC) and Forces 
Françaises de l’Intérieur (FFI).18 His inclusion of Georges Bidault, president of 
the CNR and a leader of the MRP, in the reshuffled provisional government 
acted to “symbolically neutralise the CNR as an alternative source of 
allegiance.”19 On 27 August de Gaulle informed Bidault’s former organisation 
that its services were no longer needed. The following day he dissolved the FFI 
and met personally with the members of COMAC to make it clear that they were 
to return to their civilian roles now that the war was over.20 
 The liberation of France brought with it a renewed power struggle. 
Despite the broad cross-party consensus concerning both the necessity for 
colonial reform and the continuing importance of empire more generally, there 
remained sharp disagreements over how both objectives were to be advanced. 
This would become even more apparent as the First Constituent Assembly set 
about drafting a new constitution in October 1945. In these debates, conflicts 
between the political parties were focussed upon metropolitan institutions, not 
on the empire. Legitimate concerns over metropolitan reconstruction moreover, 
meant that although the ideological importance of empire remained relevant, it 
was more difficult to generate a coherent and workable plan to assure its 
continuity. The relative chaos of the early post-war years generated a unique 
political environment within France, one dominated by the necessity of dealing 
with floods of refugees and vast shortages of food and housing. Approximately 
500,000 French homes were destroyed as a direct consequence of the war 
between 1944 and 1945 alone.21 The requirements of dealing with the day-to-
day running of metropolitan France meant that the few leading figures within 
each party who were keenly interested in empire had a significant influence in 
decision-making. These men included Marius Moutet and P.-O. Lapie from the 
Socialist Party (SFIO) and P.-E. Viard from the MRP.22  
The Brazzaville conference, convened in January and February 1944 
epitomised a certain strand of official thinking about empire in a post-war 	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context. Although the conference was aimed specifically at policy in French 
Black Africa, it is instructive because it mobilised the same ideas of power and 
continued influence that were also applied to French policy in the Levant. It was 
aimed at reshaping French colonial policy through limited reforms that were 
meant to symbolise metropolitan gratitude for colonial wartime sacrifices. These 
reforms would provide a roadmap for future French economic and political 
influence in French Africa. It also served as a public attempt to garner 
international support for the French empire project. As a propaganda event it 
was quite successful.23 However, France’s premature withdrawal from the war 
in 1940 and subsequent policy of Franco-German cooperation had damaged its 
credibility as an imperial powerhouse.24 The provisional government also had to 
contend with increasing colonial unrest brought on by unprecedented levels of 
wartime requisitioning and demands on labour resources. The presence of 
“anti-colonial rhetoric from the United States, the Soviet Union and the Atlantic 
Charter was likewise having a significant effect on the educated strata of 
colonial populations.”25 The task of creating a workable colonial policy via Paris 
and the Brazzaville Conference was further complicated by the attitudes of local 
colonial officials. Many of these men, including Oliva Roget, were career 
administrators who remained tied to historic assumptions of cultural and racial 
superiority.26  
This gathering, and as Martin Shipway has described it, the resulting 
“Brazzaville myth,” brought to light two competing interpretations of imperial 
governance. Despite its success in publicising plans for a reformed and liberal 
empire, the conference set the stage for a clash between federalist aspirations 
and traditional republican ideals grounded in assimilation.27 Socialist politician 
and Consultative Assembly member Jules Moch championed the latter model. 
He argued that federal concepts conflicted with basic republican doctrines 	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enshrined in the idea of a “one and indivisible republic.”28 Henri Laurentie, head 
of the political section of the Commissariat aux Colonies and the organisational 
heart of the conference, remained supportive of a federalist empire, enshrined 
in the French Union plan. However, the commission of experts that was 
convened after the conference to debate the merits of the two plans argued that 
a federal system would fail. Similarly, a study group of experts that met in 1945 
argued that the suggested federal assembly, made up of representatives from 
both the metropole and overseas territories would be resented within mainland 
France due to a perceived loss of sovereignty.29 Despite agreeing on the 
continued value of the empire, this consensus did not translate into agreement 
on how to govern it. Indeed, the conference itself was limited to an advisory 
role. Moreover, while it could suggest changes to the Consultative Assembly 
and the Provisional Government both of these organs lacked the constituent 
power that would allow them to actually institute any structural reforms to 
current imperial organisations.30 
 Barnett Singer and John Langdon have argued that, from 1943, de 
Gaulle began to view colonial demands for increased autonomy more 
favourably. The General supported the idea of the French Union system. 
However, the reforms that de Gaulle envisaged were workable only within the 
existing colonial framework.31 On 8 December 1943 he spoke of the future of 
French Indo China, pledging to deliver “greater sensitivity to local traditions and 
greater access to state services and employment.”32 Likewise, de Gaulle’s 
January 1944 address at the Brazzaville conference celebrated “France’s 
civilizing mission, its obligation to develop its colonies economically, and its duty 
to bring progress and dignity to those who had laboured so diligently on its 
behalf.”33 As Martin Shipway has pointed out, “colonial reform was designed at 
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every stage to consolidate and rationalise the empire…” in line with the 
assimilationist thesis of cultural superiority.34  
 De Gaulle was prepared to back a more liberal framework of political 
institutions empire-wide. However, these concessions were not intended to be 
the precursor to political autonomy. They were, rather, “considered only as a 
reflection of French generosity, in response to acts of heroism on her behalf.”35 
Edward Griggs, the British Minister Resident in the Middle East from 21 
November 1944, recalled a conversation with a member of the French 
Délégation Générale. In it, the latter asserted that no French government could 
allow itself to be held responsible for sacrificing the country’s special position in 
the Levant. This privileged role was as important to the psychological well being 
of France as the reserves of oil that accompanied it.36 Even the PCF, which had 
devoted much of its resources between 1939-June 1941 to criticising British 
imperialism, believed that despite nationalist movements, the empire ultimately 
desired indeed demanded to remain a part of France.37 Importantly, such 
sentiments were not limited to the political elite. French public opinion likewise 
assumed that after the war France would resume her position of prestige and 
power, and that this would include its imperial projects.38  
 British policy in late 1944 and early 1945 was not so far removed from 
the French perspective. In November 1944 the Colonial Office was editing a 
memorandum entitled “The Future of the Colonial Peoples.” Princeton 
University Press subsequently published this document under the authorship of 
an acknowledged authority on British imperial administration, Lord Hailey. It was 
distributed to British consulates throughout the United States via the British 
Information Services in New York. It was intended to “prove helpful to 
Americans who are often inclined to glib and oversimplified solutions for the 
problems of other nations.”39 Like the Brazzaville conference, it was reform-
minded and suggested replacing the mandates system with a series of 
Regional Commissions. These commissions would suggest ways to coordinate 	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colonial security, healthcare and trade. There was a great deal of concern, 
evident within the text, regarding the desire to preserve the current system of 
free trade or the open door policy. However, of even greater interest was the 
belief that sympathetic American opinion could help preserve the British 
Empire. Mr A.H. Poynton in the Colonial Office was tasked with soliciting 
feedback on drafts of the publication. One response suggested reducing the 
number of direct quotations from British official statements as to an American 
reader they were “…just too starry eyed to be credible.” Another advised 
impressing American readers with a table showing the present populations and 
geographical boundaries of different empires to remind them that the British 
Empire was neither the sole nor the largest in existence: “The Americans like 
figures anyway.”40 In 1944 Britain’s colonial bureaucracy was thus up to defend 
the concept of empire, and it was doing so through rhetoric, directed specifically 
at an American audience. The undeniable power of American influence will 
become even more apparent in the British response to the French 
bombardments of Damascus in May 1945, and will be addressed in more detail 
below.  
 The absence of Britain’s Middle East mandates from “The Future of the 
Colonial Peoples” was an indication of how volatile the situation was in that 
region. Uprisings in the Levant could easily spread throughout the Middle 
East.41 Like France, Britain was confronting reconstruction at home while 
renegotiating its imperial commitments abroad. Unlike France, its position as an 
undisputed victor and its still preponderant military and political strength in the 
Middle East placed it in a comparatively advantageous position. Britain casually 
supported the Arab League, founded on 22 March 1945, if only as an 
opportunity to encourage the creation of power structures that would support 
continued British influence. British Ambassador in Cairo Lord Killearn42 wrote in 
regards to the Arab League, “We have a long-term interest in promoting through 
Arab co-operation the material welfare and the satisfaction of the sentimental 
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aspirations of these countries as far as our imperial interests permit.43 This 
attitude was echoed within the Foreign Office, where it was considered wise to 
encourage Arab unity on the grounds that it was unlikely to succeed in the long 
term.44 Appearing to support Egyptian regional leadership would also make it 
possible for Britain to maintain the Suez Canal Zone base and avoid discussing 
the futures of Palestine and Syria. Moreover, Britain held the key to two league 
concerns: fear that French power would be re-established in Syria and 
demands that the 1939 White Paper promises be implemented in Palestine.45  
 British policy in 1945 would remain firmly committed to retaining Arab 
support for its presence in the Middle East. However, in contrast to the 
Lebanese parliamentary crisis in November 1943, the escalation of French 
confrontational tactics in Damascus made it impossible to avoid active and 
public intervention on the side of the nationalist movements. Indeed the extent 
of French violence was itself a shocking turn of events. Britain chose to act after 
receiving reports that indiscriminate shelling and machine gun fire were being 
carried out by French forces in Damascus. Crucially, this decision was finalised 
before receiving a reply from President Truman on the American stance.46 The 
further consolidation and hardening of Syrian official and public opinion by 1944 
against any sort of compromise with the French added to the explosiveness of 
the atmosphere.  
 The following section will examine how this unstable context and the 
policy motivations on each side promoted a particular line of rhetoric. On the 
British side, the bombardments of Damascus meant abandoning any hopes for 
the successful conclusion of a Franco-Syrian treaty. Although officials would 
note their annoyance over what they saw as the manipulative and inflexible 
stance of Syrian nationalists, the violence of the event and the overwhelming 
outcry of international opinion precluded any chance of the desired 
compromise. The mobilisation of internationalist rhetoric against the oppression 
of smaller states marked the newfound moral strength of the Syrian position. 
Indeed, representatives from trustee nations were at the same time being 	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allowed to voice their repugnance for empire in the international forum of the 
San Francisco Conference. The French provisional government, on the other 
hand, desired to assert the solidarity of the French nation and its concurrent 
right to govern its overseas territories. These twin preoccupations led to an 
increasingly violent and anti-British rhetoric. In post-war France, the rise of a 
“colonial myth,” which linked imperial possessions with international power only 
heightened mistrust between the French and the British as they attempted to 
negotiate the future of the Levant.47 The end of the war was epitomised by 
national struggles to maintain, reassert or gain power. For France and Britain, 
power was most often linked to their respective imperial or mandated territories 
and was carried out under the shadow of emerging American and Soviet 
military and political domination. The discussions of empire, and particularly, 
imperial reform that were emerging in late 1944 and 1945 reflected this new 
balance of power.  
 
“The World’s Appearance Changed:” Syria 194548 
French policy at the close of the European conflict was devised amidst a 
significantly altered domestic and global political landscape. Attempting to 
recover from a devastating defeat and the taint of the collaborationist 
government that had followed, the provisional government embarked upon a 
programme of reconstruction and renewal at home and overseas. The 
discussion above made it clear that consensus existed on two points: France 
must regain its place as a great power and the preservation of the empire was 
integral to this goal. However, the failure of the provisional government to agree 
on how to meet nationalist demands and restructure the empire triggered 
inconsistent and confused rhetoric. Public messages and statements tried to 
justify policies under Republican ideals of assimilation, cultural superiority and 
paternity. At the same time they touted France’s liberal policies reflected in the 
Brazzaville conference and reiterated promises to honour the independence 
declarations of 1941. Such rhetoric tried to preserve the legitimacy of the 
French imperial project, or at the very least the right to manage its reformation.  
 Alongside legitimacy, the provisional government was intent on 
reasserting the sovereignty of France as an “imperial nation state,” a concept 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Thomas, “Divisive Decolonization”,71, 80. 
48 De Gaulle, Salvation, 872. 
	   263	  
that has been developed in detail by historian Gary Wilder. France’s imperial 
status, he argues constituted a guarantee of international power and economic 
prosperity and was a mind-set that was deeply rooted in the interwar years of 
the 1930s.49 This celebration of France greatness through empire had been 
most blatant during the 1931 Paris International Colonial Exposition, which 
emphasised the importance of une plus grande France.50 In 1945, the 
provisional government again swung into action to shore up French imperial 
influence. Mounting frustrations over what were perceived as attempts to usurp 
the French position in the Middle East contributed to an increasingly hostile 
attitude towards the British. However, de Gaulle and his provisional government 
lacked the material and financial resources to resist British military and political 
pressure following the Damascus bombardments. This impotency highlighted 
the contradiction between French claims of legitimacy and sovereignty and its 
material inability to maintain such policies under nationalist pressure. British 
rhetoric on the other hand, sought to achieve to balance (with limited success) 
between supporting French desires to conclude a favourable Franco-Levantine 
treaty and strident nationalist demands for uncompromised independence. This 
stance was reflected in Churchill’s addresses as well as discussions within the 
Cabinet. Foreign Office documents similarly emphasised the need to avoid 
publicity that would compromise the British image in the Middle East. We know 
that the spectre of unrest in Palestine was a long-standing concern in British 
policy. A crisis here could spread to other Arab countries, a fear that had been 
prevalent since the Peele Commission first proposed the partition of Palestine 
in 1937.51 The analysis that follows will examine how, for both France and 
Britain, longer-term issues of prestige, influence and regional power influenced 
the construction and communication of Middle East policy. Ultimately, rhetoric 
on both sides sought to legitimise their actions using language steeped in the 
idea of rights and responsibilities. Gaullist pronouncements focussed upon 
historic claims to the Levant. On the other hand, their British rivals drew upon 
American policy as a means to validate their position in the Middle East and 
demonstrate their selfless role as an impartial regional negotiator.  	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 In January 1945, Terence Shone, the newly appointed Counsellor at the 
British Embassy in Cairo, informed the Foreign Office that there was 
overwhelming opposition in Syria to a treaty with France.52 French intelligence 
described frequent student demonstrations and general unrest throughout 
Syria. In the same month, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden wrote to Killearn 
confirming that Britain would oppose French efforts to re-establish themselves 
in the Levant.53 This policy, however, still did not rule out the possibility of a 
compromise between France and the Levant States. Britain continued efforts 
into early 1945 aimed at persuading both Syria and Lebanon to come to a 
settlement with France.54 Such a treaty would guarantee French precedence in 
the Levant through a network of preferential economic, military and cultural 
agreements. Edward Spears, who was a vocal critic of the French position in 
the Levant, fell foul of this tactic, causing unprecedented tension between 
himself and the Foreign Office.55 His opinions were given a great deal of space 
within the Arab press, and their emotional rhetoric gave rise to concern in the 
Gaullist provisional government.56 They also contradicted directions from 
London, which were to placate French demands in the hope that the Levant 
states would agree to conclude the desired treaties. In late August 1944 René 
Massigli, de Gaulle’s commissioner for foreign affairs had asked Eden to issue 
a public declaration in support of a Franco-Levantine treaty. To Spears’ horror, 
Eden wrote to Massigli saying that the British Government “would welcome an 
agreement between France and the Levant states freely to conclude the 
treaties foreseen in the declaration of independence, as a convenient method of 
determining their future relations.”57 This statement not only caused a great deal 
of embarrassment for Spears, it angered the Syrian press, who interpreted it as 
a reversal in British policy. Eden pressured Churchill for seven months before 
the latter finally asked Spears to resign in December 1944. The Foreign Office, 
anxious to downplay his exit, explained this development to the press as his 	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eagerness to return to his Parliamentary duties, and not a sign that Britain was 
preparing to renege on promises of Levantine independence.58 Shone replaced 
Spears on 15 December.  
After the Yalta Conference, held between 4 and 11 February 1945, 
Churchill addressed the Commons, citing a number of crucial points regarding 
France and the Levant. In this 27 February address, Churchill described the 
vital role that France would play in the post-war governance of Germany and 
the formation of the United Nations institutions. France itself had been excluded 
from Yalta, leading to “disappointment and depression in Paris newspaper 
comment.” 59 Churchill’s statement attempted to dispel growing suspicions that 
Britain was preparing to assume France’s position in the Levant. He 
emphasised that, despite a friendly meeting with Syrian President Shukri al-
Quwatli, “there was no question of shaping new policy for the Middle East.”60 He 
reiterated his hope that an agreement could be reached between the three 
states, which would recognise traditional French privileges. However, the final 
paragraph of Churchill’s statement was a warning that acknowledged the new 
reality of American and Soviet power. There was a growing gap between British 
verbal support for such an agreement and British willingness and ability to 
enforce this policy. Only two weeks before the May crisis Lord Cranborne met 
with Syrian Prime Minister al-Khouri. The latter expressed his concern over the 
trusteeship system being debated at the San Francisco conference and asked 
for safeguards to Syrian independence.61  
Engaging powerful opinion outside of Britain was a way for Churchill to 
follow a middle line the aim of which was to avoid completely alienating either 
the French provisional government or the Syrian nationalists. Making such 
statements within the Commons lent his words additional gravitas, and ensured 
the attention of target audiences in France and the United States. Massigli, who 
was by now the French ambassador in London following his dismissal as 
Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, took note of this tactic. In his analysis of 	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Churchill’s speech he pointed out the proposed divergence between British and 
American/Soviet policy.62 Churchill’s pronouncement, however, made it clear 
that in early 1945 the British had not yet ruled out the possibility of compromise 
in the Levant, however slim the likelihood of achieving it. Massigli wrote to Paris 
that he had received assurances from some friends in Parliament that they 
would do everything possible to avoid the Levant question becoming an issue in 
Anglo-French Relations. To this end, the French would also attempt to avoid 
publically clashing with Spears.63 On the back of Massigli’s advice, he was 
categorised as a rogue, who should be ignored if possible: “Le mieux serait de 
ne pas attacher à l’activité de ce personnage plus d’importance qu’il n’en 
méritait.”64  
Alongside these attempts to placate the French, British officials in Syria 
were offering advice to local leaders. In the days leading up to and following the 
Damascus crisis, they encouraged heads of government in both Levant states 
to mobilise world opinion to their advantage. On 21 May General Paget met 
with the acting Syrian Prime Minister Jamil al-Mardam. Paget urged Mardam to 
avoid acts of violence against the French authorities. They should take care that 
“provocation as there was came from the other side. International opinion was 
rallying to them…”65 Encouraging the resolution of the crisis through 
international consensus would, Paget hoped, force France to give up its claims 
to a preferential treaty. This voluntary withdrawal would also allow Britain to 
emerge relatively unscathed without having had to intervene on a military level. 
Paget was well aware that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union 
supported the idea of a favoured position for France in the Levant.66  
Amidst the rising tensions in Syria and Lebanon, de Gaulle issued a 
number of official statements that sought to confirm not only the legitimacy of 
the French presence, but more importantly, the ability of the French state to 
control events in the region. On 5 February de Gaulle gave a radio broadcast 
announcing his desire to conclude an alliance with Britain after eliminating 	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“certain vestiges of an outdated rivalry in this or that part of the world.” A 
Foreign Office comment on the text of the broadcast noted dryly, “This allusion 
to outdated rivalry refers, of course, in particular to Syria and the Lebanon…”67 
De Gaulle made further statements from Paris emphasising that France carried 
the full responsibility for maintaining order in the Levant and to that end would 
defend its interests against would be challengers.68 The sharp contrast of these 
statements with France’s actual capabilities to impose its will in the Levant was 
proof of a deeper concern: the desire to drive events in the Levant as a 
sovereign and capable nation. Strong rhetoric was a substitute for actual 
material power as the provisional government attempted to shore up the 
empire. In early May, nationalist uprisings in Sétif, Eastern Algeria would result 
in an estimated 6000 Algerian deaths.69 Likewise, the still uncertain future of 
French Indo China and increasing American involvement in this region made a 
powerful front highly necessary. At every turn, de Gaulle’s speeches, press 
releases from the provisional government, and the mass media asserted 
France’s right and ability to protect its colonial holdings and resolve 
metropolitan issues.  
 French relations with Syria came to a head in May, when additional troop 
reinforcements arrived in the Levant. This move could only be perceived by 
nationalist groups as armed pressure to conclude a treaty that would be 
favourable to France. On 6 May approximately 900 Senegalese reinforcements 
arrived in Beirut despite British warnings that their presence would escalate 
tensions.70 In the days to follow, VE day celebrations saw clashes develop in 
Beirut, Damascus and Homs. In sharp contrast to the liberal rhetoric of empire 
that had followed the Brazzaville conference local celebrations appeared to 
reaffirm French rights and ownership in the Levant. Reports described French 
lorries and parachutes decorated with the tricolour and shouts of “This is your 
country de Gaulle.”71 French Delegate General to the Levant Paul Beynet (who 
had replaced Yves Chataigneau in March 1944) reported that fights had broken 
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out in Damascus between Francophiles and “fanatic Muslims.”72 This sharp 
division between pro-French (good) and nationalist (evil) illustrates how local 
officials justified violent actions against indigenous communities.  
 At the same time, hundreds of delegates and representatives were 
discussing the future of colonial empires and the role of the trusteeship 
commission at the San Francisco conference with passion but also a great deal 
of uncertainty. Commander Harold Stassen, a former governor of Minnesota 
and now American conference delegate gave a speech that moved decisively 
away from expectations that America would swiftly dismantle the colonial 
empires. He argued that delegates should see the future of the world organised 
around interdependence rather than independence and went as far as to 
compare the U.S. federal system with the colonial empires.73 At the 21 March 
debate in the French Consultative Assembly earlier that year, Commissioner for 
Foreign Affairs Georges Bidault had supported the invitation of Syrian and 
Lebanese delegates to the conference. The internationalisation of nationalist 
demands in the Levant through this forum would make it even more difficult for 
France to retain control over the independence process.  
 Between the troop arrivals and the actual bombardments, the 
atmosphere in Syria deteriorated further, the mounting tension manifested in 
mass demonstrations and sporadic violence. French analyses of the Lebanese 
and Syrian press reported that the additional troops and the VE day 
celebrations had led to a spike in anti-French publications.74 France continued 
to refuse requests to transfer the local security forces, the Troupes Spéciales, to 
Syrian control, a pre-condition on which Prime Minister al-Mardam was 
insistent. The Troupes Spéciales were led by French commanders and 
contained a high percentage of participants from minority communities. Many 
were themselves reluctant to be transferred to the local government, which had 
little money to spend on defence.75 In the summer of 1941, de Gaulle believed 	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that having al-Mardam involved in negotiations, as he had been in 1936, would 
be favourable to the conclusion of a treaty.76 Nearly ten years later, al-Mardam 
was much less willing to strike a compromise. Beynet had warned de Gaulle on 
5 April that continuing to refuse al-Mardam’s demands would spark a crisis. De 
Gaulle, however, refused to believe that Syrian nationalists would not fold under 
French pressure. He told Beynet that the questions of independence and 
French military presence in the Levant were two distinct and unrelated issues.77 
On 26 May the Foreign Office issued an official British statement. It was typical 
of the diplomatic middle ground favoured in London. It expressed “regret that 
the improved atmosphere should have been disturbed by the despatch of 
certain French reinforcements, and that these should have been the occasion 
for breaking off negotiations for a general settlement.”78  
 On 29 May at 7:00 p.m. French troops under the order of commander 
General Fernand Oliva Roget began the shelling and aerial bombardment of the 
vicinity around the Damascus Parliament building. In the aftermath, it was 
impossible to tell how many hundreds had died. North and West African colonial 
troops were under orders to bury Syrian casualties in mass graves.79 De Gaulle 
maintained that French forces issued a cease-fire on 30 May at 11:00 p.m., 
which went into effect on 31 May.80 However the official British report stated 
that firing continued through 31 May.81 Condemnation for Roget’s actions was 
immediate. In San Francisco, delegates from the Middle East lambasted French 
revolutionary tradition. The Indian representative summarised the speech made 
by his Iraqi colleague: “There were certain countries which regarded liberty, 
equality and fraternity as fit for home consumption only and not for export.”82 
The conference provided a convenient forum for delegates to reiterate their 
commitment to the broad right of self-government.  
 As the crisis escalated in Damascus, local French officials were quick to 
blame the British. They accused British censors of refusing to allow the 	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publication of French justifications for the bombardments. Syrian censorship 
was under the direction of the Chief Censor in Palestine, and was very much 
under British control.83 This response was notable because it recognised the 
role of rhetoric as a fundamental tool of foreign policy: the ability to 
communicate and justify actions publically. A secretary of the British Legation 
responded scornfully to French complaints over the publication of anti-French 
articles in the local media, saying crisply that it was difficult to forbid the press 
from publishing the opinion of the entire country.84 French claims suggested 
that the legitimacy of a particular policy could be affected by how it was 
explained. By protesting against the actions of British censors, local French 
officials alleged that rhetoric played a fundamental role in the creation of 
regional and global opinion.  
 British officials, who met with the Lebanese Prime Minister on 30 May, 
echoed this belief. General Staff member Brigadier William Oliver, accompanied 
by Mr Young of the British Legation, advised Riad el-Solh to refrain from any 
violent response in order to give world opinion a chance “to be transformed into 
action.”85 Paget also stressed to Syrian President al-Quwatli the benefits of 
managing the Syrian image through rhetoric. At a 28 June meeting, he 
suggested a number of ways to preserve world sympathy towards Syrian 
demands: “The Syrians should avoid all occasions for criticism. The Syrians 
should avoid inflammatory speeches, dangerous propaganda, demonstrations 
by badly disciplined students, bonfires of books and especially lack of control by 
the press.”86 Syrian and Lebanese policy was explicit in its goal of achieving 
independence from French control. However, the above advice demonstrates 
how the British also tried to “manage” the crisis at a local level. By encouraging 
the Syrian administration not to escalate the situation rhetorically, Paget was 
also attempting to minimise the likelihood of British military and political 
intervention. Moreover, in the event that British troops had to intervene to quell 
a backlash of local violence towards the French, their own regional image would 
very likely suffer irreparable damage.  	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 In London, Cabinet meetings on 30 May reflected a great deal of concern 
for the ramifications of French actions. However, intervening in the Levant 
required careful planning. Churchill stressed that Britain should not become 
wholly responsible for resolving the crisis. He argued that it was crucial to “carry 
the United States with us” by getting them “publicly to declare their support for 
our action.”87 Eden expressed similar concerns, which highlighted the 
importance of Middle East opinion towards the British. He argued that armed 
intervention seemed inevitable as, “If it were seen that we were powerless to 
prevent the French from persisting in their irresponsible conduct, our influence 
throughout the whole of the Middle East would be undermined.”88 The Cabinet 
was clearly formulating the British response with an acute awareness of how 
intervention or non-intervention would affect British credibility and prestige, 
especially within their remaining mandates.  
 On 31 May Churchill sent a message to de Gaulle demanding that 
French troops be confined to their barracks and a cease-fire ordered. Paget 
would take over responsibility for restoring order in Damascus. Churchill also 
made the strategic decision to publicise this order, which prompted two 
statements from de Gaulle in defence of French policy. De Gaulle’s statements 
drew upon core themes of sovereignty, solidarity and capability to defend 
Roget’s actions. What these statements showed above all was how important it 
was for de Gaulle to be able to demonstrate that France was still a legitimate 
global power. In his first statement he declared that a cease-fire had been 
ordered for 30 May, a day before the British note.89 At a press conference held 
in Paris on 2 June to clear up any misunderstanding in “world-wide 
and…national public opinion” de Gaulle stressed again the correctness of 
French actions.90 Specifically, he argued that all of France supported the policy 
and that British interference had promoted unrest in the region.91 De Gaulle also 
referred repeatedly to the Lyttleton-de Gaulle agreement in an attempt to 
establish a legal basis for his accusations.  
 His address to the press cast France as a victim both of British 
interference and of local intractability. On three occasions in the speech, de 	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Gaulle emphasised French good faith, declaring that France was “prête à 
négocier” the conditions under which Syrian and Lebanon would exercise their 
independence.92 Going further, he applauded the prospect of a grand 
settlement in Middle East affairs through international cooperation.93 Foreign 
Office intelligence described de Gaulle’s press statement as “marked by a 
number of half truths, suppressions of inconvenient facts and insinuations 
against Great Britain.”94 At the same time, de Gaulle relied upon a number of 
more traditional justifications to explain France’s privileged role in the Levant. 
He spoke of the eminence of the French position due to intellectual, spiritual 
and moral contributions.95 These responsibilities, he went on, were justified 
because they were lifting the Levant towards “civilisation.”96 Blaming Britain for 
the crisis was a way to suggest that France was one of the victims of the ordeal. 
This tactic was also symptomatic of the historic rivalry and suspicion that made 
up regional Anglo-French relations. Similarly, the Syrian and Lebanese refusal 
to make economic, strategic and cultural agreements with France was rooted in 
a deep culture of mistrust and hatred of past repressive policies. However, 
despite de Gaulle’s impassioned statement, he wrote later in his memoirs that 
the strength of his response was met largely with disapproval in both the 
diplomatic corps and the Consultative Assembly. The former stressed the need 
to maintain a positive Anglo-French relationship and the latter criticised the hard 
headedness of de Gaulle’s actions. These disagreements within the provisional 
government over his reaction ultimately undermined the authenticity of Gaullist 
arguments. The French press, furthermore, contained no displays of “national 
resolution” and only published small articles that left the reader to conclude that 
Syria was a lost cause.97  
Throughout the affair, and in contrast to the high levels of criticism 
directed towards the French after the 1943 parliamentary crisis in Lebanon, the 
British press remained unexpectedly balanced. Massigli’s analyses of these 
publications expressed surprise at the level of objectivity.98 Although the 	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clashes were extensively reported within British papers, the analysis was largely 
focussed upon the state of the Anglo-French relationship and the international 
response towards the bombardments. The Guardian described British 
intervention as “humiliating” to the French and argued that it had provoked 
concerns over a possible loss of French prestige.99 American opinion was 
depicted as unanimous in condemning French actions and Russian sources 
were quoted arguing that French policy in the Levant was inconsistent with 
decisions taken at Dumbarton Oaks and the aims of the San Francisco 
Conference.100 Responding to a review of the bombardments published in the 
Economist, Massigli noted the tendency to search out British responsibility in 
the Levant affair. In the same note, he speculated that this inclination was the 
result of a gap between popular and government views within Britain.101 How 
can this gap be explained in light of the British government’s continued regional 
engagement? As policy documents have shown, officials in the Cabinet as well 
as the Foreign Office were primarily preoccupied with how British actions would 
affect opinion within the Arab world. In regards to opinion in the metropole, 
British officials preferred to avoid drawing attention to the Levant crisis. There 
was a notable absence of official statements, and those that were issued 
remained highly neutral in tone. When Churchill asked if the British telegram to 
Truman should be given to the press for publication, Eden responded, “No need 
to inflame opinion here. It is inflamed.”102  
 British official statements attempted to remain aloof from events. Eden’s 
initial Commons declaration on 29 May was diplomatic and noncommittal, to the 
great annoyance of Spears. The Foreign Minister expressed the hope that 
those involved would behave with “caution and prudence” and he did not 
criticise the French.103 This tactic was motivated by efforts to avoid both French 
and American criticism. Foreign Office official Sir Orme Sargent wrote to Eden 
in early July to warn him that if British reinforcements were sent to Syria they 	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could cause “adverse French reaction as well as unfavourable comment in [the] 
State Department and American Press.”104 Furthermore, the close of the 
European war and the approach of the general election in Britain led to a 
decline in interest as the public moved from a wartime to a reconstruction or 
post-war mentality. Clement Attlee’s victory over wartime leader Winston 
Churchill was a sign of this shift within the public sphere, even if the Middle East 
remained of primary importance to decision makers. Indeed, the newly elected 
Labour government continued to champion this region as vital to British policy. 
Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin advocated the need to “broaden the basis of 
British influence in the Middle East through economic and social policy.”105  
 Statements like these reflected a level of continuity in official thought, 
which persisted in seeing empire as a source of power and prestige. However, 
first France in 1946 and, shortly after, Britain in 1948 would be unceremoniously 
ejected from their Middle Eastern mandate projects. The Syrian crisis in May 
1945 exposed a period of great change and heightened uncertainty at the end 
of a global conflict. In both France and Britain, official desires to preserve 
influence in overseas territories clashed, not just with nationalist sentiments but 
also with metropolitan demands for reconstruction at home. For Britain, 
preserving influence in the Middle East meant presenting a carefully 
constructed neutral front. Overt French violence put an end to this tactic and 
caused extensive damage to the Anglo-French relationship. De Gaulle’s 
provisional government, on the other hand, lacked the material resources 
necessary to take unilateral control of the Levant. More importantly, the displays 
of violence in Damascus effectively forfeited any remaining ethical and moral 
capital to the nationalists. De Gaulle found himself under the intense pressure 
of American and Soviet anti-imperialist rhetoric, international critique emanating 
from the San Francisco Conference, and British military superiority. Even the 
provisional government avoided defending Roget’s actions. There was little 
option left except to withdraw.   
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Conclusion  
The negotiations that followed, leading to the joint Anglo-French evacuation of 
the Levant in the spring of 1946 lie beyond the scope of this chapter. However, 
it is worth adding that Anglo-French tensions in the Levant were hardly over. In 
January 1946, French General Raoul Monclar was appointed as the new 
commander of the French forces in the Levant, a development that was 
deplored by the Syrian population. British officials also expressed dislike of 
Monclar, not least because of his “high handed and tactless actions” and 
reputation as a “hot headed member of [the] French “colonial” clique.” Among 
other things, Monclar had filled his back garden in Beirut with explosive booby 
traps, which were triggered late one evening, shattering several windows in the 
British Consulate General next door. 106 On 10 January 1946, J Thyme 
Henderson, a Foreign Office specialist on the Far East, commented on French 
attitudes towards the Levant “The French seem to be behaving stupidly, 
however, we needn’t save the French from themselves.”107  
 The process of negotiating withdrawal was a tortured one, and the last 
British and French forces did not leave the Levant until August 1946. However, 
in early 1946, the British were so desperate to extricate themselves from the 
imbroglio that they were contemplating a unilateral exit.108 One of the initial 
reasons for this course of action was the hope that it might shore up local 
opinion towards the British. There were signs throughout the Levant that 
popular sentiment was becoming increasingly hostile to the Anglo-French 
presence. Shone provided a constant stream of reports, making suggestions for 
British lines of publicity and providing analyses of Syrian and Lebanese public 
opinion.109 After receiving these reports, a Cabinet distribution commented upon 
the dangers of unilateral withdrawal. This report argued that if the British were 
to leave without forcing a simultaneous exit, “Their [Levant states] oriental 
minds will not see the logic of our decision; and if we are to minimise odium and 
lose as little influence as possible, notification of our decision would best be 
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made when it could be accompanied by maximum world publicity for our 
reasons for it.”  
 In the last two years of the war, British Middle East policy was most 
strongly influenced from two quarters: the United States and the Middle East 
itself. Britain was committed to retaining its influence in this oil-rich region and 
needed both American support and the willingness of regional leaders to 
accomplish this goal. In this context, rhetoric allowed Britain to fashion itself as 
a proponent of liberal-minded imperial reform, a nominal supporter of Syrian 
and Lebanese independence and a proponent of mutually agreed Franco-
Levantine treaties. However, it soon became clear that French demands were 
irreconcilable with the kind of unfettered independence Syrian and Lebanese 
nationalist movements had in mind. The violence of the French bombardment in 
Damascus forced Britain to act, both to put an end to the destruction and loss of 
life and shore up its own prestige. At the same time, by encouraging Syrian and 
Lebanese leaders to de-escalate the situation by getting international opinion 
onto their side, Paget was signalling his desire to distance Britain as much as 
possible from the crisis.  
 The French provisional government, and more importantly, the series of 
highhanded colonial administrators who officiated over the close of the 
mandates, displayed a fundamental unwillingness to relinquish influence over 
the Levant. De Gaulle himself was determined to see France regain her position 
as a global power. In this case, having power meant not simply having an 
empire but controlling how and the extent to which it was reformed. Negotiating 
treaties that would perpetuate French influence in the Levant was the first test 
of French power. It failed on a spectacular level. Facing the heavy task of 
reconstructing metropolitan France both structurally and socially, there was little 
actionable support for imperial projects at home. Nor did the assumption that 
France would retain her empire translate into a coherent plan for colonial 
reform.  
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 	  
Sitting down to summarise over three years of reading, archival research and 
historical analysis is not, as it turns out, an easy task. Staring at the screen of 
my pitifully overworked laptop, dozens of scholarly arguments and possible 
lines of discussion competed to be heard. A few days into what felt like a 
historical black hole, a non academic friend asked me a deceptively simple 
question: “and the conclusion is…?” His query made me think about my 
research in a different light. Instead of trying to cobble together all of the 
observations that have been made throughout this study about power, 
sovereignty or ethics, I made myself think about the one factor that united all of 
those themes. How could I describe my work in just a few words? In the end, I 
settled upon two words: rhetoric matters. Yes, at the heart of all of the crisis 
points or case studies that have been picked apart over the last few hundred 
pages, there is one central idea. That idea is that rhetoric is an essential, 
indeed an organic component within government policy making establishments. 
Rhetoric is the thread that links the policy that was being made behind the 
closed doors of the War Cabinet with how it was later being perceived, 
discussed, or criticised within different sectors of the public, both in the 
metropole and further afield.  
 Rhetoric, from this perspective, becomes a tool not of simple policy 
explanation, but of political persuasion. The arguments that are being 
constructed and published via the highest levels of government policy making 
establishments are written with the intention of convincing their readership to 
think about and discuss an issue in a particular way. What remains concerning 
is that the means for doing this may be to appeal to human reason, but may just 
as easily rely on the use of highly emotional and even factually inaccurate 
arguments. By acknowledging that the statesmen who have appeared 
throughout this study were strategically using rhetoric in order to influence how 
an operation or an initiative was judged by a particular group or groups leads to 
a second assertion. Namely, public opinion, or what decision makers and 
leaders believe to be public opinion can have a tangible impact on a final policy. 
Likewise, the mass media can echo or challenge the arguments made through 
official government statements. As we have seen, throughout the Second World 
War, the governments in both France and Britain alongside Charles de Gaulle’s 
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Free French movement looked to the press as a reliable measurement of public 
opinion.  
 So, rhetoric as a persuasive and interpretive tool provides a link between 
the government and wider popular opinion. The next question is: what insights 
can rhetoric provide into the policy making process and more specially into the 
policies that were being made between 1940-1945? In other words what can we 
learn from the content of official statements and mass media responses? The 
remainder of this discussion will expand upon three closely connected themes 
that have emerged throughout this thesis. First, on a broader level policy 
making has a strong moral and ethical dimension. This is particularly evident in 
decisions that lead to or may lead to displays of violence. Second, policy is not 
always purely strategic. It is also highly symbolic. In the context of the Second 
World War, British policy placed a great deal of emphasis on pursuing 
operations that would heighten their own prestige. On the other hand, Vichy’s 
responses to British incursions into French colonial territory were intent on 
maintaining the illusion that unoccupied France constituted a legitimate 
sovereign territory. The empire and the fleet were two symbols of this claim. 
Last, there is sometimes a gap between rhetoric and policy or, more 
specifically, the underlying intentions of policy. This theme was particularly 
evident at the close of the war, when the French Provisional Government and 
Britain clashed over the post-war political organisation of the Middle East.  
  
The Moral Dimension of Decision Making 
Just war theorist Michael Walzer summarised the problem of morality and 
conflict succinctly: “Realism is the issue. The defenders of silent leges claim to 
have discovered an awful truth: what we conventionally call inhumanity is 
simply humanity under pressure.”1 However, what this thesis has shown is that 
governmental policy making, whether during war or peace balances somewhere 
between moral imperatives and self interest. The difficulty lies in making sense 
of the complex relationship between statesmen on one hand and the often 
shifting range of factors that contribute to the policy making process on the 
other. Put another way, what considerations are shaping how statesmen 
respond to different national and international events and how might their 	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worldviews change over time? This study has demonstrated that policy making 
is above all a highly complex process. It absolutely incorporates a certain 
amount of self interest. However, it is also limited by contemporary cultural 
norms, accepted ethical and moral behaviour, and estimations of public opinion. 
Cathal Nolan has described international ethics as “dirty, grey, uncertain 
choices.”2 He is right in arguing that politics and policy making cannot truly be 
understood without also grasping the historical context in which individual 
choices were being made. Likewise, this analysis, which has focused upon 
points of high tension in the Anglo-French relationship, examines how ethical 
considerations played a part in or were at least recognised in the rhetoric of 
wartime policy.  
 Beginning with the British, the decision to continue fighting against the 
Axis powers after the French defeat in June 1940 was almost always portrayed 
as a moral decision. Churchill’s addresses similarly promised that victory was 
guaranteed because Britain was on the “right” side of the battle. One of his 
best-remembered speeches, given in the House of Commons on 4 June 1940 
did this by contrasting Britain’s glorious and fundamentally honourable past to 
Hitler’s “sinister” and “perverted” ideology.3 Still, regardless of the seemingly 
prophetic qualities of Churchill’s speeches, victory over the Axis was never 
guaranteed as a matter of moral principle. It was in large part the British victory 
in 1945 that gave Churchill’s earlier addresses such staying power. Yes, it is 
undoubtedly fair to say that Hitler and his Nazi party did breach essential and 
fundamental laws of humanity and human rights in ways that were not 
comparable to Allied policies. However, this does not mean that no great 
insights can be achieved from studying how moral questions were dealt with on 
all sides of the conflict.4 As we have seen, British operational policies carried 
out against the imperial possessions of metropolitan France were, particularly in 	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1940, influenced by accepted moral codes. This was strongly evident in the 
British operations against the French fleet at Mers el-Kébir, operation Catapult. 
In this operation, policy makers were constrained by the prospect of civilian 
causalities. They ruled out any violent operations at Algiers and the commercial 
port of Oran because bombarding these ports would lead to extensive civilian 
deaths. At Alexandria, where the British did carry out operations to neutralise 
French ships under the command of Admiral Godfroy, both civilian causalities 
and fear of damaging the port installations themselves influenced the Chief of 
Staff’s decision to offer Godfroy a more lenient ultimatum. However, when 
Britain and its allies did use force against metropolitan France and its empire, 
one of the most frequently used themes to justify this decision was the concept 
of inevitability. This kind of discourse, what Walzer would describe as 
“references to necessity and duress,” demonstrates how on a basic level 
decision makers remained cognizant of how moral norms placed limitations on 
the acceptability of violence, even during war.5 British rhetoric developed a two-
part argument based on claims that operations such as those at Mers el-Kébir 
were necessary. First, destroying the fleet was indispensible in order to 
maintain the British war effort and protect the metropole. Second, German 
perfidy (they will eventually use the fleet against Britain) and French impotence 
(they will be unable to resist German pressure) made British actions inevitable.  
 Despite the undeniable violence of the final bombardments at Mers el-
Kébir, British actions received widespread support from within the metropole 
and from abroad. The justifications that were written largely within the Admiralty 
successfully argued that although tragic, the bombardments were the inevitable 
result of the Franco-German armistice and a necessary step towards ultimate 
victory. The entire process of Catapult, from the initial discussions within the 
War Cabinet to the near unanimous (apart from metropolitan France obviously) 
reception amongst much of the public revolves around one key idea. Namely, 
moral codes, while not disappearing, do alter between war and peace. This is a 
point that has been written about in more depth in the field of International 
Relations (IR) and its subfield Foreign Policy. Stephen Garrett, for example, has 
challenged the classical argument that the inherent brutality of war allows 
leaders to more easily perpetrate and justify what would otherwise be 
considered heinous acts. Under the IR concept of “dirty hands” moreover, 	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officials are seemingly justified in taking actions for the benefit of the broader 
society that would be considered irreprehensible were they being carried out by 
a private individual in a peacetime context.6 While Garrett mobilised theories of 
wartime morality to judge historical decisions, my own research, by contrast, 
has shown how conceptions of morality impacted the way in which wartime 
policy was formulated and discussed. It has established a better understanding 
of what factors, including moral ones, entered the policy making process. In 
doing so it has shown how potentially divisive or morally ambiguous policies 
were explained using language that described a unique system of wartime 
ethics. It has shown that policy makers certainly were more willing to embark on 
operations that would have been widely criticised outside of a wartime context 
without immediately abandoning the understanding that civilians were inherently 
innocent and thus not viable targets. Equally importantly, this view was made 
possible in part by the knowledge that the British and American publics would 
support operations that appeared to contribute towards Allied victory. This 
became highly apparent, particularly in public responses to what were seen as 
military failures.  
 The operational failures of joint Anglo-Gaullist forces, first at Dakar in 
September 1940 and again in the Levant in 1941 were the subject of a great 
deal of criticism within Britain. After withdrawing without capturing the strategic 
port of Dakar, Senegal, de Gaulle tried to save face by claiming that his 
decision was taken to avoid bloodshed and a battle between Frenchmen. 
However, both the British public and the mass media more broadly 
unreservedly criticised the withdrawal. It was, these groups claimed, contrary to 
the pursuit of victory. De Gaulle was arguing that withdrawal was justified 
because it was ethical. However, what the Dakar chapter made clear was that 
his decision was being debated outside of peacetime morality. The conflict 
called for, even demanded decisive and unflinching action. Casualties were 
expected and accepted and there was sometimes little inclination amongst the 
British public to consider the Vichy government and its armed defenders as 
anything but an enemy nation. Indeed, Home Intelligence Reports have 
preserved calls from the British public at the same time as the Torch operations 	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that were demanding bombing raids on German and Italian cities as reprisals 
for the destruction of British cities.  
 During the Anglo-Gaullist invasion and capture of the two Levant states 
in June-July 1941, discontent over the perceived softness of Allied forces again 
led to public criticism. Churchill himself addressed public discontent over the 
slow progress towards capturing Syria and Lebanon. The rumours identified 
through Home Intelligence Reports urged the swift completion of operation 
Exporter. They suggested that the on going struggle was a result of Imperial 
and Free French forces showing underserved sympathy towards Vichy 
defenders. The immense value placed on tangible victory in these examples 
can be examined through S.I. Benn’s concept of “conscientious wickedness.” 
He describes this idea as the pursuit of a single minded objective, which is 
generally agreed to be good or ethical. However, this objective is pursued 
without regard for evil or immoral acts perpetrated along the way.7 Scholars like 
Stephen Garrett have used this concept to analyse the actions of Allied leaders 
in the Second World War, most particularly in the case of the area bombing of 
Germany in the last half of the war. Taking a more expansive approach towards 
policy making, it becomes clear that policy makers were not alone in 
distinguishing between war and peace time morality. There was a great deal of 
support amongst the British public for policies that appeared to align with the 
ultimate goal of victory. There was a significantly lower degree of sympathy for 
what were considered enemy casualties, even in some cases civilian causalities 
in an enemy nation. This is an interesting point, which could be expanded upon 
further by future research. Namely, casting retrospective blame on statesmen 
for pursuing morally questionable policies during a time of war obscures the 
links between these leaders and the broader interested public. If there is a shift 
in what is understood as morally defensible behaviour, surely this is true across 
a broad spectrum of the population, not just amongst the political elite.   
 Connotations of acceptable moral behaviour change during a conflict. 
But, these rules extend in theory only to those nations who are active 
participants within the conflict. After concluding the Franco-German and Franco-
Italian armistices, unoccupied Southern France under Pétain’s Vichy 
government became, in name, a neutral state. However, the neutrality of Vichy 
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was hotly contested throughout the conflict.8 On one side, Britain claimed 
imperial incursions against Vichy colonial territory were justified because of a 
combination of German infiltration and Vichy’s policies of collaboration. On the 
other hand, Vichy argued that these operations were at heart illegal and 
immoral acts of territorial aggression against a sovereign and neutral territory. 
Vichy’s arguments were particularly evident throughout the rhetoric of public 
speeches, statements and the content of press reports. After each crisis point, 
we saw how Vichy attacked the brutality of British aggression against sovereign 
territory. Not only were British actions unwarranted, Vichy argued, they 
subverted the traditional democratic process of negotiation by perpetrating a 
policy of deadly force against an innocent and unprepared former ally. To 
establish credibility for such criticisms, however, Pétain’s government had to 
convince other nations that unoccupied France was indeed a non belligerent. 
This was, as we saw in the Mers el-Kébir chapters, difficult from the beginning. 
In late June 1940 both Pétain and Darlan argued that the fleet was safe, and 
that their honour bound them not to act contrary to the armistice terms. 
However, a week later the majority of neutral countries, including the United 
States, announced that they believed that British actions were justified in light of 
the credible threat of a German takeover of the French fleet. Moreover, as the 
war continued, French concessions towards Germany further eroded its 
proposed neutrality. This was most apparent in the Anglo-Free French 
operations to capture Syria and Lebanon. Minister for Foreign Affairs Admiral 
Darlan acquiesced to German demands for the use of Syrian Aerodromes in 
Spring 1941 to support the anti-British uprising in Iraq. After the Torch invasions 
in December 1942, Vichy would again grant German access to rebuff incursions 
in Tunisia. The total occupation of France in late 1942 certainly put an end to 
any claims of metropolitan French sovereignty. However, what remains 
important is that prior to this Vichy used rhetoric as a way to establish the 
credibility of the French nation. More importantly, Vichy was largely 
unsuccessful in securing outside criticism for British actions. Even the United 
States, which recognised Pétain’s government largely failed to echo French 
criticisms against British policy towards France and its empire.  
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Guarding Prestige: The Symbolic Value of Wartime Policy 
Wartime policy also incorporated a second, intangible factor: national prestige. 
In mid 1940 Britain, having recently lost its French ally had few offensive military 
options available to it. Certainly, launching a full scale attack against Germany 
was out of the question. Taking firm action against the French fleet, however, 
was highly achievable. Moreover, as was made clear in War Cabinet meetings, 
both the British population and American officials, including President Roosevelt 
himself, had expressed the desire for decisive action to neutralise the fleet. 
Official statements and press responses portrayed the events at Mers el-Kébir 
as proof of British resolve. The eventual victory that would follow from making 
difficult but unwavering decisions such as this one was also portrayed using 
highly emotive and historic rhetoric. These descriptions included images of 
Churchill delivering his rousing Commons address and reassuring highlights in 
the press of past British victories. Other decisions, such as the refusal to offer 
demilitarisation to Admiral Gensoul for fear of appearing weak also betrayed the 
symbolic value of the Catapult operations. In all of the case studies that this 
thesis has examined, the importance of prestige was evident in British, Free 
French and Vichy actions and, crucially, rhetoric. In the case of Mers el-Kébir 
British policy towards the French fleet was not just a response to a strategic 
threat. It symbolised British commitment to the war effort. This had the effect of 
assuring American official opinion and boosting British morale within the 
metropole.  
 Likewise, after failures such as those at Dakar only three months later, 
we saw how British policy makers learned from and emphasised that 
operational failure would damage their prestige. While planning the invasions of 
the Levant states, avoiding political embarrassment like that at Dakar was one 
of the considerations that entered into the decision making process. Similarly, in 
the first major American-led offensive action in North Africa in 1942, it was clear 
that Roosevelt hoped to avoid symbolic resistance from Vichy forces by 
stressing the American character of the operations. Despite the large numbers 
of British forces participating in the Torch landings, this fact was absent from the 
initial public statements. Rhetoric then, was used in a symbolic way to illustrate 
British strength and commitment to the war effort. Silence, or the deliberate 
choice to suppress certain information from the public, such as the British role in 
the North Africa invasions, was likewise a strategic use of rhetoric. In the British 
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metropole, the official decision in the autumn of 1940 not to publish statistics of 
air raid deaths was a way to avoid compromising happier imagery of victory 
though hard work and commitment to the war effort. 
 This same tactic, emphasising the French character of joint Anglo-Free 
French operations in Dakar and the Levant was used by the British in the hopes 
of lessening resistance from Vichy forces. However, the majority of troops and 
the strategic plans for these operations were in fact British. Official 
communiqués greatly emphasising the inherent “Frenchness” of each operation 
showed how important the concept of image was. De Gaulle’s Free French 
movement was portrayed as the true representative of the French nation. British 
rhetoric did this not only through direct support of Gaullist resistance, but also 
by deliberately separating the French population from the “men of Vichy.” 
Despite its initial unpopularity, the Free French movement was nevertheless 
symbolically important because it allowed Britain to argue that operations 
against French colonial territory were being carried out by French forces for the 
benefit of the French nation. Moreover, imperial holdings were vital for both 
Vichy and Free France. Both sides held up empire as a symbol of their 
respective representative legitimacy. 
 In each crisis point, British and Free French forces challenged Vichy’s 
right to freely govern the empire and fleet. In responding to these challenges, 
the metropolitan French government chose to emphasise Britain’s role. By 
casting blame exclusively on British territorial aggression and imperial rivalry, 
Vichy effectively suppressed any mention of the Free French movement and its 
position as a rival French voice. In other words, official responses interpreted 
imperial incursions as just that – simple cases of imperial land grabbing. De 
Gaulle, when mentioned, was portrayed as a unique traitor and British agent 
while the Free French movement was noticeably absent from either official or 
press publications. We saw how the empire was just as important to de Gaulle 
and what became the provisional French government in 1944. Having an 
empire was an important sign of legitimacy but also power and prestige on a 
global level. In both cases, de Gaulle and the Vichy government believed that 
being able to demonstrate control over colonial territories would help them 
attain global status. By May 1945 the French empire became of even greater 
importance, as both France and Britain sought to find a way to maintain ties 
with strategically important territories. At the same time, the reality of 
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reconstruction at home, increasing demands from nationalist movements and a 
heavy reliance on loans from the anti-imperialist United States made 
demonstrations of imperial reform essential.     
  
Minding the Rhetorical Gap 
This thesis has focussed upon showing how closed-door policy making can be 
connected to the public sphere via rhetoric. Particularly towards the end of the 
war, we began to see that sometimes the way in which a policy was presented 
or discussed publically did not always match its underlying strategic goals. This 
was especially apparent in the case of the Levant states. Here, and in the 
broader Middle East, both France and Britain hoped to preserve varying levels 
of strategic, economic and cultural influence by concluding preferential treaties 
with their colonies and mandated territories. Their abilities to do this depended 
upon being able to exert more power and influence than the local nationalist 
groups that were beginning to demand unqualified independence. Examining 
Anglo-French policies towards the Levant and Middle East between 1941-1945 
revealed the limitations that both states faced in achieving this goal. 
 In the first instance, joint Anglo-Free French promises in 1941 assured 
the Levant states that they would be granted independence. The spectre of 
independence, however, caused a great deal of strain in both Anglo-French and 
Franco-Levantine relations. Each side tended to interpret the idea of 
independence through a largely self-interested framework. Here, the British and 
Middle East Command based in Cairo did their best to rise above the fray and 
present themselves as a neutral middleman. However, this position led to a 
significant difficulty. Knowing that the prospect for unrest was extremely high in 
British Palestine, it was vital that Britain be able to retain a credible neutrality 
throughout Franco-Levantine negotiations. The only way that this was possible 
was if France, Syria and Lebanon were able to come to a mutual agreement on 
France’s future position in those territories without significant British 
intervention. This was not to be. What these three chapters on the Levant 
showed, however, was that the success of British policy was inextricably linked 
to Britain’s public image in the Middle East. The benign image presented 
through numerous public statements that reiterated the independence 
guarantees was not consistent with long term strategy. British policies – when it 
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came to their own territories – bore a striking resemblance to the Franco-
Levantine treaty demands.  
 The violent repression of nationalist sentiment first in Lebanon in 1943 
and later in Damascus in 1945 ultimately discredited French demands and 
forced Britain to exercise its superior military and political power. The crisis in 
the Levant was heightened by the fact that the Free French and later the 
provisional government never had the material resources to challenge British 
policy in the Middle East. Indeed, following the French capitulation and de 
Gaulle’s arrival in London, it soon became clear that the lack of recruits to the 
Free French movement meant it had more moral than actual power. Thus, Free 
French policies and ostensible Anglo-Free French operations could always be 
traced back to British support. Gaullist policy in this sense was a reflection of 
British policy resulting from its almost complete financial and material reliance 
upon its hosts. De Gaulle’s response to British actions at Mers el –Kébir was 
typical of this relationship. De Gaulle offered his public support of the 
bombardments notwithstanding his private fury. Between 1940-1944, de Gaulle 
had little choice but to publically align British and Free French policy. Opting to 
challenge Britain, as he did in September 1941, risked exposing the 
overwhelming British power that was the underlying framework of the Free 
French movement.  
 Becoming the head of the provisional government in 1944 may have 
given de Gaulle official recognition and legitimacy as the head of the liberated 
French state. However, the economic and financial reality in France was dire. 
De Gaulle’s attempts to revitalise French prestige through a reformed empire 
were faced by challenges from at home and abroad. These challenges reflected 
the disparity between French rhetoric and the actual reality of French material 
resources. In the Levant, French claims based on historic cultural influence met 
a determined nationalist movement. Two realities severely limited de Gaulle’s 
and a series of determined colonial administrator’s efforts to successfully press 
their demands. First, the continuing superiority of British military strength in the 
Middle East and the Levant more specifically meant that that de Gaulle’s 
provisional government could hardly create unilateral policies without the 
possibility of British interference. Second, American and Soviet anti imperial 
policies (whether rhetorical or actual) as well as fear of tarnishing its own image 
in the Arab world gave Britain strong reasons to respond to French violence. 
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While American and Soviet anti imperialism helped to internationalise 
discussions surrounding the future of empires, forums such as the San 
Francisco conference and later the United Nations would serve as platforms 
upon which previously unrepresented states could publicise their grievances.  
   
Conclusion and Future Research  
Ultimately, why is this rhetorical link, between policy makers and the public 
sphere so important? In short, public statements and explanations for both 
foreign and domestic policy can give us better insights into how decision 
makers view and attempt to influence what they believe is public opinion. Of 
crucial importance, the three themes discussed above do not function 
independently of one another. Rather, together they illustrate how intangible 
considerations such as morality and prestige were fundamental considerations 
throughout Anglo-French wartime policy. Linked to this, we saw how rhetoric 
can be used to camouflage other, strategic interests or a lack of material power. 
The grammatical construction and word choice of press releases and speeches 
are vital clues as to the values, ideas and opinions that make up official 
arguments and try to shape a particular public response. The repeated use of 
emotive historic imagery can give researchers clues into how historical events 
are preserved in cultural memory.  
 Politics and policy making is not a strict exercise in top down 
government. Rhetoric allows us to see how different policies, whether in war or 
peace are formulated, disseminated, discussed, debated, judged and 
remembered. As such, rhetoric is a powerful tool of persuasion and historical 
analysis. Crucially, it can be used to further interdisciplinary studies linking past 
and present perspectives, for example, by analysing the use of historic rhetoric 
in contemporary political addresses and media sources. Most recently, we saw 
this in the British European Union referendum, as politicians mobilised 
emotional arguments from the Second World War to convince the British public 
how to vote. Not only, then, can the methodology used in this thesis be applied 
to additional historical case studies, it can also be used to encourage a more 
critical look at the content of today’s political and media publications. In the final 
analysis, rhetoric opens up greater understanding into how we try to or are 
persuaded to make sense of the world around us. It opens the way into broader 
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debates such as what constitutes moral behaviour in war and peace and how 
these discussions are carried out between policy makers and their publics. 
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